Opinion
2022 CA 1287
06-20-2023
IN RE: MEDICAL REVIEW PANEL PROCEEDINGS FOR THE CLAIM OF BRENT CAUSEY (PCF NO. 2020-00797)
Debra Bracey Denham Springs, Louisiana Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellant, Brent Causey Allen J. Krouse Valerie E. Fontenot New Orleans, Louisiana Attorneys for Defendant/Appellee, Seaside Behavioral Healthcare, LLC d/ b/ a Seaside Hospital of Baton Rouge
On Appeal from the 19th Judicial District Court In and for the Parish of East Baton Rouge State of Louisiana No.C714105 Honorable Kelly Balfour, Judge Presiding
Debra Bracey Denham Springs, Louisiana Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellant, Brent Causey
Allen J. Krouse Valerie E. Fontenot New Orleans, Louisiana Attorneys for Defendant/Appellee, Seaside Behavioral Healthcare, LLC d/ b/ a Seaside Hospital of Baton Rouge
BEFORE: WELCH, PENZATO, AND LANIER, JJ.
PENZATO, J.
Brent Causey appeals the trial court's August 16, 2022 judgment sustaining the exception of prescription filed by defendant, Seaside Behavioral Healthcare, LLC d/b/a Seaside Hospital of Baton Rouge (Seaside Hospital), and dismissing, with prejudice, Mr. Causey's claims against Seaside Hospital. We affirm.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
This case arises from a May 11,2019 incident that occurred while Mr. Causey was a patient at Seaside Hospital. Mr. Causey alleges that on May 11, 2019, he was attacked by several employees of Seaside Hospital and sustained serious injuries as a result.
On February 24, 2020, Mr. Causey filed a petition for damages in the Nineteenth Judicial District Court against Seaside Hospital, alleging Seaside Hospital was vicariously liable for the actions of its employees, was guilty of negligently training and supervising its staff and employees, and breached its duty to protect him as a patient within its care and custody. Seaside Hospital filed an exception of prematurity on My 17, 2020, based on Mr. Causey's failure to present his claims to a medical review panel prior to filing his petition for damages. A hearing on Seaside Hospital's exception of prematurity was set for October 19,2020.
On August 3, 2020, Mr. Causey filed a request for a medical review panel, alleging that, on May 11, 2019, Seaside Hospital deviated from the applicable standard of appropriate medical care in its treatment of Mr. Causey. Thereafter, the parties entered into a consent judgment whereby Mr. Causey agreed that he did not oppose Seaside Hospital's exception of prematurity and consented to the dismissal of his petition for damages. On November 9,2020, the trial court signed a judgment sustaining Seaside Hospital's exception of prematurity and dismissing Mr. Causey's petition for damages, without prejudice.
On December 29, 2021, Seaside Hospital filed an exception of prescription contending that Mr. Causey's request for a medical review panel was untimely because it was filed more than one year after the May 11, 2019 alleged act of malpractice. Mr. Causey opposed the exception. After a hearing at which Seaside Hospital introduced evidence, the trial court signed a judgment on August 16,2022, sustaining Seaside Hospital's exception of prescription and dismissing Mr. Causey's claims against Seaside Hospital with prejudice. Mr. Causey appeals the August 16, 2022 judgment.
ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR
Mr. Causey assigns the following as error:
1. The trial court erred in failing to recognize that the civil action filed on February 24, 2020, interrupted the tolling of time for the filing of the medical malpractice claim and/or that the original action sounded in medical malpractice;
2. The trial court erred in failing to permit the application of the three-year discovery rule imposed pursuant to La. R.S. 9:5628 since discovery had not occurred to clarify the causes of action or to discover that Seaside Hospital was a qualified provider pursuant to medical malpractice statutes; and
3. The trial court erred in considering the LeBreton ruling as applicable when that ruling was comprised of a different factual issue of prescription.
LeBreton v. Rabito, 97-2221 (La. 7/8/98), 714 So.2d 1226.
