Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from the Superior Court of San Bernardino County. Nos. J231429, J231430, J231431, J231432 Marsha Slough, Judge.
Megan Turkat Schirn, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Jean-Rene Basle, County Counsel, and Kristina M. Robb, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
No appearance for Minors.
OPINION
MILLER J.
Defendant and Appellant, E.A. (Mother) appeals from the juvenile court’s orders (1) denying her petition to modify a court order (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 388), and (2) terminating her parental rights to her four children (§ 366.26). Mother contends the juvenile court erred by denying her request to modify a court order, because she showed changed circumstances and showed that the modification would be in the children’s best interests. Additionally, Mother contends the juvenile court erred by terminating her parental rights because Mother and the children share a strong parent-child bond. (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(i).) Finally, Mother asserts that the juvenile court erred by not complying with the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) inquiry requirements related to the children’s father. We affirm the judgments.
All further statutory references will be to the Welfare and Institutions Code, unless otherwise indicated.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
A. BACKGROUND
Mother had eight children; at the time of the detention in this case, Mother was seven months pregnant with her ninth child. Mother’s four oldest children have been permanently placed outside of Mother’s care due to Mother’s positive drug tests and failure to comply with court orders. Mother previously received reunification services from July 6, 2005, through November 7, 2008. The younger children are at issue in the instant case. The four children at issue are: (1) A.G.1, a male, born May 2003; (2) A.G.2, a female, born July 2004; (3) A.G.3, a male, born June 2006; and (4) M.G., a male, born January 2008. A.G.1, A.G.2, and A.G.3 had positive drug tests at birth.
In September 2005, as part of the prior dependency case involving the four older children, the juvenile court found A.G. (Father) to be the presumed father of A.G.1 and A.G.2. At the time of the detention in this case, Father was incarcerated in Tehachapi State Prison. Father was convicted of sexual penetration by force on July, 15, 2009. He is scheduled to be released in November 2011. Mother admitted that she and Father engaged in domestic violence. Mother said she was tired of the domestic violence, so she contacted the police, and Father was placed in jail for three weeks. Mother explained that Father ultimately broke into her apartment and forcibly raped her, which led to his conviction and prison sentence. The four older children who were removed from Mother’s care have a different father than the children at issue in this case. Mother is married to the father of the four older children.
B. DETENTION
On February 18, 2010, Chino Police Officer Pry went to Mother’s apartment. While in the apartment, Officer Pry smelled what he believed to be methamphetamine smoke. Officer Pry found Mother in a bedroom; inside the bedroom, he found (1) a substance that appeared to be methamphetamine in a small baggie inside the top dresser drawer; (2) a glass methamphetamine pipe inside the bathroom medicine cabinet; and (3) methamphetamine inside the pipe. The methamphetamine and the pipe were easily accessible to the children.
Mother told Officer Pry that she had used methamphetamine two days prior; however, the officer noticed that Mother’s pupils were constricted and fixed, she was moving around a lot, and her pulse was 116 beats per minute. Mother admitted using methamphetamine “a couple of times” during the then-current pregnancy with her ninth child. Officer Pry noticed that the bedroom was dirty, with food “mashed into the carpeting, ” and exposed wiring on one of the walls. Officer Pry arrested Mother, due to her drug use, and drugs and paraphernalia being so easily accessible to the children. Officer Pry contacted San Bernardino County Children and Family Services (the Department).
A Department employee found that Mother was receiving “Section 8” housing, which provided her a three-bedroom apartment, but Mother rented out two of the bedrooms in the apartment to two other families. Therefore, Mother and her children lived in one bedroom in the apartment. The Department employee found the bedroom to be “filthy” with trash, exposed wires, no sheets, inadequate clean bedding for the children, and a broken window.
While on the way to the foster home, A.G.2 told the Department employee, “[M]y mom keeps the drugs in a green bag, ” and “My mom puts a lighter under it and puts it in her mouth.” A.G.2 also mentioned witnessing domestic violence between Mother and Mother’s boyfriend. A.G.2 said, “[T]hey hit and yelled at each other.”
In the juvenile dependency petition, the Department alleged that (1) Mother and Father failed to protect the children (§ 300, subd. (b)); (2) the children were at risk of being sexually abused due to Father’s sexual offense conviction (§ 300, subd. (d)); (3) the children were left without any provision for support (§ 300, subd. (g)); and (4) A.G.1’s siblings had been abused due to Mother’s drug use, domestic violence, and unsafe living conditions, which placed A.G.1 at substantial risk of being abused or neglected.
