This appeal followed.¶ 6 On appeal, the defendant argues that (1) because he stipulated to all of the evidence needed to support the determination that he was subject to commitment, the stipulation was tantamount to a waiver of the hearing, (2) the Mental Health Code does not contemplate a waiver of hearings in their entirety (see In re Michael H., 392 Ill.App.3d 965, 979, 332 Ill.Dec. 216, 912 N.E.2d 703, 714 (2009) ), and (3) even assuming waiver is permissible, the record must demonstrate that the waiver was knowing and voluntary. He further contends that counsel's decision to stipulate to all of the evidence necessary to commit him constituted ineffective assistance of counsel.¶ 7 Before addressing these arguments, a brief overview of the procedures to be followed after a finding of not guilty by reason of insanity would be useful.
We will therefore consider this appeal under the capable-of-repetition-yet-avoiding-review exception. • This court recently addressed the issues raised in this appeal in In re Michael H., 392 Ill. App. 3d 965, 912 N.E.2d 703 (2009). There, as here, the respondent was found subject to continuing involuntary admission to Chester after waiving his right to a hearing on the petition for continued commitment.
Instead, this case presents an issue of statutory interpretation that affects the procedural requirements of a respondent's admission for treatment under the Mental Health Code. See In re Alfred H.H., 233 Ill. 2d 345, 356, 910 N.E.2d 74, 81 (2009). The statute at issue is a relatively new piece of legislation and has been discussed in only one published opinion (see In re Michael H., 392 Ill. App. 3d 965, 975-79, 912 N.E.2d 703, 711-14 (2009)). Therefore, an authoritative determination regarding the interpretation of this statute will be helpful in the future guidance of public officers.
¶ 18 Respondent has not cited to any case which would support his argument here on appeal. He instead urges us to consider procedures found to be impermissible under the Mental Health and Development Disabilities Code (Code) ( 405 ILCS 5/1-100 et seq. (West 2006)) when deciding whether stipulations are permissible under the Act. He concedes that the Act makes no reference to the Code. Nevertheless, relying on In re Michael H., 392 Ill. App. 3d 965, 332 Ill.Dec. 216, 912 N.E.2d 703 (2009), he maintains that the policy and legal reasons for not allowing mental health patients to stipulate under the Code to involuntary commitments apply equally to commitments under the Act. Citing Samuelson, 189 Ill. 2d at 563, 244 Ill.Dec. 929, 727 N.E.2d 228, he maintains that "individuals subject to the Act comprise a very specific type of mental disease causing specific types of behavior from the mental illness."
¶ 23 Receiving involuntary mental health services, including the involuntary administration of psychotropic drugs, involves a " ' "massive curtailment of liberty." ' " In re Michael H., 392 Ill. App. 3d 965, 972, 912 N.E.2d 703, 709 (2009) (quoting Barbara H., 183 Ill. 2d at 496, 702 N.E.2d at 561 (quoting Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480,491 (1980))).
The involuntary admission was to remain in effect for 180 days from the date of the order, and, that time limit having expired, the order is no longer in effect and no actual relief can be granted. Nevertheless, we will review this otherwise moot order under the public-interest exception to the mootness doctrine because we believe that the issues presented are of a public nature and are likely to recur and that an authoritative determination would provide guidance to public officials in the future. In re Michael H., 392 Ill.App.3d 965, 969, 332 Ill.Dec. 216, 912 N.E.2d 703 (2009).¶ 4 On October 14, 2010, a petition was filed in the circuit court of Randolph County seeking to continue the involuntary admission of the appellant pursuant to section 3–813 of the Code (405 ILCS 5/3–813 (West 2010)).
See, e.g., In re Michael H., 392 Ill. App. 3d 965, 968 (2009) (noting that even unpublished orders of our appellate court, which are legally binding upon the parties to a lawsuit and upon the Illinois trial courts, are not precedential "authority" and therefore may not be cited as authority or submitted as supplemental authority in our appellate court other than to establish double jeopardy, law of the case, res judicata, or collateral estoppel).¶ 28 Allowing the defendant to submit the Illinois Supreme Court's "Statement on Racial Justice" as additional "authority" in this case establishes a bad precedent that will undermine the rule of law.
As this court has recognized, orders for involuntary admission are "inherently more restrictive than other types of mental health orders." In re Michael H., 392 Ill. App. 3d 965, 972, 912 N.E.2d 703, 709 (2009). Here, the State alleged that Joseph is subject to an involuntary admission because he will be dangerous if he is not medicated and that an involuntary admission is the only realistic way to make sure he takes his prescribed medication.
Second, we note that there have been at least four recent cases from Randolph County that this court has reversed for a failure to comply with the Code. See In re Joseph M., 398 Ill. App. 3d 1086 (2010); In re Donrell S., 395 Ill. App. 3d 599 (2009); In re Michael H., 392 Ill. App. 3d 965 (2009); In re Phillip E., 385 Ill. App. 3d 278 (2008). Thus, we believe there is a need for an authoritative determination for future guidance.
As a general rule, this court does not consider moot questions. In re Michael H., 392 Ill. App. 3d 965, 969, 912 N.E.2d 703, 707 (2009). Nonetheless, this appeal presents an issue of public interest that calls for an authoritative determination.