Ordered that the order is affirmed, with costs. The objectant established his entitlement to judgment as a matter of law ( see Alvarez v Prospect Hosp., 68 NY2d 320, 324), by demonstrating that the executors' petition asserting, inter alia, that certain funds withdrawn by the objectant from certain bank accounts are assets of the decedent's estate, was interposed after the expiration of the applicable statute of limitations ( see CPLR 214; Matter of King, 305 AD2d 683; Matter of Neshewat, 237 AD2d 524, 525; see also Matter of O'Brien, 54 AD2d 880). Since, in opposition, the executors failed to raise a triable issue of fact, the Surrogate's Court properly granted the objectant's motion for summary judgment dismissing the petition as time-barred ( see Alvarez v Prospect Hosp., 68 NY2d at 324).
The petitioner correctly contends that the Surrogate's Court improperly denied as time-barred that branch of her motion which was to add Teacher's Insurance and Annuity Association-College Retirement Equities Fund (hereinafter TIAA-CREF) as a party to this discovery proceeding, which was originally commenced on or about May 10, 1993. "Generally, the Statute of Limitations applicable to a discovery proceeding is the three-year Statute of Limitations under CPLR 214 (3) for replevin and conversion actions" ( Matter of Neshewat, 237 AD2d 524, 52C [1997]; see Matter of Kraus, 208 AD2d 728; Matter of Bellingham, 132 AD2d 973). That period, which is applicable to this case, is subject to CPLR 210, a tolling provision which serves to extend the relevant limitations period ( see Roldan v Allstate Ins. Co., 149 AD2d 20, 31).
ORDERED that the order is affirmed, with costs payable by the estate. The petitioner commenced a discovery proceeding pursuant to SCPA article 21. "[C]ourts have likened such a proceeding to an action for conversion or replevin and applied a three-year Statute of Limitations" (Matter of Witbeck, 245 A.D.2d 848, 849; see Matter of Neshewat, 237 A.D.2d 524, 525). The three-year statute of limitations period (see CPLR 214) normally runs from the date the conversion allegedly took place.
We cannot agree. As a starting point, we acknowledge that petitioner did indeed seek a discovery order pursuant to SCPA 2103 and, further, that other courts have likened such a proceeding to an action for conversion or replevin and applied a three-year Statute of Limitations (see, e.g., Matter of Neshewat, 237 A.D.2d 524; Matter of Norstar Trust Co., 132 A.D.2d 973, lv denied sub nom. Matter of Bellingham, 70 N.Y.2d 614). The cited cases, however, are not dispositive of the primary issue before us on appeal. Although petitioner indeed sought a discovery order pursuant to SCPA 2103, the crux of the petition is that respondents are in possession of funds properly belonging to decedent's estate and that they should not in good conscience be permitted to retain such moneys. Thus, ultimately, our inquiry distills to whether petitioner has stated a cause of action upon which relief may be granted and, if so, what Statute of Limitations applies.