Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Tulare County No. JJD062195, Hugo J. Loza, Commissioner.
Gillian Black, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Edmund G. Brown, Jr., Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Michael P. Farrell, Assistant Attorney General, Brian Alvarez and Sarah J. Jacobs, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
OPINION
Gomes, J.
In a juvenile wardship petition (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 602) filed February 26, 2008, it was alleged that appellant M.V., a minor, committed a felony violation of Penal Code section 245, subdivision (a)(1) (assault with a deadly weapon), with notice that the offense was a serious felony within the meaning of section 1192.7, subdivision (c), and that, in committing that offense, appellant inflicted great bodily injury (§ 12022.7, subd. (a)). The petition further stated that the prosecution intended to move for an increase of the maximum term of confinement by aggregating the terms of all previous sustained petitions. At the contested jurisdiction hearing, the juvenile court denied appellant’s motion to dismiss (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 701.1) and found the allegations true. At the subsequent disposition hearing, the court committed appellant to the Youth Correctional Center Unit for a term of 168 to 365 days and declared appellant’s maximum term of physical confinement (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 731, subd. (b)) to be seven years and ten months.
All further statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise stated.
On appeal, appellant contends the petition should be dismissed because: (1) the juvenile court applied the wrong legal standard when evaluating his self-defense claim; (2) applying the proper legal standard, the prosecutor’s evidence failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he did not act in self-defense; and (3) the juvenile court erred in denying his motion to dismiss. As we shall explain, we disagree with these contentions and will affirm the judgment.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORIES
Petitioner’s Case
On the afternoon of February 22, 2008, 15-year-old M. was hanging out at his house with his 15-year-old friend C., and M.’s sister and her friends Cl. and B. At some point in the afternoon, appellant, who was also 15, spoke with Cl. on the telephone, who told appellant she was at M.’s house. Cl. told appellant not to come over and she would meet him at a fast food restaurant. Sometime later, appellant showed up at M.’s house. Cl. spoke to appellant at the front door and told him to leave because she didn’t want any trouble. Appellant told her to tell M. and C. that he would be waiting for them around the corner if they wanted any problems and walked away.
Cl. went to M.’s room and told them what appellant said. M. and C. told Cl. they wanted to find out why appellant came over. They emptied their pockets of change and money, and M. took off his jacket and put on a belt. M. and C. walked outside the house, followed by B. and Cl. Cl. followed the boys because she wanted to make sure they didn’t do anything. She thought the boys might do something as they were acting like they were going to go and beat up somebody, although they never said that. M.’s sister followed the group out.
After the group turned the corner, Cl. saw appellant, who was walking away. Appellant continued walking until Cl. yelled “white boy,” which was appellant’s nickname. Appellant stopped and turned around. M. and C. walked up to appellant. M. asked appellant why he was there. Appellant responded that he was there to talk to Cl. C., who was standing five to ten feet behind M., remained silent. M. and appellant started talking back and forth; they were “talking crap” to each other. M. told appellant he didn’t want him coming around his house ever again. Appellant said “I’ll get locked up for attempted murder right now.” M. perceived that as a threat.
M. and appellant began circling each other. M. felt intimidated and thought appellant was going to swing at him. Cl., who along with C. and the other witnesses was standing six or seven feet from M. and appellant, saw M. punch appellant in his neck area, but claimed he did not hit appellant “that hard.” Although M. testified on direct examination that he did not hit appellant, but had swung and missed, he admitted on cross-examination that he grazed appellant, explaining that he “barely felt it on my knuckle” as he “barely clipped” the tip of appellant’s nose. M. claimed he did not make full contact.
Appellant stabbed M. in his left side, right above the hip area, and ran away. C. chased appellant while holding a metal pipe that he found in the road during the chase. M. had surgery the day he was stabbed and temporary staples were inserted at the site of the stab wound. He remained in the hospital for three days. No internal organs were affected and he suffered no complications from the injury.
According to M., C. and Cl., neither M. nor C. had a weapoN.M. denied having a knife in his pocket and claimed he did not show any weapons during the fight. C. denied having anything in his hands before the fight and denied participating in the fight, claiming he did not say anything when M. and appellant were exchanging words. Cl. did not see either boy with anything that might hurt someone.
