Opinion
07-23-00330-CV
11-09-2023
IN RE NEW ENGLAND ANNUITY ASSOCIATES, LLC, RELATOR
ORIGINAL PROCEEDING
Before QUINN, C.J., and PARKER and YARBROUGH, JJ.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Brian Quinn Chief Justice
New England Annuity Associates, LLC, petitioned for a writ of mandamus. Through it, Annuity requested we order the Honorable Lowell "Kregg" Hukill, 242nd Judicial District (trial court), to vacate an order signed on October 2, 2023. In that order, the trial court 1) granted the traditional motion for summary judgment of Genex Capital Corporation, 2) adjudicated and denied Annuity's claim for declaratory relief concerning an interest in interpled funds, and 3) ordered those funds to be released to Genex and a particular law firm. Ordering the release of those funds before entry of a final order disposing of other pending claims constituted an abuse of discretion, said Annuity. We conditionally grant the writ of mandamus.
The underlying facts need not be discussed at length. They involve multiple parties and multiple claims. One concerned $75,000 interpled into the trial court's registry. Both Genex and Annuity claimed ownership of or interests in the sum. And though the trial court awarded it to Genex through summary judgment, no one disputes that the summary judgment was interlocutory. In other words, claims remained pending for final adjudication. That meant Annuity lacked legal means by which to cause an immediate review of the ruling's accuracy before the $75,000 was released to Genex. See In re McIntire, No. 07-22-00249-CV, 2023 Tex.App. LEXIS 60, at *2 (Tex. App.-Amarillo Jan. 5, 2023, orig. proceeding) (mem. op.) (noting that writs of mandamus generally are unavailable as a means to review an interlocutory summary judgment); Green v. Tex. Dept of Crim. Just., No. 07-20-00291-CV, 2020 Tex.App. LEXIS 9182, at *1-2 (Tex. App.-Amarillo Nov. 23, 2020, no pet.) (mem. op.) (per curiam) (noting that appellate courts generally lack jurisdiction to review interlocutory summary judgments via appeal).
So, what we have here is a trial court's awarding what could be characterized as final relief (i.e., disposing of the $75,000 and claims thereto) in an interlocutory setting. And, that setting just happens to pretermit appellate review of the decision. Annuity believes that disposing or releasing the funds in that setting constituted an abuse of discretion for which it lacked an adequate legal remedy. To support its position, it cites In re Burlington Coat Factory Warehouse of McAllen, Inc., 167 S.W.3d 827 (Tex. 2005) (orig. proceeding), and other authority.
In Burlington, the Supreme Court held that an interlocutory judgment may not be enforced through execution. Id. at 831. That is, a party generally has a right to suspend the enforcement of a judgment pending appeal. In re Renz, No. 03-15-00207-CV, 2015 Tex.App. LEXIS 9545, at *5 (Tex. App.-Austin Sept. 10, 2015, orig. proceeding) (mem. op.); In re El Caballero Ranch, Inc., No. 04-04-14-00584-CV, 2014 Tex.App. LEXIS 12764, at *6 (Tex. App.-San Antonio Nov. 26, 2014, orig. proceeding) (mem. op.). One loses that right when a trial court permits the enforcement of an interlocutory order disposing of some claims before entry of an appealable final judgment. In re Renz, 2015 Tex.App. LEXIS 9545, at *5. Moreover, a trial court doing so constitutes an instance of abused discretion. Id. at *6. So too does the circumstance evince the lack of an adequate legal remedy for purposes of satisfying the prerequisites for obtaining a writ of mandamus. Id.; accord In re Burlington Coat Factory Warehouse, 167 S.W.3d at 831 (concluding that there is no adequate remedy by appeal for allowing execution to issue before final judgment has been entered). The circumstances at bar fall within those parameters.
The trial court executed an interlocutory order disposing of Annuity's declaratory action. Through that order, it also released to the funds in dispute to Genex. Ordering the funds to be released because Annuity's claim to them was denied is tantamount to enforcing the decree before a final judgment issued. That interferes with Annuity's ability to suspend enforcement of the judgment pending appeal. So, the trial court abused its discretion in mandating the distribution of the funds under the circumstances at bar, and Annuity lacked an adequate legal remedy to address the error by appeal. That means Annuity satisfied the prerequisites to obtaining a writ of mandamus.
Yet, Genex says otherwise because Annuity purportedly is not a judgment debtor. See TEX. R. APP; P. 24.1(a) (providing the way a "judgment debtor" may supersede a judgment). Annuity purportedly is not a judgment debtor because some monetary liability was not imposed upon it. To support its position, Genex cites us to our opinion in Natural Gas Clearinghouse v. Midgard Energy Co., 113 S.W.3d 400 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 2003, pet. denied). There, we did say in footnote 12 that "a judgment debtor is one obligated to pay a money judgment." Id. at 413 n.12. However, Genex apparently failed to note the context of that statement. The question in Midgard dealt with prejudgment interest under the Texas Finance Code. Moreover, the definition we uttered came from that Code, not from Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 24.1. The latter does not restrict the meaning of judgment debtor to that stated in § 301.002(a)(6) of the Finance Code. And, that this is true can be seen from the rule itself.
Under it, final decrees encompassing the recovery of interests in either realty or personalty are subject to suspension pending appeal. See TEX. R. APP. P. 24.2(a)(2) (explaining how the trial court determines the type of security to post when superseding a "judgment . . . for the recovery of an interest in real and personal property"). Indeed, in Devine v. Devine, No. 07-07-15-00126-CV, 2015 Tex.App. LEXIS 5173 (Tex. App.- Amarillo May 20, 2015, pet. denied) (mem. op.), we observed that judgments for the recovery of realty are subject to superseding. Id. at *6-7. Certainly, judgments adjudicating interests in realty are more than decrees ordering someone to pay a money judgment. Given this, the term judgment debtor would be better understood as connoting the party against whom a judgment was rendered or the party who lost in a dispute involving interests in property. Annuity would come within it, assuming the trial court eventually finalizes its interlocutory summary judgment. And, that Rule 24.1 et seq. permits superseding judgments adjudicating the recovery of an interest in personal property and that money is personal property means Annuity could supersede it.
We conditionally grant the writ of mandamus and will direct the trial court to vacate its order to remit "funds held in the Registry of this Court in the amount of $75,000.00, plus all interest accruing on such amount, . . . to 'Genex Capital Corporation and DeMarcus Law, PLLC.'" Because we are confident that the trial court will promptly comply, the writ so ordering will issue only if the trial court fails to comply sua sponte by December 8, 2023.