Opinion
No. 354772 No. 354773
04-15-2021
In re P. MOSKOWITZ, Minor.
If this opinion indicates that it is "FOR PUBLICATION," it is subject to revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports. UNPUBLISHED Kent Circuit Court Family Division
LC No. 18-052070-NA Before: SHAPIRO, P.J., and CAVANAGH and REDFORD, JJ. PER CURIAM.
In these consolidated appeals, respondent-mother and respondent-father appeal as of right the trial court's order terminating their respective parental rights to their daughter, PM. The trial court terminated respondent-mother's rights pursuant to MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i), (g), and (j). Respondent-father's parental rights were terminated after he voluntarily released his rights to PM. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm.
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
At the time of the termination hearing in 2020, both respondents were in their mid-thirties and had been married since 2002. Both respondents had been diagnosed as "very high functioning" autistic. Their first involvement with Children's Protective Services ("CPS") occurred in July 2003 after respondent-mother gave birth to the couple's daughter, FM. Within a few months of FM's birth, the child was hospitalized for dehydration and malnutrition. During the CPS investigation that followed, it became apparent that respondents' parenting skills were deficient and their emotional stability fragile. In addition, CPS found respondents' home dirty, unkempt, and unsanitary prompting the filing of a petition for temporary wardship of the child in August 2003. After respondents failed to benefit from services, their parental rights to FM were involuntarily terminated in November 2004.
More than 10 years later, in late 2016, respondent-mother gave birth to PM. Immediately after PM's birth, CPS received complaints from hospital staff related to respondents' parenting skills and their emotional instability. Between December 2016 and August 2018, several petitions were filed and authorized. During these early proceedings, however, the trial court permitted PM to remain in respondents' care as an in-home ward, while respondents participated in court-ordered preventative services. Eventually, the early petitions were either withdrawn or dismissed.
In August 2018, however, petitioner sought and the trial court granted an ex parte order authorizing PM's removal from respondents' care. In October 2018, both respondents entered pleas of admission and the trial court found statutory grounds to exercise jurisdiction over PM. Thereafter, respondents were ordered to comply with case-service plans. Specifically, the trial court ordered respondents to permit a cleaning service to clean their house and, thereafter, respondents were required to maintain a stable and clean home environment. The trial court also ordered respondents to participate in random drug screens, attend parenting classes, follow the recommendations of their psychological evaluations, and act appropriately with the caseworkers.
In the 14 months that followed, respondents participated in the court-ordered services, but little evidence indicated that they benefited from the services offered. Consequently, in January 2020, petitioner filed a supplemental petition seeking termination of respondents' parental rights. At the conclusion of a two-day termination hearing, held between March and July 2020, the trial court terminated respondent-mother's parental rights pursuant to MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i), (g), and (j). Respondent-father's parental rights were terminated after he voluntarily released his rights on the second day of the termination hearing. Respondents now appeal.
II. RESPONDENT-MOTHER'S APPEAL
A. REASONABLE EFFORTS TO PREVENT REMOVAL
Respondent-mother first argues that the trial court erred by finding that petitioner, the Department of Health and Human Services ("DHHS"), made reasonable efforts to prevent PM's removal from respondents' home. We disagree.
We review for clear error a trial court's decision regarding reasonable efforts. In re Fried, 266 Mich App 535, 542-543; 702 NW2d 192 (2005). "When reviewing the trial court's findings of fact, this Court accords deference to the special opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of the witnesses." Id. at 541 (citation omitted). A finding is clearly erroneous if an appellate court is left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made. In re Diehl, 329 Mich App 671, 687; 944 NW2d 180 (2019).
During the preliminary hearing in a child-protective proceeding, the trial court "must decide whether to authorize the filing of the petition and, if authorized, whether the child[ren] should remain in the home, be returned home, or be placed in foster care pending trial." MCR 3.965(B)(12). "The preliminary hearing is governed by MCL 712A.13a and corresponding provisions of MCR 3.965." In re Rood, 483 Mich 73, 95; 763 NW2d 587 (2009). Under MCL 712A.13a(9) and the identical provision in MCR 3.965(C)(2), the trial court may order placement of a child into foster care if the court finds all of the following conditions:
(a) Custody of the child with the parent presents a substantial risk of harm to the child's life, physical health, or mental well-being.
