Opinion
No. COA09-472.
Filed September 15, 2009.
Wake County Nos. 07 JT 110-11.
Appeal by Respondent-Mother from order entered 16 January 2009 by Judge Monica Bousman in Wake County District Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 24 August 2009.
Office of the Wake County Attorney, by Assistant County Attorney Roger A. Askew and Assistant County Attorney Mary Elizabeth Smerko, for Petitioner-Appellee Wake County Human Services. Ryan McKaig for Respondent-Appellant-Mother. Pamela Newell Williams for the Guardian ad Litem to the minor children.
I. Procedural History and Factual Background
Respondent-Mother ("Respondent" or "the mother") appeals from order entered 16 January 2009, terminating her parental rights to her minor children Mark, born in 1999, and Alex, born in 2006. Respondent's two older minor children, Alexis and Carol, were involved in the underlying juvenile proceedings but were not subject to the termination proceedings. Martin, the biological father of Mark, and Daniel, the biological father of Alex and Respondent's boyfriend, voluntarily relinquished their parental rights to their children and are not parties to this appeal.
Pseudonyms are used throughout this opinion to protect the identity of the minor children.
On 3 April 2006, Wake County Human Services ("Petitioner") received a report that Daniel, while under the influence of alcohol, had choked Mark and hit Martin in the face in the presence of the children. Police responded to the scene and Daniel was arrested later that evening. Respondent bailed Daniel out of jail the following morning.
Petitioner attempted to engage the family in treatment services and a safety plan. The safety plan prohibited Daniel and Respondent from engaging in domestic violence and substance abuse in front of the children and required Daniel to complete a substance abuse assessment and follow all recommendations. Petitioner attempted to schedule a substance abuse assessment for Daniel numerous times but was not successful. Respondent and Daniel repeatedly violated the safety plan. On 1 December 2006, Petitioner received a report that Daniel had assaulted Respondent while she was holding Alex, resulting in Alex "denting" his head on the sink. Although Daniel faced assault charges for violence perpetrated against a neighbor on 15 December 2006 and against Respondent on 23 December 2006, Respondent paid the bail money to have Daniel released from pre-trial detention and allowed him to return to live in her home. Additionally, Respondent gave Petitioner false information about the whereabouts of Daniel and solicited her children not to be truthful with Petitioner about the circumstances at home.
Petitioner provided referrals to stabilize the family home and to address inadequate healthcare for the teenaged girls, educational concerns for the children, and Respondent's failure to give Carol her prescribed medications for seizures and ADHD. During an assessment by Wellness Supports, Carol was diagnosed with Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder related to sexual abuse perpetrated against her by a family friend in 2004. Wellness Supports was only able to complete three visits with Carol at Respondent's home, due to Carol's continued distraction there, and Respondent did not comply with Wellness Supports' requests for office visits with Carol. Wellness Supports was only able to complete an initial assessment of Alexis, who has issues with morbid obesity, poor self-esteem, and possible depression. When asked why Respondent did not follow through with services to address Carol's and Alexis's mental health concerns, Respondent stated that she was not going to make the girls do anything they didn't want to do. Additionally, although Alexis reported that Carol was having seizures at night, Respondent did not refill Carol's medication because Carol "`[w]on't take it[.]'"
On 16 February 2007, Petitioner filed a juvenile petition alleging all four children were neglected. Upon the filing of the petition, Petitioner obtained nonsecure custody of the children and placed them in foster care. The trial court subsequently held an adjudication and disposition hearing on the juvenile petition and entered an order on 1 May 2007 finding the children neglected. The trial court continued custody of the children with Petitioner and ordered Respondent to, inter alia, complete a psychological evaluation and follow all recommendations, maintain stable housing and employment, participate in the children's therapy, and participate in family therapy.
Respondent completed a psychological evaluation on 2 May 2007. The evaluation report stated that Respondent "is a highly guarded and avoidant individual whose excessive reliance on denial and lack of psychological sophistication has resulted in her repeated neglect of her children." The report noted that Respondent had already ignored her children's many needs, "from [Alexis's] morbid obesity, to her children's mental health concerns, to their educational limitations — problems she understands in only a vague and superficial way." The evaluation concluded that Respondent would need considerable external support, treatment, and education in order to provide for her children's needs, to gain insight into herself, and to address issues in her relationship with Daniel. Although it was recommended that Respondent participate in programs designed to help women who are the victims of domestic violence and partners with substance abusers, the report also concluded that Respondent's "minimization of [Daniel's] physical abuse towards her and his violence towards others, as well as his substance abuse, raises concerns about her openness to these resources, and thus, her ability to profit from them."
