Opinion
No. D03-CP09-002673-A
January 10, 2010
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION
On August 14, 2009, the petitioner, the commissioner of the department of children and families ("DCF") filed a petition alleging that the minor child, Mia M., was uncared for in that her home could not provide the specialized care which the physical, emotional or mental condition of the child required pursuant to General Statutes § 46b-120(10). Contemporaneous with the filing of the petition, DCF filed an application for an ex parte order of temporary custody which the court, Brenneman, J., granted on August 14, 2009. On that date the court also ordered preliminary steps. On August 18, 2009, the court, Maronich, J., sustained the order of temporary custody. The trial of this matter commenced on December 11, 2009, and was adjourned to various dates, concluding on December 15, 2009. The respondent mother, Lorelle M., appeared and was represented by counsel. On September 15, 2009, the court, Maronich J., found proper service on the respondent father, David G., and entered default against him for failure to appear. The respondent father did not appear for trial. At the commencement of trial on December 11, 2009, the court found that the respondent father was not on active duty in any branch of military or naval services of the United States.
FACTS FINDINGS
The court finds by a fair preponderance of the evidence, having heard the testimony of all of the witnesses, having read all of the exhibits and having taken judicial notice of court orders and proceedings, the following facts.
The respondent mother, Lorelle M., is thirty-eight years old and has an extensive history of mental illness. DCF involvement with Lorelle began at the time of the birth of her first child, Jasmine, in July 2008, when Danbury Hospital staff contacted DCF with concerns over Lorelle's ability to safely parent her infant daughter because of her extensive history of mental illness and numerous hospitalizations. Nursing staff was also concerned with Lorelle's mood swings, inappropriate behavior and comments, and talking to herself. An order of temporary custody was granted and sustained, and the child was subsequently adjudicated uncared for after a written plea of nolo contendere and committed to the care and custody of DCF. The child remains in DCF care and is the subject of a termination of parental rights proceeding.
Lorelle was born, and has lived all of her life, in Danbury. Lorelle's mother, Anita, claims that Lorelle was sexually abused by her father when she was thirteen years old. They were divorced shortly thereafter and Lorelle's father resides in California. Lorelle maintains telephone contact with him. Lorelle is bonded with her mother who resides in Danbury, although the relationship is turbulent and there has been a history of strife and domestic violence between them. Lorelle did not graduate from high school, but has earned her GED. She has held various short-term jobs including daycare assistant, karate instructor and nursing home aide. There was no testimony as to whether she is currently employed. Lorelle relies upon social security disability benefits for support and resides alone in a one-bedroom apartment. Lorelle's most recent successor conservator of the person and of the estate, Attorney Tracey C. Hammer, was appointed on February 15, 2008 by the Danbury Probate Court. There was no evidence as to when a conservator was first appointed.
Lorelle's history of psychiatric instability began when she was hospitalized at age nineteen for depression and suicidal ideation. At the time, she was involved in a long-term, abusive relationship. Lorelle has suffered from pseudocyesis or "false pregnancy" for at least fifteen years. Sufferers of pseudocyesis falsely believe they are pregnant and manifest many of the physical symptoms of pregnancy. At the trial, the court received testimony from Donna Pellerin, M.D., a psychiatrist who has known and treated Lorelle on an inpatient basis at Danbury Hospital since July 2004. Since that time Lorelle has had at least seven inpatient hospitalizations for her mental health issues. Dr. Pellerin treated Lorelle on each of those occasions and has provided psychiatric consultations when Lorelle presented at Danbury Hospital on other occasions. Dr. Pellerin confirmed a diagnosis of schizoaffective disorder bipolar type with paranoid delusions. She has treated Lorelle with Ativan, an anti-psychotic medication, and Abilify, an anti-anxiety medication. Dr. Pellerin testified that on each of her admissions Lorelle presented as labile with paranoid delusions. The admissions usually occur in the context of lack of sleep and non-compliance with medications. On each occasion Lorelle is so focused on her delusions and agitated that her delusions become all consuming, rendering her disabled. Dr. Pellerin notes that even at baseline, i.e. the best level of mental health functioning at which the patient is capable, Lorelle remains delusional and her judgment is impaired. Dr. Pellerin confirmed that Lorelle's condition is chronic.
