In re Michelle C.

Full title: IN RE MICHELLE C. IN RE JONATHAN C

Court: Connecticut Superior Court, Judicial District of Middlesex Child Protection Session at Middletown

Date published: Feb 8, 2005

2005 Ct. Sup. 2402 (Conn. Super. Ct. 2005)

Opinion

No. CP02-006995-A

February 8, 2005

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION

TROMBLEY, JUDGE.

I. INTRODUCTION

This case arises out of a petition filed with the Superior Court for Juvenile Matters in New Britain on July 25, 2003, by the department of children and families (hereinafter referred to as the petitioner or the department) whereby the petitioner seeks the termination of the parental rights of Cheryl C. and Michael C. to their minor children, Michelle, who was born on June 9, 1995, and is currently nine years of age and Jonathan, who was born on August 1, 1997 and who is currently seven years of age.

The petitioner claims, as a basis for the termination of father's parental rights, that he has failed to rehabilitate himself within the meaning of General Statutes Sec. 17a-112(j)(3)(B)(I). The petitioner also alleged the same statutory ground relative to mother, however, on May 26, 2004, the court (Lopez, J.), accepted mother's consent to the termination of her parental rights to each child, after a through canvass. As hereinafter described, this court, on June 22, 2004, after finding that the termination of mother's parental rights was in the best interest of both children, entered the order terminating mother's parental rights. See Transcript of that proceeding. Father remains vehemently opposed to the termination of his parental rights.

Mother, father and the children were represented by court-appointed competent counsel throughout the proceedings. The trial was held on four days, June 8, June 14, June 22 and October 14, 2004.² The court heard from nine witnesses. The six witnesses called by the petitioner included two department caseworkers, each of the children's therapists, an evaluating clinical psychologist and Michelle's current caretaker. In addition to father, those testifying on his behalf were his mother and his sponsor who was also father's former employer. Three of the witnesses, the current caseworker, the psychologist and father testified in June and in October. The court received nineteen exhibits into evidence, seventeen of which were offered by the petitioner and two from father.

2 The reasons for the four-month interval shall be hereinafter addressed.

The court took judicial notice of five items:

1. A social worker's affidavit (Garden), dated June 12, 2002.

2. A social worker's affidavit (Fernandez), dated June 13, 2002.

3. Father's Specific Steps issued by the court on July 16, 2002.

4. The Summary of Adjudicatory Facts that accompanied the termination petition, dated July 21, 2003.

5. A Case Status Report, dated August 16, 2004 that described mother's "good-bye visit."

The court finds that both parents have appeared in the matter. As noted, both were represented by counsel. The court has jurisdiction of the parties and the subject-matter. There is no proceeding pending elsewhere affecting the custody of the two children. The court, after reading the termination petition and the summary of facts filed therewith, reading all of the exhibits and the judicially noticed items, considering the testimony of all the witnesses, assessing the credibility of each of the witnesses and considering the arguments of counsel, makes the following findings.

II. HISTORY OF PROCEEDINGS

Court proceedings commenced in New Britain on June 14, 2002, when the department filed a petition against mother and father alleging that the two children were neglected, and that they were being denied proper care, physically and emotionally or morally and were being permitted to live under conditions, circumstances or associations injurious to their well-being. General Statutes Sec. 46b-120(9)(B) and (C). On that day, the court (Tanzer, J.) issued an order of temporary custody, vesting the custody of both children in the department. On June 17, 2002, the paternal grandmother was allowed to intervene. On July 16, 2002, the court (Tanzer, J.) accepted pleas of nolo contendere by both parents and committed the two children to the care and custody of the department. On April 21, 2003, the court (Cohn, J.) ordered that the commitment be maintained. The court made no finding concerning continued efforts by the department to reunify the children with their parents, nor did the court make any finding as to the department's proposed permanency plan; i.e., termination and adoption. It is noteworthy that neither parent was present at that proceeding. It was reported to the court that each of the children had been placed with relatives and that mother and father were visiting them weekly.

As noted, on July 25, 2003, the department filed the termination petition. On August 18, 2003, pro forma denials were entered by both parents. It was reported that Jonathan was residing with his maternal grandparents, while Michelle was with her maternal great aunt and uncle. The department was seeking an adoptive home, in which the two children could live together. It was reported at that time that the current custodians were not an adoptive resource.

On November 13, 2003, the court (Santos, J.) ordered a clinical evaluation of mother and father that was to be performed by Dr. Nancy Randall and that was to include an interactional session between each parent and the two children. It was noted that mother was not visiting with the children as she was incarcerated and did not wish to see the children in that environment. The court, however, ordered visits between the children and their mother and father, who was also incarcerated, in order to facilitate a meaningful parent/child interactional with Randall.

III. FACTS A. Events Resulting In The Order of Temporary Custody Of June 14, 2002.

On June 7, 2002, the department received a report from Bristol Hospital that father had overdosed on heroin. Father was taken by ambulance to the hospital. While father was being treated, mother brought the two children to the hospital, whose clothes were observed to be soiled and dirty. On June 11, 2002, the department received a report from the Bristol Police Department that mother was found slumped over in a disabled car. The investigating officer observed a glass of water with a needle sticking out of it. Mother admitted to shooting heroin twenty minutes before the police arrived; she was on her way to pick up the two children at school. Mother admitted to a twenty bag a day addiction to the substance. Mother also disclosed that father consumed twenty bags of heroin per day.

The family's history with the department dates back to October 1996; since then, numerous references had been received by the department. On June 11, 2002, an investigative social worker spoke with mother at the paternal grandmother's residence. Mother stated that on June 7th, father arrived at her residence with heroin and then proceeded to overdose in the presence of the two children. Father had left an inpatient drug rehabilitation program (Connecticut Renaissance); he returned to the program after his discharge from Bristol Hospital. While mother was being interviewed by the department's investigative social worker, she appeared to be under the influence of drugs, as she was incoherent, slow, weak and drowsy. The two children ware apparently staying with the paternal grandmother at the time.

While one caseworker interviewed mother, another spoke to the two children. Michelle told the interviewer that "mommy uses drugs and gives herself shots." Michelle also told the caseworker that she and her brother slept in the same bed as their mother and father and that mother gave herself a shot while in the bed. This then seven-year-old child explained that her father was in jail because "he steals stuff to get drugs." The child asked the caseworker to put her and her brother "with another family, so that mommy and daddy can get better."

Both children told the worker that they witnessed father's overdose on June 7th and that "his lips were white." Both children were scared when the police and ambulance arrived. On June 11, 2002, the department initiated a ninety-six-hour hold; as noted, the court issued the order of temporary custody three days thereafter.³

3 See judicially noticed caseworker affidavits.

B. As To Mother

On June 22, 2004, after the third day of the trial, this court, having decided to continue the trial for four months, after reviewing the relevant exhibits, terminated mother's parental rights, based upon her consent. The court found that termination was in the best interest of both children, after finding that mother never completed any of the inpatient or outpatient programs to which she was referred by the department. The court noted several hospitalizations by mother for detoxification, numerous arrests and incarcerations and a history of unstable housing. At the time that the court terminated mother's parental rights, she was in a post-release inpatient program from which, if completed, she would not be discharged until early 2005. The court also referred to Dr. Randall's evaluation that recommended long-term treatment for mother, as previous periods of sobriety had been short-lived. Petitioner's Exhibit #14.

C. As To Father

Loisa Torres had been the department caseworker assigned to this family since January 2002; she ceased that assignment in December 2003. She testified that the department received a referral from Michelle's school in December 2001 that the child was not attending school. The department's investigation revealed that both mother and father were addicted to heroin. Father had recently been released from an inpatient program. He refused a request by the department to undergo a hair analysis. Torres referred father to Bristol Counseling for an aftercare program. Father did not cooperate. Torres then made a referral to the Wheeler Clinic, however, before the appointment could be made father was incarcerated on a violation of probation warrant. Father was sentenced to eighteen months, however, the department of corrections (D.O.C.) sent father to in inpatient program known as Connecticut Renaissance; father was admitted to that program in May 2002. On June 7, 2002, father left the program without permission and took an overdose of heroin in the presence of the children. As noted, after his discharge from the hospital, father was readmitted to the program, which he finally completed in December 2002.

Father testified that he left the program in June, because he heard that his children were in danger in that mother was sleeping at the wheel. When he arrived home, mother offered him heroin and he took a near fatal dose in the presence of the children, who witnessed him passed out on the floor and revived by police and ambulance personnel.

