Opinion
34236-1-III [†]
05-09-2023
In the Matter of the Guardianship of DONALD RAYMOND MITCHELL, and SEVERAL OTHER SIMILAR CASES CONSOLIDATED ON APPEAL.
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
Siddoway, J.
Hallmark Care Services, Inc. and Lori Petersen assign error to two sets of judgments and orders in these appeals. The appeals were commenced with their notices of appeal of 76 judgments dated January 19, 2016, that were entered against them and in favor of Spokane County as contempt sanctions (the contempt judgments). After the superior court vacated the contempt judgments on its own motion in September 2019 and then denied Hallmark's and Petersen's requests for awards of costs, Hallmark and Petersen appealed the cost orders, which this court treated as amending the 2016 notices of appeal. Representative copies of the original and amended notices of appeal with the challenged contempt judgment and cost order are attached in an appendix (Ex. A).
Also before us is a motion to dismiss this appeal as moot, which was filed by an attorney for Spokane County's Guardianship Monitoring Program.
We dismiss the appeals of the contempt judgments as moot. We affirm the trial court's orders denying Hallmark's and Petersen's requests for cost awards.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
After Lori Petersen, a certified professional guardian, was disciplined by the Certified Professional Guardianship Board with a 12-month suspension, review was initiated in Spokane County Superior Court of guardianships in which two certified professional guardianship agencies (CPGAs) by which she had been employed- Hallmark Care Services, Inc. d/b/a Castlemark Guardianship and Trusts, and Hallmark Care Services, Inc. d/b/a Eagle Guardianship and Professional Services (collectively Hallmark)-were serving as court-appointed guardians. In re Guardianship of Holcomb, No. 33356-6-III, slip op. at 4, 7-8 (Wash.Ct.App. Oct. 18, 2018) (unpublished). The Hallmark CPGAs and Petersen were removed as guardians, and in May and June 2015 Hallmark and/or Petersen filed notices of appeal in over 120 guardianships. They challenged the court's appointment of a special master, its removal of them as guardians, and judgments entered against them for the cost of guardians ad litem in the cases in which they were removed. Id. at 16-17. The appeals were consolidated, with Guardianship of Holcomb serving as the anchor case.
Available at https://www.courts.wa.gov/opinions/pdf/333566_unp.pdf.
In February 2016, Hallmark and Petersen filed this second set of appeals, seeking review of contempt judgments entered against them in 76 guardianship matters. After Hallmark's and Petersen's removals as guardian, the superior court had ordered them to file accountings. When they failed to do so in the 76 cases, the court entered a $228 judgment as a contempt sanction in each case. Appeal of the contempt judgments was stayed pending a decision and issuance of the mandate in Holcomb.
Early in the Holcomb appeal, a Spokane County deputy prosecutor moved for permission to appear as amicus curiae for Spokane County's Guardianship Monitoring Program, an arm of the county's superior court administrator's office (hereafter "the Monitoring Program"). He contended that the individual guardianships lacked the funds to defend the court's orders. The motion was granted by our commissioner, who ruled that the prosecutor's participation as special amicus would assist this court within the meaning of RAP 10.6(a). In the same ruling, our commissioner held that orders removing the Hallmark CPGAs as guardians were not appealable by them because the CPGAs were not aggrieved parties.
This court's opinion filed in Guardianship of Holcomb in October 2018 reversed all of the judgments imposing guardian ad litem fees against Hallmark and Petersen, concluding that the judgments were entered without affording Hallmark and Petersen due process. The court's reasons and more of the underlying facts are recounted in the opinion in that first appeal. Following remand, Spokane County abandoned its earlier effort to recover guardian ad litem fees from Hallmark and Petersen.
Following our decision in Guardianship of Holcomb and issuance of the mandate, notification to the parties in this appeal of a briefing schedule prompted the deputy prosecutor who had served as special amicus to seek leave under RAP 7.2(e) for the Spokane County Superior Court to dismiss the contempt judgments on its own motion. The prosecutor's RAP 7.2(e) motion was supported by a declaration from then-superior court presiding Judge Harold D. Clarke III, in which Judge Clarke explained:
6. Commissioner [Steven] Grovdahl issued sanctions to be [paid] to Spokane County at a rate of $3.00 a day for every day [Petersen] and her guardianship agencies failed to perform accountings in each
Guardianship. Commissioner Grovdahl thereafter entered judgment in each of the Guardianships referenced in Attachment "A."
