Opinion
No. 340742
05-15-2018
In re BRAGGS Minors.
UNPUBLISHED Wayne Circuit Court Family Division
LC No. 15-520770-NA Before: CAMERON, P.J., and FORT HOOD and GLEICHER, JJ. PER CURIAM.
In this child protective proceeding, respondent-mother appeals as of right the trial court's two orders terminating her parental rights to her minor children, CB and ZB, pursuant to MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i), (g), and (j). We affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
On September 21, 2015, petitioner filed a petition requesting that the circuit court exercise temporary jurisdiction over CB. The petition alleged that a CPS worker had observed the child at a home with filthy surfaces, excessive clutter, and without utilities or ample food. On a separate occasion, a worker observed the child when he was dirty, wearing dirty clothes, and sleeping on a mattress with dirty linens inside a room that had food and debris on the floor. Respondent's home also had clothing, food, and trash "covering the floors," and contained a foul odor. Respondent agreed to place the child temporarily with relatives because her residence posed a risk of harm to him. In August 2015, respondent completed services that included budgeting, carpet cleaning, housekeeping skills, and parenting education. Her house appeared clean, had food, and had functioning utilities, which prompted petitioner to return the child to her care. However, shortly after, petitioner encountered respondent in an incoherent condition, and again observed clothing, food, and trash throughout the house.
On September 23, 2015, the trial court authorized the petition. After the adjudication, the trial court found that respondent's house had minimal food for the child, and there were dirty clothes and garbage throughout the home. Respondent also had been diagnosed with bipolar disorder and had a substantiated neglect case in 2011. The trial court concluded that respondent could not provide the child with proper care, and it exercised jurisdiction over him. It ordered respondent to complete parenting classes, attend family and individual therapy, participate in mental health services, maintain suitable housing and legal employment, regularly attend parenting times, and remain in contact with the caseworker. After ZB was born, petitioner filed a petition and restated the allegations that were made against CB, and it further alleged that the home was unsuitable, that respondent had a history of mental illness, and that respondent was already working on a treatment plan. Thereafter, the trial court exercised temporary jurisdiction over ZB as well.
On May 9, 2017, petitioner filed a supplemental petition requesting termination of respondent's parental rights as to both children. The petition alleged that respondent failed to benefit from parenting assistance and education, did not complete family or individual therapy, neglected to regularly take medication prescribed to improve the symptoms of her schizoaffective disorder, lived in inappropriate housing that lacked appliances, bedroom furniture, and hot water, and failed to provide her caseworker with proof that she received a monthly income of approximately $700. After a termination hearing and best interests hearing, the trial court entered an order as to each child terminating respondent's parental rights under MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i), (g), and (j). On appeal, respondent argues that the trial court erred both in finding that the statutory grounds for termination were established by clear and convincing evidence, and in finding that termination of her parental rights was in the children's best interests.
II. STANDARDS OF REVIEW
The petitioner bears the burden of proving a statutory ground for termination by clear and convincing evidence. MCL 712A.19b(3); In re Trejo, 462 Mich 341, 350; 612 NW2d 407 (2000). We review for clear error a circuit court's decision that a statutory ground for termination has been proven by clear and convincing evidence. MCR 3.977(K); In re Trejo, 462 Mich at 355-357. Once the petitioner has proven a statutory ground for termination, the trial court must order termination if "termination of parental rights is in the child's best interests." MCL 712A.19b(5). A circuit court's decision regarding a child's best interests is also reviewed for clear error. MCR 3.977(K); In re Trejo, 462 Mich at 355-357. A decision qualifies as clearly erroneous when, "although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made." In re JK, 468 Mich 202, 209-210; 661 NW2d 216 (2003).
III. ANALYSIS
A. STATUTORY GROUNDS
Respondent first argues the trial court clearly erred in finding statutory grounds for termination under MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i), (g), and (j). We disagree.
