Opinion
No. COA12–495.
2012-09-4
In The Matter of N.C. and D.D.C.
Mercedes O. Chut for Petitioner Guilford County Department of Social Services. J. Thomas Diepenbrock for Respondent-father.
Appeal by Respondent-father from order entered 12 January 2012 by Judge Sherry F. Alloway in Guilford County District Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 20 August 2012. Mercedes O. Chut for Petitioner Guilford County Department of Social Services. J. Thomas Diepenbrock for Respondent-father.
BEASLEY, Judge.
The father (Respondent) of D.D.C. appeals from an order terminating his parental rights to his child. After careful review, we affirm.
To protect the privacy of the child, his initials are used in this opinion.
D.D.C. was born in late May 2010. On 2 June 2010 an order was filed placing D.D.C. in the nonsecure custody of Guilford County Department of Social Services (DSS). D.D.C. was adjudicated a dependent juvenile on 22 September 2010. On 1 August 2011, DSS filed a petition to terminate Respondent's parental rights on grounds that: (1) Respondent neglected D.D.C.; (2) Respondent willfully left D.D.C. in foster care for more than twelve months without showing to the satisfaction of the court that reasonable progress under the circumstances had been made in correcting the conditions which led to the removal of the child; and (3) Respondent willfully, for a continuous period of six months preceding the filing of the petition, failed to pay a reasonable portion of the cost of care for the child although physically and financially able to do so. The trial court conducted a hearing on the petition on 13 December 2011. On 12 January 2012 the trial court filed an order terminating Respondent's parental rights on all three grounds. On 6 February 2012, Respondent filed notice of appeal.
Respondent challenges the sufficiency of the evidence and findings of fact to support the conclusions of law as to the existence of the three grounds to terminate his parental rights. An order terminating parental rights must be based upon findings of fact, supported by clear, cogent and convincing evidence, which establish the existence of a statutory ground for termination of rights. In re Young, 346 N.C. 244, 247, 485 S.E.2d 612, 614 (1997). Findings of fact may be supported by clear, cogent and convincing evidence “where there is some evidence to support those findings, even though the evidence might sustain findings to the contrary.” In re Montgomery, 311 N.C. 101, 110–11, 316 S.E.2d 246, 252–53 (1984). Findings of fact are also binding if the appellant does not challenge them on appeal. Koufman v. Koufman, 330 N.C. 93, 97, 408 S.E.2d 729, 731 (1991).
Respondent first contends that the evidence and findings of fact are insufficient to support a conclusion that his parental rights be terminated pursuant to N.C. Gen.Stat. § 7B–1111(a)(1) on the ground he neglected D.D.C. Respondent argues the findings fail to show that there is a probability of repetition of neglect. He also argues DSS failed to give him adequate time to comply with his case plan. Respondent's arguments are unpersuasive.
A juvenile is neglected if he does not receive proper care, supervision, or discipline from a parent, custodian or guardian or if he has been abandoned by a parent. N.C. Gen.Stat. § 7B–101(15) (2011). “A finding of neglect sufficient to terminate parental rights must be based on evidence showing neglect at the time of the termination proceeding.” In re Young, 346 N.C. at 248, 485 S.E .2d at 615. Neglect sufficient to terminate parental rights may consist of a parent's failure: (1) to provide physical necessities, financial support, love, affection, and personal contact, In re Apa, 59 N.C.App. 322, 324, 296 S.E.2d 811, 813 (1982); (2) to maintain a permanent residence and keep in contact with the child and the Department of Social Services, In re Safriet, 112 N.C.App. 747, 753, 436 S.E.2d 898, 902 (1993); (3) to visit the child or request visitations, In re Humphrey, 156 N.C.App. 533, 540, 577 S.E.2d 421, 427 (2003); or (4) to comply with a case plan designed to reunify the parent with the child after a “prior adjudication of neglect and subsequent termination of parental rights.” In re C.M ., 183 N.C.App. 207, 212, 644 S.E.2d 588, 593 (2007).
The record shows that Respondent was served with a summons regarding the original juvenile petition on 9 June 2010. The unchallenged findings of fact show that he did not enter into a case plan until almost a year later on 3 June 2011 although DSS had attempted since December 2010. The case plan required him (1) to develop appropriate parenting skills; (2) to obtain and maintain appropriate and stable housing; and (3) to obtain and maintain employment and to provide proof of school enrollment. As of the time of the termination hearing on 13 December 2011, Respondent had scheduled appointments for a parenting/psychological evaluation on 15 June 2011 and 22 June 2011 with the Guilford Center. Respondent attended the first but not the second appointment, which was rescheduled for 20 July 2011. The Guilford Center never produced a report. Respondent does not have his own residence, having separated from his wife, and is residing with a sister and her family. Respondent is not employed. Respondent alleged he has looked for work at 15 or 20 places; however, he failed to produce documentation to prove he had sought work at these places.
