Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court of Orange County, Super. Ct. No. DL028141 Ronald P. Kreber, Judge.
Linda K. Harvie, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Edmund G. Brown, Jr., Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Gary W. Schons, Assistant Attorney General, Steve Oetting and Emily R. Hanks, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
OPINION
MOORE, J.
Michael P. (minor) contends there was insufficient evidence to support the juvenile court’s finding he inflicted serious bodily injury. He also claims both the prosecutor and the court erred in not following the procedures required for a deferred entry of judgment. We affirm and remand to permit the court to consider Welfare and Institutions Code section 790.
I
FACTS
The first amended petition alleged minor violated Penal Code section 243, subdivision (d), battery with serious bodily injury. (Unless otherwise indicated, all further statutory references are to the Penal Code.) The juvenile court found the allegation true beyond a reasonable doubt, found it was a felony and declared minor a ward of the juvenile court. The court ordered minor committed to the custody of the county probation officer for placement in a juvenile facility for 60 days.
Fifteen-year-old Frank A. testified that on June 7, 2007, he was standing by the tennis courts at Cypress High School waiting for his mother to pick him up. Waiting with him were Ryan B. and a few other teammates. Minor approached the group and “seemed to only be interested in Ryan, not me.” Minor made gestures in the form of fake punches with a closed fist toward Ryan within three inches of him.
Frank’s attention was diverted to something else for about 10 seconds. When he turned around again he saw “[minor]’s fist heading for Ryan [B.]’s face.” Again, minor’s fist was closed. Ryan was hit in the nose and he dropped to the ground in pain. Frank saw “a lot of blood.” Minor turned, walked away and then began to run.
Ryan, a student at Cypress, said he has known minor since the seventh grade. The two attended the same English class on that day. After class, when Ryan was standing by the tennis courts, minor came up to him and said in an angry tone: “Do you have a problem with me?” Ryan did not respond and closed his eyes. When he opened his eyes, he saw his neighbor walking toward her mother’s car. He followed her because he was getting a ride with them, too. At that point, minor punched him in the nose, breaking both his nose and his glasses. He was taken to the hospital and bled for “like an hour.”
Minor was in the ninth grade on June 7, 2007. He said Ryan had called him an “emo” and a “freak” and told him to kill himself in their sixth period class. He said Ryan hit him first.
II
DISCUSSION
Sufficiency of evidence
Minor contends there is insufficient evidence to support the trial court’s finding. He claims the evidence does not support a finding of serious bodily injury, and at most amounts to the commission of a misdemeanor battery.
An appeal challenging sufficiency of evidence in juvenile matters is subject to the same standard of review applicable in criminal cases. (In re Ryan N. (2001) 92 Cal.App.4th 1359, 1371.) In addressing such challenges, “the reviewing court must examine the whole record in the light most favorable to the judgment to determine whether it discloses substantial evidence — evidence that is reasonable, credible and of solid value — such that a reasonable trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. [Citation.] The appellate court presumes in support of the judgment the existence of every fact the trier could reasonably deduce from the evidence. [Citations.] The same standard applies when the conviction rests primarily on circumstantial evidence. [Citation.] Although it is the jury’s duty to acquit a defendant if it finds the circumstantial evidence susceptible of two reasonable interpretations, one of which suggests guilt and the other innocence, it is the jury, not the appellate court that must be convinced of the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. [Citation.] ‘“If the circumstances reasonably justify the trier of fact’s findings, the opinion of the reviewing court that the circumstances might also reasonably be reconciled with a contrary finding does not warrant a reversal of the judgment. [Citation.]”’ [Citation.]” (People v. Kraft (2000) 23 Cal.4th 978, 1053-1054.)
“Serious bodily injury” means a “‘[s]erious impairment of physical condition, including, but not limited to, the following: loss of consciousness; concussion; bone fracture; protracted loss or impairment of function of any bodily member or organ; a wound requiring extensive suturing; and serious disfigurement.’ [§ 243, subd. (d).]” In People v. Burroughs (1984) 35 Cal.3d 824, 831 (overruled on other grounds in People v. Blakely (2000) 23 Cal.4th 82). The Supreme Court noted that a bone fracture satisfies section 243’s serious bodily injury requirement.
Here the victim’s nose was broken, he bled for an hour and required hospital treatment. We conclude there is sufficient evidence for the court’s finding he sustained serious bodily injury.
Deferred entry of judgment procedure
Minor next contends the juvenile court and the prosecutor erred when he was not considered for the deferred entry of judgment program set forth in Welfare and Institutions Code section 790. Section 790 provides that whenever a minor committed a felony and the minor has not previously been declared to be a ward of the court for the commission of a felony offense, the offense charged is not one of the offenses enumerated in subdivision (b) of section 707, the minor has not previously been committed to the custody of the Youth Authority, the minor’s record does not indicate that probation has ever been revoked without being completed, the minor is at least 14 years of age at the time of the hearing, and the minor is eligible for probation pursuant to, section 1203.6, the prosecuting attorney shall review the file and inform the court of the minor’s eligibility. The court then has the discretion to grant deferred entry of judgment.
The Attorney General agrees there is nothing in the record to indicate the minor was informed of his eligibility for deferred entry of judgment, and recommends the matter be remanded to the juvenile court. We agree.
III
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed and remanded to the juvenile court for proceedings consistent with Welfare and Institutions Code section 790. Because we are remanding the case, we do not address minor’s other claims.
WE CONCUR: SILLS, P. J., RYLAARSDAM, J.