Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Appeal from an order of the Superior Court Ct. No. DP018815 of Orange County, Salvador Sarmiento, Judge.
Michelle L. Jarvis, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Nicholas S. Chrisos, County Counsel, Karen L. Christensen and Aurelio Torre, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
OPINION
ARONSON, J.
J.D. (father) appeals from the juvenile court’s dispositional order (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 300 et seq.) requiring him to submit to random drug testing as part of a family reunification plan. He challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support the trial court’s order. For the reasons expressed below, we affirm.
All statutory citations are to the Welfare and Institutions Code unless noted.
I
Factual and Procedural Background
In late August 2009, the Orange County Social Services Agency (SSA) filed a “non-custody” dependency petition (§ 300, subds. (b), (j)) alleging mother’s unresolved and untreated substance abuse, mental health issues, and domestic violence posed a substantial risk to her three-month-old daughter M.M. (born May 2009). Mother’s nine other children lived apart from her, and she previously had failed to reunify with three of her children, who became dependents of the court and were later placed for adoption. The petition also alleged father knew or should have known the infant was at risk while in mother’s care but failed to protect the child.
Two of the nine children were adults, another lived with his father, and three others lived with the maternal grandmother with whom mother had no relationship.
According to the detention report, a social worker visited mother’s residence to check on her and her three-month old baby, M.M. Mother, who rented a room in an apartment, was not at home. The social worker learned from another apartment resident that mother was behind on her rent and planned to move out that day. The resident reported hearing mother arguing with “the baby’s father” the previous evening.
The social worker spoke with father by telephone. He stated he and the mother were never in a relationship, but “‘just had unprotected sex.’” They lived together briefly with the paternal grandmother, but mother moved or was evicted by the grandmother and he lost contact with her a few months after she became pregnant. Father reported that while visiting mother a few days earlier, he observed bruises on her. She explained her boyfriend had assaulted her and gone to jail. Father reported mother drank excessively, including during her pregnancy, one time passing out in bushes outside his workplace. Father declared mother was “aggressive” when she drank and he did not believe she provided a safe environment for his daughter.
J.D. was identified as an alleged father at the outset of the case. He was not listed on the birth certificate and did not support mother during the pregnancy. Paternity testing established he was M.M.’s biological father, and in October 2009, the court found him to be her presumed father.
Mother told the social worker she was in the process of moving and denied she had fallen behind on her rent. She explained she lost contact with father when she was about three or four months pregnant, but recently got in touch with him after a friend gave her his phone number. She had seen him only once since, when he helped her move some of her belongings.
Mother had an extensive history of methamphetamine and alcohol abuse and misdemeanor convictions for child neglect (Pen. Code, § 273a, subd. (b)) and driving under the influence. Mother acknowledged failing to complete earlier reunification plans with her other children, and admitted she did not have a relationship with them, but stated she had “‘changed since then’” and claimed to have been sober for over a year. She denied current alcohol use and denied drinking during her pregnancy, but admitted having a drink a few months earlier to relieve stress. She denied any involvement in domestic violence with father or anyone else, but later admitted she had her current boyfriend arrested for domestic violence.
A social worker visited mother’s apartment room and found it neat and clean, noting mother had all the necessary items to care for an infant. Mother stated she received enough from welfare programs and collecting cans and bottles to pay her rent and purchase necessities. She also helped father sell clothes at a swap meet. M.M. appeared well cared for and healthy.
The social worker did not recommend removing M.M. from mother’s custody because mother had not neglected the infant. She instead requested juvenile court supervision to assure M.M.’s safety based on mother’s history and her failure to complete earlier reunification plans. The juvenile court nevertheless removed M.M. from her mother’s physical custody at the detention hearing, authorizing SSA to return her on “CRISP [conditional release with intensive supervision]-like conditions” if mother tested free of drugs and established a suitable residence. M.M. was placed in a foster home. The court authorized drug and alcohol testing for the parents over father’s objection. The court also directed the parents to other services pending the jurisdiction hearing, including parenting courses and counseling.
In the jurisdiction and disposition report dated October 2, 2009, the social worker described mother’s extensive history of drug and alcohol abuse, the neglect of her other children, and her failure to benefit from prior treatment and services. Both parents denied father used drugs. Father described himself as a social drinker who currently was not drinking because he was on a diet. He admitted getting into verbal and physical arguments with mother while drinking beer. On one occasion after M.M.’s birth, he cut mother’s hand by closing a beer cooler on it. Father also admitted driving while having a suspended license.
Father tested drug free on seven occasions in September 2009. He missed one test on September 21, claiming his mobile phone had been disconnected. He missed more tests in October, claiming his cell phone had been turned off because he could not pay the bill and therefore he learned of his testing date too late to make the appointment. He claimed he missed another test because the testing facility ran out of cups. He could not find the address for an alternate location and left a message for the social worker. The second social worker reported father had not enrolled in a parenting class or counseling and the parents argued with each other while visiting M.M. Upon learning father took mother to visit her other children, and drove her to a drug testing facility, the social worker warned father that his failure to honor appropriate boundaries with mother potentially put his child at risk.
In November 2009, the parties submitted the jurisdictional and dispositional issues to the court based on SSA’s reports. The parties also stipulated father called in the child abuse report that led to the filing of the petition. The court found the allegations of the petition to be true and exercised jurisdiction over M.M. The court denied father’s request for placement of M.M. without supervision (§ 361.2), finding the parents’ use of alcohol and domestic violence posed a substantial danger to M.M. The court also stated the drug testing results did not demonstrate father did “not have a[n] abuse problem.” The court granted father reunification services, but denied them to mother under section 361.5, subdivision (b), which authorizes the court to deny reunification services to parents who have previously failed to reunify with their other children. Over father’s objection, the court granted SSA’s request to continue testing father for alcohol in his system.