(b) No provision of service or other arrangement except removal of the child is reasonably available to adequately safeguard the child from the risk as described in subrule (a).
(c) Continuing the child's residence in the home is contrary to the child's welfare.The trial court must make a record of its findings of fact on all factors sufficient for our review before removing a child from a parent's care but it is "generally not obligated to articulate extensive findings regarding every conceivable detail." In re Williams, ___ Mich App ___, ___; ___ NW2d ___ (2020) (Docket No. 351081); slip op at 6. In this case, the trial court stated in its order following the preliminary hearing that all grounds for removal were present. On appeal, respondent-mother only challenges the trial court's findings respecting factor (d). After reviewing the record, we conclude that the trial court did not clearly err when it found that reasonable efforts were made to prevent the child's removal.
(d) Consistent with the circumstances, reasonable efforts were made to prevent or eliminate the need for removal of the child.
(e) Conditions of child custody away from the parent are adequate to safeguard the child's health and welfare.
At the August 15, 2018 preliminary hearing, the caseworker testified regarding the efforts made to prevent PM's removal. The worker noted that before the current case, respondents had previous court involvement that did not result in PM's removal, but instead allowed for in-home placement and required respondents' participation in services. To improve their parenting and homemaking skills, respondents underwent a psychological evaluation and were offered services through a number of programs including Life Skills, Families First, Families Together Building Solutions ("FTBS"), Strong Beginnings, and Early-On.
In January 2017, respondents received extensive services through Families First. This hands-on service educated respondents about PM's needs. With respondents' involvement, workers developed binders and calendars to keep PM's appointments, diaper changes, and feedings regulated. General parenting skills were discussed, reviewed, and modeled for respondents. Families First also educated respondents on budgeting and money management. Regarding housing, Families First worked in conjunction with Community Rebuilders to assist respondents in rent assistance vouchers. After 28 days of intensive assistance, the Families First services were closed. Respondents had apparently made progress during the program to improve their parenting skills. Respondents then transitioned to services through FTBS. That program provided similar hands-on assistance to respondents through April 2017.
Between April 18, 2017 and April 5, 2018, respondents participated in a family skills program through Bethany Christian Services ("BCS"). During this program, respondents were instructed on financial responsibility, budgeting, housekeeping, and childcare. This program also assisted respondents with acquiring supplies for their child, furniture for their home, and other household items. The worker transported respondents to the grocery store weekly. She also instructed respondents on proper feeding, nutrition, and caloric intake for PM. The worker demonstrated proper cereal preparation, bottle positioning, spoon feeding, and the use of a sippy cup. The worker accompanied respondents to most of PM's doctors' appointments. The family skills worker also attended respondent-mother's counseling appointments and monitored her prescriptions.
Despite this assistance for more than a year, respondents failed to maintain a clean home environment and PM did not gain weight at a normal pace. Respondents also were unreceptive to the instructions offered, acted impatiently and irritably during PM's feedings, and frequently could not demonstrate what had been taught. Because of respondent-father's sexually inappropriate and threatening behavior, services through BCS were terminated in April 2018. In addition to the preremoval preventative services afforded through Families First, FTBS, and BCS, petitioner's caseworker also prepared, reviewed, and modeled a detailed chore list to assist respondents in improving the physical condition of their home. CPS also provided respondents with sundry orders to assist in the purchase of cleaning supplies.
The record reflects that these preremoval efforts yielded some benefit. The caseworker explained during the August 15, 2018 preliminary hearing that DHHS withdrew the petition in June 2018 because respondents made some improvement. However, that progress was short-lived. The caseworker further explained that after the petition's withdrawal, CPS continued to work with the family and facilitated services. Despite these efforts, respondent-father's inappropriate behavior continued to be worrisome. Services through Families First were terminated because respondent-father threatened staff and made inappropriate comments of a sexual nature to the caseworker. Services were then switched to FTBS, but it closed the case in mid-July 2018 because of respondents' insufficient progress. Moreover, the condition of the house, already questionable, continued to deteriorate after the petition's withdrawal. During a July 2018 home visit, CPS workers noted that respondents were housing eight cats. A strong smell of cat urine and feces existed in the home. PM's toys were observed near and in the cat excrement. Significant trash and debris cluttered every room in the home. No place existed for the child to play safely. Despite the multitude of preventative services, in the summer of 2018, respondents' home continued to be unsafe and unsanitary.
