Opinion
No. 16225 Index No. 500123/19
06-28-2022
In the Matter of the Application of Howard Muser, Petitioner-Respondent, for the Appointment of a Guardian of the Person and Property of Judith Brook, ED.D., An Alleged Incapacitated Person. Adam Brook, M.D., PD.D. Cross-Petitioner-Appellant, etc. Case Nos. 2020-04349, 2021-00693
Adam Brook, appellant pro se. Huth Reynolds, LLP, Huntington (Karl C. Huth of counsel), for respondent.
Adam Brook, appellant pro se.
Huth Reynolds, LLP, Huntington (Karl C. Huth of counsel), for respondent.
Before: Manzanet-Daniels, J.P., Oing, González, Higgitt, JJ.
Orders, Supreme Court, New York County (Kelly O'Neill Levy, J.), entered September 24, 2020, which, respectively, denied the motion of cross petitioner Adam Brook, M.D., PD.D. (petitioner), the son of the late incapacitated person, Judith Brook, ED.D., to compel respondent Howard Muser to comply with discovery demands, and declined to sign subpoenas that petitioner had emailed to chambers, unanimously affirmed, with costs.
The majority of petitioner's appeal is directed at challenging the appointment of a guardian in the first instance. However, the merits of the underlying guardianship application have already been the subject of an unsuccessful appeal before this Court (Matter of Muser v Muser, 192 A.D.3d 429 [1st Dept 2021], lv denied 37 N.Y.3d 914 [2021]), which we will not now disturb.
As to the merits of this appeal, Supreme Court providently exercised its discretion in denying the motion to compel and declining to sign the subpoenas emailed to chambers (see Matter of Bramble v New York City Dept. of Educ., 125 A.D.3d 856, 857 [2d Dept 2015]). The discovery sought was related to the fee applications of private attorneys and other court appointees in this guardianship proceeding, which is a matter that falls within the court's discretion (see Matter of Audrey J.S., 34 A.D.3d 820, 821 [2d Dept 2006]). With respect to both orders, the court properly determined that the documents requested are not necessary in determining a fee award, were not tailored to obtaining any relevant information, and that the requested information would have unduly delayed the proceeding (see Matter of City of Glen Cove Indus. Dev. Agency v Doxey, 79 A.D.3d 1038, 1038 [2d Dept 2010]; Bramble, 125 A.D.3d at 857).
We have considered petitioner's remaining contentions and find them unavailing.