In a police interview three days after the stabbing, appellant told police M.’s sister told him to come to the house. When he showed up there, she invited him in, but M. and C. said they would “beat his ass” if he came inside. After appellant left, M. and C. approached him and M. asked him why he disrespected his house. Appellant saw M. was holding what appeared to be a knife and C. was holding a pipe or stick. Appellant tried to talk his way out of the situation, but M. swung at him. Appellant thought he was going to be stabbed by the knife, but he was actually struck by M.’s fist and knocked to the ground. Appellant got up off the ground, removed a knife-like object from his pocket that he had found earlier in a field, and stabbed M. Appellant took off. C. chased him while holding the pipe. In the course of the investigation, police never found either the knife appellant used or the knife or pipe allegedly held by either M. or C. Police did not find any injuries on appellant.
Ruling on Motion to Dismiss
After the prosecution’s case, defense counsel made a motion under Welfare and Institutions Code section 701.1 to dismiss based on the lack of evidence. He argued that the People did not meet their burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant did not act in lawful self-defense. Defense counsel asserted the issue in the case was not whether there was self-defense, but whether appellant applied reasonable or excessive force in striking the victim with a knife. Defense counsel argued it was not unreasonable for appellant to produce a weapon when he was confronted by more than one individual, there was nothing to contradict appellant’s assertion to police that M. and C. were armed, and appellant stopped fighting after stabbing M.
The prosecutor agreed the issue boiled down “to proportionality and whether the amount of force used by the minor in this case was, in fact, warranted.” The prosecutor argued the proper, legal response to M. punching appellant would have been to throw a punch to defend himself, but he crossed the line when he decided not to use his fist and instead pulled out a knife and stabbed the victim. The prosecutor asserted the self-defense claim went out the window when appellant chose to escalate the fight beyond what it could have been, “just a fist fight between two 15-year-old boys,” and into a much more serious situation.
The court denied the motion. The court explained there was no question appellant had a right of self-defense when M. threw the first punch, and the issue was whether appellant “used only the force that was reasonably necessary against the danger perceived.” The court stated the law was clear that a defendant only is entitled to use that amount of force that a reasonable person would believe is necessary in the same situation, and if the defendant uses more force than was reasonable, he or she did not act in lawful self-defense. The court thought appellant clearly had the right to use force to defend himself against a punch, “perhaps by throwing another punch, but I think the use of the knife clearly is force beyond what is necessary to defend himself.”
The court further explained, “Now, there are some circumstances here that indicate that perhaps [appellant] was concerned because there were other individuals there, but all three of the witnesses who testified, including Cl[.], who I believed, I think was a credible witness in terms of the way she testified, that neither [M.] nor C[.] were armed at any time prior to the altercation, and in fact, she never saw a pipe. She was told later on by C[.] that he had picked up a pipe when he was chasing [appellant]. At no time were there any weapons used by [M.] or C[.], and from the testimony of Cl[.] and the other minors, C[.] was there, perhaps as a show of force, but he didn’t engage in any of the verbal altercation, he didn’t do anything other than the fact that he was there, approximately, seven feet or so away from where [appellant] and [M.] were at during the time of the altercation, so I do believe that the evidence does show that the minor used excessive force in his defense and so the motion is denied.”
Defense Case
Appellant testified he weighs 168 pounds and is approximately 5’10” or 5’11” tall; M. is a little bit smaller. Appellant denied instructing Cl. to tell M. and C. that if they wanted to talk to him, he would be around the corner. Appellant knew the group was coming after him when Cl. said “Hey, white boy.” Appellant turned around and saw the two boys and three girls quickly walking towards him. Appellant thought because “they” had told him to beat it or he would get his “butt kicked” that C. and M. were going to beat him up. Appellant saw something in C.’s sleeve that looked like a pipe or stick. He also saw M. was holding a closed switch blade knife in his hand. Appellant said he was frightened and in fear for his life. He thought he was going to be stabbed, jumped or hurt, and that C. was going to be part of that.
