As this court has noted before, the ABA Standards, which represent a comprehensive authority concerning sanctions in lawyer discipline cases, serve as a helpful guide to this court — although not as binding authority — in determining issues surrounding the determination of the appropriate sanction in a given circumstance. See In re Morrow, 303 Or. 102, 107, 734 P.2d 867 (1987) (so stating). As to the issue before us here, the ABA Standards generally confirm the approach taken in this court's case law, as discussed above.

Although that might be a reasonable time to investigate a more complex matter or a noncooperative lawyer, we view such a significant delay in this case, which involves essentially only one event that the accused admitted as a factual matter, as a mitigating factor.See ABA Standard 9.32(j) (amended 1992) (delay in disciplinary proceedings is a mitigating factor); In re Morrow, 303 Or. 102, 106-07 n 1, 734 P.2d 867 (1987) (applying former ABA Standard 9.32(i) when six years had passed between the lawyer's misconduct and the Bar's initial investigation and two additional years had passed between the initial investigation and the filing of a formal complaint). We also note that there was a significant delay in this court between the accused's filing a request for review and oral argument.

In re Disciplinary Proceeding against Dann, 136 Wn.2d at 82-83. See also Yokozeki v. State Bar, 11 Cal.3d 436, 521 P.2d 858, 113 Cal.Rptr. 602 (1974) (unexplained seven-year delay mitigated disbarment to suspension); Florida Bar v. Thomson, 429 So.2d 2 (Fla. 1983) (unexplained delay mitigated suspension to reprimand); In re Conduct of Morrow, 303 Or. 102, 734 P.2d 867, 63 A.L.R.4th 647 (1987) (lengthy delay between conduct and charges mitigated sanction); Vaughn v. State Bar, 9 Cal.3d 698, 511 P.2d 1158, 108 Cal.Rptr. 806 (1973) (four-year delay in prosecution mitigated suspension to reprimand); Louisiana State Bar Ass'n v. Guidry, 571 So.2d 161 (La. 1990) (lawyer who committed misconduct by commingling and converting client funds suspended for six months due to three-year delay in bringing charges and intervening rehabilitation). Here Tasker made the most of the delay by demonstrating his willingness and ability to clean up his act, thus showing disbarment is not necessary to protect the public.

"See also In re Morrow, 303 Or. 102, 106, 734 P.2d 867 (1987) (In a Bar disciplinary case, "lengthy delay from the accused's conduct to the filing of charges [without prejudice] is not a defense but bears on the proper sanction."). No prejudice to accused is alleged here, nor is proof of any prejudice found in the record.