Opinion
20-P-296
05-12-2021
Antonio MEDEROS, petitioner.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0
Between 1989 and 2000, Antonio Mederos was convicted of numerous sexual offenses and subsequently was committed to the Massachusetts Treatment Center (treatment center) as a sexually dangerous person on October 13, 2003. Approximately four years later, he filed a petition for discharge, pursuant to G. L. c. 123A, § 9. A jury determined that Mederos continued to be sexually dangerous and a panel of this court affirmed the judgment in an unpublished decision pursuant to our former rule 1:28. See Mederos, petitioner, 88 Mass. App. Ct. 1116 (2015). Mederos filed another petition for discharge on November 14, 2016, and was again found by a jury to continue to be sexually dangerous. The latter judgment is the subject of this appeal in which Mederos asserts that the Commonwealth failed to establish that he suffers from a mental condition or abnormality that prevents him from having the ability to control his sexual impulses. However, because Mederos did not file a motion for a directed verdict at the close of the Commonwealth's case or at the close of all the evidence on this ground, the issue is waived. See McHoul, petitioner, 445 Mass 143, 157 (2005) ("Because the petitioner did not move for a directed verdict, the issue is waived"). We therefore review Mederos's claim under the substantial risk of a miscarriage of justice standard. See R.B., petitioner, 479 Mass. 712, 717-718 (2018). We have conducted a careful review of the record and conclude that the evidence was more than sufficient to support the jury's verdict. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment.
We note that our conclusion would be the same even if Mederos had preserved his claim by moving for a directed verdict, because "a conviction premised on legally insufficient evidence always creates a substantial risk of a miscarriage of justice." Commonwealth v. DeJesus, 99 Mass. App. Ct. 275, 282 n.14 (2021), quoting Commonwealth v. Kurko, 95 Mass. App. Ct. 719, 722 (2019).
Background. 1. Sexual offense history. The jury could have found the following facts regarding Mederos's sexual offense history. In 1989, when he was thirty-two years old, Mederos was convicted of indecent assault and battery on a person over the age of fourteen. The victim was Mederos's fourteen year old neighbor. She alleged that Mederos had offered to give her driving lessons and, while she was driving the car, Mederos directed her to a secluded area where the two got out and walked down a path. Mederos pushed the girl to the ground, removed her clothes, and forcibly raped her.
Next, in 1992, Mederos was convicted of three counts of indecent assault and battery on three girls, ages eight, ten, and twelve. They alleged that, while on a swimming outing, he forcibly kissed and fondled the breasts, crotch, and buttocks of each of them. He put his finger in the buttocks of one of the girls, and inside the bathing suit of another and rubbed her vagina. On the drive home, he placed each of the girls in his lap in turn and pushed his "private area" against them.
In 1999, Mederos pleaded guilty to indecent assault and battery on a person over fourteen in connection with a violent attack on his girlfriend, with whom he was living at the time. Mederos confronted the woman and demanded sex. When she refused, he grabbed her by the hair and smashed her head into a wall. He then ripped off her bra and underpants. When she resisted, he knocked her to the floor and fled the apartment.
Lastly, in 2000, Mederos pleaded guilty to one count of rape of a child under sixteen and indecent assault and battery on a child over fourteen. The victim was Mederos's son. The crime occurred during a visit in 1997. The son slept in the same bed as Mederos and on the second night of the visit, Mederos kissed his son on the mouth, fondled the boy's penis, and then rolled the son over in bed and anally raped him. The victim did not report the rape to his mother initially for fear of reprisal.
2. Expert testimony. Mederos was examined by two qualified examiners, Dr. Angela Johnson and Dr. Katrin Rouse-Weir, in connection with his petition for discharge. Both doctors testified for the Commonwealth at trial and opined that Mederos remained a sexually dangerous person. In addition, Dr. Andrea Barnes, who testified as a member of the community access board (CAB), offered her own expert opinion that Mederos remained a sexually dangerous person. Dr. Barnes also related that she and the other members of the CAB unanimously agreed that Mederos remained a sexually dangerous person. All three Commonwealth expert witnesses testified that Mederos meets the criteria for a statutorily defined mental abnormality and several clinically defined disorders, including unspecified paraphilic disorder and pedophilic disorder, resulting in a present lack of ability to control his sexual impulses.
General Laws c. 123A, § 9, sets forth the detailed procedural requirements for a trial.
Dr. Barnes is also a qualified examiner but did not serve in that capacity in this case.
To the extent that Mederos challenges the validity of the experts’ conclusions, the argument is waived. Mederos did not object to the admission of the experts’ testimony on the grounds that he now raises, namely that they misapplied the standards of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders to his case.