The juvenile court found the children came within the jurisdiction of the court. The court ordered that the children be placed in the Department’s custody. A.G.1 was placed with his paternal grandparents; A.G.1 had been living with his paternal grandparents since summer of 2009. The three other children were placed in foster care. The court ordered that supervised visitation between Mother and the children occur a minimum of one hour per week.
C. JURISDICTION
On March 4, 2010, Mother pled guilty to a charge of being under the influence of a controlled substance, and was sentenced to jail for 90 days. A Department employee interviewed Mother at West Valley Detention Center. Mother said that her drug of choice was methamphetamine, but that the drugs in the house were not hers, and they were not within the children’s reach. Mother was evicted from her Section 8 housing due to (1) her drug conviction; (2) her loss of custody of her children; (3) too many people living in the apartment; (4) complaints about too many people coming and going from the apartment; and (5) damage to the apartment. The Department recommended that Mother not receive reunification services due to her lengthy and serious history with the Department.
A.G.1 was doing well in his paternal grandparents’ home. The three other children were doing well in their foster placement. The three children reported that they liked having their own beds. A.G.3 suffered from severely rotted teeth. Mother said that Father allowed A.G.3 to have sweet liquids in his bottle, which damaged his teeth. A.G.3’s teeth were so damaged that they would require metal caps. While incarcerated, Mother wrote a letter to the children, which their grandmother read during a visitation appointment. The children listened to their grandmother read the letter, but did not make any comments about the letter.
The juvenile court found true the allegations that Mother and Father failed to protect the children. (§ 300, subd. (b).) Further, the court found true the allegation that the children were at risk of sexual abuse due to Father’s sexual offense conviction. (§ 300, subd. (d).) The court also found true the allegation that Father left the children without provisions for support. (§ 300, subd. (g).) Lastly, the court found true the allegation that there was substantial risk of A.G.1 being abused or neglected, due to the abuse or neglect suffered by his siblings. (§ 300, subd. (j).)
D. DISPOSITION
Included in the record are letters from Mother’s residential substance abuse treatment program, New House. The letters reflect Mother tested negative for drugs three times during April 2010. The letters also reflect Mother was admitted to the program in mid-April, and that she would be released in mid-July. The Program Manager who authored the letters credited Mother with performing her assigned chores, despite being “far along in her pregnancy.”
At the disposition hearing, the juvenile court declared Father to be the presumed father of A.G.1, A.G.2, A.G.3, and M.G. The court denied Mother reunification services, because Mother had not reunified with the four older children (§ 361.5, subd. (b)(10)), and Mother’s chronic drug abuse or failure to comply with a treatment program (§ 361.5, subd. (b)(13)). The court ordered that Mother be given a minimum of one hour per week visitation with the children. The four children were placed with their paternal grandparents.
E. AUGUST 2010 UPDATE
The paternal grandparents reported that Mother did not “make much effort” when visiting the children. For example, the grandparents asked Mother if she would meet the children closer to their home, to make the visits easier; however, Mother “failed to follow through.” Mother’s visits with the children appeared to be appropriate. The children also had visitation with their four older half siblings, who reside with the half siblings’ paternal grandmother, “under a services only guardianship, which was transferred to L.A. County Children and Family Services.” The children appeared happy to visit their older half siblings. The children’s paternal grandparents expressed a desire to adopt the four children.
F. REQUEST TO MODIFY A COURT ORDER
On September 22, 2010, Mother filed a request to modify the court’s order denying her services. In regard to changed circumstances, Mother alleged that she completed the inpatient substance abuse treatment at New House on August 2, 2010, and that same day transferred to a second substance abuse treatment program at Prototypes Women’s Center. Mother also noted that on July 8, 2010, she was granted reunification services for the children’s younger half sibling—Mother’s ninth child. Mother requested that the juvenile court modify its order denying her services to an order granting Mother reunification services. Mother asserted that modifying the court’s order would be better for the children because Mother “has been continuously engaged in services for approximately the last six months.” Mother also noted that her visits with the children had “gone very well.”
Attached to Mother’s request to modify the court’s order were certificates from her parenting classes and letters from her treatment centers. The letter from Prototypes Women’s Center reflected that mother visited with the children for one hour per week at the treatment facility, and the visits were positive.