In September 2008, Lorelle was subject of a court ordered evaluation in the matter of her first daughter, Jasmine. Dr. Rodolfo Rosado, a clinical psychologist, conducted his evaluation while Lorelle was an inpatient at Danbury Hospital. Dr. Rosado noted Lorelle's extreme manifestations of psychotic delusions evident in her preoccupation with a neighbor named Stephanie. Dr. Rosado confirmed the diagnosis of schizoaffective disorder with paranoid delusions. Although Lorelle initially denied any significant childhood trauma, when completing the standardized childhood trauma questionnaire for Dr. Rosado, she cited significant problems associated with emotional and sexual abuse. Based on that, Dr. Rosado also diagnosed post-traumatic stress disorder resulting from sexual abuse as an adolescent. Dr. Rosado stated that schizo-affective disorder is a thought disorder involving impairment of logic and sensory experience. It involves hallucinations and emotional responses that are inappropriate. Lorelle's paranoid delusions compel her to act in an irrational way and the experience of trauma evident in post-traumatic stress disorder impacts her present functions since memories are multi-sensual. Sights, sounds and sensations associated with past trauma provoke responses which are not rational or appropriate. With regard to her ability to parent, the risk for Lorelle arises from the combination of her posttraumatic stress disorder and her schizoaffective disorder. With regard to Lorelle's prognosis, Dr. Rosado noted that cases of early onset of schizoaffective disorder such as Lorelle's are especially difficult to treat. He concluded that reunification with Jasmine could only be considered if Lorelle makes significant progress based on recommendations by her mental health service providers and therapists.
In April 2009, after an incident in which Lorelle threatened both a physician and a DCF worker at a visit to Jasmine's pediatrician's office Lorelle, now pregnant with Mia, was subjected to yet a further psychological evaluation to determine if continued visitation with Jasmine was safe. Dr. Diana Badillo Martinez conducted her evaluation on April 27, 2009. Dr. Martinez stated that the symptomotology which Lorelle presented with was consistent with past diagnoses. Relevant portions of Dr. Martinez's summary follows.
Ms. M. is a 38-year-old female, single mother of a ten-month-old and pregnant with her second child. Her thought processes are highly disorganized and she reveals clear thought disorder, grandiose presentation and extremely impaired logic. Disordered thinking will greatly affect her perceptions as well as judgment. She describes a history of poor decision making, low impulse control, leading to conflicts with the police, her mother and relationships. This is particularly concerning because she does not have insight or awareness of her behaviors. Recently she became threatening and misperceived the behaviors of a physician. Given the extent of her thought disorder, flawed logic, grandiose views and weak impulse control, it is not advisable that the child remain alone with her at any time. Her manner of presentation, statements and poor impulse control while in the presence of a young and emotionally vulnerable child may induce anxiety and pose risks. However, as total separation from the child is a significant stressor, which will likely trigger an intense reaction, Ms. M. should be advised of the expected behaviors while with her child. All visits with Ms. M. should be well supervised. Inappropriate conversations or behaviors should lead to prompt discontinuation of the visit. At this time, Ms. M. is unable to care for any child for any prolonged period and requires supervision.
(Exhibit 5, p. 3-4). Dr. Martinez's recommendations included well supervised visits in a "contained setting" and further, "if any incident of loss of control in the presence of the child occurs, terminating visits altogether is advised." (Exhibit 5, p. 4.)
Lorelle had been engaged in treatment for her mental health issues at Western Connecticut Mental Health Network (formerly known as Greater Danbury Mental Health Association) since April 2005. Treatment records indicate that historically her attendance and compliance was only moderate. Attendance and compliance deteriorated markedly just prior to her withdrawing from services in January 2009. (Exhibit 3D.) After a series of false starts with other service providers and just prior to the birth of her second child, Mia, in August 2009 Lorelle had once again engaged with Western Connecticut Mental Health Network which provided at a minimum monitoring services. She could not keep an appointment and was not consistently engaged in other treatment or services at that time and medical professionals at the center were only able to provide care when Lorelle arrived on sporadic and random occasions. Lorelle began withdrawing from services after the birth of Mia and she was hospitalized again on September 30, 2009, when she was overwhelmed by extreme manifestations of her illness. She was finally discharged from care with Western Connecticut Mental Health Network on October 16, 2009. (Exhibit 3D.) It was not clear from the evidence with whom Lorelle is currently, if at all, engaged in and compliant with services for her mental health issues.
Since the birth of her first daughter, Jasmine, Lorelle has had at least two arrests for domestic violence offenses involving her mother, Anita. The most recent occurred on November 10, 2009. On that night Lorelle appeared at Anita's apartment. Lorelle became agitated and accused Anita of having an affair with Jasmine and Mia's father, David. When Lorelle began throwing items and breaking furniture Anita fled the apartment. Lorelle was later located by Danbury police and charged with criminal mischief and disorderly conduct.
Aside from her mental health issues Lorelle has been diagnosed with gestational diabetes. She is non-compliant with medical recommendations for monitoring her blood sugar levels and, against medical advice, refuses to take insulin. Oral medication has been prescribed but her compliance with these medications is unknown. She was reported to be non-compliant with prenatal care during her pregnancy with Mia.