At the time of the August 15, 2018 preliminary hearing, CPS still worked with respondent-mother and respondent-father to improve the conditions of their home, address their mental health issues, and expand their parenting skills. The caseworker also inquired about possible relative placement, but neither respondent offered any relative caregiver for consideration. At the time of removal, according to the caseworker, CPS had exhausted all possible options, yet it remained unsafe for PM to live in the home. At the conclusion of the preliminary hearing, the trial court found that petitioner had made more than reasonable efforts to prevent the child's removal. The record clearly supports the trial court's finding in this regard. Indeed, the efforts to prevent removal of the child were extraordinary in this case.
Nonetheless, respondent-mother suggests on appeal that because respondent-father sabotaged their progress, reasonable efforts to remove the barriers to reunification would have required that petitioner provide her with an opportunity to work toward reunification on her own. Respondent-mother raises this argument when asserting that reasonable efforts to prevent removal were not made and when also arguing in her next issue that reasonable efforts toward reunification were not made. The record, however, reflects that, regardless of the time frame, petitioner early and often offered respondent-mother the opportunity to participate in services independent of respondent-father. Respondent-mother regularly declined these offers. Even late in the case, in June 2020, caseworker Tori Young spoke to respondent-mother about working on a treatment plan without respondent-father. Respondent-mother again declined the offer. Therapist Mat Klemp corroborated this testimony. Klemp expressed reluctance to provide an opinion regarding whether respondent-mother could live independently, but he testified that, if asked, respondent-mother would say that she would not want to do that. Respondent-mother's assertion that reasonable efforts were not made to prevent PM's removal because she was not afforded her own treatment plan is not supported by the record. Respondent-mother was presented with the opportunity to improve her circumstances separate from respondent-father and she consistently declined the offers. Accordingly, the trial court did not err as claimed.
B. REASONABLE EFFORTS TOWARD REUNIFICATION
Respondent-mother also contends that the trial court erred when terminating her parental rights because petitioner failed to make reasonable efforts to reunite her with her child. In general, before a court may contemplate termination of a parent's parental rights, the DHHS must make reasonable efforts to reunite the family. MCL 712A.19a(2). The purpose of the treatment plan is to facilitate the return of the children to their parents. In re Mason, 486 Mich 142, 156; 782 NW2d 747 (2010). DHHS's statutory duties to update a parent's treatment plan and provide the parent with necessary and relevant reunification services continue throughout the case. Id. "The adequacy of the [DHHS]'s efforts to provide services may bear on whether there is sufficient evidence to terminate a parent's rights." In re Rood, 483 Mich at 89. After reviewing the record, it is readily apparent that petitioner made reasonable efforts to reunite respondent-mother with PM and that the termination of respondent-mother's parental rights resulted because of her failure to benefit from the treatment plan, rather than the adequacy of petitioner's efforts.
Respondent-mother asserts that inadequate housing served as the primary barrier to reunification. She argues that petitioner's efforts at reunification were not reasonable because necessary referrals were not made to assist her in securing suitable housing, particularly housing independent of respondent-father. Notably, respondent-mother does not argue that petitioner's efforts to accommodate her disabilities were insufficient under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 USC 12101 et seq. She simply asserts that necessary referrals were not made. The record, however, provides no support for respondent-mother's contention that petitioner's efforts to assist in securing suitable housing were deficient.
