This was clearly the Congressional intent and it is unlikely that those members of Congress who sought to have all reaffirmation agreements prohibited under the Code would have compromised on the statutory language with those desiring the allowance of at least some reaffirmation agreements had they believed that the statutory language, in this case the Section 524(d)(1) admonitions, would be ignored in determining the enforceability of reaffirmation agreements. Another helpful case is In re Miller, 13 B.R. 697, 4 CBC 2d 1471, 7 BCD 1334 (Bkrtcy.E.D.Pa. 1981). In Miller, the debtor applied for withdrawal of his application for approval of a reaffirmation agreement after being admonished by the court pursuant to Section 524(d)(1).
Similarly, the thirty-day recission period of § 524(c)(2) has been construed narrowly to protect debtors, as it begins to run only after a discharge hearing where admonitions have been given, not from the date the reaffirmation has been executed. In re Clements, 18 B.R. 435, 437 (Bankr.N.D.Ala. 1982); In re Miller, 13 B.R. 697, 700 (Bankr.E.D.Pa. 1981). Implicit in both Miller and Clements is that a reaffirmation can be enforceable only after admonitions have been given.
"[T]he statutory reaffirmation scheme is to be strongly construed so as to protect the interest of debtors." In re Roth, 38 B.R. 531, 537 (Bankr.N.D.Ill.), aff'd, 43 B.R. 484 (D.C.N.D.Ill. 1984); In re Miller, 13 B.R. 697 (Bankr.E.D.Pa. 1981). Reaffirmation agreements are unenforcable unless they are entered into before the granting of a discharge and are approved by the Court.
Because of the danger that creditors may coerce debtors into undesireable reaffirmation agreements, the language of section 524(c) must be strictly construed. See In re Roth, 38 B.R. 531 (Bankr.N.D.Ill.E.D. 1984), aff'd 43 B.R. 484 (Bankr.N.D.Ill.E.D. 1984); In re Farmer, 13 B.R. 319 (Bankr.M.D.Fla. 1981); In re Miller, 13 B.R. 697 (Bankr.E.D.Pa. 1981); In re Stephens, 2 B.R. 365 (Bankr.N.D.Ohio 1980). There is no evidence that either Mr. Daviau or Mr. Nale executed any pressure on the debtor to participate in the settlement agreement.
See 124 Cong. Rec. H.R. 11,096 (Sept. 28, 1978); S. 13,413 (Oct. 6, 1978); see also In re Miller, 13 B.R. 697, 7 B.C.D. (CRR) 1334, 1335-36 (Bkrtcy.E.D.Pa. 1981). Since the court deals with reaffirmation agreements at the discharge hearing as provided by 11 U.S.C. § 524(c) and (d), it necessarily follows that the discharge should not be granted prior to the discharge hearing.
Wood Investment's argument that the thirty day period commenced on May 20 cannot prevail. Quoting from In re Miller, 13 B.R. 697, 7 B.C.D. 1334, 4 C.B.C. 1471 (Bkrtcy., E.D., Penn., 1981), ". . . we conclude that it is from the last event which confers `preliminary' enforceability — here, the discharge colloquy — that the thirty day period begins to run.