7. Appellant never performed the accountings.
. . . .
9. Having reviewed the issues in this case I am at this time respectfully requesting this Court to grant the Superior Court Jurisdiction pursuant to RAP 7.2 to enter an order vacating the orders imposing sanctions on Appellant.
10. The reason for vacating the orders at this time is that the sanctions were originally imposed to coerce Appellants to perform their legal obligations in preparing accountings in each of the Guardianships for which she was removed in the summer of 2015.
11. Civil Contempt Sanctions can be imposed only as long as it is possible for a party to purge themselves of the contempt by performing the Court's directions. See In Re King v. Department of Social and Health Services, 110 Wn.2d 793, 804, 756 P.2d 793 (1988); United States v. Rylander, 460 U.S. 752, 103 S.Ct. 1548, 75 L.Ed.2d 521 (1983).
12. Since Appellant and her businesses have not yet had control over the estates in question for a number of years, she would not presently be in a position to provide accurate accountings at this stage. Moreover, any accountings prepared at this point would be of no value to the present Guardians. It is therefore pointless to pursue sanctions at this juncture.
13. A copy of the Superior Court's proposed order vacating the judgments imposing sanctions in these matters which the Court proposes to enter after a presentment hearing as soon as practical is attached hereto.Mot. to Permit Super. Ct. to Enter an Ord., Ex. 2, Decl. of Harold D. Clarke, III at 2-4, In re Guardianship of Mitchell, No. 34236-1-III (Wash.Ct.App. Aug. 6, 2019) (on file with court). Our commissioner granted the motion in a letter ruling on August 9, 2019.
The superior court's proposed order vacated its October 2015 order imposing sanctions and the resulting judgments. Hallmark and Petersen filed a response in the trial court in which they agreed that the orders and judgments should be vacated. But they objected to the proposed order's characterization of the order imposing sanctions as "lawful" and to its characterization of the underlying claims in the case as being "fully resolved." E.g., Clerk's Papers (CP) at 27972-27974. Hallmark and Petersen also filed a declaration with the trial court identifying a total of $2,558.50 in statutory attorney fees and other amounts that they asked be awarded to them as costs.
This amount consisted of $1,306.80 for "Copies, LAR0.7 Motion, Motion to waive fees, Motion for Stay 8712 copies x $.15 (22 service parties, 76 separate cases)," $100.00 for "Mailing Costs (22 service parties)," $290.00 for "Filing Fee - Court of Appeals," $196.00 for "Transcription Costs - Statement of Arrangments [sic] (paid to Ct. Reporter)," and $665.70 for "Current motion 4438 x .[1]5 = 665.70." CP at 27983.
Presentment of the proposed orders vacating the contempt judgments took place before Judge Clarke on September 13, 2019. He entered orders vacating the October 2016 orders imposing sanctions and resulting judgments at that time, but took the cost issue under advisement.
On September 23, 2019, Judge Clarke entered an "Order Re: Statutory Fees and Costs" that denied Hallmark's and Petersen's requests for costs. He determined that neither the superior court nor the Monitoring Program-against whom Hallmark and Petersen sought to recover the costs-were parties to the guardianship cases. He also determined that if Hallmark and Petersen were parties, they did not prevail in any substantive way because the court had vacated the contempt sanctions on its own motion.
After the superior court vacated the contempt orders and judgments, but before Hallmark and Petersen filed their amended notices of appeal, the Monitoring Program moved to dismiss this appeal as moot. Hallmark and Petersen opposed the motion. It was referred to the panel for decision. Hallmark and Petersen timely filed amended notices of appeal of the cost orders.
ANALYSIS
I. Appeal of the judgments imposing contempt sanctions is moot
The Monitoring Program moved to dismiss these appeals as moot, arguing that since the superior court has vacated the orders imposing sanctions and resulting judgments, this court can no longer provide effective relief. It cites State v. Gentry for the propositions that "[o]rdinarily, this Court will not consider a question that is purely academic," and, "A case is moot if a court can no longer provide effective relief." 125 Wn.2d 570, 616, 888 P.2d 1105 (1995).
Hallmark and Petersen argue that dismissal is unwarranted for two reasons: the Monitoring Program lacks standing to bring the motion to dismiss, since it is neither a party nor has it been recognized as amicus curiae in this appeal, and there is a matter- specifically, their requests for costs-that has not yet been addressed. Hallmark and Petersen also move to strike the attachments to the Monitoring Program's motion to dismiss, which they argue are not part of the trial or appellate record in this matter.
