Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Super. Ct. Nos. JD221262, JD221263
RAYE, J.
A. V. (appellant), mother of the minors M. R. and K. C., appeals from an order of the juvenile court entered at the 12-month review hearing terminating her reunification services. (Welf. & Inst. Code, §§ 366.21, subd. (f), 395.) Appellant contends there was insufficient evidence that reasonable services were provided, a substantial probability of the minors’ return within six months warranted a continuation of services, and the court applied the wrong standard when terminating services. We shall affirm.
All further statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code unless otherwise indicated.
BACKGROUND
On September 30, 2004, appellant’s children M. R., 12 years old; K. C., 14 years old; K. K., four years old; and W. P., one year old, were placed into protective custody after the one year old was found walking outside appellant’s house naked and alone. The home did not meet basic health and safety standards. K. C. was not enrolled in school and had been left in charge of her siblings while appellant was gone.
At this time appellant had three other children living with their father, L. S.: S. V., 10 years old; S. S., eight years old; and B. S., five years old. Appellant gave birth to two other children while the dependency cases were pending: A. W., born in 2005, and S. K., born in 2007. Only M. R. and K. C. are subjects of this appeal.
Appellant, who had an extensive history of child welfare referrals, admitted leaving K. C. to watch 14-month-old W. P. As to K. C.’s not being enrolled in school, appellant explained, “I’m not going to lie, it’s really me just being stupid and procrastinating.”
K. C. told the social worker that appellant was overwhelmed by having so many children and that she believed appellant was using drugs. She said appellant would improve “somewhat” after intervention by Children’s Protective Services, but only long enough to get her children back. K. C. was responsible for many duties involving the children and their home, and had been told by appellant that school was a privilege.
On October 4, 2004, the Sacramento County Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) filed section 300 petitions under subdivisions (b) and (g), alleging appellant failed to provide adequate care and supervision for W. P., the house did not meet basic health or safety standards, and appellant had a long history with Children’s Protective Services.
A social worker tried to contact appellant but her telephone had been disconnected; she was subsequently able to reach appellant on her cell phone. Appellant declined to meet with an early intervention specialist, declaring she had been advised by counsel not to participate. The jurisdiction and disposition report noted counseling would be part of appellant’s plan and attached an October 22, 2004, referral to Diogenes Youth Services for counseling.
A December 2, 2004, addendum report related an interview with K. C.’s father, R. K., who has an extensive criminal record and was “being held on a fresh charge and a parole hold.” The report also related K. C. had been pregnant but miscarried; she said she would probably not wait until she was an adult before becoming pregnant again.
An addendum report dated January 5, 2005, noted appellant tested negative for drugs and alcohol from the end of October through mid-December 2004. Appellant was taking a medical assistant course from a local college and by the January 5, 2005, report had been making considerable efforts to clean her house. She had to retake her parenting classes because of attendance problems and had not yet started counseling, but DHHS recommended returning the minors to appellant in light of her efforts.
On December 23, 2004, the juvenile court sustained the petitions as amended and ordered the minors be placed with appellant under intensive supervision by DHHS. The court further ordered that the minors have no contact with either R. K. or the three other alleged fathers of appellant’s children.
The March 10, 2005, progress report noted K. C. had enrolled in high school on February 16, 2005. The report described appellant’s house as well stocked with food and not lacking in clothing or material things.
However, the home was often a mess, showing few signs of housekeeping, which indicated a risk of neglect if appellant did not follow through with services and take a more active role in parenting. Appellant displayed poor parenting skills, failing to set appropriate limits or follow through on instructions, which allowed the children to “run[] wild.” She displayed a need for counseling to address her problems with self-esteem, setting priorities, caring for herself, dealing with stress, and maintaining healthy relationships with significant others. Appellant had not made it to any of her scheduled counseling appointments and showed little motivation to utilize the provided services.