M. punched appellant while holding the closed knife in his hand and hit him in the area between his chin and the base of his neck. Appellant claimed the force of the punch caused him to lose his breath and he went down on one knee. Appellant then swung, “stabbed [M.] in the side,” and ran away. Appellant claimed the object he used to stab M. was not a knife, describing it as a short sharp object that was made of wood and metal, which he found while walking from the fairgrounds and put in his left, front pocket.
Court’s Ruling on the Petition
The prosecutor argued the case came down to proportionality. The prosecutor asserted the evidence did not support appellant’s version of events, as there was no evidence to support his claim that M. and C. were armed. The prosecutor pointed out that Cl. was a credible witness who testified that the boys were unarmed, and the only evidence they were armed was appellant’s statement, which the prosecutor claimed was self-serving. With respect to proportionality, the prosecutor contended appellant’s use of the knife escalated the altercation to the point that appellant no longer could hide behind a claim of self-defense.
Defense counsel responded that proportionality was not the law, instead the standard was whether the person, knowing what he knew at that moment, acted reasonably. Defense counsel argued the court should apply the standard set forth in CALCRIM No. 3470, i.e. “when deciding whether the defendant’s beliefs were reasonable considering all the circumstances as they were known to and appear to the defendant, and consider what a reasonable person in a similar situation with similar knowledge would have believed. If the defendant’s beliefs were reasonable, the danger does not even need to have existed.” Defense counsel asserted appellant reasonably believed the boys were armed and that self-defense was necessary because he said the boys were armed, the boys were obviously hostile, and appellant was scared and knew they were going to beat him up. He further argued that appellant did not need to wait until someone produced a weapon and the relevant issue was what appellant saw, “not what we think today is accurate or whether it was proportional or whether they found other weapons or not.”
The prosecutor responded that the issue was whether appellant had a reasonable belief that the boys were armed, and asserted his belief was unreasonable because there was no other evidence the boys were armed and no weapons were found. The prosecutor stated that “maybe the minor had a belief that they were armed, maybe that was his belief, but was it a reasonable belief, and our position is that it was, in fact, not a reasonable belief.”
The court agreed the issue came down not to a subjective standard of what appellant believed to be the circumstances, but rather the reasonable person’s standard as stated in CALCRIM No. 3470, i.e. “what the reasonable person would conclude from all the facts as they were known or presented to him at that situation.” The court believed the matter came down to the third element under CALCRIM No. 3470, namely “ did the defendant use no more force than was reasonably necessary to defend against the danger.”
The court noted that what appellant had going for him was that there were other individuals there. The court considered what bias M., C. and Cl. would have to fabricate or say something different than what actually took place, and concluded that Cl.’s testimony corroborated the testimony of M. and C. that they were not armed, which to the court was a “very significant factor because if either one of these individuals was armed, specifically [M.], obviously this minor would have a right of self-defense.” The court found, however, there was absolutely no evidence that either M. or C. was armed before the altercation. The court also found that appellant’s statement before the physical altercation to the effect that he would get locked up for attempted murder showed that he was “willing and intended to use that knife even before the punch is thrown.” The court also considered that no other witness testified appellant fell to the ground after the punch was thrown.
The court explained: “[I]t all comes down to the fact that this minor simply used excessive force in defending himself against a punch. It doesn’t appear to me this was a confrontation, a mutual combat situation where if the minor had not used the knife he certainly would have been within his rights, his legal rights, to use fists to defend himself, but the fact that he used a knife to defend himself against a fist clearly is excessive force more than was necessary to defend himself. There’s no indication that C[] had jumped in or was involved in that fight at that time. Perhaps [appellant] had some concern about that, but there’s no indication that C[] had done anything up to that point so at this point the Court does find that the 245 (a)(1) has been shown true.” The court also found the section 12022.7 great bodily injury allegation true and denied appellant’s request for a misdemeanor finding.
DISCUSSION
Appellant contends the prosecutor failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he did not act in self-defense, therefore the evidence was insufficient to support the juvenile court’s finding against him on this point. Appellant also contends the trial court misunderstood the legal requirements of self-defense and therefore improperly denied his motion to dismiss and sustained the petition based on the same incorrect legal standard.