On the issue of standing, the motion to dismiss acknowledged that the deputy prosecutor filing the motion had been granted special amicus statute in different but related appeals. It pointed out that this court had continued to give the deputy prosecutor notice of these appeals, and evidently had not given notice to the individual guardianships. According to the certificate of mailing attached to Hallmark's and Petersen's amended notices of appeal, they directed copies of those notices to only the deputy prosecutor. See, e.g., Appendix, Ex. B. This court's amended perfection letter dated November 19, 2019, was addressed to only two lawyers: the lawyer for Hallmark and Petersen, and the deputy prosecutor. The amended perfection letter provided that "[t]he Amicus Curiae Respondent's brief is due in this court 30 days after service of the appellant's brief." Letter, In re Guardianship of Miller, No. 34236-1-III (Wash.Ct.App. Nov. 19, 2019) (boldface omitted) (available from court).
Amicus curiae status may be granted by motion or on the court's request. RAP 10.6. The motion for leave to file an amicus brief may be filed with the brief. RAP 10.6(b). "The appellate court may ask for an amicus brief at any stage of review." RAP 10.6(c). The amended perfection letter sent to counsel in November 2019 implicitly granted the deputy prosecutor's request to file the motion to dismiss and authorized his participation in these appeals as special amicus.
Turning to the motion to strike, RAP 17.4(f) directs a person who files a motion to file all supporting papers with its motion. A motion to dismiss an appeal as moot will generally be supported by evidence that is not part of the appellate record. Unlike attachments to briefs that are relevant to the substance of errors assigned on appeal, evidentiary support for a motion to dismiss an appeal need not be added to the appellate record.
Hallmark and Petersen contend this appeal should not be dismissed as moot because they objected to the trial court's basis for vacating its contempt orders and judgments and because this court can still meaningfully review the order denying their requests for awards of costs.
These appeals are moot with respect to the contempt judgments, the original object of the appeals. "A vacated judgment has no effect," and "[t]he rights of the parties are left as though the judgment had never been entered." In re Marriage of Leslie, 112 Wn.2d 612, 618, 772 P.2d 1013 (1989). Hallmark and Petersen objected to the trial court's reasons for vacating the orders and judgments, arguing that they should have been vacated because the underlying court order that required the accountings to be filed was not lawful. E.g., Rep. of Proc. (Sept. 13, 2019) at 53, 55. They explained that the purpose of their response in opposition to the proposed orders was to make a record that they disagreed that the trial court had a lawful basis for ordering the accountings. Id. at 53, 55. That record has been made. This court can offer no other effective relief.
The appeal is not moot with respect to the orders denying Hallmark's and Petersen's requests for awards of costs, because effective relief can be granted: if they successfully argue that the trial court erred in denying their requests, we can remand for entry of cost awards.
Accordingly, the motion to dismiss is granted in part and denied in part. We dismiss review of Hallmark's and Petersen's appeals of the contempt judgments. We deny the motion to dismiss their appeals of the cost orders.
II. The superior court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to award costs
The superior court denied Hallmark's and Petersen's requests for costs after concluding (1) neither the superior court nor the Monitoring Program are "parties" to the underlying proceedings; and (2) even if Hallmark and Petersen are parties, they are not "prevailing parties" because the superior court vacated the contempt orders and judgments on its own motion.
We review a decision denying costs for abuse of discretion. Fluke Cap. & Mgmt. Servs. Co. v. Richmond, 106 Wn.2d 614, 625, 724 P.2d 356 (1986); Prosser Hill Coal. v. County of Spokane, 176 Wn.App. 280, 292, 309 P.3d 1202 (2013). Discretion is abused when its exercise is manifestly unreasonable or based on untenable grounds or reasons. T.S. v. Boy Scouts of Am., 157 Wn.2d 416, 423, 138 P.3d 1053 (2006). A discretionary decision is based on untenable grounds if the record does not support the court's findings; it is made for untenable reasons if the court applies the wrong legal standard or the facts do not satisfy the correct standard; and it is manifestly unreasonable if, based on the facts and correct standard, it is outside the range of acceptable choices. In re Parentage of Schroeder, 106 Wn.App. 343, 349, 22 P.3d 1280 (2001).