LAW AND DISCUSSION
Louisiana Revised Statutes 9:5628 establishes the time for filing medical malpractice actions. The statute requires that actions for medical malpractice be brought within one year of the alleged act, omission, or neglect, or within one year from the date of discovery. Additionally, even as to claims filed within one year of the discovery of the alleged malpractice, all such claims must be filed, at the latest, within three years from the date of the alleged act, omission, or neglect. La. R.S. 9:5628(A). Medical malpractice claims are governed by the specific provisions of the Louisiana Medical Malpractice Act (MMA) regarding suspension of prescription to the exclusion of the general civil code articles on interruption of prescription. LeBreton v. Rabito, 97-2221 (La. 7/8/98), 714 So.2d 1226, 1231. Prescription begins when a plaintiff obtains actual or constructive knowledge of facts indicating to a reasonable person that he is the victim of a tort. In re Doe, 2021-1258 (La.App. 1 Cir. 6/14/22), 344 So.3d 652, 654, writ not considered, 2022-01094 (La. 10/18/22), 348 So.3d 732, reconsideration not considered. 2022-01094 (La. 1/11/23), 352 So.3d 561.
Louisiana Revised Statutes 9:5628(A) provides, in pertinent part, that:
No action for damages for injury or death against any physician, ... whether based upon tort, or breach of contract, or otherwise, arising out of patient care shall be brought unless filed within one year from the date of the alleged act, omission, or neglect, or within one year from the date of discovery of the alleged act, omission, or neglect; however, even as to claims filed within one year from the date of such discovery, in all events such claims shall be filed at the latest within a period of three years from the date of the alleged act, omission, or neglect.
Ordinarily, the exceptor bears the burden of proof at the trial of the exception of prescription; however, if the action is prescribed on its face, the plaintiff bears the burden of showing that the action has not prescribed. Bailey v. Loewe, 2019-0915 (La.App. 1 Cir. 8/3/20), 310 So.3d 746, 748. When an exception of prescription is filed during the medical review panel stage of the proceedings, the request for a medical review panel is considered the petition to be reviewed for timeliness. Id. Further, if the plaintiff relies on La. R.S. 9:5628's contra non valentem defense, the plaintiff must prove that defense - that is, that he was unaware of the malpractice before the alleged date of discovery, and his delay in filing suit was not due to his willful, negligent, or unreasonable action. In re Doe, 344 So.3d at 654. When evidence is introduced at the hearing on an exception of prescription, as is the case before us, an appellate court reviews a trial court's factual determinations, express or implied, under the manifest error standard of review. Id.
At the hearing on the exception of prescription, Seaside Hospital introduced the following documents into evidence: Mr. Causey's request for a medical review panel; Mr. Causey's petition for damages filed on February 24, 2020; Seaside Hospital's exception of prematurity, memorandum in support thereof, and Seaside Hospital's certificate of enrollment from the Patient's Compensation Fund; the joint motion and order to enter a consent judgment and the November 9, 2020 judgment granting Seaside Hospital's exception of prematurity and dismissing Mr. Causey's petition for damages without prejudice; and correspondence from the Patient's Compensation Fund indicating Mr. Causey's request for a medical review panel was filed on August 3, 2020. Mr. Causey did not introduce any evidence at the hearing.
Assignments of Error Nos. 1 and 3
Mr. Causey's request for a medical review panel was filed on August 3, 2020, more than one year from May 11, 2019, the date of the alleged malpractice. In his first assignment of error, Mr. Causey argues that the filing of his petition for damages on February 24, 2020 interrupted and/or suspended prescription of his separately filed medical malpractice complaint pursuant to La. C.C. art. 3462. In his third assignment of error, He argues that the LeBreton case is inapplicable to the facts presented herein, In Lebreton, the plaintiff filed her petition for damages and request for a medical review panel within the one-year prescriptive period. LeBreton, 714 So.2d at 1227. Her petition for damages was dismissed after the defendants raised an exception of prematurity. The medical review panel issued its opinion, finding no medical malpractice, and sent notification of its opinion to plaintiffs attorney. Id. Approximately five months later, the plaintiff re-filed her petition for damages. The defendants filed an exception of prescription, contending that the suit was filed beyond the ninety-day suspensive period provided for in the MMA. The defendants argued that instead of applying the general rules of prescription provided in the Civil Code, the case should be resolved with the more specific rules enunciated in the MMA. Id. at 1228. The Louisiana Supreme Court agreed, holding that the specific statutory provision providing for the suspension of prescription in the context of medical malpractice must be applied alone, not complementary to La. C.C. art. 3462, the more general codal article that addresses interruption of prescription. Id.
Louisiana Civil Code article 3462 provides in pertinent part that "[p]rescription is interrupted when the owner commences action against the possessor, or when the obligee commences action against the obligor, in a court of competent jurisdiction and venue."
