Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
Del Norte County Super. Ct. No. JDSQ076278
Siggins, J.
Minor M.T. appeals from a jurisdictional order finding her to be a ward of the juvenile court. She contends reversal is required because the juvenile court erroneously denied her motion to suppress evidence obtained in violation of her constitutional rights to be free of unreasonable search and seizure. Alternatively, she seeks a remand to direct the juvenile court to declare whether her offense is a misdemeanor or a felony. We affirm.
BACKGROUND
This case began when Jeffrey Barney, the principal of Del Norte High School, saw M.T. and two other girls hiding in a wooded area on the school grounds. There were two burning cigarettes on the ground nearby the girls and cigarette smoke in the area. Barney asked the girls if they had any more cigarettes. M.T. said nothing, but her companion T.W. replied “no, we don’t have any more cigarettes. They’re all used up.” T.W. admitted that she had a lighter, and handed it to Barney.
Barney directed the girls to accompany him to his office. When the girls told Barney they attended Castle Rock High School, not Del Norte, Barney instead escorted them to the office at Castle Rock. T.W. was reluctant to comply with Barney’s directions. She asked him why they needed to go to the office. Barney explained that their parents had to be contacted and said “I’m afraid you might have something else with you.” T.W. replied that she only had a pocket knife, and produced a small knife with a locking blade from her purse. She appeared nervous and uncooperative, as if she had something to hide, and said the purse she was carrying belonged to a friend who was not there. Barney asked for the purse and, when T.W. refused to surrender it, took it from her. He was concerned that M.T. might also have a weapon, so he also asked for and obtained M.T.’s purse.
The third girl turned out to be a Del Norte High School student and was later taken back to Del Norte High School.
Barney walked the girls to the office of Castle Rock assistant principal David Zuber, where he searched both purses. In T.W.’s purse Barney found three knives, a lighter and a glass marijuana pipe, but no cigarettes or cigarette packages. In M.T.’s purse he found two more knives, four lighters, a pipe scraper, several empty containers that smelled like marijuana, two marijuana pipes and a medicine bottle that contained a number of pills.
A police officer responded to Zuber’s office. M.T. admitted to the officer that she owned the purse in which the pills were found. M.T. said she got the pills from her mother who gave them to M.T.
The Del Norte County District Attorney filed a juvenile petition alleging that M.T., who was already a ward of the court, came within the provisions of Welfare and Institutions Code section 602 because she was a minor in possession of tobacco (Count I); possessed a knife on school grounds (Count II); and possessed a controlled substance (Count III). M.T. admitted Counts I and III but denied Count II. During the jurisdictional hearing on Count II the court heard and denied a motion to suppress the evidence found in M.T.’s purse. The petition as to Count II was sustained and M.T. continued as a ward of the court on probation.
M.T. had recently been adjudicated a ward of the court and placed on formal probation after she admitted allegations of a curfew violation (an infraction), misdemeanor disruptive presence at school, and misdemeanor public intoxication.
This appeal timely followed.
DISCUSSION
I. The Motion to Suppress
M.T. contends the search of her purse was unconstitutional because Barney lacked a reasonable suspicion that she had engaged in proscribed conduct. Her contention is meritless.
“The standard of review of a trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress is well established and is equally applicable to juvenile court proceedings. ‘ “On appeal from the denial of a suppression motion, the court reviews the evidence in a light favorable to the trial court’s ruling. [Citation.] We must uphold those express or implied findings of fact by the trial court that are supported by substantial evidence and independently determine whether the facts support the court’s legal conclusions.” ’ ” (In re Lennies H. (2005) 126 Cal.App.4th 1232, 1236.)
“Determining the reasonableness of any search involves a twofold inquiry: first, one must consider ‘whether the . . . action was justified at its inception,’ [citation]; second, one must determine whether the search as actually conducted ‘was reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified the interference in the first place.’ Under ordinary circumstances, a search of a student by a teacher or other school official will be ‘justified at its inception’ when there are reasonable grounds for suspecting that the search will turn up evidence that the student has violated or is violating either the law or the rules of the school. Such a search will be permissible in its scope when the measures adopted are reasonably related to the objectives of the search and not excessively intrusive in light of the age and sex of the student and the nature of the infraction.” (New Jersey v. T. L. O. (1985) 469 U.S. 325, 341-342, fns. omitted; see also In re William G. (1985) 40 Cal.3d 550, 564 [reasonable suspicion must be supported by articulable facts].)
Here, Barney observed three girls hiding in a wooded area on school grounds. Cigarette smoke was in the air and there were two burning cigarette butts on the ground. Three girls; two cigarettes. Given this scenario, the school principal had ample reason to suspect that M.T. had been smoking and, as a matter of common sense and experience, that a search of her purse would likely yield cigarettes. (See New Jersey v. T. L. O., supra, 469 U.S. at pp. 345-346.) The search was justified and reasonably related in scope to the specific circumstances of M.T.’s misconduct. The juvenile court properly denied M.T.’s motion to suppress.
II. Status of the Knife Possession Offense
Welfare and Institutions Code section 702 provides in part that when a juvenile offender is found to have committed an offense which, if committed by an adult, would be punishable as either a felony or a misdemeanor, “the court shall declare the offense to be a misdemeanor or felony.” The reasons for the requirement of an express declaration are twofold: to provide a record from which the maximum term of confinement can be determined, and to ensure that the juvenile court is aware of and exercises its discretion under section 702. (In re Manzy W. (1997) 14 Cal.4th 1199, 1205, 1207.)
M.T. asserts the juvenile court erred because it failed to declare on the record whether her possession of a knife on school grounds (Pen. Code, § 626.10; Count II) was a misdemeanor or a felony, and therefore that the case must be remanded for an express declaration pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 702. She is mistaken. The People observe, correctly, that the petition expressly charged M.T. with a “MISDEMEANOR” violation of Penal Code section 626.10. “When a crime is punishable, in the discretion of the court, by imprisonment in the state prison or by fine or imprisonment in the county jail, it is a misdemeanor for all purposes under the following circumstances: [¶] . . . [¶] (4) When the prosecuting attorney files in a court having jurisdiction over misdemeanor offenses a complaint specifying that the offense is a misdemeanor . . . .” (Pen. Code, § 17, subd. (b); cf. Necochea v. Superior Court (1972) 23 Cal.App.3d 1012, 1014-1015.) As the People note, since the petition specifically charged that M.T. committed a misdemeanor, the court could not have found that she committed a felony. M.T. agrees that the allegation must “remain a misdemeanor,” as do we. Because Count II was specifically charged as a misdemeanor, Penal Code section 17, subdivision (b)(4) makes clear that it is a misdemeanor for all purposes. Assuming arguendo that the absence of the court’s express declaration under Welfare and Institutions Code section 702 was erroneous in this situation, it was harmless error and there is no point in remanding this case for a superfluous declaration. (See In re Manzy W., supra, 14 Cal.4th at p. 1209 [harmless error analysis under Welfare and Institutions Code section 702].) We do, however, remand for correction of the record to clarify that the offense is a misdemeanor.
DISPOSITION
The matter is remanded with directions to amend the juvenile court minutes to reflect that the knife possession offense was a misdemeanor. With that amendment, the judgment is affirmed.
We concur: Pollak, Acting P.J., Jenkins, J.