In May 2007, Mark alleged that he had been "tickled" by Daniel and demonstrated this "tickling" by pulling on his penis. This allegation was substantiated following a Child and Family Evaluation completed by Dr. Robert Aiello. Petitioner subsequently removed Mark from foster care placement with Alex due to Mark's inappropriate sexualized behavior toward Alex.
Following a review hearing, the trial court entered an order on 15 June 2007, ordering Respondent to comply with the specific recommendations from her psychological evaluation. The trial court found that Daniel was incarcerated in Orange County on charges which included driving while intoxicated and felony hit and run. Daniel had also pled guilty to assault with a deadly weapon with intent to seriously injure and was sentenced to 36 months supervised probation. The court also found that Daniel was an undocumented immigrant. The court continued custody of the children with Petitioner and ordered reunification with the parents as the permanent plan for the children.
On 21 December 2007, the trial court entered an order continuing custody of the children with Petitioner. The trial court found that although Respondent had completed some parenting classes, Respondent had not attended the children's Individualized Education Program meetings or met with the children's therapists at school. The trial court ordered Respondent to follow all recommendations from her psychological evaluation and listed nine specific actions Respondent must take:
[i]. Gain understanding of how her co-dependent relationships reinforce negative behaviors.
ii. Participate in programs to help women who are victims of domestic violence.
iii. Understand [how] her own difficulty setting limits, tolerance of mistreatment, and low self-esteem allows others to take advantage of her.
iv. If the above fails, participate in individual therapy with a therapist trained in substance abuse and domestic violence issues.
v. Participate in a comprehensive parenting class, and demonstrate what she has learned in visits with her children.
vi. As reunification nears, work with an in-home therapist with herself and her children to develop a behavior system and to support her efforts to put more structure into the children's lives.
vii. Learn about the effects of neglect, domestic violence, and substance abuse on children.
viii. Meet with her children's schools to understand their learning, social, and behavioral problems.
ix. Meet with her children's therapists, to understand in detail the children's emotional issues. This is separate from participating in the children's therapy.
The trial court further ordered Respondent to comply with her visitation agreement; maintain housing suitable for herself and her children; maintain stable employment; complete a "Positive Parenting" class; and maintain regular contact with the social worker, notifying the social worker of any change in her situation or circumstances within five business days.
After a review hearing on 16 January 2008, the trial court entered an order on 15 February 2008 finding that Respondent was regularly attending therapy to address her issues involving relationships, co-dependency, parenting, and domestic violence. The court further found that Respondent had completed the "Positive Parenting" class and was scheduled to begin the "Non-Offenders Parenting" class on 6 February 2008. However, the court found that Respondent continued "to deny the possibility that [Daniel] touched [Mark] inappropriately; nor does she demonstrate an understanding of the impact on [Mark] of being touched inappropriately, and her choosing not to believe him." Although Mark continued to receive regular therapy, he was struggling to move forward from the trauma of his sexual abuse. However, Respondent had not yet scheduled a meeting with Mark's therapist and continued to "require some redirection during visitation with the children." The court further found that Alexis and Carol had told Respondent that Daniel was a problem for their family, but Respondent did not acknowledge or act on their feelings. The trial court ordered Respondent to complete the same requirements contained in the 21 December 2007 order.
On 23 May 2008, the trial court entered a review order changing the children's permanent plans as follows: custody with a court-approved caretaker for Alexis and Carol; adoption for Alex; and reunification with his biological father for Mark. The trial court found that Respondent had not participated in therapy since 23 January 2008. Furthermore, despite completing the Non-Offending Caregiver group, Respondent continued to think that Mark was lying about Daniel touching him inappropriately. Furthermore, Respondent had been reluctant to respond to questions from Petitioner and the children's guardian ad litem about her relationship with Daniel, and had expressed a desire to marry him or move to Mexico with him. While Respondent indicated at the hearing held on 24 April 2008 that she had ended her relationship with Daniel approximately three weeks earlier, and stated that she had had infrequent contact with Daniel during the preceding six months, she also stated that Daniel called her two or three times a week.