In her issue heading, but not in her actual Statement of the Issues, respondent-mother references "reasonable accommodations." However, in her discussion of this issue, she does not explore "reasonable accommodation" in any fashion. Because respondent-mother fails to address the issue of "reasonable accommodation" in her brief on appeal, we consider the issue abandoned. "A party cannot simply assert an error or announce a position and then leave it to this Court to discover and rationalize the basis for [her] claims, or unravel and elaborate for [her her] argument, and then search for authority either to sustain or reject [her] position," In re TK, 306 Mich App 698, 712; 859 NW2d 208 (2014) (quotation marks and citation omitted; alterations in original). In any event, it is clear from the record that petitioner and the court went to considerable lengths to accommodate both respondents' limitations. First, respondents were granted an extraordinary amount of time to address the barriers to reunification. Despite repeated recommendations by petitioner to change the permanency plan from reunification to adoption, the trial court granted respondents additional review periods to work on their treatment plans. Respondents were also offered three, instead of two, hours of parenting time. At the outset, the caseworker recognized respondents' limitations, but she then altered typical procedures to accommodate respondents' needs. For example, a chore chart was provided to respondents. When the caseworker recognized that the chart might be overwhelming, the chart was scaled back. Tasks were broken down to those that could be accomplished daily. The worker also increased home visits in an effort to assist respondents with accountability. The caseworker met with respondent-mother more frequently. When they discussed the treatment plan, the worker broke down the elements of the plan into more simple steps and terminology. The worker asked respondent-mother a lot of questions to ascertain her level of understanding. The worker recognized that when respondent-mother became overwhelmed, she shut down. Not wanting to have respondent-mother "shut down" or be in the wrong frame of mind during parenting time, the worker noted that meetings with respondents should take place after parenting time. Early on, the foster mother prepared a picture binder for respondents to help them identify safe foods and properly perform PM's exercises. The exercises were even modeled for respondents. Respondents also were offered several educational appointments with healthcare providers to learn about PM's medical and feeding issues.
The record establishes that petitioner made extraordinary efforts to assist respondents in improving the condition of their home so that they could maintain suitable housing. The evidence further demonstrates that when these efforts failed and respondents were eventually evicted, petitioner attempted to assist respondents in obtaining alternative housing. Further, contrary to respondent-mother's assertions, petitioner attempted to assist her in obtaining suitable housing independent of respondent-father.
At the outset, in October 2018, petitioner provided respondents with the help of Tidy-Up, a service designed to help people in circumstances similar to respondents. The cleaning service was retained for eight hours, but after four hours respondents asked the service to leave. The service removed two truckloads of garbage from the home. The owner of the company observed respondent-mother retrieving items from garbage bags intended for the dump. Community Rebuilders, an agency providing housing support, made weekly inspections to ensure the house's proper maintenance. Adult Protective Services provided respondents with a dumpster to assist in the cleanup. While at times respondents made some progress in keeping the house clean, they were unable to consistently maintain the house in an appropriately clean and safe state for a child. The caseworkers also attempted to provide respondent-mother and respondent-father with simple tools to assist them in learning how to be better housekeepers. These instruction manuals employed simplified language, with basic instructions. They also included photographs to assist them in reading the instructions and demonstrated the cleaning activities. "Helpful Hints" further broke down the tasks into more manageable and meaningful steps. Not only were these visual aids prepared for respondents, the caseworker reviewed the materials with respondent-mother and respondent-father. She also offered to show them how to actually wash a dish, but respondents declined the offer.
Respondent-mother suggests that petitioner should have provided her with weekly cleaning services. However, evidence established that respondent-mother and respondent-father were capable of cleaning their house, they just chose not to do so. Respondent-mother was assessed to determine whether she needed services to help her routinely clean her house, but because of her level of functioning, she did not qualify for such services.
Community Rebuilders assisted respondents with their housing issues throughout most of the case. On December 31, 2019, however, the housing agency terminated services because of respondents' repeated violations of the lease's pet policy and the landlord's initiation of eviction proceedings which rendered respondents ineligible for the Housing Solutions Program and prevented the agency from continuing its housing assistance.
After respondents were evicted from their home in February 2020, the caseworker attempted to assist them in securing replacement housing. Young contacted several local motels, Mel Trotter, the YWCA, and A Mother's Touch. She also applied for Section 8 housing on respondents' behalf. Further, Young found two housing listings on Craig's List, but because respondents did not have the application fee, and it could not be provided by the agency, the listings were not a viable option. Nevertheless, because they might be in the future, Young requested that respondents maintain the information. She also assisted both of them in assessing their combined finances to development a housing plan. The caseworker recommended that if respondents stayed in a homeless shelter for a few months, they could save their SSI benefits and then be able to secure affordable housing. In furtherance of this plan, the caseworker provided respondents with information regarding shelters. Respondents, however, refused to follow this recommendation. Instead, they stayed in hotels and when their resources were depleted, they began camping in a tent.
Considering the foregoing, it is apparent that petitioner made extraordinary efforts to assist respondents in maintaining suitable housing. When these efforts failed, petitioner also provided respondents with resources to obtain new housing. Further, credible evidence establishes that petitioner attempted to provide respondent-mother housing independent of respondent-father. Respondent-mother's claims to the contrary lack any support in the extensive record in this case.