At the trial of this matter there was no testimony concerning the physical, mental or emotional status of the child subject to this petition, Mia M. The only evidence presented is found in the social study.
Mia M., DOB 8/12/09 was born at Danbury Hospital. During her pregnancy, Lorelle M. was diagnosed with diabetes and she was non-compliant with insulin resulting in dangerously high sugar levels. When Mia was born, she was immediately placed in neonatal intensive care unit due to exposure to increased sugar. Mia was in the neo-natal ICU for a short period of time and was later transferred to general nursery. She was then diagnosed with jaundice and necessitated phototherapy in order to reduce her billirubin levels. Mia was discharged on 8/15/09 to a DCF licensed foster family. Since that time, Mia has been gaining weight and developing in an age appropriate manner . . . According to pediatrician, Dr. Ron, Mia is a healthy baby.
(Exhibit 1B, p. 5-6.) No evidence was introduced that Mia was anything but a healthy baby, physically, mentally and emotionally, at the time of her birth or at any subsequent time since then.
DISCUSSION
In order to adjudicate the child as uncared for, the court must find by a fair preponderance of the evidence that the child is either homeless or that the "home cannot provide the specialized care that the physical, emotional or mental condition of the child requires." General Statutes § 46b-120(10). All of the testimony presented at trial pertained to the respondent mother's overwhelming mental health illness and how it so impairs her ability to parent and provide a safe home for an infant or a young child. DCF chose not to pursue an alternative ground of neglect based on a premise of predictive neglect. On the other hand, no evidence was presented that Mia was at the time of her birth, or has subsequently become, anything other than a physically, mentally or emotionally healthy baby girl. It is the contention of the petitioner, DCF, that "specialized care because of infancy" alone is sufficient to sustain a finding of uncared for based on specialized needs and an adjudication. DCF cites the case of In re Carl O., 10 Conn.App. 428, 523 A.2d 1339 (1987) in support of this proposition. The court finds that this position is not supported by a fair reading of the Carl O. decision.
In the Carl O. case, DCF sought and was granted an order of temporary custody shortly after Carl's birth. Both Carl's mother, Pamela, and Carl's father, Merritt, presented with mental health issues. There were indications of issues with the infant, Carl, but the record is vague as to the nature of the concerns. The appellate court noted the following.
Two court appointed evaluators, a psychiatrist and a pediatrician, concluded in a joint report that "neither parent gave any indication of being capable of meeting the complex demands presented by child care" because of their minimizing "to an extreme degree" the problems entailed in the care of an infant. They also concluded that "their lack of insight and suspiciousness would make it extremely difficult for them to profit from even an intense remediation program." Merritt was found to be disorganized, guarded, suspicious and lacking insight into the realities of his own life or the needs of the baby. Pamela fared no better. She too, like Merritt, was disorganized and suspicious, but was, in addition, withdrawn, preoccupied and confused.
The pediatrician found the baby, Carl, to be more than ordinarily sensitive, needing a caretaker with more than normal child care skills, one able to ascertain immediate needs and make appropriate responses. Further, the pediatrician concluded that it would be "a hazard to his development" if the Child were cared for by his parents.
In re Carl O., supra 432-33. The trial court, Brenneman, J., adjudicated the child uncared for in that the home could not provide the specialized care that the physical, emotional or mental condition of the child required.
The respondent father claims that the trial court erroneously concluded that the child had "special needs" merely because he was an infant. This claim misconstrues the trial court's memorandum of decision. The trial court found that the child required specialized care both because of his infancy and his particularly sensitive nature. The court further found that his parents were not capable of providing that care. The evidence fully supports these conclusions. The pediatrician examining Carl found him to be more than ordinarily sensitive, requiring a caretaker who could detect and respond to his immediate needs.
In re Carl O., supra, 435. The appellate court liberally quoted from the trial court decision which discussed the meaning of "special needs" in the context of infants in general and the infant, Carl, in particular.
The court found: All babies have special needs that are not shared by older children capable of meeting many of their own needs. Babies are totally dependent upon adult caretakers for every detail of their existence, and a parent capable of caring adequately for a 10 year old, or even a five year old, might not be capable of caring for an infant. In addition, Carl at less than five months of age, was an extraordinarily sensitive baby, needing more than the usual degree of appropriate responsiveness from his adult caretaker. Neither Pamela nor Merritt was capable, as of the time of filing the amended petition, of providing this special care. Carl O. was, therefore uncared-for in the sense of having parents incapable of providing the care required to meet his special needs.
In re Carl O., supra footnote 3.
