Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Santa Cruz County Super. Ct. Nos. DP000527, DP000841.
Judge of the Santa Clara County Superior Court assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.
Mother K. S. appeals from juvenile court orders of June 23, 2010, terminating her parental rights to her daughter, M. S., and her son, D. S. She essentially contends that she demonstrated in the trial court a compelling reason to avoid termination, namely that she has maintained regular visitation and contact with the children and they would benefit from continuing the relationship. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(i).) This contention, and mother’s other arguments, are not well taken, and for the reasons stated below, we will affirm the orders.
Unspecified section references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
A. Prior Juvenile Court Proceedings
For her entire adult life, mother K.S., an educated and intelligent person, has struggled with debilitating mental illness, specifically schizo-affective disorder. She was involuntarily hospitalized 20 times between 1992 when she was first diagnosed, and the summer of 2008, when this action began.
The juvenile court and related services were involved in the lives of her daughter, born in April 2001, and her son, born in June 2003, almost from the very beginning. There were 24 Child Protection Services referrals between 2001 and 2008, nine of which were substantiated. The first time the children were placed in protective custody and declared dependents in August 2003 arose out of a situation in which two-year-old daughter was wandering unsupervised in a park while mother was home in a catatonic state.
The children’s father, himself a schizophrenic, separated from mother in August 2007 after approximately six and a half years of marriage, and stated that he was not able to take responsibility for their care or to protect them from their mother’s neglect. There was some domestic violence between the parents, leading to the family court’s issuance in August 2007 of a restraining order protecting mother and the children.
This action began in August 2008, after mother was reported to be under the influence of marijuana when she brought the children for their first day of school. Mother was found at home with son, incoherent and smelling heavily of marijuana. There were several empty whiskey bottles in the residence. Mother intended to pick daughter up from school, but the investigating social worker prevailed on her to have maternal grandmother pick her up. Mother said she had been taking her anti-psychotic medication but was not sure when she had last taken it. While a sheriff’s deputy was assisting in the removal of the children, mother drove away and was immediately arrested for driving under the influence.
At a detention hearing in September 2008, while mother was hospitalized, the court upheld the detention of the children and authorized supervised weekly visitation with the parents. Later that month, mother’s mental health professionals reported that when not symptomatic, mother is responsible and caring, but when under stress, usually combined with medication noncompliance and alcohol use, she becomes symptomatic: i.e., catatonic, blocked, agitated, disoriented, confused, delusional, avoidant, or confrontational.
Mother managed to attend only three of her weekly visits with the children between September 2008 and December 2, 2008. On only one of those occasions did mother really seem present and engaged with her children. The other two visits she abruptly left before the scheduled time had elapsed. Of the dozen visits missed by mother, she did not call to cancel the visits.
On December 2, 2008, the court conducted a jurisdiction hearing in mother’s absence, rejecting another request by her for a continuance. The court sustained the dependency petitions, finding all their allegations true.
At a disposition hearing on December 16, 2008, mother and father were not present. The court modified visitation to one supervised visit per month, subject to an increase in the social worker’s discretion, and appointed the foster parents to be the children’s educational representatives.
At a continued disposition hearing on January 14, 2009, mother was again in the hospital and father was also absent. The court found the children to be dependents and continued mother’s monthly supervised visits, requiring mother to call and confirm visits in advance.
Mother was readmitted to the hospital in February 2009 and in March 2009. When she was not present at the March 10, 2009 three-month review hearing, the court denied a request by her counsel to continue the hearing.
Father’s weekly visits were terminated in April 2009 because he missed too many of them and had not complied with any part of his reunification plan.
At the six-month review hearing on June 16, 2009, the court scheduled a settlement conference and specified that mother’s phone contact would be three times weekly. On July 23, 2009, the court continued the children as dependents and increased mother’s supervised visits to two per month.
The children continued to reside with two foster parents in the same home in which they were originally placed on November 2, 2008. On October 13, 2009, without opposition from the parents, the court granted the request of the foster parents to be de facto parents. As of January 2010, the children appeared happy and secure and had formed a strong connection with the foster parents who were interested in adopting the children.
On January 26, 2010, the court ordered termination of reunification services and three supervised visits per month for mother, and set a date for the section 366.26 hearing.
