Opinion
F041918.
10-27-2003
In re MICHAEL A., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. The People, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Michael A., Defendant and Appellant.
Mary G. Swift, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Bill Lockyer, Attorney General, Robert R. Anderson, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Jo Graves, Assistant Attorney General, Carlos A. Martinez and Tiffany S. Shultz, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A juvenile wardship petition alleged that 13-year-old Michael A. committed a lewd and lascivious act on a child under the age of 14. (Pen. Code, § 288, subd. (a); Welf. & Inst. Code, § 602.) Shortly after the filing of the petition, the court granted a defense request for a continuance so a psychologist could determine if Michael was competent to understand the proceedings and cooperate with counsel. Although the psychologist found that Michael had a "gross inability to assist legal counsel," the court, without holding a competence hearing, proceeded at once with juvenile wardship proceedings and sustained the petition. On appeal, Michael argues the court violated his right to due process by not holding a competence hearing before sustaining the petition at juvenile wardship proceedings. The Attorney General argues the contrary. We will reverse the judgment.
DISCUSSION
1. The record
The psychologist reviewed not only Michaels court and police records about the crime but also the extensive medical, social service agency, and school records he had generated since the time of his birth. He did not interview Michael because he was out of the area at the time, reportedly because of a restraining order the victims mother had sought. He filed an 18-page report noting that personal testing of Michael "historically has been described as quite challenging," characterizing record review as "adequate to generate informed opinion," and finding that his "gross inability to assist legal counsel" arose out of his generally "limited understanding and comprehension" that were "certainly even more impaired in a forensic setting."
The psychologist noted that among Michaels apparently "significant and chronic, major mental health problems" were reported diagnoses of attention deficit/hyperactivity disorder, borderline intellectual functioning, developmental disorder, fetal alcohol syndrome, mood disorder, oppositional defiant disorder, and posttraumatic stress disorder. In his medical history were a medley of antianxiety, anticonvulsant, antidepressant, antipsychotic, stimulant, and tranquilizer medications. In his school history were observations of "verbally and physically impulsive, distractible, [and] overactive" behavior, "visual and auditory processing deficits," and "[d]ifficulty focusing." In his testing history were a full scale IQ of 78 and identification of a "severe auditory processing problem."
At the commencement of the jurisdictional hearing, the court acknowledged not having read the psychologists report. Michaels counsel noted for the record the psychologists opinion that Michael was incompetent. He nevertheless stated the contrary opinion that Michael could assist counsel since he knew why he was in court, answered counsels questions, and understood what counsel was talking about. The court asked if anyone requested a finding or an inquiry as to Michaels competence. The prosecutor, Michaels counsel, Michaels mother, and Michael himself all responded in the negative.
"[THE COURT:] With that, I think were going to go ahead with the trial, because no ones really raising the question about whether or not Michael understands whats going on and can assist his attorney, and thats pretty much the test, is whether he understands whats going on and whether he can help his attorney.
"[MICHAELS COUNSEL:] He doesnt understand the intricate details. However he does know that he is accused of doing something, and youre going to make a decision of whether or not he did it or he didnt do it. [¶] Right, is that correct?
"[MICHAEL:] Yeah."
The court commenced the jurisdictional hearing and sustained the petition.
2. The law
An accused who "as a result of mental disorder or developmental disability" is "unable to understand the nature of the criminal proceedings or to assist counsel in the conduct of a defense in a rational manner" is incompetent to stand trial. (Pen. Code, § 1367, subd. (a).) Trial of an incompetent accused violates due process. (Medina v. California (1992) 505 U.S. 437, 448; People v. Weaver (2001) 26 Cal.4th 876, 903.) If the evidence that casts doubt on an accuseds competence is less than substantial, the issue of whether to order a competence hearing is within the courts discretion. (People v. Pennington (1967) 66 Cal.2d 508, 518; Pen. Code, § 1368.) The reviewing court can disturb the courts exercise of discretion on a record like that only if a doubt about competence as a matter of law or an abuse of discretion appears. (Pennington , at p. 518.)
If substantial evidence of incompetence is in the record, on the other hand, the court has the duty to order a competence hearing to protect the accuseds right to due process. (Pate v. Robinson (1966) 383 U.S. 375, 378; People v. Pennington, supra, 66 Cal.2d at pp. 517-518.) "The judge then has no discretion to exercise." (Pennington, at p. 518.) That duty arises equally at a criminal trial and at a juvenile wardship adjudication. (In re Ramon M. (1978) 22 Cal.3d 419, 430, fn. 14; James H. v. Superior Court (1978) 77 Cal.App.3d 169, 172-176.)
Here, the psychologists report indisputably constitutes substantial evidence of Michaels incompetence. (See People v. Gallego (1990) 52 Cal.3d 115, 162.) "[D]espite the discretionary nature of the language of [Penal Code] section 1368, a competency hearing is required when substantial evidence of the accuseds incompetence has been introduced. [Citations.]" (People v. Hale (1988) 44 Cal.3d 531, 539.) Neither the accused nor the accuseds counsel can waive that issue. (Id. at p. 541.) By sustaining the petition without first holding a competence hearing, the court violated Michaels right to due process. (Pate v. Robinson, supra, 383 U.S. at p. 378; People v. Pennington, supra, 66 Cal.2d at pp. 517-518.)
DISPOSITION
We reverse the judgment and remand the case to the superior court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
We concur: WISEMAN, Acting P.J. & LEVY, J. --------------- Notes: In light of our holding, we deny Michaels request for judicial notice and need not address his arguments about the presumptive statutory incapacity of a minor under the age of 14 to commit a crime or about ineffective assistance of counsel.