A. RCW 4.84.010, 4.84.030, and 4.84.090: a "prevailing party" is one who recovers an affirmative judgment in his or her favor
Hallmark and Petersen's argument on the merits begins with RCW 4.84.030, which provides that "[i]n any action in the superior court . . . the prevailing party shall be entitled to his or her costs and disbursements." "[T]he term 'prevailing party' is not defined in the same manner in every statute." AllianceOne Receivables Mgmt., Inc. v. Lewis, 180 Wn.2d 389, 394, 325 P.3d 904 (2014). Determining who is a prevailing party "'depends upon the extent of the relief afforded the parties.'" Prosser Hill Coal., 176 Wn.App. at 293 (quoting Riss v. Angel, 131 Wn.2d 612, 633, 934 P.2d 669 (1997)); Durland v. San Juan County, 174 Wn.App. 1, 25, 298 P.3d 757 (2012).
"In general, a prevailing party is one who receives an affirmative judgment in his or her favor." Riss, 131 Wn.2d at 633. This is the case for RCW 4.84.010 and RCW 4.84.030, and seemingly RCW 4.84.090 as well. Burman v. State, 50 Wn.App. 433, 445, 749 P.2d 708 (1988) (RCW 4.84.030); Stout v. State, 60 Wn.App. 527, 528, 803 P.2d 1352 (1991) (RCW 4.84.010); see State ex rel. Lemon v. Coffin, 52 Wn.2d 894, 896-97, 332 P.2d 1096 (1958) (stating "By the terms of RCW 4.84.030 , the prevailing party is entitled as a matter of right . . . to other specific items as provided in RCW 4.84.090." (emphasis added)).
Hallmark and Petersen did not receive affirmative judgments in their favor, so the trial court did not abuse its discretion by refusing to award them costs under RCW 4.84.010, .030, and .090.
B. RCW 4.84.060: "Defendant" eligibility for costs
When a cost statute's prevailing party determination does not depend on receipt of an affirmative judgment, the determination turns on "whether the claimant meets the conditions of the specific statute" that authorizes the costs. AllianceOne, 180 Wn.2d at 394. Hallmark and Petersen also claim entitlement to costs under RCW 4.84.060. RCW 4.84.060 provides, "In all cases where costs and disbursements are not allowed to the plaintiff, the defendant shall be entitled to have judgment in his or her favor for the same." (Emphasis added.) Chapter 4.84 RCW does not define "plaintiff" or "defendant." The ordinary meaning of "plaintiff" is "[t]he party who brings a civil suit in a court of law"; the ordinary meaning of "defendant" is "[a] person sued in a civil proceeding or accused in a criminal proceeding." Black's Law Dictionary 1391, 528 (11th ed. 2019).
Hallmark and Petersen characterize the superior court as having brought 76 actions against them, making the superior court a "plaintiff" and making them "defendants" within the meaning of RCW 4.84.060. But the superior court plainly did not bring a civil suit; in entering the contempt judgments, it was exercising its authority as a court to "impose a sanction for contempt of court under [chapter 7.21 RCW]." RCW 7.21.020. Hallmark and Petersen were plainly not being sued in a civil proceeding or accused in a criminal proceeding; they were being sanctioned as alleged contemnors.
The trial court did not abuse its discretion by refusing to award Hallmark and Petersen costs under RCW 4.84.060.
C. RCW 4.84.250 and RCW 4.84.270: in "actions for damages," a defendant is a prevailing party only if there is an "entry of judgment" under which the plaintiff "recovers" nothing or less than was offered in settlement
Hallmark and Petersen also invoke RCW 4.84.250, the small claims statute, under which, as of 2019, a prevailing party can be taxed and allowed a reasonable attorney fee as part of the costs, "in any action for damages where the amount pleaded by the prevailing party as hereinafter defined" is less than $10,000. (Emphasis added.) RCW 4.84.270 provides that "[t]he defendant, or party resisting relief" shall be deemed the prevailing party for purposes of RCW 4.84.250 where "the plaintiff, or party seeking relief in an action for damages" recovers nothing, or the same or less than the amount offered it in settlement. (Emphasis added.) In its controlling decision in AllianceOne, the Washington Supreme Court held that "[w]ithout an entry of judgment by the court, there is no recovery and there can be no prevailing party under RCW 4.84.250 and .270." 180 Wn.2d at 396. AllianceOne holds that for a defendant or party resisting relief to recover reasonable attorney fees under RCW 4.84.250, it must show "(1) the damages sought were equal to or less than $10,000, (2) [the defendant or party resisting relief] was deemed the prevailing party, and (3) there was an entry of judgment." Id. at 398. Because AllianceOne had voluntarily dismissed its collection action against Lewis, the Supreme Court held that Lewis failed the second and third requirements. Id. at 399.
