A shelter care order is no more than this." In re Moloney (1986), 24 Ohio St.3d 22, 25, 24 OBR 18, 492 N.E.2d 805. {¶ 23} Appellant's argument is essentially that the juvenile court's decision granting CCDJFS predispositional temporary custody on August 5, 2005, was against the manifest weight of the evidence.

See, also, In re Baby Girl Baxter (1985), 17 Ohio St.3d 229, 17 OBR 469, 479 N.E.2d 257, paragraph two of the syllabus, where it was held that "R.C. 2151.412 does not require a juvenile court to order a reunification plan when it makes a dispositional order pursuant to R.C. 2151.353(A)(4)." Accord In re Moloney (1986), 24 Ohio St.3d 22, 25-26, 24 OBR 18, 21-22, 492 N.E.2d 805, 808. R.C. 2151.353(A)(4) reads, in pertinent part:

A shelter care order "is in no sense dispositive; it is interlocutory in nature, limited in scope and purpose, and temporary in duration." In re Moloney, 24 Ohio St.3d 22, 25, 492 N.E.2d 805 (1986). As an interlocutory order, a shelter care order ostensibly merges into the final judgment.

The trial court was not required to make a reasonable-efforts determination at the permanent custody hearing: "R.C. 2151.412 does not require that a court order a reunification plan when it makes disposition pursuant to R.C. 2151.353(A)(4)." Inre Baby Girl Baxter, 17 Ohio St.3d 229, 234, 479 N.E.2d 257 (1985); see also In re Moloney, 24 Ohio St.3d 22, 25-26, 492 N.E.2d 805 (1986). {¶ 32} Thus, Baxter and Moloney establish that a reasonable-efforts determination is not required at a permanent custody hearing under R.C. 2151.353(A)(4).

{¶25} After a child has been adjudicated dependent pursuant to R.C. 2151.353, the trial court has four options. In re Moloney, 24 Ohio St.3d 22, 26 (1986). The court may permit the child to remain with the parent subject to court conditions and limitations, including supervision.

It respond[ed] to an emergency—the immediate physical needs of the child—until the court [could] fully inquire into the facts and decide what [was] best for the child." In re Moloney, 24 Ohio St.3d 22, 25 (1986). {¶27} Because the parents were deprived of their right to custody of their infant child throughout the objection process, they had a fundamental right to a fair and expeditious resolution of the adjudication.

Instead, appellant claims the trial court's judgment is against the manifest weight of the evidence because there is no evidence in the record as to the problems causing his daughter to be placed outside his home; appellant's home was never investigated to determine whether it would be a proper placement; and appellant was never added to the case plan. In In re Maloney (1986), 24 Ohio St.3d 22, the Ohio Supreme Court cited its previous decision in In re Baby Girl Baxter (1985), 17 Ohio St.3d 229, and held that "`* * * R.C. 2151.412 does not require that a court order a reunification plan when it makes disposition pursuant to R.C. 2151.353(A)(4).'" Id. at 26.

A shelter care order is no more than this." In re Moloney (1986), 24 Ohio St.3d 22, 25. {¶ 89} Shelter care orders are matters, therefore, of limited scope and purpose.

The reunification plans necessitated by R.C. 2151.412 pertain only where a child has previously been determined to be dependent, neglected or abused; temporary custody has been committed to a children services board, welfare department or a certified organization; and an order is sought changing temporary to permanent custody." In re Moloney, 24 Ohio St.3d 22, 26. {¶ 26} Thus, although a children services agency should make a good faith effort to reunite a dependent child with his biological parent, such a reunification plan is not required where it would be futile to implement one.

Initial and comprehensive reunification plans are not necessary pursuant to an emergency shelter care order. In re Moloney (1986), 24 Ohio St.3d 22, 26, 492 N.E.2d 805, 809; see, generally, In re Catlett (Sept. 17, 1982), Lucas App. No. L-82-117, unreported (explaining that "it [is] obvious that the state legislature envisioned circumstances under which the submission of a reunification plan by the children services board would not be necessary"); see, e.g., In re Baby Girl Baxter (1985), 17 Ohio St.3d 229, 479 N.E.2d 257 (holding that R.C. 2151.42 does not require a juvenile court to order a reunification plan when it grants permanent custody); see, also, Elmer, 36 Ohio App.3d at 244, 523 N.E.2d at 543 (explaining that "there is no need to implement a reunification plan when it would be futile").