Id. at 297. This court struggled with similar facts, though a different privilege, in In re Napp Tech., Inc. Litigation, 338 N.J.Super. 176, 768 A.2d 274 (Law Div. 2000). There, Napp, a chemical processor, hired a public relations firm, Holt Ross ("H R"), to advise it on how to communicate to the public in the wake of a massive explosion at the plant.

In applying the three statutory factors to non-traditional media outlets, the courts have determined that Internet message boards and press releases issued by public relations firms do not meet the prima facie test. Too Much Media, supra, 206 N.J. at 236, 20 A.3d 364;In re Napp Technologies, Inc. Litigation, 338 N.J.Super. 176, 184, 768 A.2d 274 (Law Div.2000). The Supreme Court in Too Much Media held that the newsperson's privilege does not extend to a self-described journalist who posted comments on an Internet message board because such activities are not sufficiently similar to the traditional types of “news media” enumerated in the statute.

In accordance with the plain language of the statute, reported decisions have consistently found that "news media" can include outlets not listed in the Shield Law so long as they are similar to traditional news media. See Trump v.O'Brien, 403 N.J.Super. 281, 304, 958 A.2d 85 (App.Div. 2008); Kinsella v. Welch, 362 N.J.Super. 143, 154-55, 827 A.2d 325 (App.Div. 2003); In re Avila, 206 N.J.Super. 61, 66, 501 A.2d 1018 (App.Div. 1985); In re NappTechs., Inc., 338 N.J.Super. 176, 184-87, 768 A.2d 274 (Law Div. 2000). In Avila, for example, even though a Spanish-language tabloid did not meet the Shield Law's precise definition of a "newspaper" — because it was free and lacked the necessary postal designation, See N.J.S.A. 2A:84A-21a(b) — the tabloid was sufficiently "similar" to a newspaper to qualify as "news media."

The term "prima facie" can be a source of confusion because it has several meanings. (See, e.g., Koch v. Specialized Care Services, Inc. (D.Md. 2005) 437 F.Supp.2d 362, 378-380; Dolan v. Powers (Mo.Ct.App. 2008) 260 S.W.3d 376, 385; Berry v. State (Fla.Dist.Ct.App. 1984) 453 So.2d 197, 198; In re Napp Technologies, Inc. (2000) 338 N.J. Super. 176 [ 768 A.2d 274, 279 fn. 3]; Black's Law Diet. (8th ed. 2004) p. 1228, cols. 1, 2 [defining "prima facie" and "prima facie case"].) The anti-SLAPP statute itself does not use either "prima facie" or "threshold," but simply states that "[a] cause of action" is "subject to a special motion to strike" if it " aris[es] from any act . . . in furtherance of the person's right of petition or free speech . . . in connection with a public issue."

In applying the three statutory factors to non-traditional media outlets, the courts have determined that Internet message boards and press releases issued by public relations firms do not meet the prima facie test. Too Much Media, supra, 206 N.J. at 236; In re Napp Technologies, Inc. Litigation, 338 N.J. Super. 176, 184 (Law Div. 2000). The Supreme Court in Too MuchMedia held that the newsperson's privilege does not extend to a self-described journalist who posted comments on an Internet message board because such activities are not sufficiently similar to the traditional types of "news media" enumerated in the statute.

Courts in New Jersey have also applied the "intent" test and have come to different results. Compare In re Venezia, 191 N.J. 259, 271-75, 922 A.2d 1263 (2007) (finding a reporter acts in the course of pursuing his professional activities whenever he obtains information for the purpose of disseminating it to the public), with In re Napp Technologies, Inc., 338 N.J.Super. 176, 191, 768 A.2d 274 (Law Div. 2000) (finding no First Amendment privilege in favor of a public relations firm because it had failed to establish an intent to disseminate publicly the information it had gathered). (iii)