These cases plainly did not involve an "action for damages"; they involved the imposition of remedial sanctions. See RCW 7.21.030. In addition, AllianceOne compels the conclusion that where the superior court vacated the contempt judgments on its own motion, there was no entry of judgment and no prevailing party. The trial court did not abuse its discretion by refusing to award Hallmark and Petersen a reasonable attorney fee under RCW 4.84.250 and .270.
D. RCW 4.84.170: County liability where private parties would be liable
RCW 4.84.170 provides in relevant part that "[i]n all actions prosecuted . . . in the name and for the use of any county . . . the . . . county shall be liable for costs in the same case and to the same extent as private parties." (Emphasis added.) Similar to the inapplicability of RCW 4.84.060, the court's imposition of a remedial sanction for contempt is plainly not an "action prosecuted in the name and for the use of [the] county." Even if it were, Hallmark and Petersen would have to be able to point to the basis on which a private party would be liable for costs "in the same case and to the same extent," which they fail to do.
The trial court did not abuse its discretion by refusing to award Hallmark and Petersen costs under RCW 4.84.170.
E. RCW 4.84.080: Not a cost authorization provision
RCW 4.84.080 does not authorize an award of costs but merely sets the statutory attorney fee amount. This section "is given force [only] in the context of related rules." AllianceOne, 180 Wn.2d at 394.
F. Due process
Finally, Hallmark and Petersen recount acts of alleged judicial misconduct below that they contend amount to violations of due process. The alleged acts and violations are untethered to any reasoned argument for costs that was advanced in the superior court. A party is not entitled to an award of costs as a matter of due process; recovery of costs is a matter of substance, not procedure, and "is purely a matter of statutory regulation." Platts v. Arney, 46 Wn.2d 122, 128, 278 P.2d 657 (1955) (citing State ex rel. Fosburgh v. Ronald, 25 Wn.2d 276, 277, 170 P.2d 865 (1946)). We have reviewed and rejected all of the statutory bases on which Hallmark and Petersen claim to be entitled to costs. Their "'naked castings into the constitutional seas are not sufficient to command judicial consideration and discussion.'" State v. Johnson, 179 Wn.2d 534, 558, 315 P.3d 1090 (2014) (quoting State v. Blilie, 132 Wn.2d 484, 493 n.2, 939 P.2d 691 (1997)).
We dismiss the appeals of the contempt judgments as moot. We affirm the trial court's orders denying Hallmark's and Petersen's requests for cost awards.
A majority of the panel has determined this opinion will not be printed in the Washington Appellate Reports, but it will be filed for public record pursuant to RCW 2.06.040.
WE CONCUR: Lawrence-Berrey, A.C.J. Staab, J.