The discharge summary from Connecticut Renaissance is Father's Exhibit B. Father was readmitted to the program at the "highest learning experience" level. During phase two of the long-term program, it was reported that father behaved badly and was disrespected; he was laid off from his job at the facility due to having a "bad attitude." The initial planned discharge date was extended. Upon his discharge on December 24, 2002, it was reported that father had explored his triggers, gained insight and had cooperated with probation and the department. Recommendations were made that father attend a scheduled appointment for outpatient aftercare at Bristol Hospital, attend self-help meetings, build a support network, obtain full employment and cooperate with probation and the department.

Torres testified that she coordinated the implementation of those recommendations with father's probation officer. Father was referred to several aftercare relapse prevention programs, including Bristol Hospital, Bristol Counseling Center and the Wheeler clinic, however, father failed to complete any of the aftercare programs as he continued to use heroin. Father did not keep the appointment set up at Bristol Hospital by Connecticut Renaissance; when Torres attempted to reschedule, she was informed that a personal appearance by father would be required. Father did not follow through.

Father explained during his testimony that he did not keep the aftercare appointment because he had no medical insurance and that, by the time he obtained coverage (a month and a half later), he had relapsed. Father admitted that he was warned by his counselor at Connecticut Renaissance not to move in with mother upon his discharge from that program. Father did move in with mother, relapsed on February 12, 2003, and remained with mother until his current incarceration. Father testified that he went to Bristol Hospital in February 2003; but they had no beds; in March 2003 he admitted himself to Blue Hills for three days of detoxification. In the summer of 2003, he twice tried to admit himself to Bristol Hospital, however, on each occasion, he was told that there were no beds.

Petitioner's Exhibits #3 through #7 contain various records from Bristol Hospital. Petitioner's #3 is the emergency room notes from father's visit on June 7, 2002. He was found by emergency personnel "in respiratory arrest" and had to be revived at the scene. It was reported that, "the kids, age 6 and 4, found the patient." The report cautions that the children would be unsafe while father was in the home. It was reported that father was unmotivated for treatment, hostile, uncooperative and evasive during his examination. It was also reported that the children were "very unkempt and dirty and had developmental problems." Emphasis added. As noted, the hospital called the department and made a formal referral as to the perceived neglect of the children.⁴ Petitioner's #5 is an emergency room report dated March 1, 2003. Father was unemployed and was seeking detoxification. He reported that his longest period of sobriety was ten months and declared, "I want my sobriety back!" Father reported that he resumed using heroin three weeks earlier and that he was receiving no treatment. The hospital obtained a bed at Blue Hills. Petitioner's #7 is a report from Bristol Counseling Center dated April 16, 2003. Father was referred to their substance program after, he detoxed at Blue Hills. After four sessions, the counselor was unable to reach father; he was discharged to due to his non-compliance with the program requirements. Petitioner's #6 is a Bristol Hospital emergency room report dated July 27, 2003. Father was, again, requesting detoxification and had used heroin the previous day. Father presented with numerous symptoms, including the shakes and chills. Father admitted that in the past, he had used twenty to thirty bags of heroin daily, which he administered intravenously; The hospital could not find any available beds, thus, discharged father, offering him "alternative detoxification options." It was reported that father possessed a state welfare medi-card. Father was told to follow-up the emergency room visit by contacting the hospital's counseling center. Two days later father went to Rushford for detoxification, only to be discharged for noncompliance, three days after his admission. On August 16, 2003, father told his probation officer that he used eight bags of heroin three days earlier.

4 Interestingly and of some concern, the hospital received a telephone call from the department caseworker, who was on duty at the time the referral was received. The worker did not agree that the children were in danger and told the hospital's social worker that "we don't follow up on dirty kids!" Emphasis added.

On August 1, 2003, father was a passenger in a vehicle that was stopped by police officers, who observed a needle and five bags of heroin in father's vicinity. The officers were informed by the dispatcher that there was an outstanding warrant for father for possession of narcotics; failure to appear and risk of injury to a minor. Father was arrested and was held under a $20,000 bond. See Petitioner's Exhibit #11. Father's criminal record includes arrests for forgery, assault, interfering with an officer, reckless endangerment, possession of narcotics, sale of narcotics, violation of probation and failure to appear. Father was convicted of reckless endangerment on August 23, 2000, for which he received a one-year suspended sentence with three years probation. On November 20, 2000, he was convicted of possession of narcotics and received a three-year suspended sentence and three years probation. On November 21, 2003, father was sentenced to five years with eighteen months to serve, followed by two years probation for the sale of narcotics. That conviction resulted from a controlled purchase of heroin from father by confidential informant. Father sold the heroin out of his trailer, where he resided at a trailer park with mother and the two children. During the transaction, Jonathan walked into the bedroom; father did not order the child to leave, instead, the confidential informant did so. See Petitioner's Exhibit #9. One month after receiving the eighteen month sentence, father was sentenced, concurrently, to two years for the violation of his probation.

Until October 2004, less than one month prior to his release date, father engaged in no rehabilitative programs, while he was incarcerated. On June 14, 2004, father testified that he had received a "ticket" in November 2003, that prevented him from participating in any programs, but that he was then on the waiting list for the so-called Tier II substance abuse education program offered by D.O.C. On June 14, 2004, it was father's plan to obtain an early release to a halfway house, then to re-apply for a driver's license, get a job, go to meetings, get a sponsor and live with his mother. A substance abuse program, either inpatient or outpatient, was not included in father's after release plan! In fact, father denied the need for any treatment program, pointing out that he was "clean" since September 2003, which was when his continuous incarceration commenced. Father referred to his most recent incarceration, as his "second long-term treatment."

On October 14, 2004, Day #4 of the trial, father testified that he was promised a job as a painter by a former employer, who is also his sponsor. Father had started the Tier II program ten days prior thereto and had "just signed up" for N/A meetings. Father had also placed his name on the list for domestic violence counseling, but his release date was prior to the start of those classes. Father explained that, once he is released, he will be on Transitional Supervision, which is similar to parole; if he doesn't follow the rules, he will serve another year. Father also explained the reason that he did not pursue the halfway house option; his release date for the Transitional Supervision was "too close." Father once again, refused to consider an inpatient substance abuse program as part of his post-release plan, but added that if his supervising officer recommended an outpatient program, he would cooperate.⁵ Father also stressed the point that "his boss [and sponsor] does not like programs." Father denied any need for domestic violence counseling, stating that it "has never been an issue." Father denied ever hitting mother or the children. Mother, however, during her interview for the termination social study ( Petitioner's Exhibit #1), told Torres that domestic violence did take place, that father was never available to the two children, and that it was father that introduced her to drugs. As noted, father's release date was November 1, 2004.

5 It is noteworthy that the D.O.C. Community Release Program, signed by the warden in May 2004, mandates Transitional Supervision "with outpatient addiction services." See Father's Exhibit A.

D. As To The Children

Upon their removal, both children were placed in a Safe Home, where they remained for nearly two months. In August 2002, Michelle was placed with her maternal great aunt and Jonathan was placed with his maternal grandparents. At the time the trial concluded, each of the children remained in said placements.

Michelle is now nine years of age. According to Torres, this child has repeatedly stated that she wants parents who "do not do drugs." As of March 2003, Torres reported that Michelle, who was then in second grade, was doing well at home and in school and that she was comfortable in her foster placement. See Petitioner's Exhibit #2. Michelle had seen a therapist, who was engaged by the department in November 2003. The purpose of the referral was to support the department's plan to find an adoptive home in which the children could reside together. M.H., Michelle's therapist testified that, during her fourteen sessions with the child, Michelle was "upbeat and excited" at that prospect. She stated that Michelle is very angry with her father, but rarely comments about her parents. She referred to the child as a "little Mary Poppins," who rarely expresses anger and is always happy. However, given the child's troubled history with her parents, that veil of happiness is of concern to the therapist, as it is indicative of "avoidant behavior." M.H. concluded her testimony by stating her belief that Michelle "needs a consistent family environment . . . and that she needs it now!" "The child wants a permanent mother and father."

Jonathan is currently seven years of age; apparently, he is a handful for any caretaker. He requires and receives speech therapy, as he has difficulty forming words and sentences. As of March 2003, Torres reported that the child was referred by the department to a therapist, in November 2002 due to poor boundaries and violent and aggressive outbursts. His bad behavior escalates after visiting his parents. Although he enjoys seeing his parents, Jonathan avoids mentioning his mother or father. Torres observed that Jonathan was bonded to his foster parents, i.e., his maternal grandparents. See Petitioner's Exhibit #2. In her termination social study ( Petitioner's #1), Torres reported that the child's speech had improved, but that the behavioral problems continued, particularly, after parental visits. Jonathan, like his sister, wished that they could reside together in the same family.