A June 9, 2005, report stated appellant failed to follow through with counseling for the minors once she regained custody of her children, causing the referral to be “closed out.” Appellant was referred to counseling again on May 12 but had yet to attend a single session and had not completed her parenting classes. An in-home parenting program was recommended and appellant was referred, but the program was then terminated. Although her drug tests remained negative and she appeared cooperative and willing to change, appellant was not making sufficient progress and continued to struggle with the daily activities of raising her children.
The September 1, 2005, progress report showed appellant’s referral to Diogenes Youth Services had been approved on June 23, 2005, but there had been no sessions and the social worker had been unable to verify the reason sessions had not commenced. Appellant’s three children by L. S. had moved in with her, leaving appellant with eight children in her home. M. R. and K. C. were brought to counseling once but never made it to another appointment. After several failures to appear, appellant’s counseling was again terminated.
Appellant continued to test negative for drugs and alcohol, as related in a November 3, 2005, progress report. The family did not receive their recommended in-home counseling as they had moved without telling the counselor. K. C. had not attended school for at least three weeks, and the social worker could not verify her enrollment.
The December 8, 2005, in-home review reported appellant and her eight children had moved to a four-bedroom home. Neither M. R. nor K. C. had attended a single individual or family counseling session, although M. R. and K. C. had both enrolled in high school. Appellant remained overwhelmed by having so many children in her house, which was found to be in poor upkeep during an unannounced visit.
Appellant was living on a $2,000 monthly survivor’s benefit for the death of W. P.’s father. She was participating in a nursing assistant internship and had been offered employment upon completion. While appellant continued to test clean for drugs and alcohol, she had an active arrest warrant. Appellant still had not completed her counseling but had made efforts to schedule parenting classes.
The June 8, 2006, report found M. R., now in a different high school, had poor grades because of truancy and was talking back to appellant. Appellant was cooperative with DHHS but continued to be overwhelmed by the number of children in her home. The house was very dirty, littered with clothes and old food, and had mold on the walls, raising concerns appellant would clean only when pressured and prompted by DHHS. She had not yet cleared her outstanding warrant, nor had she addressed her own or her family’s counseling needs in spite of multiple referrals.
A July 13, 2006, progress report stated a fourth counseling referral had been made and the family was making some slow progress after three in-home sessions. The report also found appellant was now more diligent in cleaning her home.
On December 28, 2006, DHHS reported M. R. was now attending a new high school and doing well. K. C. was also going to a new school, having been dismissed from her previous school for rules infractions. L. S.’s children had returned to their father, easing appellant’s burden.
Appellant was working at Wal-Mart and for In-Home Supportive Services. She was also in conjoint family therapy, and the social worker recommended continued parenting education. According to the therapist’s September 27, 2006, report, appellant, who at the time had eight children by at least four different men, struggled with setting limits with men and her children, leading her to be stressed and overwhelmed, and impairing her decision-making ability. Counseling had been terminated because appellant stopped attending.
The December 28 report noted appellant had made substantial strides, but expressed a desire that she complete the case plan. Appellant still had barriers to her progress, including her failure to complete both her parenting classes and a psychological evaluation.
On January 4, 2007, the minors again were placed in protective custody after appellant was found to have violated several of the court’s orders, including leaving the minors with R. K., with whom the children were to have no contact.
Appellant was admitted to the hospital on December 28, 2006, for a bacterial infection. Appellant told the social worker she left the children with K. C. and that R. K. was going to check in on them. In a January 4, 2007, interview with K. C., K. C. told the social worker that R. K. had moved in with them in November 2006 and they were jointly in charge of the children. Because K. C. and R. K. frequently argued, R. K. had stayed away the previous couple of nights. R. K. had prior convictions in Sacramento County for assault with a deadly weapon, robbery, carrying a firearm in a vehicle, possession of marijuana for sale, possession of ammunition by a convicted felon, and possession of burglary tools.