When PM first came into care, Caseworker Anne Walberer-Simmons discussed with respondent-mother several times that she could elect to participate in a treatment plan independent of respondent-father. Respondent-mother refused to do so. According to respondents' therapist, if given the opportunity, respondent-mother would not want to participate in a plan separately from respondent-father. After respondents were evicted, the caseworker met privately with respondent-mother to discuss planning independent of respondent-father. The worker explained to respondent-mother that respondent-father's actions were impacting respondent-mother's efforts toward reunification. Further, the worker testified that on January 24, 2020, she tried to develop a short-term plan with respondent-mother. The two met separately and contacted A Mother's Touch. The caseworker confirmed that respondent-mother's SSI income qualified her for housing through this agency. Thereafter, however, respondent-mother indicated that she would not be comfortable living there without respondent-father. At the March 11, 2020 hearing, Young testified that respondent-mother had not followed up on this individual housing option. Young would have explored this housing option further if respondent-mother had indicated a willingness to live separately from respondent-father.
Respondent-mother asserts that petitioner failed to provide her with appropriate services, particularly those related to housing stability. Although the agency is required to make reasonable efforts to provide services to secure reunification, the parent has a commensurate responsibility to participate in and benefit from the services offered. In re Frey, 297 Mich App 242, 248; 824 NW2d 569 (2012). The record in this case demonstrates that petitioner offered respondent-mother a multitude of services that she either refused to accept or of those she accepted, she simply failed to benefit.
C. STATUTORY GROUNDS
Next, respondent-mother challenges the trial court's finding that there existed clear and convincing evidence to terminate her parental rights. This argument lacks merit.
To terminate parental rights, the trial court must find by clear and convincing evidence that at least one of the statutory grounds for termination has been established. In re Trejo, 462 Mich 341, 355; 612 NW2d 407 (2000). This Court reviews the trial court's findings under the clearly erroneous standard. MCR 3.977(K). A finding is clearly erroneous if the reviewing court is left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed. In re Miller, 433 Mich 331, 337; 445 NW2d 161 (1989).
The trial court terminated respondent-mother's parental rights pursuant to MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i), (g), and (j), which permit termination of parental rights under the following circumstances:
(c) The parent was a respondent in a proceeding brought under this chapter, 182 or more days have elapsed since the issuance of an initial dispositional order, and the court, by clear and convincing evidence, finds either of the following:
(i) The conditions that led to the adjudication continue to exist and there is no reasonable likelihood that the conditions will be rectified within a reasonable time considering the child's age.
* * *
(g) The parent, although, in the court's discretion, financially able to do so, fails to provide proper care or custody for the child and there is no reasonable expectation that the parent will be able to provide proper care and custody within a reasonable time considering the child's age.
* * *
(j) There is a reasonable likelihood, based on the conduct or capacity of the child's parent, that the child will be harmed if he or she is returned to the home of the parent.
The trial court removed PM from respondent-mother's care because of deplorable housing conditions, mental instability, domestic issues between respondent-mother and respondent-father, and poor parenting skills. The trial court ordered respondent-mother to comply with a treatment plan specifically designed to address each of these issues. Despite being offered a multitude of services, with accommodations to address her impairments, respondent-mother failed to demonstrate that she could properly parent her special-needs child or that the child would be safe in her care. At the time of termination, 21 months after the initial dispositional hearing, none of the issues that brought PM into care had been adequately addressed or resolved.
At the time of the July 2020 termination hearing, housing remained a barrier to reunification. Indeed, during the entire two years PM was in care, respondent-mother lacked a suitable home. Initially, and for a significant period of time, respondent-mother and respondent-father had a home, but they struggled with maintaining it in a safe and sanitary condition. Then, despite petitioner's efforts and assistance from multiple sources, respondent-mother and respondent-father were evicted in February 2020 because of the deplorable conditions of the home and the lease violations. After the eviction, respondent-mother never obtained suitable housing. The record reflects that respondent-mother refused the assistance offered to her. Instead, she elected to live in a tent community with respondent-father with multiple other individuals. Thus, at the time of the July 2020 termination, housing remained a barrier to reunification.
