Opinion
No. 107,572.
2012-10-5
In the Interest of M.P.
Appeal from Johnson District Court; Kathleen L. Sloan, Judge. Michael J. Bartee, of Michal J. Bartee, P.A., of Olathe, for appellant. Steven J. Obermeier, assistant district attorney, Andrew J. Dufour, legal intern, and Stephen M. Howe, district attorney, for appellee.
Appeal from Johnson District Court; Kathleen L. Sloan, Judge.
Michael J. Bartee, of Michal J. Bartee, P.A., of Olathe, for appellant. Steven J. Obermeier, assistant district attorney, Andrew J. Dufour, legal intern, and Stephen M. Howe, district attorney, for appellee.
Before BRUNS, P.J., PIERRON and MARQUARDT, JJ.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
PER CURIAM.
The natural mother of M.P. appeals the termination of her parental rights. We affirm.
M.P. was born in June 2007. The State initiated child in need of care (CINC) proceedings on February 26, 2010. The State alleged that mother neglected M.P., he was filthy when he came to daycare, and smelled of burnt marijuana, feces, and urine. It was also alleged that mother was under the influence on a regular basis when she brought M.P. to daycare. SRS social worker Lisa Knight discovered that mother and M.P. were homeless. Attempts by Knight to communicate with mother ended up in conversations where mother would yell and cuss at her and make accusations of improper disclosure of information about her case. Mother was on probation for domestic battery, possession, battery, and possession of drug paraphernalia. When asked by her probation officer to submit to a drug test, mother admitted the test would not be clean. M.P. was taken into protective custody.
On June 16, 2010, the trial court adjudicated M.P. to be a CINC. Mother did not contest the facts in the CINC petition. The court adopted individual 6–month reintegration plans for mother and father. Mother was ordered to maintain suitable housing with utilities, stock her home with nutritious food, maintain employment, and allow background checks on any roommates. Among other things, she also had to complete parenting education, refrain from physical discipline, find licensed daycare for M.P., and submit to random urine analysis (UA) tests.
On December 20, 2010, the trial court extended the reintegration plan for an additional 3 months based on moderate progress. However, in March 2011, the court determined that mother was not ready to reintegrate. In late April 2011, the State filed a motion to terminate mother's parental rights. On May 26, 2011, the court entered a visitation order requiring all visits between mother and M .P. to be held at the courthouse and that mother was required to submit a clean drug screen before any visitation would occur.
On June 16 and 24, 2011, the trial court heard testimony on the motion to terminate parental rights. Social worker Michelle Plegge testified that she was the fourth case manager assigned to the case. Plegge stated that Ruby Dye and Tara Turpin were the first case managers, each for about a month, and then Lindsey Sanner took over the case from June 2010 to December 2010. Plegge was assigned to the case on December 15, 2010, and remained in that position until the trial in June 2011.
There was no evidence presented at trial that mother had completed all aspects of her reintegration plan. Plegge testified she regularly reviewed the reintegration plans with both parents. Plegge explained how things began to really deteriorate in February of 2011 when visitations had to be reduced. Mother would raise her voice, scream into the phone, and tell Plegge that she needed to learn how to do her job and go back to school. Mother did not find suitable housing, failed to maintain stable employment, sporadically submitted background checks on people she was living with, failed to obtain consistent mental health treatment, missed UA tests, and tested positive for methamphetamines in December of 2010 and April of 2011. Plegge testified that M.P. was doing well in his placement with a maternal uncle, that M.P. needed permanency which neither his father nor mother could provide, and father's and mother's lack of ability to care for M.P. was not likely to change in the foreseeable future.
Turpin testified that she was M.P.'s case manager from March 2010 to the end of April 2010, and she was mother's individual therapist as well. Turpin explained that mother had a lot of mental health issues that needed to be addressed in addition to curtailing mother's frustration with the social workers and the pace at which they were trying to reintegrate mother and M.P. Turpin testified that mother had a long way to go concerning stable living arrangements, her interactions with M.P., and her interactions with the multiple professionals on her case.
Summer Dokolas testified she is a vocational rehabilitation counselor with KVC/SRS. Dokolas testified concerning mother's employment situation and opportunities, and that KVC had given money to her for rent, transportation, cell phone, and car insurance. Dokolas explained KVC had to cut off financial services to mother because she was not following through with visitations, therapy, and/or employment. She described a verbally abusive phone call mother made to KVC. Mother's case was closed because of her failure to follow recommendations and established plans.
