Opinion
D041627.
7-28-2003
In re NATASJA P., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. SAN DIEGO COUNTY HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES AGENCY, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. MARIE P., Defendant and Appellant.
Marie P. appeals a judgment declaring her minor daughter, Natasja P., a dependent of the juvenile court under Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, subdivision (b). Marie contends the petition filed on behalf of Natasja does not state a cause of action. She also challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support the courts jurisdictional findings. We affirm the judgment.
Statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Natasja was born prematurely in July 2002, and remained hospitalized for five months with serious medical problems. She had a cranial hematoma, which is likely to result in developmental delays. She also has respiratory problems and apnea. When Natasja was about to be discharged from the hospital, a hold was placed on her because of concerns about Maries mental health and ability or willingness to address Natasjas special needs.
Marie told the hospital social worker she wanted to be alone to secure her own privacy. She was guarded and refused to disclose the name of the hotel where she lived. The social worker feared Marie would isolate Natasja and not seek support services for Natasjas medical needs and development. Although Marie acknowledged she would benefit from counseling and ongoing support, she did not attend a mental health appointment she made.
Marie mistrusted and was suspicious of the hospital staff. She reported being victimized by the nurses and recorded incidents of their mistreating her and Natasja. Marie told the social worker she was defensive because people were always trying to "mess" with her. She believed decisions regarding Natasjas care were for her to make. Dr. Murat Akalin frequently interacted with Marie at the hospital and wrote a letter detailing Maries mental state and the potential impact her condition could have on her willingness to seek the necessary treatment and services for Natasja. Marie often expressed paranoid thoughts and showed paranoid behavior. The nursing staff reported Marie was guarded and defensive and reluctant to interact with staff when learning about Natasjas care.
According to Dr. Akalin, Maries thought process was mildly disorganized with occasional loose associations. When agitated, she was unable to listen to updates on Natasjas care. Marie selectively withheld information about her future plans. She did not like having so many people involved in Natasjas care. Dr. Akalin concluded Marie had a psychiatric disorder with psychotic features. Because her condition was untreated, the level of her paranoia and tendency toward isolation placed Natasja at serious risk on discharge from the hospital. In Dr. Akalins opinion, Marie would not be able to provide Natasja with the frequent and numerous professional contacts she needed to support her development.
The San Diego County Health and Human Services Agency (Agency) filed a petition in the juvenile court under section 300, subdivision (b) alleging Natasja was at risk because she required intensive in-home professional intervention and treatment and Maries paranoid behavior caused her to isolate herself and decline professional assistance.
In an addendum report, Agencys social worker noted Natasja required physical and occupational therapy. Natasja was about to be discharged from the hospital and needed to return in a few days and again several weeks later. Marie was referred to Dr. Chris Streeter for a psychiatric evaluation. Dr. Streeter reported Marie was not schizophrenic, but had an obsessive-compulsive personality disorder that influenced her need for perfection. This disorder compounded her paranoia and rigid thought patterns. He believed some of Maries paranoia could be based in reality. Dr. Streeter said it was difficult to predict whether Maries psychiatric condition would impede her functioning as a mother because some obsessive-compulsive traits were adaptive and helpful in certain situations. However, Dr. Streeter feared Marie would perceive Natasjas care providers as incompetent and discontinue their services. Because Dr. Streeter did not have the opportunity to compare his findings to those of the hospital staff, he was unable to form an opinion as to the most beneficial disposition for Natasja. Marie assured Dr. Streeter she would seek whatever treatment Natasja needed. Dr. Streeter concluded Marie and Natasja would benefit from the supervision and support of Childrens Services.
Marie completed an application for the Early Start Program for Natasja. The program would provide in-home services one to four times a month. A case manager from the Regional Center and a public health nurse would visit the home once every three months. A Regional Center representative said her visit with Marie was positive and Marie was willing to actively participate in the program.
The social worker concluded Maries difficulty working with and trusting Natasjas medical providers would prevent her from addressing Natasjas medical needs. Marie admitted she was experiencing stress, which exacerbated her paranoia. The social worker recommended Natasja be placed with Marie while Marie received support services.
