Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County Super. Ct. No. JCM202602, Ronald Johnson and Frederico Castro, Judges. (Retired judges of the San Diego Superior Court, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to art. VI, § 6 of the Cal. Const.)
IRION, J.
Miguel E. appeals from a judgment of the juvenile court after the court sustained a petition filed under Welfare and Institution Code section 602 and continued Miguel as a ward of the court. Miguel contends insufficient evidence supported the court's finding that he committed felony vandalism (Pen. Code, § 594, subds. (a), (b)(1)). We affirm.
FACTS
At 1:00 a.m. on July 29, 2006, Leila Wilson was watching television in her apartment bedroom when she heard the sound of shattering glass outside. Wilson looked outside her window and saw two individuals running. Wilson noted that a streetlight illuminated one of the individuals and she could see his clothing, his "do-rag," his shiny earrings and the distinct shape of his ears.
At 6:30 a.m. Krystal Aguirre discovered her 2006 Nissan Altima had been vandalized; the windows were smashed, and the tires were slashed. Nothing had been taken from the inside of the vehicle, including Aguirre's purse and other personal items she had left on the seat. Aguirre had parked the vehicle near her grandmother's residence, where she had spent the night. Wilson approached Aguirre and told her that she had observed two males running from the parked vehicle. After hearing Wilson's description of one of them, Aguirre believed it was Miguel, her ex-boyfriend. They had stopped dating at the beginning of the year. Aguirre told police that Miguel had helped vandalize a school the previous month (see fn. 1, post), and she had heard from people that he was angry with her for reporting the incident.
Police showed Wilson a six-photograph line up. Wilson pointed to Miguel's photograph and said: "This looks like the man I saw that night."
The total damage to Aguirre's vehicle was $3,387.
At the trial on January 8, 2007, Wilson identified Miguel. Wilson had never seen Miguel nor met Aguirre before the night of the car vandalism. Miguel denied he vandalized Aguirre's vehicle. Miguel testified that he played in a soccer game on the evening of July 28, 2006, and went home after the game ended. Miguel arrived home at 11:00 p.m. and stayed home the entire night. In her testimony, Miguel's mother supported her son's soccer alibi.
The court found Miguel violated Penal Code section 594, subdivisions (a) and (b)(1), and sustained the petition. The court said: "The identification by the independent witness, who did not know the minor at all, is conclusive. She identified him without any doubt, here, this morning."
Miguel previously had been adjudged a ward of the juvenile court in 2003; jurisdiction was terminated in 2005. In June 2006 Miguel and his friends vandalized their high school; the juvenile court adjudged him a ward for this offense on September 21, 2006.
DISCUSSION
Miguel contends there was insufficient evidence to support the court's finding that he vandalized Aguirre's vehicle; he maintains the evidence only showed that he was at the crime scene. Miguel is mistaken.
" 'In reviewing the sufficiency of evidence . . . the question we ask is "whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt." ' " (People v. Young (2005) 34 Cal.4th 1149, 1175.) As an appellate court, we " 'must view the evidence in a light most favorable to respondent and presume in support of the judgment the existence of every fact the trier could reasonably deduce from the evidence.' " (People v. Johnson (1980) 26 Cal.3d 557, 576.) "This standard applies whether direct or circumstantial evidence is involved." (People v. Catlin (2001) 26 Cal.4th 81, 139.)
If the verdict is supported by substantial evidence—that is, evidence which is reasonable, credible, and of solid value—we accord due deference to the verdict and will not substitute our evaluations of the witnesses' credibility for that of the trier of fact. (People v. Koontz (2002) 27 Cal.4th 1041, 1078.) A conviction will not be reversed for insufficient evidence unless it appears "that upon no hypothesis whatever is there sufficient substantial evidence to support" the conviction. (People v. Redmond (1969) 71 Cal.2d 745, 755.)
Although Wilson's eyewitness identification of him as running from the crime scene was the only direct inculpatory evidence, Miguel ignores the ample circumstantial evidence implicating him and supporting the true finding on the vandalism count. First, there was substantial evidence of motive. Miguel had dated Aguirre and, on at least one occasion after their breakup, showed his anger toward her during a telephone call. Miguel had recently been declared a ward of the court for taking part in vandalism at the school and suspected that Aguirre's friend had reported the school vandalism to the police. Also, Miguel's running from the crime scene after the glass shattered showed a consciousness of guilt. (See People v. Visicotti (1992) 2 Cal.4th 1, 60.)
Further, the court which had the opportunity to hear and observe the witnesses as they testified, was in the best position to determine witness credibility. The court found Wilson credible in placing Miguel at the scene of the crime, and the court found Miguel and his mother not credible on this issue. We do not second-guess the credibility calls of the trier of fact. "It is the exclusive function of the trier of fact to assess the credibility of witnesses and draw reasonable inferences from the evidence." (People v. Sanchez (2003) 113 Cal.App.4th 325, 330.)
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
WE CONCUR: HUFFMAN, Acting P. J., McINTYRE, J.