Opinion
No. COA13–25.
2013-07-2
In the Matter of M.I.B.
No brief for petitioner-appellee guardians of the juvenile. Michael E. Casterline for respondent-appellant mother.
Appeal by respondent-mother from order entered 8 October 2012 by Judge Laurie L. Hutchins in Forsyth County District Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 4 June 2013. No brief for petitioner-appellee guardians of the juvenile. Michael E. Casterline for respondent-appellant mother.
Murray C. Greason, III for the guardian ad litem.
ELMORE, Judge.
Respondent appeals from an order terminating her parental rights to her minor child M.I.B. (the juvenile). Because the trial court's findings of fact support its conclusion to terminate respondent's parental rights for willful abandonment of the juvenile, we affirm.
The Forsyth County Department of Social Services (DSS) became involved with the juvenile in 2000, when the juvenile was adjudicated neglected. The juvenile was initially placed in the custody of DSS, but by order dated 7 November 2000, the trial court appointed maternal relatives D.R. and A.R. (petitioners) as the juvenile's guardians. On 20 December 2010, petitioners filed a petition to terminate respondent's parental rights, alleging respondent had willfully failed to pay a reasonable portion of the cost of care for the juvenile and had willfully abandoned the juvenile. By order entered 8 July 2011, the trial court terminated respondent's parental rights to the juvenile finding both grounds existed. Respondent appealed, and this Court vacated the termination order and remanded the matter to the trial court to make additional findings of fact on respondent's willfulness under each ground. In re S.L.B., ––– N.C.App. ––––, 725 S.E.2d 473 (2012) (unpublished).
On remand, petitioners waived the ground of willful failure to pay a reasonable portion of the cost of care for the juvenile. Without taking new evidence, the trial court modified its findings of fact and entered a new order terminating respondent's parental rights solely on the ground of willful abandonment. Respondent now appeals.
Respondent argues that the trial court's findings of fact are insufficient to support its conclusion that she willfully abandoned the juvenile. We disagree.
“The standard for review in termination of parental rights cases is whether the findings of fact are supported by clear, cogent and convincing evidence and whether these findings, in turn, support the conclusions of law.” In re Clark, 72 N.C.App. 118, 124, 323 S .E.2d 754, 758 (1984). A trial court may terminate parental rights if “[t]he parent has willfully abandoned the juvenile for at least six consecutive months immediately preceding the filing of the petition or motion[.]” N.C. Gen.Stat. § 7B–1111(a)(7) (2011). “ ‘Whether a biological parent has a willful intent to abandon [her] child is a question of fact to be determined from the evidence.’ “ In re T.C.B., 166 N.C.App. 482, 485, 602 S.E.2d 17, 19 (2004) (quoting In re Adoption of Searle, 82 N.C.App. 273, 276, 346 S.E.2d 511, 514 (1986)). “In this context, ‘the word ‘willful’ encompasses more than an intention to do a thing; there must also be purpose and deliberation.' “ Id. (quoting Searle, 82 N.C.App. at 275, 346 S.E.2d at 514).
Upon review of the termination order, we conclude that a number of the trial court's findings of fact support its conclusion that respondent willfully abandoned the juvenile. Finding of fact 6 establishes that respondent “had the capacity to visit the minor child at DSS” but she “failed to visit, and has not seen the minor child in the last 9 1/2 years.” Finding of fact 7 establishes that respondent has not “contacted or attempted to contact the minor child or the Petitioner in the last 9 1/2 years” despite petitioner's phone number remaining the same during that period of time. Likewise, finding of fact 7 also indicates that respondent has not sent any “notes, letters, or correspondence to the minor child in the past 9 1/2 years.” Lastly, finding of fact 4 establishes that petitioner is respondent's cousin, which makes respondent's lack of communication for such a prolonged period of time appear even more purposeful and deliberate.
Affirmed. Judges McCULLOUGH and DAVIS concur.
Report per Rule 30(e).