T.G.H. was Jonathan's therapist from October 14, 2002 to June 23, 2003, at which time the therapy was terminated by the department, so that all its resources could concentrate on locating adoptive parents for the two children. The referral was made by the department, as Jonathan was having angry outbursts, was hitting himself, was cruel to animals and was "very clingy." He was also wetting the bed, and had, on one occasion, smeared feces on the wall. During twenty-four therapeutic sessions, the therapist, who is a psychiatric social worker, observed that Jonathan exhibited violent play themes and that he was too affectionate with adults. The child told the therapist about mother's loss of control of the car and about father being taken by ambulance to the hospital. The child has been diagnosed as having a Reactive Attachment Disorder (RAD), with mixed anxiety and depressed mood and a Phonological Disorder (impaired speech). The therapist stated that one of the recognized causes of RAD is the neglect of the affected child. She explained that, although Jonathan's speech was unintelligible, he compensated by motioning with his hands. When asked about progress from the therapeutic sessions, the therapist responded that she did not see a lot of progress, as the child continued to demonstrate violent themes in his play, as the therapy ended. She added, however, that Jonathan was also displaying "some nurturing themes as well."

According to T.G.H., the department stopped the child's therapy in June 2003, as the maternal grandmother was no longer, due to job requirements, able to transport the child to the therapy. For a while, the department transported the child, however, the department was concentrating its resources on finding a permanent home for the children. According to the therapist, the department's caseworker explained that the maternal grandmother could not transport the child to both therapy and the pre-adoptive meetings. Apparently, the department chose not to provide the transportation necessary for the child's therapy to continue. Jonathan's therapist testified that she was "surprised," when informed at the time of the trial, that Jonathan was still in foster care and residing with his maternal grandparents. She strongly recommended that therapy be restarted, adding that, "it will take years for Jonathan to get where he needs to be." The therapist observed that the child exhibited a strong attachment to his maternal grandmother and cautioned that it will be hard for Jonathan to leave, but T.G.H. remained confident that Jonathan is capable of forming an attachment to other caretakers. She cautioned, however that he will be difficult to place, due to his behaviors. In concluding her testimony, Jonathan's therapist opined that the child needs a permanent home, a home where he knows that his mother and father will not leave and will always be there; she added that "children thrive on predictability."

In light of the therapist's recommendation that Jonathan resume therapy, this court ordered, at the conclusion of Day #3 of the trial, that the department immediately reconnect Jonathan with a therapist. On October 14, 2004, Jennifer Sisk, the current department caseworker assigned to this case, testified that Jonathan had connected with a therapist during the four-month interval and was also taking prescribed medications. His maternal grandparents were cooperating with his therapy and his medical regimen. Sisk reported that the school had observed "major improvement" in the child's concentration and the maternal grandparents also noted some improvement in his behavior at home.

E. Visitation

While father was in the Connecticut Renaissance inpatient program, the department transported the children to see father every two weeks. Upon father's discharge from that program, visits were every other week, apparently, until father's incarceration. Torres testified that, often, Michelle refused to go on the visits, complaining that her stomach ached. The child also told the caseworker that father was "mean" to her. Jonathan was observed to be very aggressive during the visits with his father; father did not help the situation by presenting his son with, among other things, a toy gun, a poor choice, given the child's preoccupation with violent themes. Torres testified that father missed "quite a few" visits, but of the visits that he made, he was accompanied by his mother. The visits were at the department's offices. In March 2003, Torres reported that father, who was at that time staying with his mother, told her that he was unable to care for his children. At that time, mother was incarcerated and was awaiting sentence for larceny. See Petitioner's #2.

At the time that the trial commenced, the children were visiting with each parent, for one and one-half hour every four to six weeks. Sisk testified that she would pick up both children at their school at 9 a.m. and then take them to see mother at her inpatient program; when that visit ended, she would then take the children to see father at the correctional facility. In order to accommodate the parental visits, the children would miss an entire day of school!

Apparently, the children did not visit with either parent for several months prior to Judge Santos' order in November 2003, that parental visits resume, pending the clinical evaluation by Dr. Randall. As noted, mother told the department caseworker that she did not wish to see the children while she was incarcerated. This court will infer that father must have felt the same way, as this court has no evidence that, prior to Judge Santos' order, father, either administratively or judicially, sought visitation.

On March 8, 2004, M.H., Michelle's therapist, wrote a letter to Sisk expressing her concern as to the visits with father. Petitioner's Exhibit #13. The therapist was informed by Michelle's foster mother that, once visits at the prison began, the child, in addition to the stomach ache complaint, suffered from enuresis. The foster mother observed adverse changes in the child's behavior at home, and in Michelle's performance at school. The therapist reported that Michelle was "confused as to where she will live," as she was seeing her parents again, after several months of no contact and after receiving therapy purposed to support her placement with adoptive parents.

F. Dr. Randall's Evaluation Dated March 24, 2004 Petitioner's Exhibit #14 is a report of the court-ordered clinical psychological evaluation of mother and father that was performed by Dr. Nancy Randall. The evaluation, which included interactional sessions of the children with each parent, was conducted on March 9 and 10, 2004. At that time the children had been in the department's custody for twenty-one months and father had been incarcerated for over six months. Father informed Randall that he hoped to be in a position to care for his children after his release, he told the evaluator that he intended, however, to first complete an inpatient substance abuse program. Father admitted that there was "some" domestic violence with mother and that on one occasion, Michelle tried to physically separate them; father, however, believed that the violent, loud and angry parental altercations had no effect on the two children. Father admitted that he had been using heroin since 2000. He informed Randall that for a six- to nine-month period in 2001, he was in a methadone maintenance program, but he continued to use heroin. Father admitted injecting heroin in the presence of the two children. He stated that he was not attending any NA meetings "yet," during his incarceration.

Randall reported that father minimized his need for treatment and was, therefore, "at high risk" for relapse. Father also tended to downplay the history of physical violence. The evaluator opined that when father encounters too many demands, he turns to drugs. Randall questioned father about his relationship with mother. Father professed a desire "to get back together," so long as they both were in recovery. Randall was concerned, as during the evaluation, both mother and father acknowledged that they pull each other back to drugs. Randall recommended long-term substance abuse treatment for both parents, due to their past failures of attempts at recovery. At the time, mother had entered her post-release inpatient program; her completion date, at the very least, was January 2005.

During her interview with Michelle, who was then age eight and in third grade, the child informed the evaluator that things were "very bad," while she lived with her parents; she told Randall that her parents were "not home a lot." The child explained that father was often in jail and that mother was not there when the child awakened in the morning. Michelle lamented that her parents did drugs and that they "always lied." She saw her mother and father inject themselves with heroin and observed violent altercations. The child told Randall that her stomach hurt when she visits her parents. The child stated that she and her brother missed each other and wanted to live in the same home, but that they did regularly see each other and did sleep-overs.

As to Jonathan, he was age six and was in first grade at the time of the evaluation. He referred to his maternal grandfather as "dad" and told Randall that he remembered only "a teeny bit" living with his mother and father; the child remembered that one time, "the police put mommy in a police car" and that he and Michelle went to a Safe House. He told Randall that he misses his sister and that he would like to live with her in the same home. In March 2004, Randall opined that the children were in need of a stable, nurturing home, where they could live together.

Randall contacted each of the children's therapists and conducted telephone interviews. Michelle's therapist said that the child was not prone to admit problems; Michelle feared that her therapist would write down everything and tell someone. The therapist informed Randall of the anxiety experienced by the child at the parental visits, especially her visits with father. Jonathan's therapist stated that the child had "a hard time at home" after visits. She told Randall that the department stopped Jonathan's weekly therapy in June 2003 in order to transition him to a pre-adoptive home. The therapist informed Randall that Jonathan was attached to his maternal grandmother. Randall recommended continued therapy for both children.

During the interactional session between Jonathan and his father, Randall saw Jonathan step on father's leg irons; when father said that it hurt, the child did it again. The child also attempted to choke father, who, laughingly, removed the child's hands from his neck. Randall retorted that the child's aggressive behavior toward father was "quite concerning." Michelle was quiet, most of the time, and resisted father's attempts to engage her. Randall reported that the relationship between the children and their father was "less close" than that with mother.

Randall reported that reunification of the children with either parent was not recommended. Randall noted that the children had been in placement for nearly two years, with little improvement by either parent and that both parents were only at the beginning of any recovery process. Each parent faced long-term treatment, and each was at risk for further relapse. Randall stated that these two children should not been made to wait to see if mother or father can conquer the addiction to heroin.