In their opposition to Mother’s request, the Department reported that Mother’s visits with the children primarily consisted of the three male children playing on Prototype’s playground equipment, while A.G.2 listened to Mother’s iPod. A social worker asked A.G.1 and A.G.2, separately, if they would like to live with Mother. A.G.1 responded, “‘No, I don’t want to live with my mom. I want to stay with my grandma.’” A.G.2 responded that she would like to stay with her grandparents and said, “‘I like doing stuff. We go on trips.’”
The Department further noted that during the older half siblings’ dependency case, Mother took part in inpatient and outpatient addiction programs, including the same 90-day inpatient treatment program at New House. Mother also took parenting classes, participated in individual counseling, and received Section 8 housing. Mother’s reunification services, as to the older half siblings, were terminated on January 9, 2007.
The Department argued that while Mother had again participated in inpatient substance abuse treatment as part of the instant dependency case, she had been in the detention center or treatment program for the length of the case, and therefore had not demonstrated an ability to live drug-free in an unsupervised environment. The Department argued it would not be in the children’s best interests to change the court order, because Mother had not yet demonstrated an actual change in the circumstances that led to the children’s removal.
Further, the Department argued the children were living in a drug-free environment with their grandparents, and that the children were bonded to their grandparents. The Department asserted it was in the children’s best interests to move forward with the adoptions by the paternal grandparents.
At the hearing on Mother’s request to modify the court’s order denying her services, Mother’s counsel noted that V.Q., the children’s younger half sibling, was returned to Mother’s custody. Mother’s counsel argued that Mother should be granted reunification services so the children could have an opportunity to bond with V.Q.
At the hearing, the Department conceded that Mother was making progress; however, the Department argued there was no proof that Mother’s circumstances had changed, because Mother was still living in a closely supervised environment. The Department reiterated the argument that the children’s best interests would be served by allowing the adoption to move forward, so that the children could have stability and permanency.
The juvenile court noted Mother was not present in court for the hearing. The court found Mother was working on ending her years of substance abuse; however, the court concluded Mother had not proven a change in circumstance. Further, the court found that modifying the order would not be in the children’s best interests, particularly due to Mother’s failure to appear at the hearing on her request to modify the court’s order denying her services.
G. TERMINATION
The court issued its rulings to terminate Mother’s and Father’s parental rights on December 13, 2010. The court found the children were likely to be adopted. Accordingly, the juvenile court terminated Mother’s and Father’s parental rights.
DISCUSSION
A. MODIFICATON OF A COURT ORDER
Mother contends the juvenile court erred by denying her request to modify a court order. We disagree.
“Under section 388, a parent... may petition the court to change, modify or set aside a previous order on the grounds of changed circumstances or new evidence. [Citation.] The petitioner has the burden to show a change of circumstances or new evidence and [that] the proposed modification is in the child’s best interests. [Citation.] Generally, the petitioner must show by a preponderance of the evidence that the child’s welfare requires the modification sought. [Citation.]” [¶] We review the grant or denial of a petition for modification under section 388 for an abuse of discretion. [Citations.]” (In re B.D. (2008) 159 Cal.App.4th 1218, 1228.) “‘[D]iscretion is abused whenever the court exceeds the bounds of reason, all of the circumstances being considered.’ [Citation.].” (In re Carl N. (2008) 160 Cal.App.4th 423, 432.)
In regard to the first prong, Mother did not display that she could refrain from drug use when living in an unsupervised environment. Mother has only shown that she has remained drug free and attended classes while closely monitored. Mother’s history reflects that she has previously participated in services and inpatient drug treatment, only to return to abusing drugs. Accordingly, the juvenile court’s finding that Mother’s circumstances had not changed was reasonable, because there was nothing showing that Mother was capable of living drug-free when unsupervised.
In regard to the second prong, the best interests of the child are determined by considering (1) the seriousness of the problem that led to the dependency; (2) the strength of the parent-child bond; and (3) whether the problem that led to the dependency has been resolved, or the ease with which it may be resolved. (In re Amber M. (2002) 103 Cal.App.4th 681, 685.) The problems that led to the dependency were Mother’s drug use, storing the drugs within the children’s reach, and the poor conditions of the bedroom where the children lived. A.G.2 described witnessing Mother engaging in domestic violence, and having to ask the neighbors for food. The lack of food and easy access to methamphetamine reflects an unsafe and unhealthy environment. Based upon these facts it is reasonable to conclude that the problems that led to the dependency were serious.
