Opinion
B192514
4-25-2007
In re MICAH T., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. MICAH T., Defendant and Appellant.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
BOREN, P. J., ASHMANN-GERST, J., CHAVEZ, J.
Micah T. (the minor), a ward of the juvenile court, appealed from the orders of wardship. On appeal, this court modified the disposition order and ordered a conditional reversal of the wardship subject to a finding of prejudice. On remand, the juvenile court held a hearing, and on May 16, 2006, it ordered reinstated its original orders of wardship and disposition. The minor has appealed from the order of May 16, 2006.
We appointed counsel to represent the minor on appeal.
After an examination of the record, on January 11, 2007, counsel filed an "Opening Brief" in which no issues were raised. On January 12, 2007, we advised the minor that he had 30 days within which to personally submit any contentions or issues that he wished us to consider. No response has been received to date.
The record establishes the following. On January 2, 2004, the minor was adjudicated a ward of the juvenile court (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 602) after it found that the minor had possessed a concealable firearm (Pen. Code, § 12101, subd. (a)(1)). The adjudication evidence established that on October 28, 2003, Los Angeles County Deputy Sheriffs James Andrews and his partner Christopher Lio saw the minor riding a bicycle on the sidewalk with another youth sitting on the handlebars, which is a violation of the Vehicle Code. The deputies ordered the minor to stop. The minor failed to comply with the order, abandoned his bicycle, and entered a nail shop. He stopped and tossed an object into an adjacent planter that, when inspected by the deputies, was a loaded, operable handgun.
All further statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise indicated.
The juvenile court sustained the petition alleging a violation of section 12101 and ordered the minor supervised home on probation. The minor appealed from the orders of wardship, raising Pitchess issues (Pitchess v. Superior Court (1974) 11 Cal.3d 531) and contending that one of his probationary orders was unconstitutionally overbroad.
On June 4, 2004, the minor and his parents filed an application for interstate compact services in Maryland as he and his family had moved. On July 6, 2004, the juvenile court terminated its home on probation order and terminated jurisdiction over the minor. The juvenile court noted on the order of termination of jurisdiction that it was aware there was an appeal pending from the orders of wardship.
On September 14, 2005, the Court of Appeal ordered the challenged probationary order modified and conditionally reversed the orders of wardship subject to further proceedings in the juvenile court on discovery and a determination of whether the failure to grant discovery was prejudicial. On remand, on May 16, 2006, the juvenile court concluded that the omitted discovery would not have affected its orders, and it reinstated the original adjudicatory finding and disposition.
The minor again appealed from the order reinstating the original adjudicatory finding and disposition.
During preadjudication discovery, the minor had sought Pitchess discovery from Deputy Andrewss personnel records with respect to allegations and findings of aggressive behavior, acts of violence, acts of excessive force, false arrest, illegal search and seizure, fabrication of charges, or dishonesty. To support the discovery request, the minor claimed that the deputies had planted the gun. This court considered the minors claims of improper discovery. On September 14, 2005, we filed an unpublished opinion in the case, In re Micah T., case No. B172432. We stated in the opinion that we had reviewed the sealed reporters transcript of the in camera hearing proceedings on discovery. We held that two complaints the juvenile court had refused to disclose should have been given to the minor, complaints Nos. 109571 and 097494. This court ordered one probation condition modified and further ordered the cause reversed conditionally, subject to a juvenile court determination of whether any prejudice flowed from the failure to grant proper discovery.
On remand on May 16, 2006, in the minors absence, the juvenile court heard testimony on the evidence defense counsel had developed on the basis of the further discovery ordered by the Court of Appeal. During the hearing, a witness, Edward Riley (Riley), testified that on July 2001, Deputy Andrews and a Deputy McDonald had stopped him as he was driving his car in Inglewood. Riley claimed that he was driving normally and hanging from his rearview mirror, he had an "air freshener" that did not obstruct his view. When the deputies stopped him, Deputy Andrews told Riley that he had been stopped because he had the item hanging from his rearview mirror. When he was asked for his license and registration and he reached for them, Deputy Andrews perfunctorily ordered him out of his car and said that Riley looked nervous. Once Riley was outside his car and at the police car, Deputy Andrews immediately searched Rileys pockets and removed his belongings from his pockets. While Deputy Andrews searched Riley, Deputy McDonald opened Rileys drivers door and began searching Rileys car. Then both deputies searched his car. Riley claimed that prior to stopping him, the deputies had engaged in erratic driving behind him, driving from side to side and up to his bumper, then dropping back. During the search of his car, the deputies found a disassembled rifle in his trunk in a duffle bag full of dirty clothing, and he was charged with illegally possessing the weapon. Before they drove him to the sheriffs station, Deputy Andrews also told Riley that the deputies had searched his car because Deputy Andrews believed it might be stolen. Deputy Andrews said that there was a sticker on the inside of the drivers door that was peeling off a little, which led him to believe that possibly, the vehicle identification number had been switched. Riley later pled guilty to a felony gun charge. His mother, not Riley, had filed the complaint of officer misconduct.
After listening to Rileys testimony, the prosecutor commented that Rileys testimony was irrelevant as it established no pattern of misconduct. Defense counsel asserted that Rileys testimony was that he was stopped without a reason and searched without his permission, and such claims were relevant to Deputy Andrewss traits of character.
The juvenile court found the evidence developed from further discovery to be insufficient to show that the minor was prejudiced from nondisclosure of the complaints. After listening to Rileys testimony and the argument of counsel, the juvenile court found no prejudice and reinstated the orders of wardship.
We have examined the entire record and are satisfied that the minors attorney has fully complied with her responsibilities and that no arguable issues exist. (People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436, 441.)
The order of May 16, 2006, is affirmed.