Randall reported that Michelle was "emotionally overloaded" and that her ability to cope with stress was "stretched to the limit"; Randall detected some signs of underlying anger. The evaluator reported that Jonathan was active and impulsive and exhibited signs of aggressive behavior. The child is out of control without close supervision and the enforcement of boundaries. Randall was concerned as to the mixture of affectionate and aggressive behaviors that she observed, while the child was with father; the child quickly changed from positive to negative emotions. Randall reported that Jonathan had a positive attachment with his sister and his maternal grandmother. Randall, therefore, was optimistic that Jonathan was capable of forming a positive attachment to another family.

On June 8, 2004, Day #1 of the trial, Randall, after stressing the children's need for permanency and stating, "the sooner, the better," assessed father's rehabilitation potential. She was concerned that father had not participated in any programs while incarcerated. She recommended that father spend at least six months in an inpatient program, after his release, to be followed by an intensive six- to twelve-week outpatient program, that meets several days a week. Randall opined that if father failed to follow that course, the two children would be "at risk" if placed with father. Randall was concerned about Jonathan's aggressive relationship with his father and recommended that father completely sever his relationship with mother, who was his "drug partner." Randall stated that, in her opinion, father was "at high risk" for relapse and that her opinion had not changed since she evaluated father.

As to Michelle, Randall stated that the child was holding on, but could not handle any more demands. The evaluator believed that Michelle was parentified and worries about her mother and her brother. As to Jonathan, Randall agreed with the RAD diagnosis, as, clearly, the child's play and emotional needs were not met by his parents; "he did not get what he needed when he was young."

G. The Four-Month Interval

At this juncture, an explanation is warranted as to the reason for the four-month continuance of the trial. On June 22, 2004, Day #3 of the trial, the evidence was concluded and all parties had rested. During the final argument, the attorney for the minor children informed this court that the planned placement that envisioned both children residing together had disrupted and had, therefore, been abandoned by the department. In earlier argument, the assistant attorney general had neglected to mention this significant development to the court!

At the conclusion of the evidence, the court was under the clear impression that an appropriate adoptive home had been identified and that the children had met the adoptive parents. The court was under the impression that a permanent home, where Michelle and Jonathan could live together, was within their grasp, while father had nearly five months remaining until his early release date. Immediately after the disclosure by the attorney for the minor children, this court recalled Sisk to the stand. She testified that, on June 11th, Michelle stayed overnight with the proposed couple and that it went well, however, two days later, during a day visit, Jonathan engaged in very inappropriate behaviors. He removed the seat belt on the way to the visit and, during the visit, Jonathan pulled the couple's daughter off a swing and engaged in "sexualized behavior" toward the daughter. This incident resulted in a phone call to Sisk from the couple, who informed the caseworker that they would take Michelle, but would not accept Jonathan.

After hearing Sisk's testimony, the court recessed to consider the options.⁶ The court decided to continue the trial for four months in order to monitor father's progress, if any, and to see if the therapy, that the court ordered for Jonathan, yielded any results. The court ordered the department to pursue the goal of identifying an appropriate permanent placement for the two children, while continuing to maintain the visits with father. The court also ordered that Dr. Randall perform an up-dated evaluation of the two children, that was to include interviews with the foster parents. As previously noted, the court terminated mother's parental rights and recited the basis for doing so. The court ordered a "goodbye visit" between mother and the children, if therapeutically recommended.

6 A transcript of the court's decision to continue the trial was ordered by the court. It details the court's reasons for continuing the trial for four months.

H. Dr. Randall's Evaluation Dated August 10, 2003

Petitioner's Exhibit #16 is the report of the evaluation of the children by Dr. Randall, as ordered by this court. The children were evaluated and the foster parents were interviewed. Randall also conducted a telephone interview with S.L., Jonathan's new therapist and, once again, spoke to Michelle's therapst.

As to Michelle, her foster mother told Randall that the child was "very disappointed" at the loss of the adoptive home and that she believed that Michelle would be fine if placed separately from Jonathan, but that Jonathan would miss his sister. She informed Randall that Michelle was adamant that she does not want to live with her father and was angry with him for forgetting her birthday. The child's therapist reported that Michelle was doing well. The child had told her therapist that she will not live with her father, as, according to Michelle, he is mean, yells and the child fears that he will return to drugs. M.H. agreed with the foster mother's assessment that Michelle would do well, even if she lived separately from her brother, however, the therapist recommended that the siblings have ongoing contact with each other. Michelle has told M.H. that she wants "a real family." Rogers observed that Michelle was "trying to remain hopeful and optimistic" as to her placement with a permanent family; the child is, according to Randall, "ready to move on to a family where she can grow up."

As to Jonathan, the child admitted to his foster mother (grandmother) that he acted badly toward the adoptive family because he wanted to stay with his grandparents. According to the grandfather, the child is defiant and does not listen and was so hard to handle at school, that the school psychologist had to accompany Jonathan on a past field trip. The grandfather told Randall, however that, lately, the child was behaving better at home. He believed that Jonathan would be "okay," if placed separately from Michelle, however he recommended frequent contact, as "Michelle has a calming effect on Jonathan." He confirmed that Jonathan was back in therapy and was taking prescribed medication for ADHD. He added that he has never observed the child engaging in sexualized behaviors. Randall spoke to Jonathan's therapist who had conducted three sessions by that time. The therapist told Randall that she and Jonathan were just getting to know each other. Jonathan talks to the therapist about his sister and enjoys seeing her. She stated that the child needed "consistency and structure" in his home. Randall observed that Jonathan was less hyperactive than when he was seen with his mother and his father, however Jonathan becomes "quickly overwhelmed by emotional intensity or ambiguous situations," both of which precipitate regressive behaviors. Randall predicted that the child will "likely require treatment and medication well into the future" and will require a structured school and home environment, with close supervision, as Jonathan appeared to Randall to be less socially mature than other children his age. The evaluator also reported that, despite the above concerns, he is a "loving child who desperately wants to be loved and nurtured."

Randall concluded that placing the children in separate adoptive homes would be an acceptable plan; so long as the children continued to enjoy a visiting relationship. Noting that Jonathan may have sabotaged the planned placement in an attempt to stay with his grandparents, Randall suggested that a therapeutic foster placement might be considered as an interim solution, prior to Jonathan's permanent placement; Randall cautioned, however, that Jonathan should have continued contact with his current caretakers, while in the interim placement. Stressing her assessment that Michelle was not difficult to place with a permanent family, Rogers opined that her brother's problems should not be permitted to prevent her from finding a permanent home. Randall concluded her evaluation by stating that, separate adoptive homes was "a viable option" and may be "better for both children." Randall urged the current caretakers of the children to cooperate with any transition. Randall opposed any plan to reunify the two children with father.

IV. ADJUDICATION A. In General

For the purpose of adjudication, the court is limited to consideration of those events which preceded the filing of the termination petition or the latest amendment, except where the judicial authority must consider subsequent events as part of its determination as to the existence of a particular ground that might be alleged for termination of parent's parental rights. Practice Book § 35a-7. The Commentary to that section allows the Court to consider post-adjudicatory evidence in adjudicating the statutory grounds of failure to rehabilitate. The adjudication date is, therefore, July 25, 2003. The disposition is the date that the trial concluded and the decision was reserved, i.e., October 14, 2004.

Since the termination of parental rights results in a complete severance of the legal relationship between a child and his or her parent, terminating one's parental rights has been referred to as "a most serious and sensitive judicial action." In re Barbara J., 215 Conn. 31, 44 (1990). Since termination involves the ultimate interference of the State in the familial unit and results in a final severance of the legal relationship between child and parents, courts must require strict adherence to statutory standards. See In re Migdalia M., 6 Conn.App. 194, 203, cert. denied, 199 Conn. 809 (1986).

B. Reasonable Efforts

Prior to the court's consideration of the statutory ground alleged by the petitioner to provide the basis for the termination of father's parental rights and prior to consideration as to whether such termination is in the best interests of the two children, this court must consider the "reasonable efforts" findings required by General Statutes § 17a-112(j)(1). That section provides that in order for the court to grant the termination petition, it must find, by clear and convincing evidence, that the department has made reasonable efforts to locate the parents and to reunify the child with the parents. In lieu of that finding, the court may find by clear and convincing evidence that the parents are unable or unwilling to benefit from reunification efforts.

