The Supreme Court properly declined to admit into evidence the defendant's purported copy of the instruction manual for the breathalyzer instrument on the ground that it was unauthenticated ( see People v. Feldman, 299 N.Y. 153, 168, 85 N.E.2d 913;People v. Laracuente, 21 A.D.3d 1389, 1391, 801 N.Y.S.2d 676). In addition, the Supreme Court properly denied the defendant's request for a judicial subpoena duces tecum to compel production of the copy of the manual in use by the County of Westchester or the New York State Police ( see Matter of County of Nassau Police Dept. v. Judge, 237 A.D.2d 354, 654 N.Y.S.2d 174;Matter of Constantine v. Leto, 157 A.D.2d 376, 377, 557 N.Y.S.2d 611,affd.77 N.Y.2d 975, 571 N.Y.S.2d 906, 575 N.E.2d 392). The defendant argues that the Supreme Court deprived him of his constitutional due process rights to a fair trial and to present a defense when it declined to take judicial notice of the definition of the term “civil twilight,” an alleged time of day.

Defendant did not establish a "factual predicate which would make it reasonably likely that documentary information will bear relevant and exculpatory evidence." ( Matter of Constantine v Leto, 157 AD2d 376, 378, affd 77 NY2d 975 [internal quotation marks omitted]; see also People v Bagley, 279 AD2d 426, lv denied 96 NY2d 711; Matter of County of Nassau Police Dept. v Judge, 237 AD2d 354.) Furthermore, the subpoena was overbroad and unreasonably burdensome ( see People v Zilberman, 297 AD2d 517, lv denied 99 NY2d 566).

To overcome the protections provided by Civil Rights Law § 50-a ( e.g. Matter of Capital Newspapers Div. of Hearst Corp. v. Burns, 67 NY2d 562, 568; Zarn v. City of New York, 198 AD2d 220, 220-221) and the Criminal Procedure Law's discovery prescriptions ( Matter of Terry D., 81 NY2d 1042, 1045; Matter of Constantine v. Leto, 157 AD2d 376, 378, affd 77 NY2d 975; People v. Begley, 279 AD2d 426, 426-427), a party seeking discovery of the contents of police personnel files must allege sufficient facts as "would make it reasonably likely" ( People v. Gissendanner, 48 NY2d 543, 550) that the files contain "documentary information . . . [constituting] relevant and exculpatory evidence" ( Constantine, 157 AD2d at 378). Defendant's speculative assertions regarding the possibility of alleged prior complaints against the officers for misconduct did not constitute the "clear showing of facts" to justify the relief sought ( People v. Valentine, 160 AD2d 325, 326; see also Matter of Police Dept., County of Nassau v. Judge, 237 AD2d 354, 355). Further, defendant's stated purpose in seeking the subpoena, to impeach the officers' accounts of defendant's conduct in the course of the arrest, by reference to the officers' alleged prior use of unnecessary force in the exercise of their duties, amounts to an impermissible "fishing expedition . . . for collateral materials to be used for impeachment purposes" ( Zarn v. City of New York, 198 AD2d at 220-221; see People v. Scott, 212 AD2d 477, 478 [same]).

The petitioner's application to quash the subpoena duces tecum should have been granted. The materials requested by the subpoena are privileged communications made between an attorney and his client ( see CPLR 4503[a][1]). Although the privilege may in certain circumstances yield to a strong public policy ( see Matter of Jacqueline F., 47 N.Y.2d 215), the respondents' factual allegations established that their request is merely a fishing expedition ( see People v. Gissendanner, 48 N.Y.2d 543, 550; Matter of County of Nassau Police Dept. v. Judge, 237 A.D.2d 354; Matter of Suffolk County Med. Examiner v. Guido, 215 A.D.2d 705). Disclosure is not warranted based only on speculation that some unspecified information will be found with which to impeach the complaining witness in the underlying criminal prosecution ( see People v. Gissendanner, supra at 549; People v. Radtke, 219 A.D.2d 739). Therefore, the trial court erred in directing the petitioner to turn over the subpoenaed materials for an in camera inspection.

ORDERED that the order is affirmed, with costs. The Supreme Court properly granted the plaintiff's motion to quash a subpoena served on her attorney (see, Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Abrams, 71 N.Y.2d 327; Golden Mark Maintenance v. Alarcon, 265 A.D.2d 377; Matter of County of Nassau Police Dept. v. Judge, 237 A.D.2d 354). S. MILLER, J.P., McGINITY, SCHMIDT and TOWNES, JJ., concur.

Here the Supreme Court's orders of discovery exceeding that permitted by statute was a misuse of the subpoena power. Accordingly, the subpoenas are quashed and prohibition is granted (see, Matter of County of Nassau Police Dept., v. Judge, 237 A.D.2d 354; Matter of Suffolk Co. Med. Examiner, 215 A.D.2d 705; Matter of County of Nassau v. Sullivan, 194 A.D.2d 236; Matter of Constantine v. Leto, supra). We note that the subpoena served upon the Civilian Complaint Review Board is quashed only to the extent that it has not been complied with (see, Matter of Brunswick Hosp. Cent. Inc. v. Hynes, 52 N.Y.2d 333, 336).

Here, the defendant has not satisfied his burden of establishing a factual predicate, warranting an intrusion upon the officer's personnel records. Significantly, the defendant's allegations that he is innocent and his constitutional rights were violated are conclusory and offers nothing of a particularize nature to support the claim that the requested materials will bear relevant and exculpatory evidence, as opposed to general impeachment material (seeMatter of County of Nassau Police Dept v. Judge , 237 AD2d 354 [2d Dept. 1997] ).Further, defendant's stated purpose in seeking the subpoena "to confront and cross-examine Officer Figueroa about any relevant and material information contained within his personal file," casting doubt on the reliability of the officer's testimony, amounts to an impermissible fishing expedition for collateral materials to be used for impeachment purposes ( Zarn v. City of New York, 198 AD2d 220, 220—221 [2d Dept. 1993] ; People v. Cedeno , 4 Misc 3d 134(A) [App.

A showing that certain documents carry a potential for establishing relevant information is wholly insufficient; instead, it is incumbent upon the party seeking the subpoena to put forth "some factual predicate which would make it reasonably likely that documentary information will bear relevant and exculpatory evidence." Constantine v. Leto, supra, 157 AD2d at 378 citing Gissendanner, supra, 48 NY2d at 550; see, also County of Nassau Police Dept. v. Judge, 237 AD2d 354, 355 (2nd Dept. 1997). On this record, the inexorable conclusion is that petitioner's purpose in serving the subpoena duces tecum is to obtain otherwise unavailable discovery in the hope of finding something helpful to her defense, which is not a sanctioned use of a judicial subpoena.