B. The Section 366.26 Hearing
A contested hearing took place on June 23, 2010. Father was not present, and stated through his guardian ad litem that although he did not want his parental rights terminated, he was unable to care for his children. The Consortium for Children had been unable to work out a post-adoption visitation agreement. The adoptive parents were open to contact with a strong structure.
The court heard testimony from Melissa Klein, a social worker, that daughter is generally and specifically adoptable. Daughter has expressed the need for permanence, saying she did not want to have to move again and wanted to stay with her foster family. She said she wants to be adopted and stay in her foster home. She loves her mother but it does not work to live with her. Son, who needs extra support, guidance, and stability, told Ms. Klein to tell the judge that he wants to stay where he is forever.
Minor’s counsel quoted daughter as saying that she loves her mother but does not want to live with her. Daughter would like to see mother and grandmother once a month. Son said that he wants to be adopted and live with his foster parents and see his mother and grandmother once a month.
Mother testified that she had visited her children regularly since May 2009 except once in March when she was hospitalized with an ulcer. At the end of the visits, they exchange big hugs, tell her they love her and do not want the visit to end. She calls the children three times a week. She loves them, and she believes that they love her and have a very close loving relationship with her. She does not want her parental rights terminated because she would not be able to maintain the same level of contact with them and it “would just tear [her] apart.”
C. The Court’s Ruling
At the conclusion of the section 366.26 hearing, the court gave a comprehensive oral decision reviewing the history of the juvenile court proceedings and covering almost nine pages of the reporter’s transcript. Although the court did not make an express finding whether mother had established the elements of the parent-child exception, the court did expressly find by clear and convincing evidence that both children were generally and specifically adoptable and that there was no compelling reason to determine that termination of rights (and adoption) would be detrimental to them. On this basis, the court terminated the parental rights of mother and father.
The court went on to analyze in considerable factual detail the applicability of the parent-child exception. “The Court has to look at that and see whether or not that is a compelling reason to override the stability of the adoption for these two children. I only have a handful of cases where the children are so adamant about wanting to be adopted. Many times, the children are torn with the conflict, torn with loyalties. Not to say that these children aren’t torn, but they still have been able to personally identify what they want and what they need. However, the decision is not theirs. The decision is the Court’s, unless the child is 12 or over. The child must adhere to what the Court has decided for them.
“Is it a compelling reason in this case to set aside their option for adoption and the highest level of permanency to maintain the relationship with mother? The continuing relationship that mother has will [sic] with the children is one of family. It’s not one of a parental relationship. Mother has consistently visited. The visits are good. According to the visit logs, the interaction is appropriate. However, there’s not a parental interaction during those visits. The children do not look to the mother to be the parent. The children look to mother to have a good time during that visit, and then they’re fine with going back and going back into the life that they are settled in at this time.”
The court also noted that daughter “wants this case to be decided. She doesn’t want to have to wonder what is going to go on in the future.” The court noted that imposing a legal guardianship would prolong the lack of stability for the children. “That’s not the level of permanency that these children are both specifically asking for and so desperately need. [¶] The Court is not able to find that there’s a compelling reason to institute the exception in this case, because I do not believe that it’s in the children’s best interests to do so, and I do not believe that they would be benefit in any way.”
After making these rulings, the court then stated: “I am encouraged by the fact that they have, in fact, said that they want to have some ongoing contact with mom and grandma, which means they acknowledge that this is their family too. I’m hoping that the prospective adoptive parents can hear that loud and clear, because it’s important that the children are allowed to maintain contact. And it would not be to the level that there has been during this case, however, it’s important that they maintain contact and know that they do have more family here and that this family continues to love and care about them.
“It wouldn’t be three times a week calls, wouldn’t be possibly three times a month visits, but it would be some ongoing contact, which would be appropriate, so that the children still know where they come from and still know they have that family. That’s important.
“But as far as their day-to-day parental figures, for some time now, they have recognized that their biological parents are not their day-to-day parental figures, and they are desiring that the foster family be their permanent parental figures.
“[¶]... [¶]
“In this case, I will mark box 22, that the parties are going to continue to engage in discussions regarding post adoption contact, because I want that—I want that follow-through. I don’t want that to just drop off. The children are very clear they do want to continue to have contact with mom and grandma. So I want to continue those discussions. So by my making that record, I’m making it clear to the prospective adoptive parents that the children and the Court expect that those discussions should continue, which means that the Consortium For Children will continue to contact mother and grandmother in that regard.”
