In re Moses

74 Citing cases

  1. Montoya v. Goldstein (In re Chuza Oil Co.)

    No. 18-11836-t7 (Bankr. D.N.M. Jul. 16, 2021)   Cited 1 times

    This doctrine originally arose under the Bankruptcy Act in codebtor cases—the new creditor, who was obligated on an existing debt as a guarantor or surety, provided Debtor with funds to pay the old creditor.In re Moses, 256 B.R. 641, 645 (10th Cir. BAP 2000) (collecting cases). In such cases, courts reasoned that the codebtor's payment to the old creditor did not constitute a transfer of debtor's property, and there was no diminution of the debtor's estate inasmuch as the amount available for unsecured creditors remained the same as before the transfer regardless of the debtor's control of the transferred funds. Courts also noted that earmarking was equitable because if the transfer were avoided, the codebtor would be subject to double liability.

  2. In re Ireland

    BAP No. WO-04-049, Bankr. No. 02-22503-BH, Adv. No. 03-1051-BH (B.A.P. 10th Cir. Oct. 18, 2004)   Cited 1 times

    Section 547(b) states: See, e.g., Manchester v. First Bank Trust Co. (In re Moses), 256 B.R. 641, 644 (10th Cir. BAP 2000) (citing cases); Harris v. Beneficial Oklahoma, Inc. (In re Harris), 209 B.R. 990, 993 (10th Cir. BAP 1997) (citing cases). Except as provided in subsection (c) of this section, the trustee may avoid any transfer of an interest of the debtor in property —

  3. Wilcox v. Anchor Wate Co.

    2007 UT 39 (Utah 2007)   Cited 42 times
    Holding that the rate in section 15-1-1 did not apply because the case did not deal with a contract for a loan or forbearance, and instead applying a rate used in federal bankruptcy law because it was a "more appropriate prejudgment interest rate" for the case

    For the reasons detailed below, we find that neither the reinsurance agreements nor any theory Anchor Wate advances establishes such an interest; therefore, the district court correctly determined that the reinsurance proceeds were part of SAIC's estate. In re Edgeworth, 993 F.2d 51, 55 (5th Cir. 1993); accord In re Moses, 256 B.R. 641, 645 (10th Cir. 2000). ¶ 15 As a general matter, an insured has no legal interest in reinsurance proceeds.

  4. WILCOX v. ANCHOR WATE CO

    2006 UT 67 (Utah 2006)   Cited 1 times   1 Legal Analyses

    For the reasons detailed below, we find that neither the reinsurance agreements nor any theory Anchor Wate advances establishes such an interest; therefore, the district court correctly determined that the reinsurance proceeds were part of SAIC's estate. In re Edgeworth, 993 F.2d 51, 55 (5th Cir. 1993);accord In re Moses, 256 B.R. 641, 645 (10th Cir. 2000). ¶ 15 As a general matter, an insured has no legal interest in reinsurance proceeds.

  5. In re Fox

    Case No. 08-1053-EFM (D. Kan. Mar. 4, 2009)

    As such, "the fundamental inquiry under 547(b) will be whether the debtor had a legal or equitable interest in the property such that the transfer at issue diminished or depleted the debtor's estate."Manchester v. First Bank and Trust Co. (In re Moses), 256 B.R. 641, 645 (10th Cir. BAP 2000) ( citing Begier v. IRS, 496 U.S. 53, 58-59, 110 S.Ct. 2258, 110 L.Ed.2d 46 (1990)).Begier, 496 U.S. at 58-59.

  6. In re Marshall

    U.S. Dist. Ct. No. 07-1222-WEB, Case No. 05-18216, Adv. No. 06-5181 (D. Kan. Feb. 26, 2008)

    [T]he fundamental inquiry under § 547(b) will be whether the Debtor had a legal or equitable interest in the property [transferred] such that the transfer at issue diminished or depleted the Debtor's estate." Manchester v. First Bank Trust (In re Moses), 256 B.R. 641, 645 (10th Cir. BAP 2000) ( quoting Bailey v. Hazen (In re Ogden), 243 B.R. 104, 113 (10th Cir. BAP 2000). In preference litigation, the form of the transaction must satisfy the statutory elements, and the "debtor's intent or motive is not material."

  7. Hofmann v. Drabner (In re Baldwin)

    514 B.R. 646 (Bankr. D. Utah 2014)   Cited 6 times

    In other words, “an interest of the debtor in property” as used in § 547(b) “is best understood as that property that would have been part of the estate had it not been transferred before the commencement of bankruptcy proceedings.” “ ‘Generally, a transfer of money or property owned by a third person to a creditor of a debtor is not a preference.’ ” Manchester v. First Bank & Trust Co. (In re Moses), 256 B.R. 641, 645 (10th Cir. BAP 2000) (citations omitted).Begier v. IRS, 496 U.S. 53, 59 n. 3, 110 S.Ct. 2258, 110 L.Ed.2d 46 (1990)

  8. In re Egidi

    386 B.R. 884 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2008)

    Earmarking is a judicially created exception to the general rule that certain transfers are recoverable as preferences by the trustee in bankruptcy. There is a debate amongst the courts whether the earmarking doctrine is an element of "property of the debtor" or it is an entirely separate doctrine, whose applicability is separate and distinct from the criteria of section 547. Compare McCuskey v. Nat'l Bank of Waterloo (In re Bohlen Enter., Ltd.), 859 F.2d 561 (8th Cir.1988) (earmarking addresses the issue of whether transfer of an interest of a debtor in property has occurred), and Montgomery, 983 F.2d 1389 (6th Cir.1993) (earmarking is an exception to the property of the estate analysis), with Manchester v. First Bank & Trust Co. (In re Moses), 256 B.R. 641, 648 (10th Cir. BAP 2000) ("[E]armarking does not assist in defining the elements of a preference under § 547(b). It is merely a judicially created exception to the requirements of § 547(b).").

  9. In re Egidi

    386 B.R. 884 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2008)

    Earmarking is a judicially created exception to the general rule that certain transfers are recoverable as preferences by the trustee in bankruptcy. There is a debate amongst the courts whether the earmarking doctrine is an element of "property of the debtor" or it is an entirely separate doctrine, whose applicability is separate and distinct from the criteria of section 547. Compare McCuskey v. Nat'l Bank of Waterloo (In re Bohlen Enter., Ltd.), 859 F.2d 561 (8th Cir. 1988) (earmarking addresses the issue of whether transfer of an interest of a debtor in property has occurred), and Montgomery v. Southland Escrow Serv., 983 F.2d 1389 (6th Cir. 1993) (earmarking is an exception to the property of the estate analysis), with Manchester v. First Bank Trust Co. (In re Moses), 256 B.R. 641, 648 (B.A.P. 10th Cir. 2000) ("[E]armarking does not assist in defining the elements of a preference under § 547(b). It is merely a judicially created exception to the requirements of § 547(b).").

  10. In re Marshall

    CASE NO. 05-18216, ADV. NO. 06-5181 (Bankr. D. Kan. Jul. 23, 2007)

    Id., citing Butner v. U.S., 440 U.S. 48, 55 (1979).Manchester v. First Bank Trust Co. (In re Moses), 256 B.R. 641, 645 (10th Cir. BAP 2000), quoting Bailey v. Hazen (In re Ogden), 243 B.R. 104, 113 (10th Cir. BAP 2000). 5 Collier on Bankruptcy ¶ 547.