In the termination petition, the department alleges that it has made reasonable efforts to reunify the two children with their parents but that the parents are unable or unwilling to benefit from such efforts. The Appellate Court has referred to the word "reasonable" in the statutory context as the "linchpin" in adjudging the efforts by the department under the circumstances of the particular case. In re Ebony H., 68 Conn.App. 342, 349 (2002). The court has stated that the department's obligation hereunder is to do everything possible. Reasonableness is an objective standard and the issue of whether the efforts made by the department were reasonable depends upon the court's consideration of all the circumstances in this case. A parent's response to the department's reunification efforts is also relevant to the court's inquiry. In re Alexander T., 81 Conn.App. 668, 672 (2004).

The department cannot force an uncooperative parent to accept services. In re Natalia G., 54 Conn.App. 800, 803 (1999). While a parent is incarcerated or under the jurisdiction of other agencies and treatment providers, the department is limited in its ability to arrange for appropriate rehabilitative services. Specifically, while a parent is incarcerated, he/she is under the exclusive jurisdiction of the D.O.C. from whom it is the parent's obligation to request to pursue services. In re Roshawn R., 51 Conn.App. 44, 56 (1998). In re Hector L., 53 Conn.App. 359, 371 (1999).

At the time the order of temporary custody was issued, father was under the jurisdiction of the D.O.C. at Connecticut Renaissance, to which he had been re-admitted, after taking his heroin overdose. Upon his release from the inpatient program, father was under the jurisdiction of the Department of Adult Probation, with whom the department coordinated its after-care efforts. The evidence shows, however, that father failed to complete any after-care program. Father presented himself on several occasions to Bristol Hospital for detoxification, but only when the symptom of his heroin addiction overwhelmed him father failed to heed the advice of his counselor at Connecticut Renaissance to live apart from mother and proceeded to resume his former lifestyle with his drug partner. Father refused to follow the recommendations of counselors at Bristol Hospital, his probation officer Torres that he engage in outpatient therapy. Father continued to abuse heroin and even sold heroin in his son's presence.

On July 16, 2002, at the time of the children's commitment to the department, Father was issued the specific steps provided for in C.G.S. § 46b-129(j). Chief among his road map for reunification was to refrain from the use of substances and engage in no criminal behavior. As the evidence clearly indicates, father failed, miserably, to comply. The plan also envisioned individual and family therapy and couples counseling, however, as testified to by Torres, the primary goal for both parents was to enroll in and keep connected to a drug relapse prevention program — an absolute prerequisite to any individual or family counseling. As noted, father refused the department's request for a hair test. According to Torres, father also refused to sign any releases provided by the department. Until days before the extended trial concluded and while incarcerated under sentence, for over six months, father participated in no programs offered by the DOC. He did not attend AA or NA groups while incarcerated. As Torres reported in the termination social study (Petitioner's Exhibit #1), both mother and father have failed to use the community services offered by the department and other agencies that were purposed to assist them in reunifying with their children.

In addition to referrals to after-care programs and drug testing the department provided transportation to enable the parents to visit with their two children. The department also provided the clinical evaluations and therapists for each of the children. Although this court finds that the cessation of Jonathan's therapy was not in the child's best interest and was ill advised, that serious glitch does not detract from the services either provided directly by the department or in coordination with other agencies. See Ebony H., 68 Conn.App. 342, 349 (2002).

This court, therefore, finds, by clear and convincing evidence, that the department exerted reasonable efforts in order to reunify the two children with father and that father was unwilling to benefit from those efforts. Although the evidence introduced by the petitioner was directed towards its burden of proof relative to father, the evidence clearly and convincingly proves that the petitioner made extensive efforts to reunify the two children with mother and that mother, due to her criminal activity and heroin addiction was unwilling to benefit thereby. See Petitioner's Exhibits 1, 2 14.

C. The Failure to Rehabilitate 1. The Applicable Law

The petitioner alleges, as the sole statutory ground to support the termination of father's parental rights, that he has failed to achieve that level of rehabilitation necessary to be a responsible parent to his two children. Before this court reaches the issue of whether termination of father's parental rights is in the two children's best interest, the petitioner must prove the statutory ground alleged by clear and convincing evidence. In contrast to custody proceedings, in which the best interests of the child are always the paramount consideration and, in fact, usually dictate the outcome, in termination proceedings the statutory criteria must be met before termination can be accomplished and adoption proceedings begun. In re Eden F., 250 Conn. 674, 689 (1999).

General Statutes § 17a-112(j)(3)(B)(i) allows for the involuntary termination of parental rights when "the parent of a child who has been found by the Superior Court to have been neglected or uncared for in a prior proceeding . . . has failed to achieve such degree of personal rehabilitation as would encourage the belief that within a reasonable time, considering the age and needs of the child, such parent could assume a responsible position in the life of the child . . ." In re Stanley D., 61 Conn.App. 224, 229 (2000).

To terminate parental rights for failure to achieve rehabilitation, both prongs of the test incorporated in the cited section must be met; one, that the parent has failed to achieve rehabilitation, and two, that there is no reason to believe that the parent could assume a responsible position in the life of a child within a reasonable time, considering the age and needs of the child. (Emphasis in original.) In re Danuael D., 51 Conn.App. 829, 843 (1999).

Our Supreme court has defined "rehabilitation" as follows:

"Personal rehabilitation" as used in the statue refers to the restoration of a parent to his or her former constructive and useful role as a parent . . . [§ 17a-112] requires the trial court to analyze the [parent's] rehabilitative status as it relates to the needs of the particular child, and further, that such rehabilitation must be foreseeable within a reasonable time. "Rehabilitate" means to restore [a handicapped or delinquent person] to a useful and constructive place in society through social rehabilitation . . . The statute does note require [a parent] to prove precisely when [he] will be able to assume a responsible position in her child's life. Nor does it require [him] to prove that [he] will be able to assume full responsibility for his child unaided by available support systems. It requires the court to find by clear and convincing evidence, that the level of rehabilitation [he] has achieved, if any, falls short of that which would reasonably encourage a belief that at some future date [he] can assume a responsible position in [his] child's life.

(Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Eden F., supra, 250 Conn. 706.

The court must perform a "bifurcated analysis" and must first determine whether father achieved such rehabilitation as of July 25, 2003, the adjudication date. If the court determines that father had not done so, then the court must decide whether father's rehabilitation was foreseeable within a reasonable time, with appropriate deference to the age and needs of the two children.

In re Victoria B., 79 Conn.App. 245, 251 (2003).

The statute mandates that the court consider "some future date," insofar as parental rehabilitation is concerned, as reasonably achievable, given the age and the particular needs of the children.

In re Shyliesh H., 56 Conn.App. 167, 179 (1999).

What constitutes a reasonable time is a factual determination that must be made on a case-by-case basis.

In re Stanley D., 61 Conn.App. 224, 231 (2000).

Although the standard is not full rehabilitation, the parent must show more than in any rehabilitation . . . [In] assessing rehabilitation, the critical issue is not whether the parent has improved his ability to manage his own life, but rather whether he has gained the ability to care for the particular needs of the child at issue.

(Internal citations and quotation marks omitted.) In re Victoria B., 79 Conn.App. 245, 254-55 (2003).

Because the parent-child relationship is at issue, all relevant facts and family history should be considered by the trial court when deciding whether to terminate [father's] parental rights.

In re Brianna F., 50 Conn.App. 805, 814 (1998).

The court may also consider the impact of a parent's compliance or non-compliance with the specific steps on the issue of rehabilitation. In re Devon B., 264 Conn. 572, 589 (2003). However, successful completion of some or all of the specific steps, in and of itself, will not guarantee a finding that a parent has reached that level of rehabilitation to render appropriate parental care In re Jennifer W., 75 Conn.App. 485, 500 (2003).

2. Father's Rehabilitative Status As Of July 25, 2003.

There can be no dispute that, as of the date the termination petition was filed, father was in no position to responsibly parent his two children. Father was actively using heroin and was in no substance abuse program. The Bristol Hospital records confirms that from March 14 to July 27, 2003, father underwent several detoxifications, yet continued to use the substance with the resultant multi-faceted adverse physical symptoms, when he attempted to cease using or could not obtain the heroin necessary to feed his addiction. As of the adjudication date, father was not in compliance with the conditions of his probation and was, thus, facing a substantial risk of incarceration. His continued involvement in his criminal activities precluded any ability to parent his two children. In re Vanna A., 83 Conn.App. 17, 25 (2004). Due to his heroin use and criminal activities, father was not complying with the court-ordered specific steps. This court, therefore, finds that the petitioner has proven, by clear and convincing evidence, that, as of the adjudication date, father had not achieved a level of rehabilitation necessary to parent his children; in fact, as of that date, father had achieved no level of rehabilitation. The petitioner has satisfied the first prong of the rehabilitation test.