Appellant still had several outstanding warrants and had missed several appointments for a psychological evaluation. The social worker’s report noted appellant was also not cooperative with reengaging the family in counseling. M. R. was not in school because the family had moved and she could not enroll in her new high school until she returned her books to the old school.
DHHS filed supplemental petitions (§ 387) on January 9, 2007, for K. C., M. R., K. K., and W. P., and a section 300 petition for A. W., alleging violation of prior court orders, leaving the children in the care of K. C., not enrolling M. R. in school, and allowing contact with R. K.
Appellant admitted the allegations to a social worker, declaring she now would do whatever she was supposed to do. According to M. R., appellant needed time away from the children so she could learn to follow the court’s orders. M. R. told the social worker: “Every time I thought she would learn when the Judge would lecture her, but she never does.”
K. C. told the social worker the allegations were all true and expressed a desire to live with the maternal grandmother, as she doubted appellant would follow court orders given her history of noncompliance. She was not attending school when taken into protective custody and could not remember the day she last attended.
The maternal grandmother said she was willing to look after the children while appellant was in the hospital, but appellant would not allow the grandmother to bring her dog to the home because R. K. objected. She believed “[appellant] is for [appellant] and for the guys she is with.” The report concluded appellant was not complying with any of the directives of her reunification plan and gave numerous excuses for her failures in spite of being provided ample time, support, and assistance to complete the plan.
A March 22, 2007, addendum report stated a psychological evaluation of appellant was completed on February 13, but the report had not yet been prepared. The evaluator told the social worker that appellant had “very little insight into her behavior” and was very defensive during testing, showing “very little appreciation for the current CPS [Children’s Protective Services] issues or the CPS’ concerns.” The May 23, 2007, addendum report found appellant had attended 10 of her 13 counseling appointments.
A March 9, 2007, short-term counseling report concluded appellant had a “dependent personality” and “needs others to assume responsibility for her life.” She “fails to see the connection between her decisions, or lack of them, and the consequences of her situation.” Appellant parentified the older children and there were “unhealthy triangulations” between family members, particularly between appellant, K. C., and the maternal grandmother. While individual counseling had been beneficial to appellant, there were still “many therapeutic issues better addressed alone first before family therapy can be successful.” The report concluded appellant must participate in her individual counseling sessions and must also participate in family therapy.
In an April 14, 2007, counseling report, the therapist determined that placing the minors with the maternal grandmother raised difficulties for appellant because of the discordant relationship between the two and the maternal grandmother’s tendency to side with the children, thus sabotaging appellant’s efforts to set limits. This problem was further complicated by appellant’s poor history of limit setting, establishing boundaries, and making herself the responsible parent.
The report found that establishing healthy boundaries and setting limits were key to appellant’s success. Appellant had benefitted from therapy, but her 10 sessions were insufficient to make “an impact for continued change.” The therapist recommended continued individual counseling, participation in family therapy, and conjoint therapy between appellant and the maternal grandmother if the maternal grandmother was going to be a significant person in the minors’ lives.
Appellant finally completed her parenting classes on April 19, 2007. Her pretest score was 97 percent, while her score after testing was 98 percent. The evaluator concluded appellant appeared to have adequate knowledge of basic parenting principles.
On July 3, 2007, the juvenile court sustained the petitions as amended and set an August 30, 2007, permanency hearing.
In the August 30, 2007, prepermanency review report, M. R. and K. C. were both reported to be “AWOL” and thus could not express their placement preferences. M. R. was hospitalized on April 1, 2007, and diagnosed with suicidal ideation. She had self-inflicted razor cuts and admitted to previously cutting herself more deeply, as well as holding her breath and forcefully hitting herself.
M. R. reported domestic violence between appellant and all of the stepfathers, and stated she and five of her siblings had been victims of physical abuse. She admitted to using drugs and alcohol, and had a history of truancy and failing grades in school.