Mr. Causey argues that LeBreton is only applicable to the ninety-day suspensive period provided by the MMA for filing suit after notification of the issuance of the opinion by the medical review panel. Mr. Causey has not presented this court with any legal authority for such a limited application of LeBreton, nor have we uncovered any. To the contrary, in Borel v. Young, 2007-0419 (La, 11/27/07), 989 So.2d 42, 69 (on rehearing), the Supreme Court extended the holding of LeBreton and held that the specific provisions of the MMA regarding the suspension of prescription against joint tortfeasors applied to the exclusion of the general code article on interruption of prescription against joint tortfeasors. Thereafter, in Warren v. Louisiana Medical Mutual Insurance Company, 2007-0492 (La. 12/2/08), 21 So.3d 186, 208 (on rehearing), the Supreme Court reaffirmed its prior holdings in Borel and LeBreton and rejected the application of La. C.C. art. 1153 regarding relation-back principles in medical malpractice actions, finding the MMA provisions to be exclusive.
Accordingly, we find that the trial court was not manifestly erroneous in finding that LeBreton was applicable herein and that the filing of the petition for damages did not interrupt the one-year prescriptive period provided for in La. R.S. 9:5628 for the filing of Mr. Causey's separate action for medical malpractice.
These assignments of error are without merit.
Assignment of Error No. 2
In his second assignment of error, Mr. Causey argues that even if this court were to determine that the petition for damages did not suspend or interrupt the filing of his request for a medical review panel, his request is not prescribed because it was filed within the three-year prescriptive period set forth in La. R.S. 9:5628. Mr. Causey argues that he did not have an opportunity to discover whether or not his injuries were based in medical malpractice. He further argues that Seaside Hospital somehow prevented him from timely filing his request for a medical review panel by failing to file its exception of prematurity until after the time period to request a medical review panel had tolled.
Mr. Causey's request for a medical review panel sets forth the following facts that he alleged occurred on May 11, 2019:
At some point during the evening of May 11, 2019, a tech awakened [Mr. Causey] by roughly poking him in the head several times, stating that is was "time to get his meds". [Mr. Causey] went to the Nursing Station and inquired as to whom was poking him in the head, and a tech aggressively admitted that it was him.
Several techs began to taunt [Mr. Causey], and as he turned and started back to his room, he was tackled from behind, causing him to hit his head on the wall. Several techs then grabbed him and dragged him back to his room where they physically attacked him again, punching and kicking him in the back and ribs, and pushing his face into the mattress and holding him there to the point that he could not breathe....
About an hour after this attack, [Mr. Causey] went to the Nurse's Station and requested that he be taken to the hospital because of a severe headache and blurry vision, a lump on one side of [his] head and a gash on the other. He was refused medical assistance.
Thus, the facts alleged in the request for a medical review panel show that Mr. Causey immediately knew that he had been injured and that his injuries were caused by employees of Seaside Hospital. As noted above, prescription begins to run when a plaintiff obtains actual or constructive knowledge of facts indicating to a reasonable person that he is the victim of a tort. In re Doe, 344 So.3d at 654. Thus, the prescriptive period began on May 11, 2019. We reject Mr. Causey's arguments that he did not have an opportunity to discover whether or not his injuries were based in medical malpractice and that Seaside Hospital somehow prevented him from timely filing his request for a medical review panel. In his petition for damages, filed on February 24, 2020, Mr. Causey asserted that Seaside Hospital breached its duty to protect him as a patient within its care and custody. In fact, he argues on appeal that he made claims in his petition for damages that "sounded in Medical Malpractice." Mr. Causey did not oppose Seaside Hospital's exception of prematurity. Moreover, he has failed to allege an alternate date of discovery and has provided no proof that Seaside Hospital in any way prevented him from timely filing his request for a medical review panel. Thus, contra non valentem is not applicable as a defense.
Accordingly, we find that the trial court did not manifestly err in concluding that Mr. Causey had one year from the date of the May 11, 2019 incident to file a request for a medical review panel. Because the request was not filed until August 3, 2020, the trial court correctly sustained Seaside Hospital's exception of prescription.
This assignment of error is without merit.
CONCLUSION
For the above reasons, we affirm the August 16,2022 judgment sustaining the exception of prescription filed by Seaside Behavioral Healthcare, LLC d/b/a Seaside Hospital of Baton Rouge and dismissing Brent Causey's claims with prejudice. Appeal costs are assessed to Brent Causey.
AFFIRMED.