The court also found that, despite Mark's great anxiety toward Daniel and his feelings of rejection by Respondent, Respondent brought Daniel's brother to a family visit and during the visit they frequently referred to Daniel as Respondent's "novio," meaning boyfriend or fianc E. Respondent also accepted telephone calls from Daniel during family visits. Respondent's actions raised concerns regarding Respondent's judgment and candor. The court again included a detailed list of actions Respondent must take if she desired reunification with the children. In a review order entered 20 November 2008, the trial court changed the permanent plan for Mark to adoption.
On 21 August 2008, Petitioner filed a motion to terminate Respondent's parental rights to Mark and Alex. Martin and Daniel subsequently relinquished their parental rights to their children and Petitioner proceeded only against Respondent. The trial court conducted a hearing on the motion on 18 and 19 November, and 16 and 19 December 2008. The trial court entered an order terminating Respondent's parental rights to Mark and Alex on 16 January 2009. The court found that grounds existed to terminate Respondent's parental rights to the children pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1111(a)(1) in that Respondent neglected the children and it was probable that there would be a repetition of the neglect if the children were returned to her care, and N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1111(a)(2) in that Respondent had willfully left the children in foster care or placement outside the home for more than twelve months without showing to the satisfaction of the court that she had made reasonable progress under the circumstances to correct the conditions which led to the removal of the children. Respondent appeals.
II. Discussion
Respondent first argues that the trial court erred in terminating her parental rights based on neglect pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1111(a)(1). We disagree.
A termination of parental rights proceeding involves a two-stage process. In re Blackburn, 142 N.C. App. 607, 610, 543 S.E.2d 906, 908 (2001). The initial stage is the adjudicatory stage at which the petitioner must establish by clear, cogent, and convincing evidence that at least one of the statutory grounds for termination listed in N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1111 exists. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1109 (2007); In re Anderson, 151 N.C. App. 94, 97, 564 S.E.2d 599, 602 (2002). This Court reviews the trial court's determination at the adjudicatory stage to determine whether the trial court's findings of fact are based upon clear, cogent, and convincing evidence and whether the findings support the conclusions of law. In re Huff, 140 N.C. App. 288, 291, 536 S.E.2d 838, 840 (2000), disc. review denied and appeal dismissed, 353 N.C. 374, 547 S.E.2d 9 (2001).
If the trial court finds that at least one ground for terminating parental rights exists, the trial court proceeds to the dispositional stage where it must determine whether it is in the child's best interests to terminate parental rights. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1110(a) (2007). The trial court has discretion, if it finds that at least one of the statutory grounds exists, to terminate parental rights upon a finding that it would be in the child's best interests. Blackburn, 142 N.C. App. at 613, 543 S.E.2d at 910. A trial court's determination at the dispositional stage is reviewed on appeal for abuse of discretion. Anderson, 151 N.C. App. at 98, 564 S.E.2d at 602.
Preliminarily, although the trial court concluded that grounds existed to terminate Respondent's parental rights pursuant to both N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 7B-1111(a)(1) and (2), we note that competent evidence supporting either one of these statutory grounds requires us to affirm the trial court's order. In re Pierce, 67 N.C. App. 257, 261, 312 S.E.2d 900, 903 (1984).
A. Grounds for Termination
The trial court may terminate parental rights upon a finding that a parent neglected a juvenile. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1111(a)(1) (2007). A neglected juvenile is one
who does not receive proper care, supervision, or discipline from the juvenile's parent, guardian, custodian, or caretaker; or who has been abandoned; or who is not provided necessary medical care; or who is not provided necessary remedial care; or who lives in an environment injurious to the juvenile's welfare[.]
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-101(15) (2007).