A trial court may terminate parental rights under MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i) if clear and convincing evidence establishes the following:
The parent was a respondent in a proceeding brought under this chapter, 182 or more days have elapsed since the issuance of an initial dispositional order, and the court, by clear and convincing evidence, finds either of the following:Under MCL 712A.19b(3)(g), a circuit court can terminate parental rights "if the court finds, by clear and convincing evidence," that "[t]he parent, without regard to intent, fails to provide proper care or custody for the child and there is no reasonable expectation that the parent will be able to provide proper care and custody within a reasonable time considering the child's age." Finally, a trial court can terminate parental rights under MCL 712A.19b(3)(j) if the evidence clearly and convincingly establishes that "[t]here is a reasonable likelihood, based on the conduct or capacity of the child's parent, that the child will be harmed if he or she is returned to the home of the parent."
(i) The conditions that led to the adjudication continue to exist and there is no reasonable likelihood that the conditions will be rectified within a reasonable time considering the child's age.
We conclude that the trial court properly found by clear and convincing evidence that termination was warranted under MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i), (g), and (j). Approximately 20 months had elapsed between the trial court's entry of its initial dispositional order and the commencement of the termination hearing. In November 2015, the trial court exercised jurisdiction over CB on the basis of its findings that respondent's house had minimal food for the child, and that dirty clothes and garbage existed throughout the home in August 2015. The trial court also found that respondent had been diagnosed with bipolar disorder, and she had a prior substantiated neglect case in 2011. In November 2015, the trial court ordered respondent to complete parenting classes, attend family and individual therapy, participate in mental health services, maintain suitable housing and legal employment, regularly attend parenting times, and remain in contact with the caseworker. The trial court exercised jurisdiction over newborn ZB in June 2016, after respondent admitted that she failed to complete her treatment plan regarding CB. The trial court ordered respondent to achieve the same elements of the treatment plan concerning CB.
Respondent's caseworker testified that respondent only sporadically attended medication reviews and mental health therapy to address her schizoaffective disorder. Although she had made some progress in recognizing her tendency to become frustrated over minor things, respondent's attendance at family therapy was inconsistent. The caseworker stated that respondent did complete parenting classes, but she failed to benefit from them. She frequently required redirection during parenting times with the children, and she had difficulty supervising ZB during visits, fed ZB inappropriate foods, and frequently used a telephone at the parenting times. Respondent once became upset at CB for refusing to drink water from a fountain, "stormed out . . . carrying" ZB, struck ZB's head on a wall, and left ZB with the foster parents without ascertaining if the child was injured. Although respondent received parenting assistance at parenting times, she failed to benefit from the additional assistance.
The foster care worker, Laura Brail, testified that respondent did not have a crib for ZB, or outlet covers, smoke detectors, or a functioning stove in June 2017. Brail also stated that respondent exhibited no benefit from the parenting classes, parenting assistance, or an infant mental health therapist who worked with her and the children at the time of the termination hearing. Respondent failed to take her prescription medication in August and September 2017 and was inconsistent in treating her mental health issues.
Clear and convincing evidence showed that the conditions leading to the adjudication continued to exist, and there is no likelihood that the conditions will be rectified within a reasonable time. Moreover, respondent failed to provide proper care or custody, and there is no reasonable likelihood that respondent could provide proper care and custody within a reasonable time. Finally, there is a reasonable likelihood that the children would be harmed if returned home to the parent.