3. Father's Rehabilitative Status on October 14, 2004

Within a month and a half subsequent to the filing of the termination petition, father was arrested. He has been in the custody of the D.O.C. continuously since September 2003. He did not participate in any educational or rehabilitative programs offered by the D.O.C. until he went to a Tier II substance abuse class ten days prior to the end of the trial — he did not place his name on the list to take a domestic violence course, until well after Day #3 of the trial. For a time, father was precluded from participation in the prison programs because he was disciplined for violating the rules. Father did not even attend an AA/NA class, until weeks before his release date. Father testified that after his release, he needed no substance abuse relapse prevention program, other then his attendance at AA/NA meetings, despite the fact that attendance at an outpatient substance program is a condition of that release. Father still harbors some hope that he and mother may be able to live together, drug-free, though each parent sees the other as a catalyst for relapse.⁷ On the last day of the trial, from a rehabilitative perspective, father was in the same position that he was in as Day #3 ended, four months previously.

7 Father, during his testimony on Day #4, denied having any contract with mother and proclaimed his intent to seek a divorce.

Father claims that his incarceration was his second long-term treatment experience, yet he received no treatment for or education about his serious and intense addiction to heroin. Father asserted that his confinement allowed him to reflect on his mistakes. Father admitted that he was in no position to take the two children immediately upon his release, but asserted that he would be able to do so in "thirty . . . sixty . . . or ninety days."

Father's plan is to move in with his mother and to obtain re-employment by his former employer. When asked about the effect on the two children, if returned to him, of another relapse, father acknowledged that another removal of the two children was the probable result, however, father stated, "that would depend on my mother."

S.P., the paternal grandmother to the children, testified on her son's behalf. She spoke to him once or twice a month during his incarceration. She confirmed that father would live with her and offered herself to serve as babysitter for the children. She asserted that the two children "can stay as long as necessary," but cautioned that she "will not go through the teenage years again." As noted S.P. was granted full intervening party status in the neglect proceeding, however, she has not moved for a transfer of guardianship and had not contacted the department in three months prior to the commencement of the trial. She testified that she last saw the two children on February 14, 2004, four months prior to the start of the trial, but added that she speaks to the maternal grandmother (Jonathan's foster mother) every two weeks. Prior to February 2004, she last saw the two children in September 2003. There was no evidence that the department did anything to preclude or limit S.P.'s visits. Most concerning is the fact, confirmed by father, that S.P. accompanied mother to her "good-bye visit" with the two children, that took place at the department's office on July 26, 2004; the paternal grandmother transported mother to the visit.

S.B. also testified on father's behalf. He is father's former employer and is not only willing to rehire father, but has agreed to be father's sponsor. He testified that when father worked for him as a painter, he did his work well and was a loyal employee. He met father when father was at Connecticut Renaissance and remembered warning father to stay away from mother after his discharge, as mother was a "trigger" for father's drug use. According to S.B., father's "whole downfall" resulted from re-connecting with mother. When asked to recite the plan for father's maintenance of sobriety, S.B. responded that a peer group and a sponsor will be important. He added that he "doesn't agree with programs." Inferentially, he would not be very supportive, if father was compelled to attend a "program" by his transitional supervisor.

4. The Two Children's Status As Of October 14, 2004:

As earlier herein described, on June 22, 2004, this court was informed that the permanency plan for the children to reside with an identified couple, approved by the department, was sabotaged by Jonathan's aberrant behavior. Thus, as the court continued the trial, the two children were in the same placements that existed since two months after their removal from parental care. The court directed the department to continue to search for an appropriate permanent placement for the two children, while maintaining visits with their father. The goal remained to place Michelle and Jonathan together in same family.

As previously noted, Dr. Randall, however, reported in her evaluation following the continuance that separate adoptive homes was a "viable option," in particular, if the children were able to visit each other. Petitioner's Exhibit #16.

In her case status reports dated October 12, 2004 ( Petitioner's Exhibit #17), Sisk described the department's efforts since June to identify a permanent placement for the two children. As of that date, Michelle had been with her maternal great aunt and Jonathan with his maternal grandparents for two years and two months. Neither caretaker had viewed the placement as permanent, although each have provided a loving and nurturing and safe family for the child and each had fully cooperated with the department in its attempts to locate a permanent adoptive home for the children. Sisk reported that on July 28, 2004, the maternal grandmother's sister and her husband offered to take Michelle. Thus, Michelle's prospective adoptive mother is the sister of Jonathan's current caretaker. Moreover, in light of that development and Jonathan's improved performance at school and behaviors at home, Jonathan's maternal grandparents are seriously considering his adoption. Michelle is well acquainted with her prospective adoptive parents, as she has visited them often and has stayed overnight. The Village for Children and Families is assisting in the licensing process. Sisk reported that Jonathan has a "romanticized vision" that, upon his release from prison, father will move in and live with him and his maternal grandparents, a highly unlikely event that is, according to Sisk, not supported by Jonathan's therapist, who is working with the child and the maternal grandparents to support his permanent placement with the family with whom the child desires to live. Obviously, from the children's perspective, if the plan was to become a reality, it would be, as it were, the best of both worlds. Although they would be living separately, they would have frequent contact and would be in the same "family."

Sisk testified that if Jonathan's current caretakers decide not to adopt him, the plan would be a therapeutic foster home, before a permanent adoptive placement is sought. Sisk stated that the maternal grandparents are "dedicated to this child" and are fully cooperating with his on-going therapy. They are in their "fifties," have no other minor children and live on a farm which is also a hospice for animals. As to Michelle, the goal was to place her with the adoptive family over the holidays. Although increased contact was occurring between Michelle and that family as the trial ended, the child was not told of the plan, as the department was "awaiting the outcome of the trial."

During his testimony on Day #4 of the trial, father was asked to describe the needs of his two children. As to Michelle, he responded that she needs, "her father, her brother, housing, food, water and schooling." As to Jonathan, father stated that he is "like me when I was a kid." Father admitted that, until the trial, he was "not aware of the extent of the problem." Father also agreed that both children need a stable familial environment and that each had been in such an environment for in excess of two years since their removal.

During her testimony on Day #4, Dr. Randall, again, offered a "poor" prognosis for father after stating that "the best predictor of future behavior is past behavior." Randall pointed out that in order to concentrate on his rehabilitative needs, the needs of the two children must be "put on the back burner." Randall confirmed what she reported in her evaluation of the two children. Randall was concerned as to the conflicted relationship between Jonathan and his father and observed that Michelle was scared and upset at the prospect of living with her father. Randall concluded by stating that it was her opinion that if Jonathan was placed with father, it would be "very damaging" to the child, due to the "confused love-hate" relationship. If Michelle was placed with father, she would, in Randall's opinion, withdraw and become depressed. She would be hesitant to form attachments. Randall opined that "both children would likely regress and would lose, the gains they made" with their current caretakers.

In termination proceedings, the opinions of professional court-ordered evaluators are entitled to great weight. In re Daniel D., 51 CA 829, 840 (1999).

5. The Age And Needs Of The Children

In addressing the second prong of the rehabilitation test, the court is statutorily mandated to consider the age and needs of the two children. Thus, their ages, the amount of time they have been in foster care, their relationship with their father, their relationship with their foster parents, their relationship with each other and, most importantly, their need for an entitlement to a permanent and stable home are among the factors to be considered by this court at this point in the court's analysis. C.G.S., § 112(q), as amended by Public Act 03-243 provides:

The provisions of this section [meaning the whole of Sec. 17a-112] shall be liberally construed in the best interests of any child for whom a petition under this section has been filed.

Michelle is currently nine and one-half years of age. She has been out of her parent's care since June 14, 2002, a period in excess of two and one-half years. She has resided with her maternal great aunt and uncle since August 2002. She has done well in her current placement, has excellent grades at school and has no behavior problems. She wants and deserves to be settled with a permanent family. She would prefer to live with her brother, however, neither her current caretaker nor Dr. Randall envision any difficulty for her if she was to live separately from, but to have confined contact with him. She has told numerous people, including her caretaker, her therapist, her caseworker and Dr. Randall that she does not want to be with her father. She has stated that she wants a "real mom and dad" that do not do drugs. According to L.B., her current foster mother, Michelle does not ask about father and when asked about the visits with father, the child "clams up." L.B. testified that the child's expressed memories of living with father are yelling, screaming and removal of toys. Her therapist and Dr. Randall agree that Michelle is long overdue to become a permanent member of a family. In June 2004, the child suffered another disappointment when an identified placement was lost due to her brother's bad behavior. By October, however, another couple came forward presenting, for Michelle, a prospective mother and father who are known to the child and who have been part of her extended family and a couple who, by virtue of their familial relationship with Jonathan's caretaker, will promote frequent contact between Michelle and her brother.