Second, in regard to the parent-child bond, when Mother’s letter was read to the children, they had no reaction. Additionally, A.G.1 and A.G.2 both stated that they would rather stay with their grandparents than return to Mother’s care. During the one-hour weekly visits with Mother, the male children usually played on the Prototype playground equipment, while A.G.2 listened to Mother’s iPod. Based upon these facts, it does not appear that the children shared a particularly strong bond with Mother. The facts do not reflect children that were sad to be apart from their Mother, rather, the children expressed a desire to stay with their grandparents and not return to Mother’s care. Accordingly, it is reasonable to conclude that there was not a particularly strong parent-child bond.
Third, we examine whether the problem that led to the dependency has been resolved, or the ease with which it may be resolved. In regard to the problems with the cleanliness of the bedroom, the Department asked Mother what she planned to do about housing, since she had been evicted from her Section 8 apartment. Mother responded that she might utilize the transitional housing offered by Prototypes. In order to be considered for housing at Prototypes, a person must stay in the program for one year. Accordingly, it appears that Mother’s housing plans were unstable, because it is not clear if or when she would actually be able to obtain housing for herself and five children.
As to resolving Mother’s drug abuse issues, the record reflects that Mother was staying sober while in the drug treatment programs. However, Mother has previously participated in drug treatment programs, and then relapsed into drug abuse. Mother was in supervised care during the pendency of the juvenile court proceedings in the instant case. As a result, Mother has not demonstrated that she is able to live a sober lifestyle when she is in an unsupervised environment. Accordingly, it is reasonable to conclude that the problem of Mother remaining drug free when she is unsupervised has not been solved. Therefore, it does not appear that Mother has solved the issue of her housing or her drug abuse. Further, it does not seem that either issue was nearing a resolution at the time of the hearing on Mother’s request.
In sum, the problems that led to the dependency were serious; the problems did not appear to be solved or nearing a resolution; and there was not a strong parent-child bond. Accordingly, it was reasonable for the juvenile court to conclude that the requested modification would not be in the children’s best interests.
Mother contends the juvenile court erred by denying her request because she was sober for eight months and had custody of V.Q. Mother is essentially arguing there is evidence favorable to her request to modify a court order. We agree there is evidence favorable to Mother’s request; however, this does not mean the juvenile court’s order exceeded the bounds of reason, all of the circumstances being considered. As noted ante, there is evidence supporting the juvenile court’s ruling. Accordingly, the juvenile court’s conclusion was within its discretion.
Next, Mother argues that staying in the treatment program showed her dedication to cooperating with the Department. Further, Mother argues that any concern regarding Mother’s relapsing into drug use would be speculation. Mother’s arguments do not explain why the juvenile court’s decision was erroneous. While Mother may be cooperating with the Department, that does not equate with a showing of changed circumstances. Additionally, Mother’s motion was not denied due to speculation about her relapsing. Mother’s motion was denied based on the concrete fact that she has been living in a closely supervised environment, and therefore has not shown changed circumstances. In other words, no one is speculating that Mother is going to relapse; Mother may never abuse drugs again, the problem is that she has not demonstrated that ability. Mother needs to show her circumstances have changed beyond the walls of a supervised environment, which she has not done. Accordingly, we find Mother’s argument unpersuasive.
Next, Mother asserts the trial court erred by misapplying the In re Kimberly F. standard. (In re Kimberly F. (1997) 56 Cal.App.4th 519.) Kimberly F. provides that when a juvenile court considers a request to modify a court order (§ 388) it should consider the following factors: (1) the seriousness of the reason for the dependency; (2) the existing bond between the parent and the children; and (3) the degree to which the problem may be easily resolved, and the degree to which it has already been resolved. (Kimberly F., at p. 532.)
While the juvenile court did not organize its analysis in a numerical fashion, it did address the Kimberly F. factors. The juvenile court stated that Mother’s problem (factor number one) was “years of addiction.” The juvenile court then moved to factor number three, where it noted that Mother was “working” on her addiction problem, but that Mother’s problem had not been completely resolved. Finally, the court considered factor number two, when it noted that Mother failed to appear at the hearing. It can be inferred from the juvenile court’s comment that Mother’s failure to appear for her own motion reflected a lack of dedication to the children—a general lack of concern or bond between Mother and children. Accordingly, we conclude that the juvenile court properly considered the three Kimberly F. factors, and therefore we find Mother’s argument to be unpersuasive.