At a contested jurisdiction and disposition hearing, the social worker testified Natasjas medical providers had valid concerns about Maries ability and willingness to allow Natasja to receive in-home and out-of-home services. Although Marie did not reject any medical advice, she wanted to minimize outside intervention. Marie said she would cooperate if she believed the services were appropriate. The social worker was concerned that Marie would make her own judgments as to Natasjas care rather than defer to the medical professionals. Following this testimony, Marie unsuccessfully moved to dismiss the petition.
Marie testified she was a hospital corpsman and pharmacy technician in the United States Navy. Natasja was born 14 weeks early. She had recovered from her resulting medical problems, but still had respiratory distress. Marie had applied for 42 days of employment leave and intended to spend every day with Natasja and take her to doctor appointments. Marie testified she could care for Natasja without a social workers supervision. She explained she had disagreements with the nursing staff, which prevented her from obtaining the medical services Natasja needed. Marie intended to ask the maternal grandmother to live with her to help care for Natasja.
After considering the evidence and hearing argument of counsel, the court sustained the allegations of the petition, declared Natasja a dependent and placed her with Marie. The court ordered Marie to comply with a case plan, including participating in therapy one hour per week. If the therapist did not believe weekly therapy was necessary, the social worker had discretion to decrease the frequency.
DISCUSSION
I
Marie contends the petition does not allege facts sufficient to support the courts jurisdictional findings under section 300, subdivision (b). She asserts there were no allegations her conduct seriously harmed Natasja or placed her at risk of serious harm.
A
Agency contends Marie waived her claim of insufficient pleadings by not objecting in the trial court. A parent must be given notice of the specific facts on which a dependency petition is based to enable him or her to meet its allegations. (In re S.O. (2002) 103 Cal.App.4th 453, 460; In re Jamie M. (1982) 134 Cal. App. 3d 530, 544, 184 Cal. Rptr. 778.) Notice is fundamental to due process. (In re Jeremy C. (1980) 109 Cal. App. 3d 384, 397, 167 Cal. Rptr. 283.) Nevertheless, a parents failure to object to a defective pleading in the juvenile court bars the claim on appeal. (In re S.O., supra , 103 Cal.App.4th at pp. 459-460; In re Shelly J. (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 322, 328-329; see also In re Jessica C. (2001) 93 Cal.App.4th 1027, 1037-1038 [parent waived any defect in allegations of petition by litigating the merits]; but see In re Alysha S. (1996) 51 Cal.App.4th 393 [demurrer to pleading may be raised for the first time on appeal].) Had Marie objected to the legal sufficiency of the pleadings, Agency would have had the opportunity to amend them. (See Super. Ct. S. D. County, Local Rules, rule 6.5 [amended eff. Jan. 1, 2002], Juvenile.)
We agree with the court in In re Shelley J. that In re Alysha S. was incorrectly decided on this point. (In re Shelley J., supra , 68 Cal.App.4th at p. 328; In re S.O., supra, 103 Cal.App.4th at p. 459 [In re Shelley J. represents the better view].)
In an effort to avoid the waiver rule, Marie asserts her counsel raised the issue of the adequacy of the pleadings by moving to dismiss the petition. However, Marie did not object to the sufficiency of the allegations at the detention hearing, but instead set the matter for trial on the issue of jurisdiction. At the contested jurisdiction hearing, Maries counsel sought to dismiss the petition at the end of Agencys case-in-chief. This request, similar to a directed verdict, challenged the sufficiency of the evidence, not the sufficiency of the petition. This was "not a due process case where [Marie] was denied constitutionally adequate notice of allegations which might result in the court asserting jurisdiction." (In re Shelley J., supra, 68 Cal.App.4th at p. 328.)
B
In any event, the petition here adequately pleaded essential facts establishing at least one ground for juvenile court jurisdiction. ( § 332, subd. (f).) The petition alleged Natasja had suffered, or was at substantial risk of suffering, serious physical harm or illness because she needed intensive in-home professional intervention and medical treatment and Maries paranoid behavior would likely prevent her from providing care for Natasja. The allegations clearly identified the reasons Natasja needed the juvenile courts protection and specified conduct by Marie that contributed to the need for protection. (In re Robert P . (1976) 61 Cal. App. 3d 310, 317, fn. 6, 132 Cal. Rptr. 5.) Thus, Marie had sufficient notice of the specific facts on which the dependency petition was based to enable her to meet its allegations. (In re Jeremy C., supra, 109 Cal. App. 3d at p. 397.)