I. Sufficiency of the Evidence
We begin with sufficiency of the evidence. It was undisputed appellant committed assault with a deadly weapon by stabbing M. with a knife. (§ 245, subd. (a)(1).) Appellant, however, argues the prosecutor failed to prove that he was not acting in self-defense when he stabbed M. Specifically, appellant asserts the prosecutor failed to prove that (1) his belief that he was in imminent danger of suffering bodily injury was not actual and reasonable, (2) the immediate use of force was not necessary to defend against the danger, and (3) appellant used more force than was reasonably necessary to defend against the danger.
A. Standard of Review
Like those of an adult criminal proceeding, factual findings of a juvenile court are reviewed under the substantial evidence test. (In re Rebecca R. (2006) 143 Cal.App.4th 1426, 1430; In re Misako R. (1991) 2 Cal.App.4th 538, 545 (Misako R.).) The appellate court views factual findings of the juvenile court in the light most favorable to the respondent to determine whether substantial evidence exists to support the conclusion of the trier of fact. (In re H.B. (2008) 161 Cal.App.4th 115, 119-120.) The reviewing court indulges all reasonable inferences to uphold the judgment, and “‘[i]f there is substantial evidence supporting the judgment, our duty ends and the judgment must not be disturbed.’” (Id. at p. 120.) Evidence sufficient to support the court’s finding must be reasonable and credible in nature. (Ibid.; Constance K. v. Superior Court (1998) 61 Cal.App.4th 689, 705.) When two conflicting inferences may be deduced from the facts, “‘“either deduction will be supported by substantial evidence, and ‘a reviewing court is without power to substitute its deductions for those of the trial court.’”’” (Misako R., supra, 2 Cal.App.4th at p. 545, quoting In re Eric J. (1979) 25 Cal.3d 522, 527.) It is exclusively the province of the trial court or jury to determine the credibility of witnesses and the truth of the facts upon which a determination depends. (People v. Guerra (2006) 37 Cal.4th 1067, 1141, disapproved on other grounds in People v. Rundle (2008) 43 Cal.4th 76, 151.)
B. Governing Law
The juvenile court relied on CALCRIM No. 3470 in ruling on the issue of self-defense. CALCRIM No. 3470 excuses assault with a deadly weapon when three elements are present: (1) the defendant reasonably believed he or she was in imminent danger of suffering bodily injury; (2) the defendant reasonably believed the immediate use of force was necessary to defend against that danger; and (3) the defendant used no more force than was reasonably necessary to defend against that danger. (CALCRIM No. 3470.) The defendant is not required to retreat. He or she is entitled to stand his or her ground and defend himself or herself and, if necessary, pursue the assailant until the danger has passed. (Ibid.)
The right to the use of force, however, continues only as long as the danger reasonably appears to exist. (CALCRIM No. 3474; see People v. Ross (2007) 155 Cal.App.4th 1033, 1044 (Ross).) Similarly, the use of excessive force destroys the justification of self-defense. (People v. Hardin (2000) 85 Cal.App.4th 625, 629-630.) When the defendant uses force which is excessive to the threatened harm, the third element of self-defense is wanting and the use of force is not excused. (Ibid.) The objective standard is used to determine whether the amount of force was reasonable. (CALCRIM No. 3470.) Finally, the harm the defendant is faced with must be imminent in nature. (People v. Humphrey (1996) 13 Cal.4th 1073, 1089.)
Where the defendant has produced evidence sufficient to raise a reasonable doubt as to whether or not he acted in self-defense, the prosecutor must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant did not act in self-defense. (People v. Tewksbury (1976) 15 Cal.3d 953, 963; People v. Lee (2005) 131 Cal.App.4th 1413, 1429.) “The accused has no burden of proof or persuasion, even as to his defenses.” (People v. Gonzalez (1990) 51 Cal.3d 1179, 1214-1215.)
