Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Santa Clara County Super. Ct. No. JV31098
Premo, J.
A Welfare and Institutions Code section 602 petition (the “D” petition) alleged that, on or about December 3, 2008, M.W. (the minor) attempted to dissuade a victim or witness from reporting a crime. (Pen. Code, § 136.1, subd. (b)(1).) A subsequent petition (the “E” petition) alleged that the minor violated the terms of his probation. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 777.)
All further unspecified statutory references are to the Penal Code.
The minor had prior sustained petitions for vandalism and vehicle theft, as well as numerous probation violations for testing positive for drugs while under house arrest.
After a contested jurisdictional hearing, the juvenile court sustained the charge of dissuading a witness or victim in the “D” petition. The minor subsequently waived his right to a hearing on the “E” petition and admitted the probation violation.
On January 5, 2009, the juvenile court continued the minor on probation and aggregated his maximum sentence to four years and six months, with 44 days of credit. The juvenile court also recommended that the minor attend the Alternative Placement Academy.
On appeal, the minor argues that there was insufficient evidence to sustain the adjudication.
We disagree and shall affirm.
I. Factual and Procedural Background
A. The prosecution case
1. Jane Jacobson
Jane Jacobson, a teacher at Terrabella Academy in Mountain View, California, testified that, on December 3, 2008, she was involved in managing or taking care of students who were being interviewed by two Mountain View police officers, Officers Magana and Cooper, in relation to a fight that had taken place just before the Thanksgiving holiday. The school had not announced that there would be interviews about the fight and tried to keep that fact quiet. Jacobson observed Officer Magana, who was not the normal officer for the school, arrive that morning during a break in classes.
Officer Magana did not testify at the jurisdictional hearing, and we were unable to locate any reference to his first name in the record.
The minor and other students were outside during lunchtime and Jacobson was asked by the teacher in charge, Steve Sanchez, to follow the minor to ensure that he went to the restroom, rather than to the office area of the school where the students were being interviewed by the police. Jacobson followed the minor, who entered the building and turned left towards the office instead of turning right towards the bathrooms. The minor approached another student, J.C., who was sitting outside the office waiting to be interviewed by a police officer, and started talking to him. Jacobson was approximately 12 feet away from the minor, and she heard him tell J.C., in an angry and anxious tone, “Don’t say anything, bitch.” In response, J.C. started to yell and scream profanities at the minor. According to Jacobson, Officer Magana came out of the principal’s office because he was concerned about the shouting. Jacobson told the minor to leave the building, and he complied.
2. Officer Ronald Cooper
Officer Cooper testified that he was at Terrabella Academy on December 3, 2008, conducting follow-up interviews of students regarding an incident which took place the day before Thanksgiving “where 12 kids were fighting in the middle of the street... [and] one of the kids was stabbed.” Based on the case and previous interviews he had conducted, Officer Cooper considered the minor to be a suspect in “a [section] 242 battery.”
Officer Cooper came out of an office where he was conducting an interview when Jacobson came up to him and reported what she had heard the minor say to J.C. Officer Cooper then interviewed the minor about what Jacobson had reported. The minor claimed that he did not say anything and did not threaten J.C. When Officer Cooper said that Jacobson had heard him tell J.C., “Don’t say anything, bitch,” the minor changed his story and admitted speaking to J.C. but claimed not to remember what he said. According to Officer Cooper, the minor was upset during the interview and “cried a little when he told me [he] wasn’t lying to me.”
B. The defense case
The minor testified on his own behalf, and said that he was going to use the restroom on December 3, 2008, and was aware that Jacobson was following him, though he indicated that was not unusual. He saw J.C., who is the younger brother of one of the minor’s friends, in the waiting area of the office. The minor said he knew there were police officers on campus, and when he saw J.C., he “just looked at him, really.” The minor saw that the door to the principal’s office was closed, and he had heard, from J.C.’s brother and other students, that J.C. was in trouble for wearing inappropriate pants. He denied saying anything to J.C., and denied that J.C. ever said anything back to him.
Before submitting the case to the court for adjudication, defense counsel argued that the People had failed to present evidence that J.C. was either a victim or a witness to a crime, nor that the minor was trying to dissuade J.C. from providing information about a crime to the police. She stated, “[The People] have not produced any evidence that the young man in question was either a victim or a witness to a crime. Nor have they been--have they proved that--if the Court believed that the attempted dissuading took place, that the dissuading was to avoid giving information to police or to a Judge or something like that. [¶] A young man is waiting outside the principal’s office. The principal’s door is closed. There’s been no announcement made that there is something being investigated, and the young man is waiting outside the principal’s office.”