The record also establishes that respondent-mother failed to improve her parenting skills during the nearly two years PM remained in care. When removed in August 2018, she was underweight and exhibited developmental delays. In general, respondent-mother demonstrated a basic understanding of child care and during parenting time, except for an occasional loss of focus, respondent-mother engaged appropriately with PM. Respondent-mother, however, needed to know how to care for PM's special needs. To that end, petitioner and multiple specialized agencies provided hands-on services to teach respondent-mother how to care for PM's special needs. Petitioner provided respondent-mother with several educational opportunities to learn about PM's needs, but she continued to demonstrate alarming lapses in judgment. No evidence establishes that respondent-mother could safely parent her child in an unsupervised setting. Indeed, in the most recent reporting periods, respondent-mother lacked permission to bring food to parenting-time visits because the agency lacked confidence that it would be appropriate.
Another event in 2020 also casts doubt on respondent-mother's ability and decision-making. After the eviction in February 2020, respondent-mother put 11 cats in a car with some sort of heater. The following day, the cats were dead. The caseworker assumed that the cats had somehow overheated. While it would not be appropriate to equate parenting a child with caring for a pet, this tragic event reflects poorly on respondent-mother's judgment and decision-making skills. --------
The record also reflects that respondent-mother lacked willingness to put her child's needs ahead of her own. The caseworker encouraged respondent-mother to leave the tent community and offered help to secure housing for herself that would someday be suitable for PM. The caseworker explained to respondent-mother that respondent-father's unacceptable and inappropriate behavior negatively impacted respondent-mother's ability to reunify with her daughter. Respondent-mother, however, refused the offer and remained in the tent community because she did not want to leave respondent-father. She also expressed reluctance to leave behind her cats. Clearly, respondent-mother failed to comprehend how her association with respondent-father and her attachment to the cats impacted her ability to demonstrate that she could safely and appropriately parent PM. Respondent-mother's unwillingness or inability to make PM a priority was particularly detrimental to respondent-mother's efforts at reunification when one considers the child's medical issues and continued special needs.
Respondent-mother also failed to adequately address her emotional instability. Both her counselor and the caseworker expressed a belief that respondent-mother had made some progress, but they opined that she remained very overwhelmed with her circumstances. The caseworker testified that respondent-mother frequently became overwhelmed by PM's significant medical needs, respondent-mother's homelessness, and respondent-mother's diagnoses of depression, anxiety, and autism. The caseworker expressed concern with respondent-mother's history of suicidal attempts and ideation, and her recent statements that she had no reason to live if PM was taken away. The record indicates that respondent-mother lacked emotional stability.
The record establishes that, at the time of termination, inadequate housing, emotional instability, and deficient parenting skills remained barriers to reunification. Further, these barriers precluded PM's return because PM continued to face significant risks of harm. Further, the record lacks evidence that these barriers would or could be adequately addressed within a reasonable time considering PM's age. Respondent-mother's history of instability in multiple facets of her life dated back to before 2004 when her parental rights to her oldest daughter were terminated under circumstances nearly identical with those presented in this case. Despite years of services, respondent-mother could not demonstrate her ability to safely parent a child, particularly one with special needs like PM. Clear and convincing evidence established that there was no reasonable likelihood that the conditions that led to adjudication would be rectified within a reasonable time considering PM's age. Accordingly, the trial court did not err by finding that at least one statutory ground existed requiring termination of respondent-mother's parental rights.
The evidence demonstrated that, at the time of termination, respondent-mother had yet to address, in any meaningful way, any of the conditions that caused her child to come into care. "[A] parent, whether disabled or not, must demonstrate that she can meet [a child's] basic needs before [the child] will be returned to her care." In re Terry, 240 Mich App 14, 28; 610 NW2d 563 (2000). "If a parent cannot or will not meet her irreducible minimum parental responsibilities, the needs of the child must prevail over the needs of the parent." Id. (quotation marks and citation omitted). Accordingly, respondent-mother lacks entitlement to any relief respecting the trial court's decision regarding statutory grounds.
D. BEST INTERESTS
Respondent-mother also argues that the trial court erred when it found that termination of her parental rights served PM's best interests. We disagree. We review for clear error a trial court's best-interest decision. In re Jones, 286 Mich App 126, 129; 777 NW2d 728 (2009).