At trial, mother took the stand in her own defense. She presented evidence about a written rental agreement she had with Walter McKinley, but it had only been established a month before trial. She testified she had obtained a psychological mental health evaluation as required by the reintegration plan. She had obtained two substance abuse evaluations. She testified she had submitted to daily UAs and had been clean for the 3 weeks prior to trial. Mother was not employed at the time of trial, but was working with Aerotek and had been sent out on a job a month before. Mother testified as to the various jobs she had during the pendency of the case, including a car wash, cleaning houses, and fast food restaurants. She had completed two rounds of parenting classes. Mother testified she had been diagnosed with ADHA, bipolar disorder, agoraphobia, and passive-aggressive personality traits. She was supposed to take medication and attend therapy. However, she was not taking medication and decided that she was doing fine without therapy.
Subsequent to the trial, the trial court had two emergency hearings on August 16, 2011, and August 30, 2011, concerning mother's UA requirements. Mother's aggression came out in dealing with the professionals arranging the UA. The court again ordered visitation to be at the courthouse and that mother would need to pass a UA prior to seeing M.P.
The trial court terminated mother (and father's) parental rights in a decision filed on January 24, 2012. In an extensive and thorough memorandum decision, the court concluded:
“Throughout the course of the case, together with the evidence presented through the testimony offered by various witnesses, it is clear to this Court that [mother] has never accepted responsibility for her son becoming a child in need of care, and has never proven to anyone that she can provide a safe, stable, and healthy environment for her son. Instead, [mother] blames everyone who had tried to assist her, and believes that it is someone else's fault that she had failed to successfully reintegrate with her son after a year and a half.”
Mother appeals.
Mother challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support the trial court's determination that she is unfit under K.S.A.2011 Supp. 382269(a).
K.S.A.2011 Supp. 38–2269(a) provides that the trial court may terminate parental rights after finding on clear and convincing evidence that “the parent is unfit by reason of conduct or condition which renders the parent unable to care properly for a child and the conduct or condition is unlikely to change in the foreseeable future.” Clear and convincing evidence is evidence which shows that the truth of the facts asserted is highly probable. In re B.D.-Y., 286 Kan. 686, Syl. ¶ 3, 187 P.3d 594 (2008). When an appellate court reviews a trial court's determination to terminate parental rights, it considers whether, after review of all the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the State, it is convinced that a rational factfinder could have found it highly probable, i.e., by clear and convincing evidence, that the parent's rights should be terminated. In re B.E. Y., 40 Kan.App.2d 842, Syl. ¶ 1, 196 P.3d 439 (2008).
K.S.A.2011 Supp. 38–2269(b) and (c) provide a nonexclusive list of factors the court may consider in determining unfitness and in terminating parental rights. The existence of any one of the statutory factors “standing alone may, but does not necessarily, establish grounds for termination of parental rights.” K.S.A.2011 Supp. 38–2269(f).
The trial court found mother unfit based on the following factors: her inability to care for the physical, mental, and emotional needs of M.P. due to her mental illness and refusal to accept treatment (K.S.A.2011 Supp. 38–2269 [b][1] ); her lack of effort to adjust her circumstances, conduct, or conditions to meet her children's needs (K.S.A.2011 Supp. 38–2269[b][8] ); her failure to make reasonable efforts to rehabilitate the family (K.S.A.2011 Supp. 38–2269[b][7] ); and her failure to carry out a reasonable court-approved plan directed toward reintegration (K.S.A.2011 Supp. 38–2269 [c][3] ).
Mother contends that she substantially complied, or attempted to comply, with the tasks of the reintegration plan. She points to her testimony at the hearing of all the requirements she had completed and the difficulty she had in working with the social workers involved in the case. She contends her inability to complete most of the tasks was due to her financial status and the failure of the professionals to provide reasonable services and assistance, not unfitness.
Mother's argument invites us to weigh her testimony against the testimony of the caseworkers. That, however, was the role of the trial court. Under our standard of review, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the State and do not weigh conflicting evidence, pass on credibility of witnesses, or redetermine questions of fact. In re B.D.-Y., 286 Kan. at 699.
In summary, considering all the evidence in the record before us in the light most favorable to the State, we are convinced a rational factfinder could have found it highly probable that mother was unfit by reason of conduct or condition that rendered her unable to properly care for M.P. and that her conduct or condition was unlikely to change in the foreseeable future. Accordingly, the trial court found that termination was in M.P.'s best interests. We agree.
Affirmed.