Jonathan is nearly seven and one-half years of age. He has been in foster care for as long as his sister. He has resided with his maternal grandparents since August 2002. They are dedicated to his well-being and have fully cooperated with the department and the child's therapist in an effort to address Jonathan's violent and aggressive behaviors. With therapy and medication, the child's performance at school and behavior at home has improved. Jonathan would like to live with his sister and wants to stay with his current caretakers. Jonathan, like his sister, is long overdue for a permanent and stable home. Jonathan's "love-hate" relationship with his father is both confusing and disturbing. He'll look forward to the visits with father, then after some expression of affection, will engage in out-of-control aggression toward his father. Visits with father are followed by an increase in his bad behavior, when he returns from the visit. With recent improvement in both his performance and behavior and, with the permanent plan for Michelle moving forward, Jonathan's maternal grandparents are now seriously considering adopting their grandson. If both permanency plans are achieved, then the two children will not only reside with "family," frequent contact between them would be assured

6. The Second Prong

In addressing the second prong of the rehabilitation test, this court must assess, not only whether father is capable, at some future time, of achieving the level of rehabilitation necessary to effectively parent his two children, but whether he is capable of doing so within a reasonable time, given the ages of the two children and their need to settle into a permanent and stable familial environment. In balancing the age and needs of the two children with the rehabilitative potential for father, the court has asked itself three questions. The first is whether the attainment of the two children's goal of permanency and stability should be deferred in order to permit father time to engage in a meaningful substance relapse prevention program and to achieve total sobriety. The second is whether allowing father more time to achieve his goal is worth the risk that a very viable permanency plan might be derailed and abandoned. The third is whether these two children should be compelled to remain in foster care, with all its uncertainties, so as to enable father to adequately address his addiction to heroin, something that, thus far, he has been unable to do. This court is compelled to answer all three questions in the negative, as the age and needs of these two children, must, in the circumstances of this case, take precedence over those of father.

Since his discharge from Connecticut Renaissance over two years ago, father has been unable to effectively deal with his addiction. He went back to heroin a month after his discharge. He resumed living with mother, his drug partner, despite being warned not to do so. He has allegedly been sober since September 2003, due only to his continued incarceration since that time. He has benefited from no rehabilitation services, while he was incarcerated. Both he and his sponsor are not confident in the success of any substance abuse programs. Dr. Randall testified that father minimizes his addiction; Dr. Randall and this court have concern that father will return to reside with mother once mother completes her long-term inpatient treatment program. The continuing relationship between father's mother and father's spouse justifies that concern. As noted, Dr. Randall has expressed significant doubt as to father's ability to shed his heroin addiction. She has strongly urged father to enroll in a long-term relapse prevention program, followed by an intensive outpatient program. Father opposed that plan, intends to live with his mother, get his old job back, get a driver's license and go to meetings. Father testified that he would be ready (with his mother) to take the two children, at the most, ninety days from his release. Father will rely on his mother, who has a limited connection to her grandchildren, as the transporter, "baby sitter" and virtual caretaker for Michelle and Jonathan.

Father's past history, including his failed attempts at sobriety, despite the benefit of a long-term program; his relationship with mother; his failure to complete any outpatient drug relapse prevention program prior to his incarceration and while incarcerated; his refusal to acknowledge his need for such program after his release; and his past and present conflicted relationship with his two children; does not instill a high level of confidence in his future success. For these two children, permitting father more time to address issues that should have been addressed years ago, while their lives remain on hold is too great a gamble. Father's sobriety is too fragile and the risk of relapse too great. In re Kasheema L., 56 Conn.App. 484, 489 (2000), cert. denied, 252 Conn. 945 (2000). Michelle and Jonathan are entitled to a permanent family now!

This Court finds that the plaintiff has proven, by clear and convincing evidence, that, given the children's ages and need for permanency and stability in their lives, father cannot achieve that level of rehabilitation necessary to deliver safe and appropriate parental care, within a reasonable time.

V. DISPOSITION

Now that the court has found in the adjudication stage that the petitioner has proven the statutory ground alleged by clear and convincing evidence, this court must consider whether termination of father's parental rights is in the best interest of Michelle and Jonathan. The burden remains with the petitioner who must convince the court that termination is, in fact, in the children's best interest. Each case must be decided on its particular facts and circumstances as it has been held that the determination of whether to terminate parental rights is a highly fact-specific process. See In re Shane P., 58 Conn.App. 244, 254 (2000).

"In every case involving parental rights, a struggle exists between parents and the state to determine what is in the child's best interest, the child being the focus of the struggle."

(Internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Dorrell R., 64 Conn.App. 455, 467 (2001).

The trial court is vested with broad discretion in determining what is in the child's best interests.

Schult v. Schult, 241 Conn. 767, 777-78 (1997).

"The ultimate standard underlying the whole statutory scheme regulating child welfare is the best interest of the child."

In re Tyqwane v. et al. (AC 24026), released October 12, 2004.

Conducting a best interest analysis is not a narrow concept restricted to a compelling reason [keeping a parent in a child's life] or to fully reuniting the parent with the child. Rather, it is purposely broad to enable the trial court to exercise its discretion based upon a host of considerations.

In re Allissa N., 56 Conn.App. 203, 208 (1999) cert. denied, 252 Conn. 932 (2000).

The parent has only one interest, that of family integrity; the state has only one compelling interest, that of protecting minor children. The child, however, has two distinct and often contradictory interests. The first is a basic interest in safety; the second is the important interest, discussed above, in having a stable family environment.

(Citations omitted.) In re Juvenile Appeal, (83-CD), 189 Conn. 276, 286 (1983). Emphasis added.

In the dispositional phase of a termination of parental rights hearing, the emphasis appropriately shifts from the conduct of the parent to the best interest of the child.

(Internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Victoria B., 79 Conn.App. 245, 261 (2003).

"The primary concern all of [the department] is the safety of [the child] . . . Where appropriate the agency can and must take unilateral action, either to reunite families or to terminate parental rights as expeditiously as possible to free neglected children for placement and adoption in stable family settings." . . . It is indisputable that protecting the physical and psychological well-being of children is a compelling, as well as legitimate, state interest." In re Shane P., 58 Conn.App. 234, 258 and 260 (2000).

General Statutes § 45a-727a delineates the state policy concerning the best interest of the child.

(1) The best interests of a child are promoted by having persons in the child's life who manifest a deep concern for the child's growth and development; (2) the best interests of a child are promoted when a child has as many persons loving and caring for the child as possible; (3) the best interests of a child are promoted when the child is part of a loving, supportive, and stable family whether that family is a nuclear, extended split, blended, single parent, adoptive or foster family . . .

In the case of In re Shyina B., 58 Conn.App. 159, 167 (2000). The court states: "the best interests of the child includes the child's interest in sustained growth, development, well-being, and continuity and stability of its environment." (Emphasis added.)

Of necessity, this court has addressed many facts and circumstances that are applicable to a consideration of the best interest of each of these children. In its analysis of the second prong of the rehabilitation test, the court is permitted to take into account relevant events that occurred after the adjudication date, i.e., July 25, 2004. Practice Book Section 35a-7. The court, therefore, has considered all occurrences up to the conclusion of trial that might reasonably impact upon father's rehabilitative potential and the ages and needs of the children. Having done so, the court, in its best interest analysis, will attempt, as much as possible, to avoid unnecessary repetition.

This court has no doubt that father loves his children, however, that love and father's expressed concern for his children's well-being are simply not enough to negate the termination of father's parental rights. In re Ashley S., 61 CA 658, 667 (2001) cert. denied 255 Conn. 950 (2001). As noted, Michelle does not want to live with her father and has said so to many persons. She told her therapist that he was mean and that she fears he will return to drugs. Jonathan has a disturbing, violent relationship with father; his visits with father result in increased aggression in his foster home after the visits. His therapist does not support his return to father. L.B. (Michelle's foster mother) testified that Michelle and Jonathan "love being together" and, although Jonathan can be "hyper and aggressive" he is not aggressive to his sister. The maternal grandfather told Randall that Michelle has "a calming influence" on Jonathan. Michelle has thrived while living with her current caretakers. L.B. testified that when Michelle first arrived she was seven years of age and was "scared of a lot of things." She added that the child did not know how to eat properly or brush her teeth. According to L.B., Michelle "now knows what a family is, has friends and is a straight A student." Jonathan, despite his speech delays and bad behavior, has done well while living with his maternal grandparents. As noted, they are dedicated to his development and well-being and, as the trial ended, were seriously considering his adoption. Michelle's prospective adoptive mother is the sister of Jonathan's prospective adoptive mother — a factor that will promote frequent contact between the children.