II. DISCUSSION
A. The Statutory Framework And The Standard Of Review
The state has a compelling interest in the welfare of children and may remove a child from parental custody under specified circumstances threatening harm to the child’s physical or emotional well-being. (In re Marilyn H. (1993) 5 Cal.4th 295, 306-307; §§ 300, 361, subd. (c).) Unless special circumstances authorize a bypass of reunification (§ 361.5, subd. (b)) or the parent had expressed disinterest in family maintenance or reunification (§ 360), when a child is removed from a parent’s custody, the state’s first priority is to preserve the family and reunify the child with his or her parents after overcoming the problems that led to removal. (Mark N. v. Superior Court (1998) 60 Cal.App.4th 996, 1010; cf. §§ 300.2; 319, subd. (e); 358, subd. (b).) To achieve this goal, the juvenile court must order a county social worker to provide welfare services to the parents and child, which ordinarily include family reunification (§§ 361.5, subd. (a)(1); 362, subd. (c); 16501.1, subd. (b)(4); 16507, subd. (a); Cynthia D. v. Superior Court (1993) 5 Cal.4th 242, 248-249; Tonya M. v. Superior Court (2007) 42 Cal.4th 836, 843) and, for children in foster care, “[v]isitation shall be as frequent as possible, consistent with the well-being of the child.” (§ 362.1, subd. (a)(1)(A).)
Ordinarily, reunification services must be offered for 12 months, with judicial review every six months. (§§ 361.5, subd. (a)(1)(A), 366.21, subd. (f), 366, 16507.) At each review hearing, there is a statutory presumption that the child should be returned to parental custody unless the social worker demonstrates that the return “would create a substantial risk of detriment to the safety, protection, or physical or emotional well-being of the child.” (§ 366.21, subds. (e), (f).) At the 12-month review hearing, if the court finds that reasonable reunification services have been provided and that there is no substantial probability of returning the child to parental custody, the court ordinarily terminates services and schedules a hearing under section 366.26 for the selection and implementation of a permanent plan, which may include a termination of parental rights. (§ 366.21, subd. (g)(2); Cynthia D., supra, 5 Cal.4th 242, 249.) Once reunification services are terminated, the statutory focus shifts away from reunification to providing a permanent, stable placement for the children. (In re Marilyn H., supra, 5 Cal.4th 295, 304.)
Under section 366.26, the statutory preference is to terminate parental rights and to order that the child be placed for adoption. (In re C.B. (2010) 190 Cal.App.4th 102, 121 (C.B.).) To terminate parental rights at a section 366.26 hearing, the court is only required to “make two findings: (1) that there is clear and convincing evidence that the minor will be adopted; and (2) that there has been a previous determination that reunification services shall be terminated.” (Cynthia D., supra, 5 Cal.4th at pp. 249–250.) Under those circumstances, “the court shall terminate parental rights unless either of the following applies:
Subdivision (c)(1) of section 366.26 provides in part: “If the court determines, based on the assessment provided as ordered under subdivision (i) of Section 366.21, subdivision (b) of Section 366.22, or subdivision (b) of Section 366.25, and any other relevant evidence, by a clear and convincing standard, that it is likely the child will be adopted, the court shall terminate parental rights and order the child placed for adoption.... A finding... under Section 366.21 or 366.22, that the court has continued to remove the child from the custody of the parent or guardian and has terminated reunification services, shall constitute a sufficient basis for termination of parental rights.”
“[¶]... [¶]
“(B) The court finds a compelling reason for determining that termination would be detrimental to the child due to one or more of the following circumstances: [¶] (i) The parents have maintained regular visitation and contact with the child and the child would benefit from continuing the relationship.” (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B).)
“While it is the child welfare agency’s burden to prove a likelihood of adoption [citation], the burden is on the parent or parents to establish the existence of one of the circumstances that are exceptions to termination. [Citation.]” (In re Thomas R. (2006) 145 Cal.App.4th 726, 731; cf. In re Erik P. (2002) 104 Cal.App.4th 395, 401; In re L. Y. L. (2002) 101 Cal.App.4th 942, 947, Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.725(d)(4).)