II
Discussion
The Trial Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion in Ordering Father to Submit to Random Drug Testing
Father contends there was no evidence he abused drugs or alcohol. He cites his lack of a significant criminal history and negative drug test results to refute the trial court’s impression “it did not have any real evidence to indicate any drug test results to show that father did not have an abuse problem.” We conclude the court did not abuse its discretion by requiring father to submit to random drug testing.
“At the dispositional hearing, the juvenile court must order child welfare services for the minor and the minor’s parents to facilitate reunification of the family. (§ 361.5, subd. (a); Cal. Rules of Court, rule [5.695](f)(1).)” (In re Christopher H. (1996) 50 Cal.App.4th 1001, 1006.) Under section 362, “When a child is adjudged a dependent child of the court on the ground that the child is a person described by Section 300, the court may make any and all reasonable orders for the care, supervision, custody, conduct, maintenance, and support of the child....” (Subd. (a).) Also, “[t]he juvenile court may direct any and all reasonable orders to the parents or guardians of the child who is the subject of any proceedings... as the court deems necessary and proper to carry out the provisions of this section....” (§ 362, subd. (c).) In crafting its dispositional order, the juvenile court has broad discretion to determine what would best serve and protect the child’s interest (In re Christopher H., at p. 1006), but “the juvenile court’s discretion in fashioning reunification orders is not unfettered. Its orders must be ‘reasonable’ and ‘designed to eliminate those conditions that led to the court’s finding that the child is a person described by Section 300’” (In re Nolan W. (2009) 45 Cal.4th 1217, 1229). An appellate court may not reverse the juvenile court’s determination absent a clear abuse of discretion. (In re Christopher H., at p. 1006.)
The juvenile court’s authority in designing a reunification plan is not limited to the issues it addressed in making its jurisdictional findings. (In re Christopher, supra, 50 Cal.App.4th at p. 1008.) The disposition phase in dependency proceedings is similar in scope to a criminal sentencing hearing. (In re Rodger H. (1991) 228 Cal.App.3d 1174, 1183.) Just as a criminal court may fashion probation conditions to address a defendant’s relevant character traits that pose a risk to society, so too may the juvenile court address all the circumstances and issues that may pose a risk of harm to the well-being of the child. (In re Christopher, at p. 1008.) Consequently, the juvenile court could consider whether father’s drinking played a prominent role in his relationship with mother and contributed to his delayed grasp of the risk she posed to M.M. The court also wanted to learn if father continued to drink with mother, which might impair father’s ability to appreciate the risk mother still posed to M.M. Consequently, the juvenile court ordered father to continue with the drug tests father had been taking before the hearing.
We are satisfied the record shows the juvenile court did not act arbitrarily or capriciously in ordering further testing. Although father’s alcohol tests were negative, he missed several random tests, which is typically considered the equivalent of a positive result. The juvenile court implicitly found his explanations for missing these tests less than convincing, and we are in no position to second-guess the court’s credibility calls. (In re L.Y.L. (2002) 101 Cal.App.4th 942, 947.) Father claimed he only drank socially, and mother corroborated this by describing father as an occasional drinker. But mother also claimed she only drank “occasionally.” Considering the evidence of mother’s alcoholism, her statement placing father’s drinking on a par with her own undoubtedly raised red flags for the court.
Undisputed evidence also showed the parents drank together during the pregnancy and after M.M. was born. The parents argued while drinking and father accidentally inflicted a minor injury to mother during one of their disagreements. Although father ultimately reported mother’s behavior to SSA, he continued to drink with her knowing the danger mother’s drinking posed to his daughter. His delay in reporting mother’s behavior and his role as an enabler to mother’s drinking bouts demonstrate he falls outside the classification of a “nonoffending parent.” (In re Jasmine C. (2003) 106 Cal.App.4th 177 [no evidence supported order for mother to attend parenting classes].) Indeed, father continued his relationship with mother after SSA’s intervention. Social workers observed the parents meeting in SSA’s parking lot and disappearing in father’s car before returning late for a scheduled visit with M.M. Based on evidence father drank with mother, whose alcoholism led to the removal of her other children, his failure to take random tests and his unconvincing explanation, the trial court reasonably sought to uncover through its testing order whether alcohol played an integral role or fostered dependency in father’s relationship with mother.
Father’s reliance on In re Sergio C. (1999) 70 Cal.App.4th 957, In re Basilio T. (1992) 4 Cal.App.4th 155, superseded by statute on another point, as noted in In re Lucero L. (2000) 22 Cal.4th 1227, 1239-1242, and other similar cases is unavailing. In Sergio C., the juvenile court ordered the father to submit to random drug tests based solely on the “unsworn and uncorroborated allegation” of mother, an “admitted drug addict.” (Sergio C., at p. 960.) The court observed there had been no investigation to support the order, and “[t]his is not a case involving a trial court’s credibility call.” (Id. at p. 961, fn. 4.) Here, in contrast, SSA’s investigation shed some light on how alcohol may have played a part in father’s relationship with mother, and the juvenile court’s rejection of father’s explanation for missing several random tests was a credibility call that supported the court’s order. In Basilio T., there simply was no evidence to support the order for substance abuse testing. As noted above, that is not the case here.
Based on the circumstances before the court, we cannot say the court abused its discretion by making an arbitrary, capricious, or absurd determination. (In re Alexis E. (2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 438, 454.) If father continues to submit negative test results, we assume the court will modify the case plan to remove this condition.
III
Disposition
The juvenile court’s order is affirmed.
WE CONCUR: SILLS, P. J., BEDSWORTH, J.