C. The adjudication
The juvenile court sustained the allegation, finding “that there’s sufficient evidence that and [I] believe beyond a reasonable doubt that count one is true as alleged and that considering the evidence the Court also finds that to be a felony. And I, therefore, sustain the petition, the D petition at this time.”
II. Discussion
A. Standard of review for insufficiency of the evidence claims
In determining whether the evidence is sufficient to support a finding in a juvenile court proceeding, the reviewing court is bound by the same principles as to sufficiency and the substantiality of the evidence which govern the review of criminal convictions generally. (In re Roderick P. (1972) 7 Cal.3d 801, 809.) These principles include the following: “It is the prosecution’s burden in a criminal case to prove every element of a crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” (People v. Cuevas (1995) 12 Cal.4th 252, 260.) The appellate court, in examining whether the prosecution has introduced sufficient evidence to meet this burden, must determine “ ‘whether from the evidence, including all reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom, there is any substantial evidence of the existence of each element of the offense charged.’ ” (People v. Crittenden (1994) 9 Cal.4th 83, 139, fn. 13.) In making this determination, “[the appellate court] must examine the whole record in the light most favorable to the judgment to determine whether it discloses substantial evidence--evidence that is reasonable, credible and of solid value--such that a reasonable trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. [Citation.] The appellate court presumes in support of the judgment the existence of every fact the trier could reasonably deduce from the evidence.” (People v. Kraft (2000) 23 Cal.4th 978, 1053.)
B. Sufficiency of the evidence to support the charged offense
Section 136.1, subdivision (b)(1) provides: “Except as provided in subdivision (c), every person who attempts to prevent or dissuade another person who has been the victim of a crime or who is witness to a crime from doing any of the following is guilty of a public offense and shall be punished by imprisonment in a county jail for not more than one year or in the state prison: [¶] (1) Making any report of that victimization to any peace officer or state or local law enforcement officer or probation or parole or correctional officer or prosecuting agency or to any judge.” “To prove a violation of section 136.1, subdivision (b)(1), the prosecution must show (1) the defendant has attempted to prevent or dissuade a person (2) who is a victim or witness to a crime (3) from making any report of his or her victimization to any peace officer or other designated officials. Section 136.1, subdivision (b)(1) does not require that the defendant act knowingly and maliciously.” (People v. Upsher (2007) 155 Cal.App.4th 1311, 1320.)
The minor does not argue that the statement he reportedly made, “Don’t say anything, bitch” is insufficient to establish the first element, i.e., attempting to prevent or dissuade a person, of the charged offense. Instead, he argues that there was insufficient evidence that J.C. was a victim of or witness to a crime or that J.C. was about to make a report to the police officers.
With the appropriate standard of review in mind, we find that there was sufficient evidence here for a reasonable trier of fact to find the minor guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Jacobson testified that she was responsible for managing the students who were being interviewed by the police about the fight that occurred just before the Thanksgiving holiday, and that J.C. was sitting outside the office awaiting his interview. Officer Cooper testified that, based on the investigation he had conducted into the fight, the minor was a suspect in that assault. Jacobson overheard the minor tell J.C., in an angry and anxious tone, “Don’t say anything, bitch,” and described how J.C. began screaming profanities at the minor in response. Since J.C. was waiting to be interviewed by police about an assault in which the minor was a suspect, it was reasonable for the juvenile court to deduce from the testimony presented that J.C. was a victim or witness to the fight which the police were investigating, that J.C. was about to give a report to the police about that fight, and thus the reason the minor made that particular statement to J.C. was to dissuade him from reporting what he may have known about the assault. (People v. Lyons (1991) 235 Cal.App.3d 1456, 1461.)
The minor testified that he had heard that J.C. was “in trouble because he was wearing some pants that wasn’t [sic] appropriate for school.” Even assuming that were so, we fail to see how the minor telling J.C., “Don’t say anything, bitch,” could logically be related to J.C.’s violation of the school’s dress code.
III. Disposition
The dispositional order is affirmed.
WE CONCUR: Rushing, P.J., Elia, J.