The testimony of the foster care worker, caseworker, and respondent showed that respondent had completed parenting classes, regularly attended parenting times, participated with a parenting coach at parenting times, and was receiving parenting time assistance from an infant mental health counselor. However, their testimony also showed that respondent failed to benefit from the intensive parenting assistance. Instead, she repeatedly left ZB without proper supervision, made angry and inappropriate statements to CB, and neglected to ensure that CB remained in the parenting time room. Furthermore, respondent became angry when CB refused to drink from a water fountain, left the parenting time early, struck ZB's head on the wall, and expressed no concern about her well-being. The testimony of the foster care worker, caseworker, and respondent also established that respondent had achieved minimal progress toward completing family counseling, individual counseling, or mental health counseling. The testimony indicated that respondent failed to regularly attend psychiatric appointments or take medication prescribed for her schizoaffective disorder. In addition, considering respondent's minimal progress during the more than 20 months that the children remained in care, no reasonable likelihood existed that she might improve her parenting skills within a reasonable time. See In re Dahms, 187 Mich App 644, 646-648; 468 NW2d 315 (1991), and In re LE, 278 Mich App 1, 27-28; 747 NW2d 883 (2008). Accordingly, the trial court did not clearly err in finding that statutory grounds for termination were established under MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i) and (g). Additionally, respondent consistently yelled at the children, failed to properly supervise them, and even hit her infant's head on the wall and failed to determine if the child was injured. We detect no clear error in the trial court's conclusion that clear and convincing evidence established the likelihood that the children remained at risk of potential emotional and physical harm if returned to respondent's care. See In re Hudson, 294 Mich App 261, 268; 817 NW2d 115 (2011) (explaining that the risk of harm to children may include potential emotional and physical harm).
B. BEST INTERESTS
Respondent also argues that the trial court clearly erred in finding that termination of parental rights was in the children's best interests. We disagree.
"Even if the trial court finds that the [petitioner] has established a ground for termination by clear and convincing evidence, it cannot terminate the parent's parental rights unless it also finds by a preponderance of the evidence that termination is in the best interests of the children. MCL 712A.19b(5)." In re Gonzales/Martinez, 310 Mich App 426, 434; 871 NW2d 868 (2015).
In In re White, 303 Mich App 701, 713-714; 846 NW2d 61 (2014), this Court summarized:
The trial court should weigh all the evidence available to determine the children's best interests. To determine whether termination of parental rights is in a child's best interests, the court should consider a wide variety of factors that may include the child's bond to the parent, the parent's parenting ability, the child's need for permanency, stability, and finality, and the advantages of a foster
home over the parent's home. The trial court may also consider a parent's history of domestic violence, the parent's compliance with his or her case service plan, the parent's visitation history with the child, the children's well-being while in care, and the possibility of adoption. [Citation and quotation marks omitted.]"[B]ecause 'a child's placement with relatives weighs against termination under MCL 712A.19a(6)(a),' the fact that a child is living with relatives when the case proceeds to termination is a factor to be considered in determining whether termination is in the child's best interests." In re Olive/Metts Minors, 297 Mich App 35, 43; 823 NW2d 144 (2012) (citation omitted). "[T]he fact that the children are in the care of a relative at the time of the termination hearing is an 'explicit factor to consider in determining whether termination was in the children's best interests.' " Id. (citation omitted).
Although respondent loved her children and they shared a bond with her, CB often acted out during parenting times and family therapy sessions. Respondent completed parenting classes, regularly attended parenting times, and participated with a parenting coach and counselor who offered her suggestions during the parenting times. However, she frequently had difficulty throughout the proceeding following through on the parenting suggestions and implementing the parenting ideas unassisted. Respondent also failed to meaningfully improve her mental health issues, which significantly impeded her ability to properly parent the children. In an October 2017 parenting evaluation, respondent denied suffering from a mental illness. CB had spent almost two years in foster care, ZB had lived in foster care for nearly her entire life, and they both had strong needs for permanency, stability, and finality. The record supports a finding that the children's needs, respondent's parenting ability, and compliance with the service plan weighed in favor of termination.
Respondent, however, argues the trial court failed to expressly address relative placement. This argument is without merit. As the trial court properly noted, CB lived in an appropriate pre-adoptive home that met his needs, and the record showed he was in relative placement. Further, the trial court noted that suitable relatives of ZB planned to adopt her. Thus, the trial court expressly acknowledged relative placement on the record in making its best interests determination, and we discern no error in that regard. The need for permanency, stability, and finality was great, and respondent's failure to benefit from services favored termination. Therefore, the trial court did not clearly err in finding that termination of respondent's parental rights was in the children's best interests.
Affirmed.
/s/ Thomas C. Cameron
/s/ Karen M. Fort Hood
/s/ Elizabeth L. Gleicher