It is also the parent’s burden on appeal to establish that the trial court’s ruling was erroneous. (In re L. Y. L., supra, 101 Cal.App.4th 942, 947; In re Megan S. (2002) 104 Cal.App.4th 247, 251.) Where a parent appeals the juvenile court’s ruling that the beneficial relationship has not been established, appellate review involves a two-step process. First, the factual question of whether the elements of the beneficial relationship have been established is reviewed under the substantial evidence standard. A challenge to a juvenile court’s finding that there is no beneficial relationship amounts to a contention that the “undisputed facts lead to only one conclusion.” (In re I.W. (2009) 180 Cal.App.4th 1517, 1529 (I.W.).) Second, if the elements have been established, the court’s determination of whether there was a “compelling reason” to determine that termination of parental rights would be detrimental to the child is reviewed under an “abuse of discretion” standard. (In re Bailey J. (2010) 189 Cal.App.4th 1308, 1315.) The detriment finding is based on facts but is not primarily a factual issue. “It is, instead, a ‘quintessentially’ discretionary decision, which calls for the juvenile court to determine the importance of the relationship in terms of the detrimental impact that its severance can be expected to have on the child and to weigh that against the benefit to the child of adoption. (In re L. Y. L., supra, 101 Cal.App.4th at p. 951.)” (Id at p. 1315.)
Mother does not address the law concerning this two-step process, even in her reply brief. Although she acknowledges the authority holding that the abuse of discretion standard applies to a decision that an exception to termination of parental rights does not apply, mother nevertheless argues that a substantial evidence standard governs such review in this case. We review discretionary decisions, such as how to strike the balance between adoption and a continued parental relationship, for an abuse of discretion. (C.B., supra, 190 Cal.App.4th at p. 123.)
B. The Trial Court’s Decision Is Amply Supported By The Record And Was Not An Abuse Of Discretion.
Mother strenuously asserts that “the juvenile court was wrong”: essentially, that there is some evidence in the record that would have supported a different conclusion. She points out that, in the trial court, the Department stated that it did “not contend that there is no benefit to a continuing relationship between mother and the children. Certainly, there are a lot of positive aspects to their relationship. The children both expressed both in words and in gestures that they have a very loving relationship with their mother.” Mother scours the visitation logs for evidence in her favor, and emphasizes evidence from their visits that she guided them in activities such as encouraging them to write thank you notes. She asserts that earlier decisions such as In re Autumn H. (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 567 created an impossibly high threshold to establish the parent-child relationship exception, while more recent cases such as C.B., supra, 190 Cal.App.4th 102 reflect a trend toward greater appellate scrutiny of parents’ claims of a beneficial relationship.
While section 366.26 does not describe the kind of “benefit” a child must be receiving from a parent to avoid termination of parental rights and release of the child for adoption, cases have construed this language in its context of defining an exception to the statutory preference for permanence through adoption.
In In re Beatrice M. (1994) 29 Cal.App.4th 1411, 1419, this court quoted with approval this observation from Autumn H.: “ ‘Interaction between [a] natural parent and child will always confer some incidental benefit to the child.... The exception applies only where the court finds regular visits and contact have continued or developed a significant, positive, emotional attachment from child to parent.’ (In re Autumn H., supra, 27 Cal.App.4th at p. 575.)”
We elaborated on this idea in In re Brittany C. (1999) 76 Cal.App.4th 847. “We also interpret the statute as requiring the parent to show that he or she has a parent/child relationship with the child, rather than a friendship. While friendships are important, a child needs at least one parent. Where a biological parent, such as appellant, is incapable of functioning in that role, the child should be given every opportunity to bond with an individual who will assume the role of a parent.” (Id. at p. 854.)
More recently, in C.B., supra, 190 Cal.App.4th at page 124, this court explained: “The exception does not require proof the child has a ‘primary attachment’ to a parent or the parent has ‘maintained day-to-day contact’ with the child. (See In re S.B. (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 289, 299.)
“The exception’s second prong requiring that ‘the child would benefit from continuing the [parent/child] relationship’ means that ‘the relationship promotes the well-being of the child to such a degree as to outweigh the well-being the child would gain in a permanent home with new, adoptive parents.’ (In re Autumn H. (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 567, 575.) The juvenile court ‘balances the strength and quality of the natural parent/child relationship in a tenuous placement against the security and the sense of belonging a new family would confer.’ (Ibid.) ‘If severing the natural parent/child relationship would deprive the child of a substantial, positive emotional attachment such that the child would be greatly harmed, the preference for adoption is overcome and the natural parent’s rights are not terminated.’ (Ibid.)