II
Marie challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support the courts jurisdictional findings. She asserts the evidence rebuts the allegation that she suffers from paranoia. She further asserts there is no evidence that her mental condition puts Natasja at risk of harm.
A
In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence on appeal, we review the entire record to determine if substantial evidence supports the findings of the juvenile court. We do not evaluate the credibility of witnesses, attempt to resolve conflicts in the evidence, or determine the weight of the evidence. Rather, we draw all reasonable inferences in support of the findings, consider the record most favorably to the juvenile courts order and affirm the order even if other evidence supports a contrary finding. (In re Casey D. (1999) 70 Cal.App.4th 38, 52-53; In re Baby Boy L. (1994) 24 Cal.App.4th 596, 610.) The appellant has the burden of showing there is no evidence of a sufficiently substantial nature to support the order. (In re Geoffrey G. (1979) 98 Cal. App. 3d 412, 420, 159 Cal. Rptr. 460.)
Section 300, subdivision (b) provides a basis for juvenile court jurisdiction if the child has suffered, or there is a substantial risk the child will suffer, serious physical harm or illness as a result of the parents failure to adequately supervise or protect the child. In enacting section 300, the Legislature intended to protect children who are currently being abused or neglected, "and to ensure the safety, protection, and physical and emotional well-being of children who are at risk of that harm." ( § 300.2, italics added.) The court need not wait until a minor is seriously abused or injured to assume jurisdiction and take the steps necessary to protect the minor. (In re Heather A. (1996) 52 Cal.App.4th 183, 194-196; In re Michael S. (1981) 127 Cal. App. 3d 348, 357-358, 179 Cal. Rptr. 546.)
B
Here, the evidence showed Natasjas medical disability resulting from her premature birth required intensive in-home professional intervention and treatment. At the time Natasja was released from the hospital, she continued to have respiratory problems, including apnea. She was likely to experience developmental delays and required physical and occupational therapy. Service providers were scheduled to visit the home frequently. Marie repeatedly said she wanted to be left alone to secure her own privacy. She said she would cooperate with services if she believed they were appropriate. The social worker believed Maries overwhelming need for privacy would interfere with Natasjas care and she might make her own medical decisions for Natasja rather than defer to the medical professionals.
The evidence also showed Maries mental state was likely to interfere with her ability to seek necessary treatment and services for Natasja. Maries paranoia was manifested by her admission she was suspicious of everyone and defensive because people had bad intentions and always tried to "mess" with her. She said her paranoia began when she was 18 years old. Dr. Akalin reported Marie often expressed paranoid thoughts and showed paranoid behavior. Because Maries condition was untreated, Dr. Akalin believed the level of her paranoia and tendency toward isolation placed Natasja at serious risk once the hospital discharged her. He believed Marie would be unable to provide Natasja with the multiple services she required.
Marie asserts the allegation she is paranoid was rebutted by Dr. Streeters findings after he evaluated her condition on two occasions. Dr. Streeter concluded Marie was not schizophrenic, but her obsessive-compulsive personality disorder compounded her paranoia and rigid thought patterns. He believed some of Maries paranoia could be based in reality. However, because Marie might perceive Natasjas care providers as incompetent and discontinue their services, Dr. Streeter concluded Marie and Natasja would benefit from the supervision and support of Childrens Services. Both Dr. Streeter and Dr. Akalin believed Natasja needed the support and supervision of the juvenile court because Marie would exclude the service providers from her home. The court was entitled to find these experts credible and give great weight to their assessment. (In re Casey D., supra, 70 Cal.App.4th at p. 53.) Substantial evidence supports the courts jurisdictional findings under section 300, subdivision (b).
Natasjas counsel informs us Natasja remains medically fragile and "requires the full focus of the juvenile court to assure her survival."
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
WE CONCUR: BENKE, Acting P. J., AARON, J.