“Issues arising out of self-defense, including whether the circumstances would cause a reasonable person to perceive the necessity of defense, whether the defendant actually acted out of defense of himself, and whether the force used was excessive, are normally questions of fact for the trier of fact to resolve.” (People v. Clark (1982) 130 Cal.App.3d 371, 378 (Clark), disapproved on other grounds in People v. Blakeley (2000) 23 Cal.4th 82, 92.) “[W]here the evidence is uncontroverted and establishes all of the elements for a finding of self-defense,” it may be found as a matter of law. (Clark, at p. 379.) However, where the evidence tends to show a situation in which the use of force may not be justified, or where the evidence is uncontroverted but reasonable persons could differ on whether the resort to force was justified or whether the force resorted to was excessive, the self-defense issue is a question of fact for the trier of fact. (Ibid.)
C. Analysis
The parties and the juvenile court agreed that the self-defense issue came down to the third element stated in CALCRIM No. 3470, namely whether appellant used no more force than was reasonably necessary to defend against the danger. The juvenile court acknowledged this determination was based on the reasonable person standard, i.e. “what the reasonable person would conclude from all the facts as they were known or presented to him at that situation.” The juvenile court found that while a number of individuals were there when M. confronted appellant, neither M. nor C. was armed, C. did not participate in the confrontation or the physical altercation, appellant had said during the confrontation that he would get locked up for attempted murder, and appellant did not fall to the ground when M. punched him. Given these facts, the juvenile court concluded appellant’s use of the knife constituted excessive force because a reasonable person in appellant’s position would not have a used a knife in response to the danger presented — a fistfight with another 15-year-old boy.
Substantial evidence supports this conclusion M., C. and Cl. all testified that the boys were not armed. While the three girls followed M. and C. out to the site of the confrontation, C. and the girls remained five to ten feet away from M. and appellant while they were verbally confronting each other. According to Cl., during the argument, appellant said that he would “get locked up for attempted murder right now.” While M. initiated the fight by throwing a punch at appellant, according to Cl. and M., M. did not hit him very hard and did not knock him to the ground. From this testimony, the juvenile court reasonably could conclude that the danger presented was merely a fistfight by a single 15-year-old boy, and that the use of a knife in response to that danger was not reasonably necessary.
Appellant points out that the prosecutor, in his closing argument, conceded appellant actually believed that M. and C. were armed. But even if appellant actually believed they were armed, the evidence supported the juvenile court’s factual finding that this belief was not reasonable. While it is true that the use of all force necessary to repel the attack is justifiable even if one misapprehends the situation, this rule only applies if a reasonable person in the same circumstances would have perceived danger. (Clark, supra, 130 Cal.App.3d at p. 377; People v. Collins (1961) 189 Cal.App.2d 575, 588.) Here, the juvenile court found a reasonable person in appellant’s situation would not have perceived danger that required the use of a knife given the facts it found true — that appellant engaged in a verbal altercation with only M., neither M. nor C. was armed, and when M. punched him, M. did not hit appellant very hard. Although appellant may have feared being injured, the juvenile court found a reasonable person would not have concluded it was necessary to use a knife to defend against a punch.
Appellant argues “the evidence in this case strongly supports the claim that appellant’s action was lawful.” It is not our function, however, in reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, to “ reweigh the evidence, reappraise the credibility of the witnesses, or resolve factual conflicts, as these are functions reserved for the trier of fact.” (People v. Craig (1994) 25 Cal.App.4th 1593, 1597 (Craig).) Our job is only to ensure that the evidence in support of the judgment is reasonable, credible, and of solid value. (Ibid.) We conclude that it is.
Motion to Dismiss and Sustaining of the Petition
Appellant contends the juvenile court misunderstood the law and applied the incorrect legal standard when he made a motion to dismiss pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 701.1. Appellant further argues that the juvenile court stated the same logic when it sustained the allegation in the petition that he committed assault with a deadly weapon and therefore the juvenile court’s findings are based on the wrong legal standard.
Both in ruling on the motion to dismiss and sustaining the petition, the juvenile court framed the issue as whether appellant used only the force reasonably necessary against the perceived danger. The juvenile court made factual findings regarding the danger presented and, applying those findings, determined that appellant’s use of the knife was excessive because a reasonable person in those circumstances would not believe the use of a knife was necessary to defend against the danger.