During one visit with appellant, both M. R. and K. C. told her K. C. had had sex with R. K. The maternal grandmother was concerned R. K. had given K. C. Ecstasy and “seduced” her when appellant was in the hospital. A foster parent overheard K. C. say she could not wait to have sex with R. K. Later, K. C. denied having sex with R. K., who was currently in the county jail and would be serving 32 months in state prison.
K. C. enrolled in a new high school after being placed with the maternal grandmother. While living with her foster parent, K. C. had done well in school, completing gifted and advanced placement classes, and wanted to be a pediatric nurse. In July 2007, after moving in with her grandmother, K. C. went AWOL again and stopped attending school.
The report noted appellant regularly attended her counseling sessions in February and March 2007. She was re-referred to counseling and completed three sessions in July and August 2007, which the counselor felt clearly benefitted her. Nevertheless, the social worker recommended terminating reunification services, noting appellant’s lack of substantial progress.
The February 28, 2008, permanency report found that K. C. and M. R. both preferred placement with the maternal grandmother. On January 18, 2008, the social worker inquired into conjoint family therapy between appellant and each of the minors. K. C. and M. R. were both AWOL again, but the case manager at Diogenes Youth Services thought conjoint family counseling could be arranged when they returned.
Appellant was working part time as a services assistant for In-Home Support Services. She was removed from her employer’s registry after accusing her only client of sexual harassment when he accused her of borrowing his car. Appellant subsequently rented a room from the client but said she would live with the maternal grandmother if reunified with the minors.
On October 15, 2007, appellant completed the last of a set of 10 individual counseling sessions. On January 25, 2008, the counselor told the social worker that appellant did well in her sessions and would benefit from family therapy as well as conjoint sessions with the maternal grandmother and K. C. On January 27, 2008, the social worker resubmitted a referral for conjoint counseling for appellant and the maternal grandmother. On February 7, 2008, the conjoint family counselor said he had not yet met with appellant as appellant and the counselor had each cancelled two sessions because of illness. The counselor called several times in an effort to reschedule, but someone would answer the phone, then hang up on him.
The social worker’s February 28, 2008, permanency report gives a referral date of December 27, 2008, which appears to be a clerical error.
The report stated appellant was currently incarcerated, did not have stable housing, and had not yet begun conjoint counseling. She had failed to reunify with A. W., W. P., and K. K. on January 28, 2008, and was still dealing with her outstanding warrants. In light of her continued poor decision making and struggle to allocate time for her children, the social worker recommended terminating reunification services.
In a contested February 28, 2008, hearing that appellant did not attend, the court concluded appellant had made efforts but was not benefitting from services. She had not demonstrated the capacity and ability to complete the objectives of her treatment plan or to provide for the minors’ well-being. Examining the totality of the circumstances, the court found the services, while not perfect, had been reasonable. The court terminated reunification services and ordered a permanent plan of placement with the maternal grandmother and the goal of emancipation for K. C. and guardianship for M. R.
DISCUSSION
I
K. C. was born in 1990 and thus reached the age of majority in 2008. DHHS contends her dependency proceedings were terminated while this appeal was pending, rendering the appeal moot as to her. Appellant asks us to strike this argument as it was based on facts not properly presented in the record, DHHS has not moved to present evidence adduced after the termination hearing, and our ability to consider such evidence pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 909 is limited.
Appellant’s point is not well taken in light of our augmentation of the record. “It is well settled that an appellate court will decide only actual controversies. Consistent therewith, it has been said that an action which originally was based upon a justiciable controversy cannot be maintained on appeal if the questions raised therein have become moot by subsequent acts or events.” (Finnie v. Town of Tiburon (1988) 199 Cal.App.3d 1, 10.) If subsequent events make it impossible for this court to grant appellant any effective relief, dismissal is appropriate. (Ibid.; In re Jessica K. (2000) 79 Cal.App.4th 1313, 1315-1316.)
For example, where an appeal is taken from a judgment of disposition or from postjudgment orders and an order of the juvenile court terminating either jurisdiction or parental rights becomes final while the appeal is pending, the pending matter is moot. (In re Jessica K., supra, 79 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1316-1317; In re Michelle M. (1992) 8 Cal.App.4th 326, 329-330.)
