Opinion
No. 341991
09-18-2018
In re MONTGOMERY/MONTGOMERY-BREWER, Minors.
UNPUBLISHED Jackson Circuit Court Family Division
LC No. 07-005885-NA Before: METER, P.J., and K. F. KELLY and GLEICHER, JJ. PER CURIAM.
The circuit court terminated respondent-mother's parental rights to her daughters, JM and JM-B, pursuant to MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i) and (j) based on respondent's history of child abuse and failure to make adequate progress to prevent future abuse through services. We discern no error and affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
Respondent is no stranger to the child protective system. The circuit court terminated respondent's parental rights to her eldest child on October 7, 2008, after she received more than a year of services. As described by this Court in an opinion affirming the termination of respondent's parental rights:
Respondent had anger management and mental health issues, including mood problems, that caused her to endanger her son. A psychological evaluation indicated "a very high risk for child abuse." Despite participating in services, she was unable to bring those problems under control to any significant extent, preferring to self-medicate with marijuana rather than work to stabilize her mood with the appropriate dosage of prescription medication and work toward positive changes through therapy. She continued to express her anger in inappropriate ways - for example, she assaulted a neighbor and made multiple inappropriate threats - and refused substance abuse treatment, continuing to present a risk of harm to the child. [In re J Montgomery, unpublished memorandum opinion of the Court of Appeals, issued July 9, 2009 (Docket No. 289022).]Documents in the lower court record indicate that respondent threatened violence against the judge assigned to the matter, as well as against certain service providers.
JM was born on June 13, 2010. Respondent used marijuana during her pregnancy and after JM's birth refused Child Protective Services (CPS) investigators access to her home to conduct a safety check. The court entered an order to take newborn JM into protective care, but respondent fled the jurisdiction. When respondent allegedly returned to the area a year later, CPS again tried to take JM into protective custody, but could not locate mother and child.
On February 10, 2016, CPS received a new complaint regarding respondent and her children, specifically that JM had bruises on her face, back, and shoulder. The 5½-year-old child reported that her mother hit her five times with a belt. JM also indicated that respondent "whooped" 3½-year-old JM-B the night before. Respondent claimed that JM had been acting out since she was molested by another child at daycare and that "she needs help." CPS left JM and JM-B in respondent's care and immediately initiated in-home services through Families First.
On March 25, 2016, school officials noticed a large bruise on JM's neck, which respondent had tried to conceal with makeup and by clothing JM in a turtleneck. JM reported that respondent choked her, stating that respondent "was trying to kill me, but she didn't." JM asserted that respondent told her to lie and blame the injury on JM-B. CPS took JM and JM-B into care and placed them together in nonrelative foster care. During a forensic interview, JM described that respondent choked her until she could not breath on the day in question and that she had choked her on other occasions as well. JM indicated that respondent also "whoop[ed]" her with her hands and a belt. A Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) investigator observed JM's forensic interview and testified that JM described disturbing physical abuse of both girls, including an incident where respondent instructed JM-B to get a knife and to kill JM. Respondent then threatened to "cut [JM] up into little pieces." JM described another incident where respondent tried to drown her for drawing a bath for JM-B with water that was too hot.
Over the next several months, respondent attended parenting classes and participated in individual therapy. Random drug screens established that respondent had stopped using marijuana as a substitute for psychotropic medication. Respondent submitted to a psychological evaluation and was diagnosed with Narcissistic Personality Disorder. The evaluator recommended intensive services to address respondent's parenting style, but felt her "prognosis is poor particularly with her poor insight and tendencies toward denial." JM began therapy as well and was diagnosed with posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD). JM acted out in extreme ways, especially at school where she interfered with the entire class.
The court conducted a termination hearing in January 2017, but determined to give respondent more time to benefit from services. In June 2017, respondent gave birth to a fourth child, who was immediately placed in his father's sole custody. Respondent persevered, continuing counseling and other services.
Over time, a divide appeared in the service providers' opinions in this case. Respondent's therapist, Susan Rowser, reported that respondent was making "tremendous progress" in therapy and had taken responsibility for her actions. Rowser opined that the caseworker was treating respondent unfairly. Rowser believed that respondent would soon be able to safely parent her children.
However, JM's therapist, Erica Magers, observed supervised parenting time sessions and noted JM's anxiety. Respondent sometimes tried to comfort JM, but at other times ignored or punished the child for her anxiety symptoms. Respondent did not take feedback well and would lash out in front of the children. Respondent also spoke negatively about the caseworkers and foster parents to the children. Finally, respondent threatened to hit JM with a belt. As a result, the DHHS suspended parenting time with court approval on August 31, 2017. Parenting time was reinstated approximately six weeks later. During the break, JM's behavior improved and her anxiety eased. The problems resurfaced with the reinstatement of parenting time.
In August 2017, James Henry, director of Southwest Michigan Children's Trauma Assessment Center, evaluated JM. Eighteen months into the proceedings, James noted that JM still had difficulty regulating her emotions and experienced "disorganized attachment," meaning she could not recognize safe relationships. Returning to the home where she experienced the trauma, James asserted, would trigger JM's PTSD and pose a risk of mental and physical harm. James recommended terminating respondent's parental rights, noting that respondent tried to justify her extreme physical discipline of the children as "mak[ing] sure that she beat the white out of" JM, who is of mixed race, and asserting that her actions "were justified by black culture."
Ultimately, the circuit court determined that respondent had not rectified the conditions that led to adjudication and that the children would be in danger of further physical and emotional harm if returned to their mother's care. Accordingly, the court terminated respondent's parental rights.
