Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Superior Court County No. JV46443 of San Luis Obispo, Ginger E. Garrett, Judge.
Jolene Larimore, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Edmund G. Brown Jr., Attorney General, Pamela C. Hamanaka, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Supervising Deputy Attorney General, David Zarmi, Deputy Attorney General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
PERREN, J.
Nathaniel N. appeals from a February 10, 2010, order that sustained a petition under Welfare and Institutions Code section 602, subdivision (a). The petition charged him with trespassing (Pen. Code, § 602, subd. (k)) and felony possession of a controlled substance (Health & Saf. Code, § 11350, subd. (a)). Appellant concedes his culpability and raises only one issue: that the trial court abused its discretion by not specifying that his restitution was joint and several with other minors involved. We affirm.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
The restitution order stems from an incident that took place the night of February 21-22, 2009. We take the relevant facts from the probation report. The night's events began around 11:00 p.m. when appellant arranged to buy Ecstasy for himself and four friends, Mark, Martin, Melanie, and Miranda. The five spent the next several hours at Melanie's house, where they each took some of the Ecstasy. Around 3:00 a.m., they stopped at Mark's to watch television for a few minutes, then moved next door to appellant's apartment, where he lived with his grandmother. Miranda asked appellant for Dilaudid (hydromorphone), which appellant's grandmother kept in their apartment. Appellant retrieved some Dilaudid tablets and gave two to Miranda and one to Martin. Fifteen minutes later Miranda asked for more. Mark retrieved additional pills and gave them to appellant, who distributed varying numbers to Miranda, Martin, Mark and himself over the next couple of hours. Miranda took the most, followed by Martin.
At some point later that morning, Miranda became unresponsive and began having trouble breathing. Mark went next door and brought back his mother, who examined Miranda and eventually called 911. Miranda was taken to a hospital and spent five days in intensive care. Mark, Martin, and appellant were brought to the San Luis Obispo Police Department for questioning. Martin became unresponsive upon arrival and was taken to the hospital.
A juvenile petition (Welf. & Inst. Code, §§ 602, 656) charged appellant with sale of hydromorphone (Health & Saf. Code, § 11352), sale of Ecstasy (id. at § 11379) and possession of hydromorphone (Health & Saf. Code, § 11350). He admitted the possession charge, and the juvenile court dismissed the two sales counts. Subsequently an amended petition was filed adding an unrelated count of trespass (Pen. Code, § 602, subd. (k)) pending from an earlier diversion. Appellant admitted both charges and the court granted deferred entry of judgment. Within two weeks, the petition was reinstated due to appellant's use of controlled substances. Appellant was placed on probation, the terms of which included that he pay restitution. At the dispositional hearing, the court ordered that appellant pay half of the victim Miranda's undisputed losses. The trial court found that appellant was "responsible for providing drugs to [Miranda] which were very nearly fatal." The trial court also found that the restitution was "not joint and several with other minors but is all due to be paid by him." The court set his share at $8,512.19, half the total losses. The court also found that Miranda "bears some culpability for her own fate and the very serious consequences she suffered."
DISCUSSION
We review restitution orders for abuse of discretion. A juvenile court abuses its discretion when it "acts contrary to law" or "make[s] an order which is arbitrary or capricious." (In re Anthony M. (2007) 156 Cal.App.4th 1010, 1016.) As long as there is "a factual and rational basis for the amount of restitution ordered by the trial court, no abuse of discretion will be found." (In re Johnny M. (2002) 100 Cal.App.4th 1128, 1132.)
Crime victims have a constitutional right "[t]o restitution... from the convicted wrongdoer in every case." (Cal. Const., art. I, § 28, subd. (b)(13)(B).) Welfare and Institutions Code section 730.6 implements this right in juvenile cases. In particular, the statute requires that a victim "who incurs any economic loss as a result of the minor's conduct shall receive restitution directly from that minor." (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 730.6, subd. (a)(1), italics added.) The restitution order must be "of a dollar amount sufficient to fully reimburse the victim or victims for all determined economic losses incurred as the result of the minor's conduct." (Id. at subd. (h), italics added.) The court must also identify, "[w]hen feasible, ... any cooffenders who are jointly and severally liable for victim restitution." (Id. at subd. (h).)
Appellant contends that the juvenile court abused its discretion in not ordering appellant jointly and severally liable with Martin and Mark for his share of the restitution. We reject this contention. Appellant concedes his culpability for the harm he caused the victim and does not contest the dollar amount of her losses. The restitution order thus implements the statutory requirement that a victim receive restitution "directly from [the] minor" who caused her economic losses. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 730.6, subd. (a)(1).)
Furthermore, the juvenile court here did not fail to "'... take into account other culpable parties in imposing a restitution order....'" (In re S.S. (1995) 37 Cal.App.4th 543, 549, citing In re Brian S. (1982) 130 Cal.App.3d 523, 533.) "'[T]here are no rigid guidelines for apportionment. Responsibility of criminal confederates is merely one factor to be considered by the court in exercising its discretion.'" (Ibid.) Indeed, it found Miranda equally responsible and consequently reduced appellant's restitution responsibility to half, even though the statute requires a court to "order full restitution unless it finds compelling and extraordinary reasons for not doing so." (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 730.6, subd. (h), italics added.) Finally, there was "ample basis on this record for the trial court to conclude" that appellant, not the other minors, was responsible for providing the Dilaudid to Miranda. (In re S.S., supra, 37 Cal.App.4th at p. 550.)
The judgment is affirmed.
We concur: GILBERT, P.J., YEGAN, J.