B. PARENT-CHILD BOND EXCEPTION
Mother contends the juvenile court erred by terminating her parental rights. (§ 366.26.) Mother contends the juvenile court should have allowed her to retain her parental rights, pursuant to the parent-child bond exception. (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(i).) We disagree.
If a juvenile court finds that a dependent child is adoptable, then it will terminate parental rights unless one of the statutorily enumerated exceptions is applicable. (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1).) One of the enumerated exceptions provides that parental rights shall not be terminated if “[t]he parents have maintained regular visitation and contact with the child and the child would benefit from continuing the relationship.” (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(i).) “The benefit to the child from continuing such a relationship must... be such that the relationship ‘“promotes the well-being of the child to such a degree as to outweigh the well-being the child would gain in a permanent home with new, adoptive parents.”’ [Citation.]” (In re Aaliyah R. (2006) 136 Cal.App.4th 437, 449.) In other words, for the exception to apply the bond between the parent and child must be a parent-child bond, rather than the type of bond a child might have with a friendly visitor or nonparent relative, such as an aunt. (In re Angel B. (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 454, 468.) We review the juvenile court’s decision to not apply the parent-child bond exception for an abuse of discretion. (In re Aaliyah R., at p. 449.)
Mother’s one-hour weekly visits with the children primarily consisted of the male children playing on Prototype’s playground equipment, while A.G.2 listened to Mother’s iPod. A social worker asked A.G.1 and A.G.2, separately, if they would like to live with Mother. A.G.1 responded, “‘No, I don’t want to live with my mom. I want to stay with my grandma.’” A.G.2 responded that she would like to stay with her grandparents and said, “‘I like doing stuff. We go on trips.’” Further, when Mother’s letter was read to the children, the children had little reaction.
The foregoing evidence reflects that Mother regularly visited the children; however, it does not appear from the evidence that Mother shared a particularly strong bond with the children. The children and Mother were together only one hour per week, and they did not spend that time talking and sharing, rather, the boys played and A.G.2 listened to music. Additionally, A.G.1 and A.G.2 stated they did not want to live with Mother. As a result, it appears the children did not share a strong parent-child bond with Mother. Accordingly, the juvenile court’s conclusion that the parent-child bond exception does not apply in this case was reasonable and rational, because it is supported by the record. In sum, the juvenile court did not err.
Mother argues the juvenile court should have applied the parent-child bond exception because the children spent the majority of their lives with Mother; Mother regularly attended visits with the children; and the visits were positive. Mother’s argument points out that there is evidence in support of applying the parent-child bond exception; however, as noted ante, there is evidence supporting the juvenile court’s decision. Since there is evidence supporting the juvenile court’s decision, the decision is not arbitrary or unreasonable, and therefore does not constitute an abuse of discretion. As a result, we find Mother’s argument unpersuasive.
Next, Mother asserts that the juvenile court erred by addressing the parent-child bond exception in a “cursory” manner, and asserts that the juvenile court should have ordered guardianship. As set forth ante, the juvenile court reached a reasonable finding; therefore, Mother’s criticism of the juvenile court’s methodology is not persuasive. Mother’s contention that the juvenile court abused its discretion because it should have ordered guardianship is likewise unpersuasive. The juvenile court’s finding was reasonable. While other holdings might also have been reasonable, it does not mean the court’s decision to terminate parental rights was arbitrary or beyond the bounds of reason. In sum, we find Mother’s argument related to guardianship to be unpersuasive.
C. ICWA
Mother contends the juvenile court erred by failing to make a proper inquiry into Father’s possible Indian ancestry. (§ 224.3.) Specifically, Mother asserts the juvenile court erred by failing to have Father complete a Parental Notification of Indian Status form (ICWA-020). We find any error to be harmless.
