In re Mead

4 Citing cases

  1. In re Finley

    68 Cal.2d 389 (Cal. 1968)   Cited 40 times
    Noting this difference under a previous version of the Washington statute

    The rules of those cases designed to permit review of erroneous determinations of habitual criminality have not been extended to factual situations other than those that they were intended to correct, and we decline to overrule them. In re Harincar (1946) 29 Cal.2d 403, 406, fn. 2 [ 176 P.2d 58]; In re Pearson (1947) supra, 30 Cal.2d 871, 876; In reBramble (1947) 31 Cal.2d 43, 52 [ 187 P.2d 411]; In re Galloway (1947) 78 Cal.App.2d 880 [ 178 P.2d 469]; In re Lamey (1948) 85 Cal.App.2d 284, 288-289 [ 193 P.2d 66]; In re Mead (1949) 92 Cal.App.2d 536, 537 [ 206 P.2d 1091]; In re Page (1950) 99 Cal.App.2d 218 [ 221 P.2d 167]; In re Martin (1952) 115 Cal.App.2d 188, 191 [ 251 P.2d 745].In re Wolfson (1947) supra, 30 Cal.2d 20; In reTedford (1948) 31 Cal.2d 693, 695 [ 192 P.2d 3]; In re Norcutt (1948) supra, 31 Cal.2d 743, 744; In re Schunke (1947) 81 Cal.App.2d 588, 590 [ 184 P.2d 700].

  2. In re Ponce

    65 Cal.2d 341 (Cal. 1966)   Cited 10 times

    The accusatory pleading thus gave petitioner notice that he was charged with having suffered prior convictions that could lead to a determination that he was an habitual criminal. This notice was sufficient without additional express allegations regarding habitual criminality or the terms of section 644. ( People v. Dunlop (1951) 102 Cal.App.2d 314, 316 [ 227 P.2d 281]; In re Mead (1949) 92 Cal.App.2d 536, 538 [ 206 P.2d 1091]; see also People v. Jackson (1950) 36 Cal.2d 281, 287 [ 223 P.2d 236]; In reGilliam (1945) 26 Cal.2d 860, 866 [ 161 P.2d 793].) [4] During the proceedings before imposition of sentence and until 60 days after the commencement of imprisonment (Pen. Code, ยง 644, subd. (c)) petitioner and his counsel had the opportunity to raise any question as to the legal sufficiency of the prior convictions to support the determination of habitual criminal status and as to circumstances that might have led the trial court in its discretion to relieve petitioner of that determination.

  3. People v. Shaw

    46 Cal. Rptr. 217 (Cal. Ct. App. 1965)   Cited 1 times

    It does not have to be alleged as such. (People v. Williams, supra, 193 Cal.App.2d 394, 401, 14 Cal.Rptr. 279; People v. Millwood (1957) 150 Cal.App.2d 154, 156, 309 P.2d 495; People v. Dunlop (1951) 102 Cal.App.2d 314, 316, 227 P.2d 281; In re Mead (1949) 92 Cal.App.2d 536, 538, 206 P.2d 1091; People v. Israel (1949) 91 Cal.App.2d 773, 784, 206 P.2d 62); nor does the absence of such an express finding in the judgment vitiate the proceedings where the record reflects prior convictions and service of time in prison as required by the statute. (In re Basuino (1943) 22 Cal.2d 247, 250; People v. Vaile (1935) 2 Cal.2d 441-444, 42 P.2d 321; In re Valenzuela (1945) 71 Cal.App.2d 198, 199-205, 162 P.2d 301.)

  4. State v. Hines

    109 N.J. Super. 298 (App. Div. 1970)   Cited 18 times
    In State v. Hines, 109 N.J. Super. 298, 263 A.2d 161 (1970), the defendant's prior conviction was in Pennsylvania, whose statute at the time simply punished "larceny" as a "felony."

    The Pennsylvania larceny statute, under consideration here, was involved in People v. Pace, 2 Cal. App.2d 464, 38 P.2d 202 (D. Ct. App. 1934), where the court, relying upon the indictment which gave the value of the stolen goods as $10, held the prior Pennsylvania conviction not applicable. To the same effect, see In re Thompson, 72 Cal. App.2d 747, 165 P.2d 533 (D. Ct. App. 1946); People v. Houston, 88 Cal.App.2d 11, 198 P.2d 53 (D. Ct. App. 1948); Ex parte Mead, 92 Cal.App.2d 536, 206 P.2d 1091 (D. Ct. App. 1949). We are inclined to follow the approach taken by the California courts.