Randall, given father's substance abuse history and relationship with the children was opposed to any further attempts to reunify the two children with father. In addressing that issue in her August 2004 evaluation, Randall concluded:

There has been consideration of these children returning to their father's care after his discharge from jail. Based on the previous evaluation of their father, it is clear that this would not be an appropriate plan for these children. Michelle is adamantly opposed to such a suggestion and would likely experience major regression and emotional upheaval if such a plan was implemented. Jonathan has less understanding of what this means, but his relationship with his father is problematic by itself, as evidenced by the aggressive interactions observed during their parent-child session. In addition, the father remains at high risk for further problems with substance abuse and other difficulties. Placing Jonathan back into this situation would only exacerbate his emotional and behavioral difficulties and leave him significantly more difficult to place in adoption at a later time when his placement with his father disrupts . . . Even if Jonathan needs to be placed in an interim therapeutic foster home before going into adoption, his long-range prognosis would be far better than a return to his father's care.

In this court's view the testimony and documentary evidence clearly support Randall's conclusions and recommendations. The risk to these two children is too great if they were made to wait any longer for father's possible rehabilitation. They each are entitled to settle in with a permanent family now. The petitioner has demonstrated, by clear and convincing evidence, that it is in the best interest of these two children that father's parental rights be terminated.

It should be noted that although this court perceives the plan for Jonathan to remain where he is and for Michelle to reside with the sister of Jonathan's caretaker, each in an adoptive capacity, as an ideal plan for each of the children, it is not the prerogative of this court to decide where a child may live or with whom, following the termination of parental rights. In re Sheena I., Conn.App. 63 713, 726 (2001). This court has, therefore, decided that it is in the two children's best interest that father's parental rights be terminated, irrespective of the implementation of the desired permanency plan for both. In re Carissa K., 55 Conn.App. 768 (776) (1999). Based upon a totality of all of the relevant facts and circumstances, this court believes that the placement of Michelle with a non-related appropriate adoptive mother and father and the placement of Jonathan in a therapeutic foster home, is far preferable than placement with father. As stated, the risk to these two children is too great, if a plan of reunification with father was pursued.

VI. THE STATUTORY FACTORS

In non-consensual termination, the court, in deciding whether termination of a parent's parental rights is in a child's best interest, is mandated to consider those factors provided in Sec. 17a-112(k), which serve as guidelines to assist the court. Proof of each factor by clear and convincing evidence is not required. In re Quanitra M., Conn.App. 96, 104; cert. denied, 255 Conn. 903 (2000). This court, therefore, in deciding to terminate father's parental rights has considered each of those factors. As each of the statutory factors has been addressed by this court throughout this memorandum, many of them in great detail, the court will severely limit rehashing them herein.

1. The timeliness, nature and extent of the services offered.

In its discussion of the reasonable efforts issue, this court has specified the efforts made by the department, D.O.C., and Adult Probation, the purpose of which was to support father, while at Connecticut Renaissance and to arrange for and support his participation in recommended aftercare programs. Had father and/or mother successfully completed the programs to which they were referred by the department and other agencies and, thereby, maintained sobriety, the department was ready, willing and able to make references for individual and family counseling and for parenting assistance and instruction. As father did not maintain his sobriety and did not refrain from criminal activities, resulting in his incarceration, all the department could do was to assist in arranging visitation and professional evaluations. As noted, therapy for each child was also provided by the department.

2. Reasonable efforts to reunite.

By arranging appointments, either individually or in coordination with probation, with appropriate aftercare providers and by arranging parental visits and providing transportation of the children to those visits, including visits to father during his incarceration, the department made reasonable efforts to reunify the children with their father.

3. Fulfillment of court-ordered obligations.

This court has earlier herein discussed in detail the manner in which father failed to comply with the court-ordered specific steps that were issued at the commitment of the children. Most significantly, father continued to abuse heroin, engaged in criminal activity that was drug-related and was, as a result thereof, unavailable as a parental resource for his children.

4. The feelings and emotional ties between the children and their father and between the children and their foster parents

Throughout this memorandum, this court has addressed the feelings and emotional ties that each of the children have for their father, as well as the relationship that the children have with their respective foster parents. As noted, Michelle has adamantly stated to, among others, her foster mother, her therapist and Dr. Randall that she does not want to live with her father. She is angry with him, avoids mentioning him and fears that he will return to drugs after his release from incarceration. As also noted, Jonathan has a conflicted and disturbing relationship with his father. Although he clings to an unrealistic notion that his father will move in with him and his maternal grandparents, when he is in the presence of his father, he unleashes violent and aggressive attacks on his father, which is most concerning, given attempts by the child's therapists to regulate and reduce Jonathan's penchant for violence. Each child has been with their current caretakers for nearly two and one-half years and has done well in their care, especially Michelle. Jonathan, although guilty of some bad behaviors while residing with his grandparents, is bonded to them and wants to live with them.

5. The age and needs of each child.

Michelle is nine and a half and Jonathan is nearly seven and a half years of age. They have been in the care of the department and out of the care of their parents since June 2002. They need and are entitled to reside in a permanent and stable familial environment, where they can develop and mature and where they will not see their caretakers inject mind-altering drugs into their bodies and be carted away by emergency personnel, nor will they witness drug sales by persons charged with their safety and well-being.

6. Father's efforts to adjust his circumstances, conduct and conditions.

Given mother's continued addiction and lack of cooperation with programs to which she was referred by the department, which precluded her from discharging appropriate parental care, father, upon his successful completion of the Connecticut Renaissancc program, needed to comply fully with the court-ordered steps. Father needed to cooperate with his probation officer and the department; father needed to participate in an aftercare program; father need to refrain from criminal activities; and, most importantly father needed to shed his addiction and maintain sobriety. Father accomplished none of these goals. He went back to mother, he returned to drugs, he shunned the aftercare programs, he did not cooperate with his probation or the department; finally, he went to prison, where he participated in no rehabilitative programs. Father has failed to adjust the circumstances, conduct and conditions that led to the removal of his children. His professed intention to now do so comes too late for Michelle and Jonathan. As stated, the children need permanency now! There is no debate among experts in child development and in many other professions that children thrive in continuous, stable and permanent home environments. In re Jeisean M. (AC 17012), released July 27, 2004. "Foster care should be a strictly time-limited interval in the life of any child. The Federal Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980, 42 U.S.C. Sec 670 et seq., as amended, envisages that after twelve months in foster care, a child deserves a permanent home." In re Samantha B., 45 Conn.Sup. 468, 479 (1997).

7. The extent to which father has been prevented from maintaining a meaningful relationship with the children by the unreasonable act or conduct of any person or by father's economic circumstances.

There is no evidence that father was prevented by anyone from maintaining a meaningful relationship with his children. Except for an interval of several months, the department arranged for parental visits while father was at his inpatient program and while incarcerated. The record does not reflect any administrative or judicial action by father to request visits after he was sentenced. That remained the case until the court (Santos, J.), in November 2003 on its own initiative, ordered prison visits, pending Dr. Randall's evaluation.

The only economic circumstances that prevented father from maintaining a meaningful parent-child relationship was father's inability to earn a living due to his addiction, his detoxifications, his inpatient programs and his incarceration. Father's inability to connect with his children was his own doing; he has no one to blame, but himself.

VII. ORDERS

ORDERED, that the parental rights of Michael C., as the father of Michelle C., because of his failure to achieve that degree of rehabilitation, as provided in General Statutes Sec. 17a-112 (j)(3)(8)(i), be and are hereby terminated.

ORDERED, that the parental rights of Michael C., as father of Jonathan C., because of his failure to achieve that degree of rehabilitation, as provided in said statute, be and are hereby terminated.

ORDERED, that the court approves of the permanency plan for both of said children of the termination of the parental rights of their mother and father and their subsequent adoption. The department, therefore, will not be obligated to make future efforts toward parental reunification.

ORDERED, that the commissioner of the department of children and families is hereby appointed statutory parent for said children, who shall submit to the Superior Court for Juvenile Matters at New Britain, within thirty days of this judgment, a case plan, and, thereafter, such further reports as may be required by law, until the permanency plan for each child is finalized.

BY THE COURT,

Wilson J. Trombley, Judge Child Protection Session