Although "a prior adjudication of neglect may be admitted and considered by the trial court in ruling upon a later petition to terminate parental rights on the ground of neglect[,]" In re Ballard, 311 N.C. 708, 713-14, 319 S.E.2d 227, 231 (1984), "[a] finding of neglect sufficient to terminate parental rights must be based on evidence showing neglect at the time of the termination proceeding." In re Young, 346 N.C. 244, 248, 485 S.E.2d 612, 615 (1997) (citation omitted). Where the child has been removed from the parent's custody before the termination hearing, and the petitioner presents evidence of prior neglect, including an adjudication of such neglect, then "[t]he trial court must also consider any evidence of changed conditions in light of the evidence of prior neglect and the probability of a repetition of neglect." Ballard, 311 N.C. at 715, 319 S.E.2d at 232 (citation omitted). Thus, where
there is no evidence of neglect at the time of the termination proceeding, . . . parental rights may nonetheless be terminated if there is a showing of a past adjudication of neglect and the trial court finds by clear and convincing evidence a probability of repetition of neglect if the juvenile were returned to her parents.
In re Reyes, 136 N.C. App. 812, 815, 526 S.E.2d 499, 501 (2000) (citation omitted).
Respondent concedes that she neglected the children in the past, which resulted in their removal from her home. However, Respondent contends that the trial court's finding that there was a likelihood of a repetition of neglect was not supported by the findings of fact or by clear, cogent, and convincing evidence. We disagree.
The trial court made the following findings of fact relevant to the likelihood of a repetition of neglect of the children:
34 The mother has not demonstrated that she comprehends the sexual abuse [Mark] suffered. Further, she has not demonstrated that she would be able to protect [Alex] from [Mark's] conduct if it were to occur.
. . . .
41. That while the mother testified that she understands her co-dependency and her therapist testified that this was an issue that is being dealt with in therapy, the mother is unable to articulate to the satisfaction of the Court that she understands her co-dependency and that she is not likely to repeat this pattern of behavior, particularly considering the history of her relationship with [Daniel] and her repeated false statements regarding the status of their relationship.
. . . .
44. That during this period from January 23, 2008 until April 16, 2008 when the mother states that she could not attend therapy due to the cost, she visited with [Daniel] at Brown Correctional Institute at least twelve (12) times. The mother testified that it took her approximately two hours each way to drive to the prison and that she went on her day(s) off from work.
. . . .
45. That the mother's therapist testified that the mother is addressing issues of co-dependency, domestic violence, issues of low self-esteem, and understanding her own difficulty in setting limits. While the mother is presently dealing with these issues in therapy, there is no competent evidence before the Court that she understands these issues and has adequately addressed them in a manner to appropriately parent these children.
. . . .
47. That numerous services and monitoring have been provided to this family for the ten (10) months prior to the time the children were placed in nonsecure custody and throughout the nineteen (19) months the children have been placed outside the home. During this twenty-nine (29) month period, the mother has not demonstrated that she has acquired the ability or insight necessary to protect the children from neglect and potential abuse.
. . . .
49. That the mother told her therapist that she had ended her relationship with [Daniel]. During this hearing, the therapist learned for the first time that the mother continued to visit [Daniel] in prison after the time the mother told the therapist that she had ended the relationship. The concealment of her relationship with [Daniel] prevented the mother's therapist from adequately addressing the mother's issues of co-dependency, domestic violence, self-esteem and understanding of how her choices affect her children. That the mother testified, at this hearing, that she lied to WCHS, her therapist, other professionals involved with [her] and her family, and this Court about her relationship with [Daniel]. In light of the fact that the mother has lied to essential persons involved with her family, the Court has serious doubts that the mother has made sufficient progress in therapy to adequately protect her children at the present time.
. . . .
56. That it is evident that the mother has been unable to acknowledge to herself or to [Mark] that [Mark] was sexually abused by [Daniel] as evidenced by her statement in a letter that she wrote to [Mark] stating "[] I am sorry that Daniel made you feel uncomfortable . . . [.]"
57. That [Mark's] therapist believes that the mother's letter to [Mark] minimizes [Mark's] sexual abuse. . . .
. . . .
60. That despite completing parenting classes, the mother has not consistently demonstrated the skills she was expected to acquire in her parenting classes during visitation with her children. While the mother has made some progress in demonstrating new parenting skills, many of the efforts she made came after continual redirection from the supervising social worker and upon specific orders of this Court.
61. That the mother continues to have a difficult time redirecting inappropriate behaviors of the children during visitations. . . .
. . . .
64. That the mother's visitation has remained supervised since February 2007, in large part, because the mother has been unable to consistently demonstrate learned parenting skills during visitations with the children. Further, the mother's disregard for her children's emotional welfare, especially with regard[] to [Mark], is demonstrated by her continually bringing up her relationship with [Daniel] throughout her visitations.