The juvenile court and the Department have an affirmative duty to inquire whether a child in a dependency case may be an Indian child, if the child is at risk of entering foster care or is in foster care. (§ 224.3.) In order to facilitate this inquiry the juvenile “court must order the parent, Indian custodian, or guardian if available, to complete Parental Notification of Indian Status (form ICWA-020).” (Cal. Rules of Court, Rule 5.481(a)(2).) If the parent does not appear at the first hearing or is unavailable, then the court must order the Department to use reasonable diligence to find and inform the parent that the court ordered the completion of form ICWA-020. (Cal. Rules of Court, Rule 5.481(a)(3).) If a Department has reason to know that an Indian child may be involved in a dependency case, then the Department may inquire into the child’s “‘extended family members’ as defined in 25 United States Code section[s] 1901 and 1903(2), to gather the information” required to complete the form ICWA-020. (Cal. Rules of Court, Rule 5.481(a)(4)(A).) Grandparents are considered to be extended family members. (25 U.S.C.A. § 1903(2).)
Father was in state prison during the dependency proceedings in this case. The juvenile court asked the children’s paternal grandmother and grandfather, “[D]o you have American-Indian ancestry?” The paternal grandmother responded, “No.” The paternal grandfather responded, “No.”
Despite the juvenile court inquiring of the extended family members about Father’s ancestry, we will assume, without deciding, that the juvenile court erred because Father did not complete the form ICWA-020.
Based on the foregoing assumption, we will move to a harmless error analysis. In the harmless error analysis, the question we ask is whether the outcome of a proceeding has been affected by the error. (See In re Rebecca R. (2006) 143 Cal.App.4th 1426, 1430 (Rebecca R.) [Fourth Dist., Div. Two] [“show a miscarriage of justice”].) This court has previously found: “there can be no prejudice unless, if [Father] had been asked, father would have indicated that the child did (or may) have such ancestry.” (Id. at p. 1431.) There is nothing in Mother’s brief suggesting that Father has or may have Indian ancestry. There is not even an assertion that it is somewhat likely that Father may have Indian ancestry. Since there is nothing indicating that Father may have indicated he has Indian ancestry, we conclude that the juvenile court’s alleged error was harmless.
Mother argues the record is devoid of information about Father’s ancestry, so if this court found the error harmless, then the court would be speculating about Father’s ancestry. The only reason this court may be placed in a position of speculating is that Mother has failed to make an offer of proof. (Rebecca R., supra, 143 Cal.App.4th at p. 1431.) Mother and Father were given services during the prior dependency proceedings when the older half siblings were removed along with A.G.1 and A.G.2. Due to those prior dependency proceedings, Mother should have knowledge or at least some recollection about whether Father claimed he has Indian ancestry. Mother’s argument that this court should not speculate, after Mother has failed to make an offer of proof, is unpersuasive.
Next, Mother argues the paternal grandparents’ responses to the ancestry questions are not trustworthy, because as prospective adoptive parents, the paternal grandparents may have a secret agenda to hide Father’s ancestry in order to circumvent the ICWA procedures. This court is not relying on the grandparents’ responses regarding their ancestry. Rather, we are relying on the argument, or lack of offer of proof, in Mother’s opening brief. Accordingly, we find Mother’s argument unpersuasive.
Finally, Mother argues the harmless error analysis in the instant case is distinguishable from Rebecca R. In Rebecca R., the father argued that the juvenile court’s termination order should be set aside because there was no documentation in the record to support the finding that the court inquired into the father’s possible Indian ancestry. (Rebecca R., supra, 143 Cal.App.4th at p. 1428.) This court found any error to be harmless. (Id. at p. 1431.)
Mother argues the instant case is distinguishable from Rebecca R., because the form at issue in that case was the JV-130, which has since been superseded by the ICWA-020. Mother notes that the ICWA-020 must be completed and filed with the juvenile court. Contrary to Mother’s interpretation of Rebecca R., the legal provisions for the form JV-130 were not in effect at the time the dependency case began in Rebecca R; rather, at that time, the only requirement was to indicate knowledge of Indian ancestry on the face of the petition. (Rebecca R., supra, 143 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1429, 1430.) Accordingly, Mother’s attempt to distinguish Rebecca R. based on the JV-130 form is problematic.
Nevertheless, we will construe Mother argument as distinguishing Rebecca R. on the theory that the ICWA-020 is a mandatory form, while at the time the dependency proceedings began in Rebecca R. there was not a similar mandatory form. The problem with this argument is that the error is not whether a form is missing from the file. The error would be not inquiring into Father’s ancestry if there were any offer of proof that Father might have Indian heritage. Accordingly, the fact that a form may or may not be mandatory does not persuade us that there has been a miscarriage of justice.
DISPOSITION
The judgments are affirmed.
We concur: McKINSTER Acting P. J. KING J.