Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Super. Ct. No. JD226314
ROBIE, J.
C. C., mother of the minor, appeals from orders of the juvenile court denying her petition for modification and terminating her parental rights. (Welf. & Inst. Code, §§ 366.26, 388, 395.) Appellant contends the court erred in denying her petition for modification. We affirm.
All further statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code unless otherwise indicated.
FACTS
The infant minor was removed from parental custody in September 2007 due to appellant’s arrest on drug charges and history of cocaine abuse. Appellant previously had reunification services terminated as to the minor’s half sibling who was also a dependent child. The juvenile court denied services to appellant but ordered them for the minor’s father.
The six-month review report stated appellant began visiting the minor in March 2008 after her release from custody and began to participate in some services on her own. At the six-month review hearing in April 2008, the court terminated the father’s services and set a section 366.26 hearing.
Appellant filed a petition for modification in August 2008 asking the juvenile court to order services for her. The petition alleged circumstances had changed because appellant, on her own, had completed a parenting class, tested negative for drugs, was in counseling and was near completion of a substance abuse treatment program. The petition alleged the proposed order was in the minor’s best interests because appellant had housing, was compliant with her probation, and had visited the minor regularly. Attachments to the petition showed that, as of July 2008, appellant was compliant with probation, had completed a parenting class, had been in therapy for six weeks and was participating in an outpatient substance treatment program scheduled to end in November 2008.
A memo provided to the court by the social worker stated that appellant’s probation officer said appellant was required to complete a 52-week parenting class but had instead taken a 12-week parenting class. Further, appellant had no drug tests after her last negative test in April 2008. The social worker confirmed appellant had a job, her own residence, and was participating in a substance abuse treatment program. However the social worker believed that appellant’s current, and unconfirmed, short-term sobriety was not enough, given appellant’s 10-year history of substance abuse, to justify providing her services.
No additional evidence was presented at the hearing in August 2008. After argument, the court noted that appellant delayed several months in starting substance abuse treatment and now sought to delay permanency for the minor. Finding appellant had established neither changed circumstances nor that the proposed order was in the minor’s best interests, the juvenile court denied appellant’s petition. In a subsequent hearing, the juvenile court terminated appellant’s parental rights.
DISCUSSION
Appellant contends the juvenile court abused its discretion in denying her petition for modification because she showed both changed circumstances and that the proposed order was in the minor’s best interests.
A parent may bring a petition for modification of any order of the juvenile court pursuant to section 388 based on new evidence or a showing of changed circumstances. “The parent requesting the change of order has the burden of establishing that the change is justified. [Citation.] The standard of proof is a preponderance of the evidence. [Citation.]” (In re Michael B. (1992) 8 Cal.App.4th 1698, 1703.) Determination of a petition to modify is committed to the sound discretion of the juvenile court and, absent a showing of a clear abuse of discretion, the decision of the juvenile court must be upheld. (In re Stephanie M. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 295, 318-319.) The best interests of the child are of paramount consideration when the petition is brought after termination of reunification services. (Id. at p. 317.) In assessing the best interests of the child, the juvenile court looks not to the parent’s interests in reunification but to the needs of the child for permanence and stability. (Ibid.; In re Marilyn H. (1993) 5 Cal.4th 295, 309.)
Section 388 provides, in part: “Any parent . . . may, upon grounds of change of circumstance or new evidence, petition the court in the same action in which the child was found to be a dependent child of the juvenile court . . . for a hearing to change, modify, or set aside any order of the court previously made or to terminate the jurisdiction of the court. . . . [¶] . . . [¶] If it appears that the best interests of the child may be promoted by the proposed change of order, recognition of a sibling relationship, termination of jurisdiction, or clear and convincing evidence supports revocation or termination of court-ordered reunification services, the court shall order that hearing be held . . . .” (§ 388, subds. (a), (d).)
Factors relevant to the minor’s best interests include the strength of the parent-child bond, “the seriousness of the problems which led to the dependency,” how difficult it may be to remedy the problems and what progress the parent has made toward doing so. (In re Kimberly F. (1997) 56 Cal.App.4th 519, 532.) Appellant only partially met her burden.
Appellant’s circumstances had clearly changed since the prior court order denying her services. She had been released from custody, was actively participating in precisely the services which would address the problems which led to the minor’s removal, and had a home and a job.
The more critical question was whether the proposed order was in the minor’s best interests. The evidence shows it was not. Assuming appellant had some bond with the minor prior to removal, she would not maintain or strengthen it while incarcerated. Thereafter, she briefly visited weekly before visitation was reduced to bi-weekly visits which did little to increase the parent-child bond. On the other hand, the minor’s daily contact with the prospective adoptive parents had created a significant attachment to them. Further, while appellant began some services immediately upon her release, she did not begin the critical service of substance abuse treatment for several months. Given her long history of drug-related problems, appellant needed to demonstrate the strongest possible commitment to sobriety and did not do so. Even appellant’s parenting class was less than required by probation and did not show appellant’s dedication to providing a stable permanent home for the minor. The minor’s interests are in permanence and stability. The minor was in a stable adoptive placement which could provide that. Appellant failed to demonstrate that delaying permanence was in the minor’s best interests. No abuse of discretion appears.
DISPOSITION
The orders of the juvenile court are affirmed.
We concur: BLEASE, Acting P. J., RAYE, J.