Conversely, where the debtor's spouse earned more than the debtor at the time the settlement agreement or divorce took effect, it is less likely that the parties intended the debtor's obligation to make mortgage payments to be a DSO. See In re Tigner, Bankruptcy No. 12–13209–WHD, 2013 WL 6211984, at *4 (Bankr.N.D.Ga. Oct. 7, 2013) (debtor's obligation to make mortgage payments was not in the nature of alimony, maintenance, or support, where, inter alia, debtor's spouse “earned a higher salary at the time of divorce”); see also Nelson v. Mineer (In re Mineer), 11 B.R. 663, 665 (Bankr.D.Colo.1981) (“Given the equal earning power, the assumption by the Defendant of the second mortgage payment does not represent an attempt to balance incomes; rather, it clearly appears to distribute equally the obligation for marital debts.”). “Common sense dictates that the party with weaker financial means, upon marital separation from a party with stronger financial means, is much less likely to incur an obligation in the nature of alimony, maintenance, or support.” Pagels v. Pagels (In re Pagels), No. 10–71138–SCS, 2011 WL 577337, at *13 (Bankr.E.D.Va. Feb. 9, 2011).

1985); In re Sposa, 31 B.R. 307 (Bankr.E.D.Va.1983); In re Mineer, 11 B.R. 663 (Bankr.Colo.1981); In re Bell, 5 B.R. 653, 655 (Bankr.W.D.Okla.1980); Smith v. Smith, 7 F.Supp. 490 (W.D.N.Y.1934).

; Rose v. Gedeon (In re Gedeon ), 31 B.R. 942, 943 (Bankr.D.Colo.1983); Nelson v. Mineer (In re Mineer ), 11 B.R. 663, 665-66 (Bankr.D.Colo.1981).          In order to assess the function a particular award was intended to serve at the time it was made, bankruptcy courts generally look beyond the four corners of the divorce decree to all the circumstances surrounding the creation of the liability.

(5) whether the debt was payable in installments over a substantial period of time, or a lump sum payment.Shaver v. Shaver, 736 F.2d 1314 (9th Cir. 1984); In re Grijalva, 72 B.R. 334 (S.D.W.Va. 1987); In re Freyer, 71 B.R. 912 (Bankr.S.D.N.Y. 1987); In re Ramey, 59 B.R. 527 (Bankr.E.D.Ark. 1986); In re Mineer, 11 B.R. 663 (Bankr.D.Colo. 1981); In re Snyder, 7 B.R. 147 (W.D.Va. 1980). The "temporary spousal" payments are intended to satisfy the mortgage and maintenance indebtedness relating to property that was owned solely by the Debtor prior to the divorce decree, which makes the payment retroactive and not prospective.

1985); In re Gedeon, 31 B.R. 942 (Bankr.D.Colo. 1983); In re Mineer, 11 B.R. 663 (Bankr.D.Colo. 1981). For example, a husband may try to discharge a maintenance or child support obligation, and discharge his wife's related attorney's fees which he was ordered to pay by the state court judge. The award of attorney's fees in those cases, and in most all similar cases, is incidental to an underlying nondischargeable support obligation due and owing by the debtor (husband) to a non-debtor (wife), or the wife's attorneys.

, In Re Whitman, 29 B.R. 362, 364 (Bkrtcy.D.R.I. 1983); In Re Rediker, 25 B.R. 71, 76 (Bkrtcy.M.D.Tenn. 1982); In Re Lineberry, 9 B.R. 700, 704 (Bkrtcy.W.D.Mo. 1981); and In Re Mineer, 11 B.R. 663, 665 (Bkrtcy.D.Colo. 1981). Here, the Pulaski County Chancery Court Order reads, in pertinent part, as follows:

Such labeling is not dispositive, but it is a factor for consideration. See In re Alcorn, 162 F. Supp. 206 (N.D.Cal. 1958); In re Mineer, 11 B.R. 663 (Bkrtcy.D.Colo. 1981). The test is the substance of the obligation and not the form or title given thereto.

Id. at 220. It was found that attorney fees and costs awarded to an ex-wife in an attempt to collect child support obligations of the Debtor can not be separated from the Debtor's duty to support his child and are nondischargeable in the matter of In re Mineer, 11 B.R. 663 (Bkrtcy.D.Colo. 1981). The 10th Circuit, in examining whether an award of attorney fees was a form of alimony and support or property settlement, noted that fees awarded as a result of defending custody matters are allowed as part of a court's continuing jurisdiction to modify alimony and custody orders.

In a case under the Bankruptcy Act, the United States District Court for the Western District of New York, held that costs incurred and awarded in a proceeding ancillary to a support decree were nondischargeable. Smith v. Smith, 7 F. Supp. 490 (W.D.N.Y. 1934). See also, In re Mineer, 11 B.R. 663 (Bkrtcy.D.Col. 1981). In Smith, subsequent to a divorce decree and judgment in favor of a wife for support and maintenance, a state court awarded the wife her costs associated with enforcing the support judgment.

In re Henry, 5 B.R. 342, 2 C.B.C.2d 726 (Bkrtcy.M.D.Fla. 1980). In re Mineer, 11 B.R. 663 (Bkrtcy.D.Colo. 1981), held a similar debt to be dischargeable because there was no provision for the termination of the obligation upon the remarriage of the plaintiff or upon the children reaching majority. Other factors considered decisive by that court were the relative equality of the spouses' earning power at the time of divorce, and the obvious intent of the plaintiff to limit the amount of child support so as not to jeopardize her ability to claim the children as tax exemptions.