"If the court finds that there are grounds for termination of parental rights and that termination of parental rights is in the child's best interests, the court shall order termination of parental rights and order that additional efforts for reunification of the child with the parent not be made." MCL 712A.19b(5). The trial court may consider several factors when deciding if termination of parental rights serves the child's best interests, including the child's bond to the parent, the parent's parenting ability, the child's need for permanency, stability, and finality, and the advantages of a foster home over the parent's home. In re Olive/Metts, 297 Mich App 35, 42; 823 NW2d 144 (2012). The court may also consider psychological evaluations, the child's age, continued involvement in domestic violence, and a parent's history. In re Jones, 286 Mich App at 131. Whether termination of parental rights serves a child's best interests must be proven by a preponderance of the evidence. In re Moss, 301 Mich App 76, 90; 836 NW2d 182 (2013).
The trial court did not clearly err when it found that termination of respondent-mother's parental rights served PM's best interests. A child requires a parent who can provide them with a safe, stable, and permanent home. The evidence in this case overwhelmingly established that respondent-mother lacked the ability to provide PM a safe and stable home and lacked the skills necessary to safely parent PM.
Respondent-mother asserts that termination did not serve PM's best interests because a bond existed between them. The record, however, does not support respondent-mother's contention. When PM experienced distress, she looked to her foster mother rather than respondent-mother for comfort. The trial court appropriately found, based upon a preponderance of the evidence, that PM had only a weak parental bond with respondent-mother.
Further, PM had special medical needs that respondent-mother failed to fully appreciate or understand. Respondent-mother never demonstrated her ability to provide PM the care she required. The record reflects that PM thrived in her foster care placement and the foster parents expressed a willingness to adopt her. When balancing the best-interest factors, a trial court may consider the advantages of a foster home over the parent's home and the possibility of adoption. In re Olive/Metts, 297 Mich App at 41-42. In her foster placement, PM had a stable home where she progressed. The foster parents indicated a willingness to provide PM long-term care, permanency and finality. At the time of termination, PM approached her fourth birthday and she had been in foster care for almost two years, longer than she had been in respondents' care. The record establishes that terminating respondent-mother's parental rights served PM's best interests by providing her a means by which PM could obtain stability, safety, permanency and finality. Accordingly, a preponderance of the evidence supports the trial court's finding that termination of respondent-mother's parental rights served PM's best interests.
II. RESPONDENT-FATHER'S APPEAL
Respondent-father raises a single issue on appeal, that petitioner failed to make reasonable efforts to reunite him with PM. We disagree.
On July 31, 2020, the second day of the termination hearing, respondent-father indicated both verbally and in writing that he wished to release his parental rights to PM. The trial court placed respondent-father under oath and advised him of his rights. It questioned respondent-father to ascertain whether he knowingly and voluntarily expressed his desire to release his parental rights to PM. Under oath, respondent-father admitted that he could not provide proper care for PM, that he would be unable to do so within a reasonable time, that termination of his rights served PM's best interests, and that he wished to waive further proceedings and release his rights to her. The trial court found that respondent-father's actions were knowingly and voluntarily made and appropriately accepted his release of his parental rights to PM. Respondent-father did not object to the trial court's findings in this regard and he did not move to set aside the trial court's findings. Nor did respondent-father move to set aside the release of rights. Under these circumstances, respondent-father is not an aggrieved party entitled to appellate relief. This Court lacks jurisdiction to hear his appeal. Alternatively, respondent-father has waived his arguments on appeal.
Pursuant to MCR 7.203(A), this Court "has jurisdiction of an appeal of right filed by an aggrieved party[.]" Respondent-father consented to the trial court's actions. Accordingly, he is not an aggrieved party. It is axiomatic that "one may not appeal from a consent judgment, order or decree." Dybata v Kistler, 140 Mich App 65, 68; 362 NW2d 891 (1985), citing Dora v Lesinski, 351 Mich 579, 582; 88 NW2d 592 (1958).