Accordingly, we have augmented the record on our own motion to include the juvenile court’s order of August 18, 2008, terminating jurisdiction over K. C. for having reached the age of majority, and take judicial notice of the court’s order. (Evid. Code, § 452, subd. (d).)
The dismissal renders us incapable of granting appellant any relief on her claim regarding K. C. This claim is thus moot. (In re Pablo D. (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 759, 761.)
II
Appellant contends there is insufficient evidence to support the juvenile court’s finding that it provided reasonable reunification services in light of DHHS’s failure to provide conjoint family counseling for appellant. We disagree.
The purpose of reunification services is to correct the conditions that led to removal so the dependent child can return to the home. (In re Joanna Y. (1992) 8 Cal.App.4th 433, 438.) The social worker must make a good faith effort to provide reasonable services responding to the unique needs of each family “in spite of the difficulties of doing so or the prospects of success.” (In re Dino E. (1992) 6 Cal.App.4th 1768, 1777.) “[T]he record should show that the supervising agency identified the problems leading to the loss of custody, offered services designed to remedy those problems, maintained reasonable contact with the parents during the course of the service plan, and made reasonable efforts to assist the parents in areas where compliance proved difficult . . . .” (In re Riva M. (1991) 235 Cal.App.3d 403, 414, italics omitted.)
In evaluating the reasonableness of services, “[t]he standard is not whether the services provided were the best that might be provided in an ideal world, but whether the services were reasonable under the circumstances.” (In re Misako R. (1991) 2 Cal.App.4th 538, 547.) A juvenile court’s finding regarding reasonable services is subject to review for substantial evidence. (Mark N. v. Superior Court (1998) 60 Cal.App.4th 996, 1010.)
Appellant’s contention is based on recommendations of joint family therapy made after the psychological evaluation. The March 14, 2007, psychological evaluation and testing report concluded appellant was not currently capable of independently providing for the needs of five to six children. The evaluator did not believe any services would leave her capable of being an adequate parent in the next six months, but if services were offered she should continue with individual counseling and parenting classes, and she should be referred for family counseling with the minors. Appellant’s therapist recommended joint family therapy in her report of April 14, 2007, and a new therapist likewise recommended conjoint and family therapy for appellant in a November 1, 2007, report.
On December 17, 2007, the court ordered the parties to meet and confer regarding conjoint counseling with the minors. On December 27 the social worker referred appellant to conjoint and family counseling, but by January 18, 2008, the minors had run away, rendering such therapy impossible until their return. On January 25, 2008, the therapist confirmed the recommendation for family and conjoint therapy made in her November 1 report.
Appellant argues the evidentiary support for the finding that adequate services were provided is insufficient in light of the eight-month delay in seeking conjoint and family therapy. Her argument fails to place DHHS’s efforts in the appropriate context. In the over three years between the filing of the initial petitions and the order terminating services, appellant was afforded numerous opportunities for a variety of services from DHHS, including parenting classes, counseling for herself, and counseling for family members. She made no serious effort regarding individual counseling until February 2007, causing the cancellation of multiple prior counseling referrals because of her lack of participation.
Appellant’s experience with parenting classes is another example of her persistent failure to take advantage of the opportunities afforded to her by DHHS. The January 5, 2005, addendum report found appellant had to retake her parenting classes because of attendance problems. Appellant did not successfully complete her classes until April 19, 2007, in spite of numerous prior opportunities.
Joint family services could have first been expected after the April 14, 2007, counselor’s report recommending family and conjoint therapy and noting appellant’s progress in individual counseling. While DHHS did not recommend appellant for this service until December 27, 2007, the delay does not render inadequate the considerable services already provided to appellant. An earlier referral for counseling might have been ideal, but appellant is entitled to reasonable, not perfect, services.