Dr. Johnson opined that Mederos meets the criteria for antisocial personality disorder (ASPD) as set forth in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (5th ed.) (DSM-V) based on his continued lack of regard for others, manipulative behaviors, and refusal to take responsibility for his actions. She testified that, although these tendencies usually diminish with age, they remain "very, very persistent" in Mederos. Dr. Johnson also opined that Mederos does not meet the criteria for pedophilic disorder as outlined in the DSM-V.
Dr. Rouse-Weir reached a slightly different conclusion. She testified that Mederos meets the diagnostic threshold for pedophilic disorder, but that he does not meet all of the criteria for a diagnosis of ASPD. Nevertheless, she opined that, because Mederos meets some of the criteria for ASPD, he can be described as having "[o]ther [s]pecified [p]ersonality disorder, with [ ]antisocial [t]raits," and that he continues to receive disciplinary reports for his inability to control "problem behavior."
Dr. Barnes, on behalf of the CAB, testified that the CAB diagnosed Mederos with unspecified paraphilic disorder, as listed in the DSM-V. In addition, Dr. Barnes related that she and the CAB diagnosed Mederos with antisocial personality disorder. Dr. Barnes explained that the opinion of the CAB was split, and that two of the five CAB members voted to give Mederos a full diagnosis of ASPD as defined in the DSM-V. Because three members did not believe that he met all of the criteria for a full diagnosis, the CAB settled on other specified personality disorder with antisocial traits.
Furthermore, all three experts testified that Mederos was likely to have difficulty controlling his sexual impulses if released from the treatment center, that he would be likely to reoffend if released, and that his lack of progress in sex offender treatment presented an additional risk factor.
Mederos called two expert witnesses, Dr. Eric Brown and Dr. Daniel Kriegman, both of whom opined that Mederos was not sexually dangerous.
Discussion. At a trial on a G. L. c. 123A, § 9, petition for discharge, the Commonwealth bears the burden of proving that the petitioner "continues to be [a sexually dangerous person]." See Hill, petitioner, 422 Mass. 147, 156 (1996), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 867 (1996). A "sexually dangerous person" is defined as follows:
"[A]ny person who has been (i) convicted of or adjudicated as a delinquent juvenile or youthful offender by reason of a sexual offense and who suffers from a mental abnormality or personality disorder which makes the person likely to engage in sexual offenses if not confined to a secure facility; (ii) charged with a sexual offense and was determined to be incompetent to stand trial and who suffers from a mental abnormality or personality disorder which makes such person likely to engage in sexual offenses if not confined to a secure facility; or (iii) previously adjudicated as such by a court of the commonwealth and whose misconduct in sexual matters indicates a general lack of power to control his sexual impulses, as evidenced by repetitive or compulsive sexual misconduct by either violence against any victim, or aggression against any victim under the age of 16 years, and who, as a result, is likely to attack or otherwise inflict injury on such victims because of his uncontrolled or uncontrollable desires."
Mederos does not dispute that he committed several offenses against multiple victims, including his son, or that he was previously adjudicated a sexually dangerous person. Rather, he claims that the Commonwealth failed to prove that he suffers from a " ‘mental illness, abnormality, or disorder’ that causes [him] to have ‘serious difficulty in controlling [his] behavior’ " (citation omitted). Johnstone, petitioner, 453 Mass. 544, 549 (2009).
Viewed in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, see Miller, petitioner, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 625, 635 (2008), the testimony of the Commonwealth's experts, coupled with their reports, satisfied the Commonwealth's burden to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Mederos remained a sexually dangerous person. Despite the discrepancies among the opinions of the Commonwealth's experts, the evidence established a sound clinical basis for concluding that Mederos suffered from a "mental illness, abnormality, or disorder that causes [him] to have serious difficulty in controlling [his] behavior" (citation and quotation marks omitted). Johnstone, 453 Mass. at 549.
In addition, contrary to Mederos's assertion, the mental conditions from which he suffers need not be included in the DSM-V in order to support a determination that he remains a sexually dangerous person. See Dutil, petitioner, 437 Mass. 9, 15 (2002) ("the statute does not require express proof of a clinically defined mental illness"). In any event, the diagnosis of pedophilic disorder and unspecified paraphilic disorder applied to Mederos by Dr. Rouse-Weir and Dr. Barnes, respectively, are included in the DSM-V.
Lastly, it is not significant, as Mederos further claims, that he has not committed any sexual offenses since he has been held at the treatment center. See Commonwealth v. Bradway, 62 Mass. App. Ct. 280, 282 n.3 (2004) ("The respondent had been either incarcerated or held at the treatment center since 1991. Therefore, the respondent's notation that his last offense occurred ‘over ten years ago’ is of little persuasive value").
In sum, the Commonwealth presented sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that Mederos remains a sexually dangerous person.
Judgment affirmed.