Even assuming that respondent-father is properly considered an "aggrieved party" so as to permit this Court to have jurisdiction over his appeal, he has waived any challenges to the termination of his parental rights. Waiver is the intentional abandonment or relinquishment of a known right. People v Carter, 462 Mich 206, 215; 612 NW2d 144 (2000). In this case, respondent-father intentionally abandoned the right to contest the termination of his parental rights. Indeed, when given the opportunity, respondent declined to continue with the termination hearing. This effectively insured that petitioner would not present additional evidence in support of its case against respondent-father. On appeal, respondent-father now seeks reversal of the termination of his parental rights, but this directly contradicts the position he took in the lower court where he agreed to the termination of his parental rights to PM. "A party may not take a position in the trial court and subsequently seek redress in an appellate court that is based on a position contrary to that taken in the trial court." Holmes v Holmes, 281 Mich App 575, 587-588; 760 NW2d 300 (2008) (quotation marks and citation omitted). "Respondent may not assign as error on appeal something that [he] deemed proper in the lower court because allowing [him] to do so would permit respondent to harbor error as an appellate parachute." In re Hudson, 294 Mich App 261, 264; 817 NW2d 115 (2011) (citation omitted).
In an effort to avoid the consequences of his intentional actions, respondent-father appears to argue that he felt despondent and hopeless which compelled him to release his parental rights. However, at the July 31, 2020 hearing, respondent-father agreed to the release of his rights under oath and in writing. He testified that his choice was entirely voluntarily. Respondent-father cannot now take the position that something other than free will and the best interests of his daughter compelled him to release his rights.
Even if we were to consider respondent-father's substantive claim that petitioner failed to make reasonable efforts toward reunification, we would conclude that the trial court did not err in this regard. First, respondent-father contends that because he was not provided with a therapist familiar with treating autistic individuals, petitioner failed to make reasonable efforts toward reunification. After considering the record as a whole, we find no merit to this argument.
In January 2017, under an earlier case and petition, respondent-father underwent a psychological assessment. The clinician, Dr. Thomas Spahn, noted that respondent-father was "very high functioning." Dr. Spahn did not believe that respondent-father needed "significant therapy," but instead opined that some counseling, hopefully with respondent-mother, would be appropriate. Dr. Spahn also noted that it would be "helpful" if the therapist had "reasonable familiarity with autistic dynamics." In August 2018, the trial court removed PM from respondents' care. At that time, respondent-father already participated in therapy with therapist Candice Hyatt. The clinic changed respondent-father's counselor to Ed Irizarry because of respondent-father's inappropriate conduct. The new counselor immediately recognized respondent-father's poor impulse control and his need to develop social skills. Irizarry diagnosed respondent-father with, among other things, hoarding and major depressive disorder with recurrent psychotic features. Irizarry testified that he addressed coping skills and helped respondent-father take responsibility for his choices instead of blaming the caseworkers and the system. Irizarry also recommended that respondent-father participate in group therapy at the YWCA. Accordingly, the caseworker made the necessary referral and respondent-father began treating with Klemp in group, individual, and joint therapy with respondent-mother.
During the March 2020 termination hearing, the caseworker acknowledged that the psychologist who evaluated respondents in 2017 recommended that they have therapists experienced with treating individuals with autism. She acknowledged that respondent-father did not progress much while treating with Irizarry, but she noted that in January 2020, respondent-father treated with a therapist who had experience working with autistic patients and felt that respondent-father received the help he needed. The caseworker explained that during a discussion in January 2020, when things turned a little heated, respondent-father stepped out of the room and decompressed for a moment, demonstrating that he made some progress.
Based on this record, we conclude that the trial court did not clearly err when it determined that petitioner made reasonable efforts to address respondent-father's emotional instability and to reunite him with PM. At the time PM came into care, respondent-father was already in treatment with a therapist of his choosing. After he engaged in threatening behavior requiring transfer to a new therapist, although that therapist lacked experience treating autistic clients, he assisted respondent-father to work on achieving goals that were fundamental to his treatment plan. Later, respondent-father worked with a therapist familiar with autism for the six months preceding termination. Considering the record as a whole, petitioner made reasonable efforts to address respondent-father's emotional instability. The trial court, therefore, did not err in this regard.
Respondent-father also contends that petitioner did not make reasonable efforts to address his housing issues. The record, however, establishes that petitioner made extraordinary efforts to assist both respondents in obtaining and maintaining suitable housing. Respondent-father's claims of error on appeal lack merit because they are not supported by the record in this case.
Affirmed.
/s/ Douglas B. Shapiro
/s/ Mark J. Cavanagh
/s/ James Robert Redford