Opinion
No. 33226
Decided May 6, 1953.
Attorneys at law — Disbarment — Grounds for — Conviction of crime involving moral turpitude — Accepting bribe to influence prosecuting attorney in official duty.
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Clark county.
After a hearing upon charges and specifications, the Common Pleas Court found appellee guilty of "(1) misconduct in office involving moral turpitude; (2) unprofessional conduct involving moral turpitude; (3) conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude;" and "ordered and adjudged that * * * [appellee] be and is hereby removed from the said office as an attorney at law, and is disbarred from the practice of the law as such attorney at law in * * * all the courts in the state of Ohio."
Appellee thereupon appealed from that judgment to the Court of Appeals, which on July 16, 1952, made the following entry which, so far as pertinent, reads: "* * * the court finds that the judgment of said Common Pleas Court * * * disbarring respondent-appellant [appellee herein] thenceforth from the practice of law, is not supported by clear and convincing evidence, is contrary to law, and said judgment is modified to provide that respondent-appellant [appellee herein] be suspended from the practice of law from December 1, 1947, to December 1, 1952, and that as so modified said judgment be affirmed * * *." The Court of Appeals wrote no opinion and stated no further reasons for its judgment.
The cause is now before this court pursuant to allowance of a motion to certify.
Mr. Wm. Malcolm Elder, Mr. Kenneth L. Rush and Mr. George S. Raup, for appellants. Mr. Orel J. Myers and Mr. W.B. Turner, for appellee.
This court in State v. Nevius, 147 Ohio St. 263, 71 N.E.2d 258, affirmed a judgment of the Common Pleas Court so far as it sentenced appellee to the penitentiary on the sixth count of an indictment charging him with accepting bribes to influence him with respect to his official duty as prosecuting attorney of Clark county. The conviction for that crime still stands.
Section 1707, General Code, reads so far as pertinent:
"The Supreme Court, Court of Appeals or Court of Common Pleas may suspend or remove an attorney at law or may give private or public reprimand to him as the nature of the offense may warrant, for misconduct or unprofessional conduct in office involving moral turpitude, or for conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude." (Emphasis added.)
The crime of which Nevius was convicted obviously involved moral turpitude.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed and the judgment of the Common Pleas Court is affirmed.
Judgment reversed.
WEYGANDT, C.J., MIDDLETON, TAFT, MATTHIAS, HART and STEWART, JJ., concur.
ZIMMERMAN, J., not participating.