65. That the mother was ordered to learn about the effects of neglect, domestic violence and substance abuse on children. While this information was presented in classes that the mother attended, the mother's behavior demonstrates that she does not understand or fully appreciate the effects that these issues and her choices have had on her children.
. . . .
71. That the Court has serious doubts that the mother truly believes that [Mark] was sexually abused by [Daniel] based on the mother's statements throughout the duration of this matter.
. . . .
82. That the mother still fails to make good parenting decisions throughout visitations, as demonstrated by the mother involving [Daniel] in the family visitations in a direct or indirect manner.
. . . .
83. That during visitations, the mother has allowed [Daniel] to call during visits and she held the phone to [Alex's] ear when [Mark] was present. She excuses this conduct by stating that the social worker didn't tell her it was inappropriate.
84. That the social worker testified that she told her that [Daniel] should have no contact during the visitations, but the mother still accepted [Daniel's] calls from prison during visitation periods.
85. That this conduct indicates that the mother cannot think about what is in the best interest[s] of all of her children. . . .
. . . .
92 That it appears that the mother may have spent more time pursuing a relationship with [Daniel] than actively working to reunify with her children.
. . . .
94. That the mother tried to make arrangements to marry [Daniel] while [] he was in prison. As late as February 2008, the mother told the Guardian ad Litem that she was going to marry [Daniel], move to Mexico, and take her kids with them. The mother denied ever making this statement.
. . . .
97. That in April 2007, the mother indicated to the Court that she understood that [Daniel] could be a barrier to her reunifying with her children, yet she continued a relationship with him, disregarding the consequences of her decision. Following [Mark's] disclosure of sexual abuse by [Daniel], the mother still continued a relationship with him for at least 15 months.
. . . .
109. The children believed that the mother prioritized [Daniel] over them. The mother admitted at this hearing that she prioritized [Daniel] over her children and over her reunification process.
. . . .
111. That the mother cannot articulate what she has learned to the social worker or to this Court. In her testimony during this hearing, the mother spoke in generalities, not specifics. It appears that the mother knows the right words to say to this Court and the other professionals that work with her, such as "ended relationship" and "abuse happened." While the mother has learned the appropriate psychological and therapeutic terms, she cannot articulate that she has made these concepts a part of her life and belief system.
. . . .
113. That the Court finds it unlikely that the mother has genuinely ended her relationship with [Daniel].
114. That the mother's testimony at this hearing regarding her ending her relationship with [Daniel] and her belief that [Mark] was sexually abused by [Daniel] are not credible. . . .
. . . .
116. The Court finds that there is a high probability of future neglect if the children were returned to the mother's care due to the following reasons: the mother's long-term denial and minimization of [Mark's] sexual abuse by [Daniel]; her minimizing the effect that her actions have had on her children; her lack of understanding of the issues that brought her children into custody, even after completing numerous classes; her lack of understanding of how her relationship with [Daniel] negatively impacts her relationship with her children; her willingness to co-parent [Alex] with [Daniel] despite the lack of demonstration of his ability to appropriately parent and his lack of treatment for the issues which placed the children outside the care of their parents.
117. That the conduct of the mother has been such as to demonstrate that she will not promote the healthy and orderly, physical and emotional well[-]being of [Mark] and [Alex].
119. That there are facts sufficient to warrant a determination that grounds exist for the termination of parental rights, said grounds as follows:
a. That the mother neglected the children within the meaning of N.C.G.S. § 7B-101(15), and it is probable that there would be a repetition of neglect if the children were returned to the care of the mother.
B. That the mother willfully left the children in foster care for more than twelve (12) months without showing to the satisfaction of the Court that reasonable progress under the circumstances has been made in correcting the conditions which led to the removal of the children. Poverty is not the sole reason that the mother is unable to care for the children.
Although Respondent assigns as error a majority of the above-cited findings of fact, Respondent's argument only addresses findings of fact numbers 41, 45, 47, 49, 60, 64, 111, 113, 116, and 119. Thus, the remaining assignments of error are deemed abandoned, N.C. R. App. P. 28(a), and the unchallenged findings are binding on appeal. Koufman v. Koufman, 330 N.C. 93, 97, 408 S.E.2d 729, 731 (1991).