II. STATUTORY GROUNDS
Respondent challenges the evidentiary support for the statutory grounds underlying the circuit court's termination decision. Pursuant to MCL 712A.19b(3), a circuit court "may terminate a parent's parental rights to a child if the court finds, by clear and convincing evidence" that at least one statutory ground has been proven by the DHHS. MCR 3.977(A)(3); In re Trejo, 462 Mich 341, 350; 612 NW2d 407 (2000). When termination is sought in a supplemental petition based on new grounds, the DHHS must present legally admissible evidence in support. In re DMK, 289 Mich App 246, 258; 796 NW2d 129 (2010). We review a circuit court's factual finding that a statutory termination ground has been established for clear error. In re Rood, 483 Mich 73, 90-91; 763 NW2d 587 (2009). "A finding of fact is clearly erroneous if the reviewing court has a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed, giving due regard to the trial court's special opportunity to observe the witnesses." In re Moss, 301 Mich App 76, 80; 836 NW2d 182 (2013) (quotation marks and citation omitted). "Clear error signifies a decision that strikes us as more than just maybe or probably wrong." In re Williams, 286 Mich App 253, 271; 779 NW2d 286 (2009).
In terminating respondent's parental rights, the court cited MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i) and (j), which provide:
(c) The parent was a respondent in a proceeding brought under this chapter, 182 or more days have elapsed since the issuance of an initial dispositional order, and the court, by clear and convincing evidence, finds either of the following:
(i) The conditions that led to the adjudication continue to exist and there is no reasonable likelihood that the conditions will be rectified within a reasonable time considering the child's age.
* * *
(j) There is a reasonable likelihood, based on the conduct or capacity of the child's parent, that the child will be harmed if he or she is returned to the home of the parent.
The court took jurisdiction in this case because of respondent's physical abuse of her children. CPS provided intensive in-home services before taking the children into care, but respondent reverted to corporeal punishment severe enough to leave bruises on JM. Respondent received 21 more months of services, including a psychological evaluation, individual therapy and supervised parenting time. Despite these services, respondent continued to make excuses for abusing her children as late as August 2017. Moreover, there was no reasonable likelihood that respondent would rectify the conditions that led to adjudication within a reasonable time. Respondent received services in 2007 and 2008 in an attempt to reunite her with her eldest child. After more than a year of services, the court terminated respondent's parental rights because she posed too great a risk of child abuse. Respondent received another round of services totaling nearly two years in this matter because she had again physically abused her children. At the termination hearing, respondent admitted that she still had "work to do" and was not yet ready to parent her children independently. Of even greater concern, respondent still did not recognize by the time of the January 2018 termination hearing that JM's PTSD was caused by her abuse; rather, she blamed JM's mental condition on their separation. Under these circumstances, the court soundly supported termination on factor (c)(i).
Termination was also supportable under factor (j). "Harm" for purposes of MCL 712A.19b(3)(j) includes physical as well as emotional harm. In re Hudson, 294 Mich App 261, 268; 817 NW2d 115 (2011). JM and JM-B had already been harmed by respondent, both physically and emotionally. The children were brought into care because of bruises found on JM's neck, back, and shoulders. JM described horrific incidents of abuse against her and her younger sister. As a result of this abuse, JM suffers from PTSD and required intensive therapeutic assistance. Given respondent's failure to adequately rectify the conditions that led to adjudication, there is a reasonable likelihood that the children would face future harm if returned to respondent's care. Accordingly, the circuit court did not clearly err in finding statutory grounds to terminate respondent's parental rights.
III. BEST INTERESTS
Respondent further contends that termination of her parental rights was not in her daughter's best interests. "Once a statutory ground for termination has been proven, the trial court must find that termination is in the child's best interests before it can terminate parental rights." In re Olive/Metts, 297 Mich App 35, 40; 823 NW2d 144 (2012), citing MCL 712A.19b(5). "[W]hether termination of parental rights is in the best interests of the child must be proven by a preponderance of the evidence." Moss, 301 Mich App at 90. The court should weigh all the evidence available to it in determining the child's best interests. Trejo, 462 Mich at 356-357. Relevant factors include "the child's bond to the parent, the parent's parenting ability, [and] the child's need for permanency, stability, and finality. . . ." Olive/Metts, 297 Mich App at 41-42 (citations omitted). "[T]he children's safety and well-being" are further considerations in the best-interest determination. In re VanDalen, 293 Mich App 120, 142; 809 NW2d 412 (2011).
Although JM and JM-B shared a bond with their mother, it was not in the girls' best interests to be returned to respondent's care. Respondent had been physically and emotionally abusive of her children and JM suffered from PTSD as a result of this maltreatment. James and Magers both testified that returning to her mother's care would trigger JM's PTSD. Moreover, by the time of the termination hearing, respondent still did not understand that her conduct caused JM's emotional trauma. Respondent's parenting ability also had not improved through services. Respondent continued to show favoritism toward JM-B during supervised parenting time sessions and showed an inability to manage JM's trauma-based behaviors. The DHHS even had to suspend parenting time sessions because respondent threatened to hit JM with a belt. Although respondent challenged the context in which this statement was made, she did not deny making the statement and seemed oblivious to the effect this type of statement could have on her daughter. Ultimately, respondent had not demonstrated a sufficient understanding that she had been abusive of her children in the past, leaving the children in danger of future abuse if returned to respondent's care. Returning children to a home rife with physical and emotional abuse cannot be in their best interests.
Accordingly, we affirm.
/s/ Patrick M. Meter
/s/ Kirsten Frank Kelly
/s/ Elizabeth L. Gleicher