Opinion
E045178
9-19-2008
In re MICHAEL R., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. MICHAEL R., Defendant and Appellant.
John L. Dodd, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Edmund G. Brown, Jr., Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, and Gary W. Schons, Assistant Attorney General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
Not to be Published
INTRODUCTION
Fifteen-year-old Michael R. requests remand for the juvenile court to exercise its discretion to declare his offense either a felony or a misdemeanor. We will remand the matter for this purpose.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Shortly after midnight on December 16, 2007, Ms. S., a facility manager for a group home, told Michael to go to bed. Instead of following the instruction, Michael left his room, approached Ms. S. at her desk, and stabbed her in the left shoulder with a three-inch "locking blade knife." Paramedics responded to the scene and took Ms. S. to a hospital for treatment.
Michael was arrested and taken to juvenile hall. As he was being booked, he was heard to say he had stabbed Ms. S. "because she pissed me off." A Welfare and Institutions Code section 602, subdivision (a), petition (the 602 petition) filed on December 18, 2007, alleged that Michael had committed the crime of assault with a deadly weapon, a knife, in violation of Penal Code section 245, subdivision (a)(1).
A San Bernardino County Probation Departments Welfare and Institutions Code section 241.1 report dated December 28, 2007, summarized Michaels dependency history: because his mother was a drug addict and his father was incarcerated, he has been a dependant of the juvenile court since March 2005, when he was 11 years old. He has a history of impulsive behavior, inability to get along with peers, and fighting.
At a jurisdictional hearing on January 9, 2008, the allegation in the 602 petition was found to be true, "in its entirety." However, the juvenile court also found Michael to be a resident of Riverside County and ordered the matter transferred to Riverside County for disposition. The Superior Court of San Bernardino County explicitly reserved to the disposition hearing the issue of whether the offense was to be treated as a felony or a misdemeanor under Penal Code section 17, subdivision (b).
On January 16, 2008, the Superior Court of Riverside County accepted the transfer and detained Michael at juvenile hall. In subsequent separate reports, the Riverside County Department of Social Services (DPSS) and the Riverside County Probation Department concurred that Michael should be granted dual status so that he could receive joint services with DPSS and probation (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 602). The reports also agreed that DPSS should be designated the lead agency. At a hearing on February 6, the juvenile court declared Michael a ward of the court and designated him a dual status youth. The juvenile court committed Michael to juvenile hall for "not less than 53 days nor more than 106 days," with "credit for time served [of] 53 days," and released him to the custody of DPSS on a variety of terms and conditions. One condition was that he provide DNA samples pursuant to the requirements of Penal Code section 296. The juvenile court did not otherwise address the question of whether his offense was to be treated as a felony or a misdemeanor.
DISCUSSION
On appeal, Michael argues that his case must be remanded to the juvenile court for it to explicitly exercise its discretion to designate his offense either a felony or a misdemeanor. The People agree. So do we.
Welfare and Institutions Code section 702 provides that when a minor is declared a ward under section 602: "If the minor is found to have committed an offense which would in the case of an adult be punishable alternatively as a felony or a misdemeanor, the court shall declare the offense to be a misdemeanor or felony." Penal Code section 245, subdivision (a)(1), provides that assault with a deadly weapon other than a firearm is punishable as either a felony or a misdemeanor "by imprisonment in the state prison for two, three, or four years, or in a county jail for [up to] one year, or by a fine . . . or by both the fine and imprisonment."
The relevant case upon which Michael relies is In re Manzy W. (1997) 14 Cal.4th 1199 (Manzy W.). In Manzy W., the California Supreme Court determined that the juvenile courts duty to designate a "wobbler" offense as either a misdemeanor or felony is mandatory. (Id. at p. 1204.) Citing its own earlier decisions, the Supreme Court rejected arguments that the determination may be implied from the length of the sentence or that a trial court may simply be presumed to have fulfilled its official duty. (Id. at pp. 1207, 1209.) The requirement for an explicit determination, said the court, "serves the purpose of ensuring that the juvenile court is aware of, and actually exercises, its discretion . . . ." (Id. at p. 1207, citing People v. McGee (1977) 19 Cal.3d 948, 963.) The designation is important because of its effect on a minors future, and not just for determining sentencing options for a present offense. (Manzy W., supra, at pp. 1208, 1209, citing and explaining In re Kenneth H. (1983) 33 Cal.3d 616, 619.) In particular, the designation may determine whether the current offense may be used for impeachment or for enhancement of a sentence for a later offense, for determination of whether a future offense constitutes a strike, and whether the offenders character is blighted by the record. (Manzy W., supra, at p. 1209.) The court did note that remand is not "`automatic" whenever a juvenile court fails to make a declaration under Welfare and Institutions Code section 702, so long as the record shows that despite its failure it was aware of, and exercised, its discretion under the statute. (Manzy W., supra, at p. 1209.)
Here, the signals are mixed and the record does not clearly demonstrate that the juvenile court was aware of or exercised its discretion. Although Michael was brought under wardship by means of a felony allegation and was required to provide the DNA sample required of convicted felons under Penal Code section 296, subdivision (a)(1), he was given what amounts to a misdemeanor term of confinement: 53 days in juvenile hall. Because of the weighty consequences of the Welfare and Institutions Code section 702 designation, we will remand the matter to give the juvenile court the opportunity to exercise its discretion.
DISPOSITION
The matter is remanded to the Superior Court of Riverside County for it to exercise its discretion to declare Michael R.s Penal Code section 245, subdivision (a)(1), offense a felony or a misdemeanor pursuant to the requirements of Welfare and Institutions Code section 702. In all other respects, the judgment is affirmed.
We concur:
HOLLENHORST, J.
MILLER, J. --------------- Notes: Harold T. Wilson, Jr., Judge of the Superior Court of San Bernardino County, found true the allegation in the petition (case No. J218745). The matter was then transferred to Riverside County. Christian F. Thierbach, Judge of the Superior Court of Riverside County, pronounced the sentence (case No. RIJ115797).