“ ‘The exception must be examined on a case-by-case basis, taking into account the many variables which affect a parent/child bond. The age of the child, the portion of the child’s life spent in the parent’s custody, the “positive” or “negative” effect of interaction between parent and child, and the child’s particular needs are some of the variables which logically affect a parent/child bond.’ (Id. at pp. 575–576.)”
As this court explained in I.W., supra, 180 Cal.App.4th at page 1528: “In the case where the trier of fact has expressly or implicitly concluded that the party with the burden of proof did not carry the burden and that party appeals, it is misleading to characterize the failure-of-proof issue as whether substantial evidence supports the judgment. This follows because such a characterization is conceptually one that allows an attack on (1) the evidence supporting the party who had no burden of proof, and (2) the trier of fact’s unassailable conclusion that the party with the burden did not prove one or more elements of the case (Oldenburg v. Sears, Roebuck & Co. (1957) 152 Cal.App.2d 733, 742 [trier of fact is the exclusive judge of the credibility of the evidence and can reject evidence as unworthy of credence]; Hicks v. Reis (1943) 21 Cal.2d 654, 659–660 [trial court is entitled to reject in toto the testimony of a witness, even if that testimony is uncontradicted]).
“Thus, where the issue on appeal turns on a failure of proof at trial, the question for a reviewing court becomes whether the evidence compels a finding in favor of the appellant as a matter of law. (Roesch v. De Mota (1944) 24 Cal.2d 563, 570–571; Caron v. Andrew (1955) 133 Cal.App.2d 402, 409.) Specifically, the question becomes whether the appellant’s evidence was (1) ‘uncontradicted and unimpeached’ and (2) ‘of such a character and weight as to leave no room for a judicial determination that it was insufficient to support a finding.’ (Roesch v. De Mota, supra, at p. 571.)”
Mother is simply asking this court to disagree with the trial court’s evaluation of the weight of the evidence and to find a compelling reason to avoid adoption--and to do so without the benefit of any expert opinion that “termination of parental rights would be detrimental to the children.” (C.B., supra, 190 Cal.App.4th 102, 125.) In the absence of any evidence of a likelihood that termination of parental rights would be detrimental to the children, we are unable to conclude that the trial court abused its discretion in finding this exception inapplicable.
Although she does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence to support the trial court’s finding that both children are generally and specifically adoptable, mother asserts that “[t]he evidence was insufficient that nine-year-old [daughter] and almost seven-year-old [son] understood that adoption meant the foster parents could permanently sever[] contact with their mother.” Specifically, she argues that “[t]here was no evidence regarding the context of the conversations either the adoptions social worker or minors’ counsel had with the children about adoption, what was explained to them about adoption and what they understood it to mean.” Mother cites no precedent requiring a court to obtain the informed consent of six- and nine-year-old children before terminating their parents’ rights.
Section 366.26, subdivision (h)(1) states: “At all proceedings under this section, the court shall consider the wishes of the child and shall act in the best interests of the child.” Of course, there are limits to what courts should do to ascertain a child’s wishes. “To ask children with whom they prefer to live or to ascertain what they wish through other evidence is one thing. To ask those children to choose whether they ever see their natural parent again or to give voice to approving that termination is a significantly different prospect. We must have regard for the possible and readily conceivable anguish that such confrontational choices could create in a short lifetime already filled with trauma.... Therefore, we conclude that in considering the child’s expression of preferences, it is not required that the child specifically understand the proceeding is in the nature of a termination of parental rights.” (In re Leo M. (1993) 19 Cal.App.4th 1583, 1593.)
Mother relies on In re Scott B. (2010) 188 Cal.App.4th 452, which involved an 11-year-old boy. “It is clear that Scott did not understand that his foster mother would have the right to cut off his contacts with Mother if she adopted him. It is also clear from the record that Scott’s emotional make up will not enable him to endure interruption of his long-time frequent visits with Mother.” (Id. at p. 471.) On those facts, it was apparent that termination of parental rights could be detrimental to the child. As we have pointed out above, we do not have here a record of apparent detriment resulting from termination.
