Opinion
04-05-2017
In the Matter of NATHALIE D.N. (Anonymous), also known as Nathalie N. (Anonymous), also known as Natalie N. (Anonymous). New York Foundling Hospital, petitioner-respondent; Nathaniel H.N. IV (Anonymous), also known as Nathaniel H.N. (Anonymous), also known as Nathaniel N. (Anonymous), appellant, et al., respondent.
Catherine S. Bridge, Staten Island, NY, for appellant. Daniel Gartenstein, Long Island City, NY, for petitioner-respondent. Seymour W. James, Jr., New York, NY (Tamara A. Steckler and Claire V. Merkine of counsel), attorney for the child.
Catherine S. Bridge, Staten Island, NY, for appellant.
Daniel Gartenstein, Long Island City, NY, for petitioner-respondent.
Seymour W. James, Jr., New York, NY (Tamara A. Steckler and Claire V. Merkine of counsel), attorney for the child.
WILLIAM F. MASTRO, J.P., SANDRA L. SGROI, JOSEPH J. MALTESE, and COLLEEN D. DUFFY, JJ.
Appeal by the father from an order of the Family Court, Richmond County (Arnold Lim, J.), dated March 1, 2016. The order denied the father's motion to vacate his default in appearing at a fact-finding hearing wherein the court determined that his consent to the adoption of the subject child is not required pursuant to Domestic Relations Law § 111.
ORDERED that the order is affirmed, without costs or disbursements.
In this proceeding to terminate parental rights pursuant to Social Services Law § 384–b, the father's sole contention is that the Family Court should have vacated his default in appearing at a fact-finding hearing wherein the court determined that his consent to the adoption of the subject child is not required pursuant to Domestic Relations Law § 111. The determination of whether to relieve a party of a default is a matter left to the sound discretion of the Family Court (see Matter of Annette J.S.J. [Rebecca F.], 106 A.D.3d 1087, 1087, 965 N.Y.S.2d 613 ; Matter of Joseph N., 45 A.D.3d 849, 849, 846 N.Y.S.2d 359 ). In a proceeding to terminate parental rights, a parent must show that there was a reasonable excuse for the default and a potentially meritorious defense in order to establish his or her entitlement to vacatur of the default (see CPLR 5015[a][1] ; Matter of Isabella R.W. [Jessica W.], 142 A.D.3d 503, 504, 36 N.Y.S.3d 205 ; Matter of Joshua E.R. [Yolaine R.], 123 A.D.3d 723, 725, 997 N.Y.S.2d 739 ; Matter of Stephen Daniel A. [Sandra M.–A.], 122 A.D.3d 837, 839, 996 N.Y.S.2d 707 ). Contrary to the father's contention, he failed to provide a reasonable excuse for his failure to appear. He failed to present detailed information or documentation to substantiate his claim of a delay in transportation, and he did not explain his failure to contact his attorney or the court about the alleged delay (see Matter of Joshua E.R. [Yolaine R.], 123 A.D.3d at 724–725, 997 N.Y.S.2d 739 ; Matter of Ilyas Zaire A.–R. [Habiba A.–R.], 104 A.D.3d 512, 513, 961 N.Y.S.2d 137 ; cf. Matter of Arianna–Samantha Lady Melissa S. [Carissa S.], 134 A.D.3d 582, 583, 23 N.Y.S.3d 31 ; Matter of Nathalie A., 145 A.D.2d 629, 630, 536 N.Y.S.2d 702 ). Since the father failed to establish a reasonable excuse for his default, we need not reach the issue of whether he presented a potentially meritorious defense to the relief sought in the petition (see Matter of Stephen Daniel A. [Sandra M.–A.], 122 A.D.3d at 839, 996 N.Y.S.2d 707 ; Matter of Miguel M.–R.B., 36 A.D.3d 613, 614, 828 N.Y.S.2d 167 ). Accordingly, the court providently exercised its discretion in denying the father's motion to vacate his default.