The findings further indicate that Respondent has not taken appropriate steps to work toward reunification, has not substantially complied with his case plan, and has not demonstrated an ability and/or willingness to parent D.D.C. and provide a safe and secure environment for the child. Respondent visited with his child eight times between 14 January 2011 and 30 June 2011 but none after the latter date.
The findings of fact also show that the child support enforcement agency established a child support obligation of $187.00 per month. Respondent had not made any payments toward the support of his child as of the time of the termination hearing and has contributed nothing to the support of the child since he came into DSS custody. Respondent does not suffer from a disability which prevents him from earning an income. Respondent has been “argumentative” with DSS staff about his need to pay support for his child.
These findings reflect that Respondent had ceased all efforts to care and provide for D.D.C as of the time of the termination hearing. We hold these findings support a conclusion of law that neglect existed upon which the trial court did not err in terminating Respondent's parental rights based upon his past and continuing neglect of D.D.C. We affirm termination of parental rights on that ground. Because a finding of only one ground is required, we need not consider Respondent's arguments with respect to the other grounds. See In re P.L.P., 173 N.C.App. 1, 8, 618 S.E.2d 241, 246 (2005), aff'd per curiam, 360 N.C. 360 (2006).
Respondent's remaining contention is that the trial court erred by entering a permanency planning order on 29 June 2011 changing the permanent plan to adoption and effectively ceasing reunification efforts without making findings of fact required by N.C. Gen.Stat. § 7B–507(b)(1). This statute provides that in any order placing or continuing a child in the custody of department of social services,
the court may direct that reasonable efforts to eliminate the need for placement of the juvenile shall not be required or shall cease if the court makes written findings of fact that:
(1) Such efforts clearly would be futile or would be inconsistent with the juvenile's health, safety, and need for a safe permanent home within a reasonable period of time[.]
N.C. Gen.Stat. § 7B–507(b)(1) (2011). This Court has held that N .C. Gen.Stat. § 7B–507(b)(1) requires the trial court to “ultimately find ... that: (1) attempted reunification efforts would be futile, or (2) reunification would be inconsistent with the juvenile's health, safety, and need for a safe, permanent home within a reasonable period of time.” In re I.R.C., –––N.C.App. ––––, ––––, 714 S.E.2d 495, 498 (2011). “An order entered pursuant to N.C. Gen.Stat. § 7B–507 need not contain a formal recitation of the statutory language, as long as the trial court makes findings addressing the relevant criteria.” In re M.I.W., 202 N.C.App. 372, 690 S.E.2d 768 (2010) (citing In re M .J.G., 168 N.C.App. 638, 649–50, 608 S.E.2d 813, 820 (2005)). At the permanency planning hearing held on 1 June 2011, the trial court found that it is not possible for the juvenile to be returned home within six months because the child's mother could not be located, Respondent is unable to provide a home for the juvenile, Respondent indicated he desired to relinquish his parental rights to his sister or for his sister to have guardianship, and Respondent refused to enter into a case plan with DSS until that hearing. The trial court also found that because it was unlikely that the juvenile would be returned home within the next six months, adoption would benefit the juvenile. The trial court further found that the child would not benefit from another permanent planned living arrangement. The trial court found that Respondent, who is 67 years old, wanted the child to be placed with the paternal aunt because he believed he would not be required to pay support for the child; he became upset when he learned the matter had been referred to child support enforcement. The trial court found that Respondent was allowed weekly visits with the child and that between 14 March 2011 and 23 May 2011, Respondent missed eight out of eleven possible visits with the child. Based upon these findings, the trial court concluded that it is in the best interest of D.D.C. to remain in the legal custody of DSS, that it would be contrary to his best interest to place him in the custody of any parent, and that the permanent plan should be changed to adoption.
We hold the trial court made adequate findings to comply with N.C. Gen.Stat. § 7B–507(b)(1). We overrule this contention.
The order terminating parental rights is
Affirmed. Judges BRYANT and HUNTER, JR. concur.
Report per Rule 30(e).