Appendix
| Guardianship of: Last Name | First Name | Trial Court # | COA # |
| Blair | Krista L. | 10-4-01235-6 | 343111 |
| Bowen | Ernest | 97-4-00967-9 | 342735 |
| Bowers | Richard | 02-4-00989-3 | 342956 |
| Boyd | Cleora K. | 12-4-01327-8 | 342883 |
| Brangwin | Linda S. | 00-4-9437-6 | 342875 |
| Campbell | David P. | 11-4-00044-5 | 342514 |
| Carey | Anna | 08-4-00665-6 | 343031 |
| Collier | Jared | 10-4-01013-2 | 343103 |
| Cornelius | Carisa M. | 05-4-00548-5 | 342972 |
| Dean | Christopher | 06-4-01476-8 | 342484 |
| Demary | Sarah | 08-4-01645-7 | 342891 |
| Desjardins | Catherine | 10-4-00727-1 | 342816 |
| Eberhart | Steven | 12-4-00510-1 | 342841 |
| Eisenman | Aaron Cory | 07-4-00293-8 | 342476 |
| Elvidge | Portia | 06-4-00102-0 | 343006 |
| Fairbanks | Lynn | 10-4-00531-7 | 343090 |
| Fenske | Michael | 11-4-04556-6 | 342531 |
| Foster | Marlo | 95-4-01412-9 | 342727 |
| Friesen | Marlene | 02-4-00384-4 | 342948 |
| Garcia | Alejandro | 11-4-00300-2 | 342824 |
| Gehring | Ron | 01-4-00294-7 | 342671 |
| Getchell | Thomas | 01-4-01342-6 | 342581 |
| Harmon | Jessica | 03-4-00764-3 | 342964 |
| Harrington | Bart | 13-4-00268-1 | 342379 |
| Harris | Robert D. | 05-4-01384-4 | 342999 |
| Hartley | Rex Lee NKA Jonathan Hartley | 01-4-00821-0 | 342905 |
| Higgins | Teresa C. nka Teresa Horan | 12-4-00250-1 | 342565 |
| Hood | Michaele | 13-4-00267-3 | 342387 |
| Hopper | Margorie K. | 12-4-00511-9 | 342425 |
| House | Connie L. | 12-4-01004-0 | 342697 |
| Jenkins | Bertha L. | 12-4-00690-5 | 342417 |
| Loss | Robert E. | 02-4-01201-1 | 342557 |
| Love | June | 94-4-00022-7 | 342719 |
| Mally | Bella | 08-4-00968-0 | 342794 |
| Martin | Helen | 06-4-01260-9 | 343014 |
| McCoy | Murphy | 12-4-00405-8 | 342590 |
| McDirmid | Margaret | 12-4-00964-5 | 342654 |
| McLellan | Malcom D. | 97-4-01092-8 | 342603 |
| McMorris | Carl | 12-4-01005-8 | 342409 |
| Melton | Bernetta | 97-4-01239-4 | 342751 |
| Miller | Thomas | 05-4-01226-1 | 342506 |
| Mitchell | Donald Raymond *** | 00-4-09873-4 | 342361 |
| Moore | Sharon Westerman | 14-4-00950-1 | 342689 |
| Morales | Gustavo | 12-4-01459-2 | 342662 |
| Morales | Ruth | 12-4-00610-7 | 342646 |
| Morris | Rosalind Elena | 07-4-00944-4 | 343022 |
| Nalley | Clayton | 09-4-00820-7 | 343049 |
| Naylor | Joseph H. | 12-4-00677-8 | 342859 |
| Nichols | Louise. L. | 09-4-01110-1 | 343057 |
| Olson | H. Kurt | 10-4-00513-9 | 343081 |
| Oppengaard | Barbara A. | 03-4-01220-5 | 342760 |
| Palmer | Lewis | 08-4-00098-4 | 342441 |
| Pitner | Sharon Louise | 88-4-01012-1 | 342930 |
| Rivero | Lucas F. | 07-4-01357-3 | 342786 |
| Sanford | Holly **** | 92-4-00006-9 | 342701 |
| Shaw | Janet Lynn | 96-4-01378-3 | 342620 |
| Slater | Nehemiah Daniel | 02-4-01155-3 | 342913 |
| Smelcer | Judd | 09-4-01453-3 | 343073 |
| Smith | Joan S. | 12-4-00998-0 | 342867 |
| Stanich | Leslie | 12-4-00381-7 | 342832 |
| Sternberg | Kristen Patrice | 12-4-01415-1 | 342395 |
| Stocker | Nanci Jo | 07-4-00756-5 | 342450 |
| Storrud | Elvella | 06-4-01226-9 | 342492 |
| Sullivan | Margaret L. | 12-4-00181-4 | 342549 |
| Trimble | Jared | 12-4-00509-7 | 342611 |
| Tuckerman | Robert W. | 12-4-00311-6 | 342573 |
| Underwood | Arthur | 98-4-00390-3 | 342743 |
| Vingo | Betty | 12-4-00595-0 | 342638 |
| Vogel | Donna | 10-4-01437-5 | 342468 |
| Wesselman | Dawn | 08-4-00910-8 | 342981 |
| White | Ralph Carl | 09-4-00282-9 | 342808 |
| Williams | Jeffery R. | 88-4-00487-2 | 343201 |
| Withers | Walter L. | 04-4-00274-7 | 342522 |
| Wright | Mary E. | 02-4-00316-0 | 342921 |
| Zauner | Linda | 06-4-01018-5 | 342778 |
| Zingale | James | 09-4-00704-9 | 342433 |
Exhibit A Omitted.