Appellant contends that because the juvenile court found that M. and C. were not armed, it altered the formulation of the reasonable person standard by adding a requirement that appellant’s belief be accurate. We disagree. It is apparent from the juvenile court’s rulings denying the motion to dismiss and sustaining the petition that the juvenile court found appellant’s belief that M. and C. were armed was unreasonable because there was no basis for a reasonable person to believe they were armed. This was not a misapplication of the reasonable person standard; rather, it was the application of it.
Appellant next contends the juvenile court did not take into consideration his fear that an assault by C. was imminent and did not analyze the reasonableness of this fear. We again disagree. The juvenile court found that C. had not done anything that would suggest he was going to participate in the fight. Accordingly, the juvenile court concluded, albeit impliedly, appellant’s belief that C. was going to participate in the fight was unreasonable.
Appellant also asserts the juvenile court did not discuss how the number of people confronting him at the time of the incident affected his perception of the danger he faced and the action he took in light of that perception. The juvenile court, however, in ruling on the petition, stated that “what the minor has going for him, as I’ve indicated before, is that there were other individuals there,... ” As we read this statement, the juvenile court did consider the group’s presence but decided, in light of the other facts it found, namely that the group remained away from the altercation, C. did not participate in the altercation, M. and C. were unarmed, and M. did not hit appellant hard enough to knock him to the ground, that a reasonable person would not have concluded the mere fact of the group’s presence presented a danger that made the use of a knife necessary.
Pointing out that reasonableness is judged by how the situation appeared to the defendant (People v. Minifie (1996) 13 Cal.4th 1055), appellant contends the juvenile court “erred by viewing the evidence through the lens of hindsight, rather than looking at whether appellant’s assessment and actions were reasonable, given the circumstances as they presented themselves to him at the time.” Here, the juvenile court concluded that the situation as it appeared to appellant was that he was engaged in a fistfight with one 15-year-old boy, who was unarmed. The juvenile court was not required to believe appellant when he testified that M. and C. were armed. As stated above, it is not our function to reweigh the evidence, reappraise the credibility of witnesses or resolve factual conflicts. (Craig, supra, 25 Cal.App.4th at p. 1597.)
Contrary to appellant’s assertion, the juvenile court did not find the use of the knife excessive merely because it was in response to a punch. Instead, the juvenile court considered all of the circumstances and found that given those circumstances, the use of the knife was excessive.
The case appellant relies on, Ross, supra, 155 Cal.App.4th 1033, is instructive. There, the court explained that the consequences of the use of force, i.e. broken bones caused by a slap to the face, did not necessarily make the force used, i.e. the slap to the face, unreasonable: “The test is not whether the force used appears excessive in hindsight but whether it appeared reasonably necessary to avert threatened harm under the circumstances at the time. The law grants a reasonable margin within which one may err on the side of his own safety, and so long as he is found to have done so reasonably, no abuse of the right of self-defense should be found to have occurred. A leading forms book makes a similar point in a proposed jury instruction: ‘[I]n using force in self-defense, a person may use only that amount of force, and no more, that is reasonably necessary for that person’s protection. However, since in the heat of conflict or in the fact of an impending peril a person cannot be expected to measure accurately the exact amount of force necessary to repel an attack, that person will not be deemed to have exceeded his or her rights unless the force used was so excessive as to be clearly vindictive under the circumstances. Thus, a person’s right of self-defense is limited by the reasonableness of his or her belief that such force was necessary at that time and under the particular circumstances.’” (Ross, supra, 155 Cal.App.4th at p. 1057.)
Applying these principles here, the juvenile court reasonably found, based on the evidence, that appellant’s use of the knife was so excessive as to be clearly vindictive under the circumstances: where appellant challenged M. and C. to come out of the house; when they did, they were unarmed; only M. participated in the verbal altercation with appellant; and during that altercation, M. hit appellant with his fist, but not hard enough to knock him to the ground. While appellant may have believed the boys were armed, the evidence supports the conclusion that a reasonable person facing the situation appellant faced would not have believed that the immediate use of potentially lethal force was necessary. There is simply nothing in the record from which we could conclude the juvenile court misunderstood or misapplied the law of self-defense in denying the motion to dismiss and sustaining the petition’s allegations.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
WE CONCUR: Wiseman, Acting P.J., Kane, J.