In this case, the Department satisfied its obligation to produce evidence of the children’s wishes. If mother wanted more details, she could have cross-examined the social worker who testified. This was not a failure of proof of adoptability.
c. The Court Did Not Err In Commenting On Possible Future Contact With Mother.
Mother bases two complaints on the trial court’s concluding remarks at the 366.26 hearing about maintaining on-going contact between mother and children.
First, mother claims that the trial court improperly considered ongoing contact in deciding that the exception did not apply, as we found in C.B. There we said, “We agree that in this case, like in In re S.B., the juvenile court injected an improper factor into the weighing process, namely, the prospective adoptive parents’ willingness to allow the children to have continued contact with mother. It is important to remember that once the legal parent-child relationship is permanently severed by termination of parental rights, a substantial, positive emotional attachment between a child and a parent has no legal protection even if depriving the child of that attachment by disallowing contact would greatly harm the child.” (C.B., supra, 190 Cal.App.4th 102, 128, fn. omitted.)
In C.B., the trial “court stated: ‘There is no evidence that that [loving] connection [between mother and the children] would be severed if the Court were to terminate parental rights. The Court cannot see that terminating parental rights would “greatly harm” the children pursuant to In re Brittany C. Instead, the children will have the best of both worlds. They will have stability, predictability, nurturing, love and warmth in their adoptive home; and because they are placed with relatives, they will maintain the connection to their parents.’ ” (C.B., supra, at p. 127; footnote omitted.)
Unlike the trial court in C.B., we do not believe that the trial court in this case granted termination on the expectation that there would necessarily be on-going contact with mother. The court expressed its “hop[e]” that the children would be allowed to maintain contact, but we do not believe that the court attached improper significance to it.
Second, later in her brief mother makes an argument entitled: “Any order for ongoing contact with mother was unenforceable and contradictory to a termination order.” (Emphasis omitted.) She asserts that post-adoption contact agreements are entirely voluntary and cannot be ordered at a section 366.26 hearing. Her opening brief asserts that “the court ordered that ongoing contact continue.” However, her reply brief states, “appellant clearly understands the court did not order post-adoption contact.” We will not further discuss the propriety of an order the trial court did not make.
D. No Home Study Was Required.
Finally, mother asserts that the lack of an approved home study was a legal impediment to adoption that the trial court overlooked.
In re Brandon T. (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 1400 (Brandon T.) explained at pages 1408 and 1409: “Usually, the issue of adoptability focuses on the minor, ‘e.g., whether the minor’s age, physical condition, and emotional state make it difficult to find a person willing to adopt the minor.’ (In re Sarah M. (1994) 22 Cal.App.4th 1642, 1649.) However, ‘in some cases a minor who ordinarily might be considered unadoptable due to age, poor physical health, physical disability, or emotional instability is nonetheless likely to be adopted because a prospective adoptive family has been identified as willing to adopt the child.’ (Id. at p. 1650.)
“ ‘Where the social worker opines that the minor is likely to be adopted based solely on the existence of a prospective adoptive parent who is willing to adopt the minor, an inquiry may be made into whether there is any legal impediment to adoption by that parent [citations]. In such cases, the existence of one of these legal impediments to adoption is relevant because the legal impediment would preclude the very basis upon which the social worker formed the opinion that the minor is likely to be adopted. [Citation.]’ (In re Sarah M., supra, 22 Cal.App.4th at p. 1650.)”
Despite finding the child at issue specifically adoptable, Brandon T. rejected the necessity for a home study prior to termination of parental rights. “Appellant argues that because an approved adoptive home study is a prerequisite to the filing of an adoption petition, there must be an approved home study for a child who is not generally adoptable before parental rights may be terminated. Contrary to appellant’s assertion, where there is no evidence of any specific legal impediments to completing the adoption process, parental rights may be terminated to a specifically adoptable child regardless of whether a home study has been completed.” (Brandon T., supra, 164 Cal.App.4th at p. 1410.)
Mother seeks to distinguish Brandon T., but we consider it applicable. Moreover, in this case, the children were found generally adoptable, so the absence of a home study was not an impediment to termination of parental rights.
III. DISPOSITION
The orders terminating parental rights are affirmed.
WE CONCUR: RUSHING, P.J., DUFFY, J.