This court has reviewed trial court decisions to determine how the Carl O. decision has been applied by the trial courts. There have been several decisions in which an infant who appeared to have no specialized needs other than those of an otherwise healthy baby have been adjudicated uncared for under the specialized needs provisions of the statute. Notably an infant was so adjudicated in the context of a co-terminus petition in In re Gachalli A., Superior Court For Juvenile Matters, Ct.Sup. 497 (January 4, 1991, Sullivan, J.). In another co-terminus matter an infant was likewise so adjudicated in In re Romance M., Superior Court For Juvenile Matters, Ct.Sup. 1969 (February 23, 1993, Silbert, J.). In each case the trial courts cited the Carl O. decision for the proposition that any "normal infant" has "specialized needs." Neither court engaged in any further analysis of the Carl O. decision. Two further decisions both involving infants have also cited the Carl O. decision for the same proposition but in each case the court also noted that the infant had "specialized needs" as the result of in utero exposure to cocaine. See In re Kristopher M., Superior Court For Juvenile Matters, Ct.Sup. 1641 (February 10, 1992, Brenneman, J.) and In re Valeria M., Superior Court For Juvenile Matters, Ct.Sup. 169, 6 CSCR 967 (July 24, 1990, Brenneman, J.). Neither decision included any further discussion of the Carl O. decision. There are several other trial court decisions where otherwise "normal" infants have been adjudicated both neglected and uncared for under the specialized needs provisions. Some of these cite the Carl O. decision, some do not. None include any discussion or analysis the Carl O. decision. In contrast in the matter of In re Donnell Timothy W., Superior Court For Juvenile Matters, Ct.Sup. 2280 (February 26, 1993, Mulcahy, J.). the court engaged in a very deliberative examination of the Carl O. decision. The respondent mother of Donnell Timothy suffered from severe mental health and substance abuse problems. The infant, Donnell Timothy "weighed seven pounds, fourteen ounces at birth and was, and continues to be, a healthy child . . . While certain documentation admitted into evidence speaks to more recent, occasional `temper outbursts' and some `lagging behind' with respect to verbal abilities there is no indication that this child, at birth, and in the months following, was anything other than a perfectly healthy, normal newborn infant." In re Donnell Timothy W., supra. The court rejected the petitioner, DCF's assertion that In re Carl O. established specialized needs solely on the basis of infancy and its consequential, exceedingly difficult care demands.
In Carl O. there was present something in addition to just the child's infancy, albeit not a great deal (at least to the extent apparent from the appellate decision); in the instant case that additional component of the child's condition at and/or following birth, which would characterize the baby as other than a perfectly normal infant, is not, in the court's view, present from the evidence developed at trial.
In re Donnell Timothy W., supra.
In another trial court matter, in discussing general principles the court, Goldstein, J.T.R., noted that "the needs of an infant are differentiated from the needs of a special needs infant. In re Carl O., 10 Conn.App. 428 (1987)." In re Hans P., Superior Court for Juvenile Matters, Ct.Sup. 12056 (August 30, 2001, Goldstein, J.T.R.).
The question of whether or not the Carl O. decision supports DCF's position aside, rules of statutory construction dictate that the court should not interpret "specialized" as it is used in the statute to include all young children by virtue of infancy. It must first be conceded that each child requires care which is particular or special to his or her age, i.e. infant, toddler, pre-school, pre-adolescent, adolescent, teenager and so forth. To single out infants for inclusion as "special" per se to the exclusion of all other groups is not logical and has no rational basis. The law prefers rational and prudent statutory construction, and we seek to avoid interpretations of statutes that produce odd or illogical outcomes. State v. George, 280 Conn. 551, 575, 910 A.2d 931 (2006). See also State v. Sandoval, 263 Conn. 524, 553, 821 A.2d 247 (2003). The second problem with interpreting the statute as the petitioner advocates is that it renders the word "specialized" within the term "specialized care" meaningless or superfluous. Interpreting a statute to render some of its language superfluous violates cardinal principles of statutory interpretation. American Promotional Events, Inc. v. Blumenthal, 285 Conn. 192, 203, 937 A.2d 1184 (2008). Further, if the legislature had intended that all infants be deemed to require "specialized care" it presumably would have so drafted the statute. Neither "special," "specialized" nor "specialized care" are defined by the statute. The court will apply the common meaning of "special" as defined in Webster's New World Dictionary and Thesaurus, 1996 by Simon Schuster, Inc., as 1. distinctive or unique, 2. exceptional or unusual. "Specialized care," at least within the context of the age of a child, must therefore mean that degree or type of care required for a particular child which is distinctive, unique, exceptional or unusual as compared to that which is ordinary or usual for all other children of a similar age group.
In the instant case there is no indication that there is anything beyond the normally very demanding needs of a newborn that would rise to the level of specialized needs in the infant Mia M. sufficient to support an adjudication that she has been uncared for. For the foregoing reasons the petition is hereby dismissed.