Although appellant was identified as having “unhealthy triangulations,” particularly between herself, the maternal grandmother, and K. C., this was neither the only nor the most severe problem appellant faced as a parent. More important were her persistent difficulties with making good decisions and taking responsibility for her actions. These problems, which could have been addressed by individual counseling, remained with appellant throughout the dependency action, as shown by her inability to appear at the 12-month hearing and her living with the dependent care client whom she accused of sexual harassment. Nothing in the record supports a finding that these problems would have been addressed by conjoint family counseling.
In light of the numerous services that had already been provided to appellant, this one delay in providing yet another type of counseling does not justify reversing the order terminating services. The court’s finding that services were adequate is supported by overwhelming evidence.
For the same reason, we reject defendant’s claim that continued services for six months were warranted in light of the allegedly inadequate prior services.
III
Appellant next contends services should have been continued as there was a reasonable probability that the minors could safely be returned to her within six months. We disagree.
The period for reunification services for a child over the age of three when removed from parental custody is limited to 12 months from the date the minor entered foster care. (§ 361.5, subd. (a)(1).) However, services can be extended up to 18 months from the date of initial removal if it is shown the minor will be returned and safely maintained in the home during that time or if reasonable services were not provided. (§§ 361.5, subd. (a)(3), 366.21, subd. (g)(1).) In order to make the finding that the minor can be safely returned to the parent, the court must find the parent regularly visited the minor, has made significant progress in resolving the problems that led to removal, and has demonstrated the capacity and ability to complete the plan and provide for the minor’s safety and well-being. (§ 366.21, subd. (g)(1)(A)-(C).)
In the interview following the minors’ first detention, K. C. told the social worker appellant improves as a parent after Children’s Protective Services takes her children, but only long enough to get them back. After the second detention, K. C. was not optimistic appellant would comply with her plan. The accuracy of both predictions finds substantial support in the record.
The incremental improvement shown by appellant after the first detention vanished once the minors were returned. While appellant’s attendance showed some progress after the second detention, right up to the 12-month hearing appellant continued to have the same fundamental problems that had placed the minors at risk before the initial detention.
For example, in December 2004 the juvenile court ordered appellant to stop driving the minors without a valid driver’s license. In August 2006 an arrest warrant was issued for appellant for driving without a license, and appellant waited until the eve of the February 28, 2008, hearing to clear up the matter. She had also failed to clear up a 2004 warrant for child endangerment by the 12-month hearing. Although DHHS could have scheduled conjoint family counseling earlier, once it did the counselor was unable to contact appellant after the first four classes were cancelled because of illness.
While the record establishes that appellant regularly met with the minors, it also establishes that she has not made progress in addressing her problems, nor has she demonstrated an ability to complete the reunification plan. It is inconceivable that further services would have been fruitful. The court properly terminated reunification services.
IV
At the 12-month hearing, the court responded to a question from appellant’s counsel by asking: “And so when I look at under the .21(g) because you’re asking me to go further, to do the six months further so what’s the exceptional circumstance here to go to the 18-month period?” Appellant contends this statement demonstrates the court’s decision not to extend services was premised on an incorrect legal standard. She is mistaken.
After making this statement, the juvenile court then applied the correct legal standard, addressing point-by-point the requirements of section 366.21, subdivision (g) before determining that services should be terminated. The court’s isolated comment does not invalidate the careful reasoning explained in its final ruling.
Even if we were to find that the court applied the wrong standard, reversal would not be warranted. We will affirm the trial court’s judgment, although it was based on erroneous reasoning, because we can uphold a ruling that is correct although arrived at incorrectly. (In re Jonathan B. (1992) 5 Cal.App.4th 873, 876.) Since the evidence establishes beyond doubt that the requirements for extending services under section 366.21, subdivision (g) were not present, we would still affirm the order terminating services.
DISPOSITION
The order terminating reunification services is affirmed.
We concur: NICHOLSON, Acting P. J., CANTIL-SAKAUYE, J.