Respondent contends that in making the challenged findings of fact, the trial court failed to take into account Daniel's likely permanent removal from the children's lives and Respondent's efforts and successes in addressing the concerns that initially led to Petitioner's involvement. Contrary to Respondent's contentions, however, the trial court specifically addressed these issues.
The trial court's finding of fact number 113 states that "it [is] unlikely that the mother has genuinely ended her relationship with [Daniel]." Respondent testified at the termination hearing that she had ended her relationship with Daniel on 21 August 2008. However, visitation logs from the Department of Correction showed that she had visited Daniel in prison as recently as 18 September 2008. Respondent also testified that she had talked to Daniel on the telephone "maybe, twice a week" since he had been in jail, and most recently on 30 October 2008. Furthermore, Respondent acknowledged that she had lied to the court in August of 2008 when she said that her relationship with Daniel had ended in April of 2008 when, in fact, she had visited him in prison four times in May, two times in June, two times in July, and one time in August.
Additionally, Respondent told Petitioner that she had ended her relationship with Daniel, even though she continued "going to see him, but just for me. I wasn't telling anybody." Moreover, although Debra Lawson, a licensed clinical social worker and licensed marriage and family therapist who treated Respondent, testified that Respondent had been "very open with her emotions" during counseling sessions and that Respondent had worked to address the issues of co-dependency, domestic violence, and self-esteem, Ms. Lawson learned at trial that Respondent had continued to see Daniel, even when Respondent had told Ms. Lawson that the relationship was over. Thus, Ms. Lawson's assessment of Respondent's progress could not have been accurate as it was based on Respondent's untruthful information, and Respondent's concealment of her relationship with Daniel prevented Ms. Lawson from adequately addressing Respondent's issues of co-dependency, domestic violence, self-esteem, and understanding of how her choices affect her children.
Additionally, finding of fact number 94 states that Respondent "tried to make arrangements to marry [Daniel] while he was in prison. As late as February 2008, [Respondent] told the Guardian ad Litem that she was going to marry [Daniel], move to Mexico, and take her kids with them." Respondent testified at the termination hearing that she had made arrangements with the jail to marry Daniel in October 2007. She also testified that Daniel had made her a ring and sent it to her.
Respondent acknowledged that Carol does not like Daniel and that Mark is afraid of Daniel. Although she testified that she did not think it was inappropriate to include Daniel's brother in a visit with Mark, she admitted that doing so would be a sign to Mark that Respondent was still involved with Daniel. When asked at the termination proceeding how she prioritized her children over Daniel, Respondent replied, "By not seeing him anymore, but I did go see him without telling the children." As Respondent then admitted, seeing Daniel without telling the children is not indicative of prioritizing her children over Daniel. Respondent further testified at the termination hearing that since Daniel's incarceration, she visited him on average once a week and spoke with him on the telephone approximately two to three times per week.
While Respondent argues that "the trial court failed to take into account Daniel's likely permanent removal[,]" there was no evidence before the court that Daniel had been deported due to his illegal immigrant status, or that he did not intend to attempt to re-enter the United States were he deported. Furthermore, even if Daniel were deported, the evidence before the court is that Respondent intended to marry him and move to Mexico with the children to be with him.
Respondent further argues that finding of fact number 111 punishes Respondent for poor communication skills and bases the continuation of her parental rights upon her being able to speak in eloquent sentences. Respondent's argument is misplaced. At issue is not Respondent's ability to communicate but, rather, her inability to correct the environment which was injurious to the children's welfare.
While Respondent may have attended therapy and counseling sessions, her mere attendance at the sessions was not the means by which Respondent could correct the conditions that led to the children's neglect. Her attendance was the means by which she was to acquire the skills needed to address and resolve such conditions. At the hearing, Respondent was not able to articulate how she had used any knowledge she had gained to correct the issues which led to the children's neglect. More importantly, however, her actions prior to the hearing did not show how she had used any knowledge she had gained to correct issues which led to the children's neglect. On the contrary, her actions demonstrated the exact opposite.
At the hearing, the following exchange took place between counsel for Petitioner and Respondent:
[Counsel:]. . . . In your opinion, have you been able to gain an understanding of how your co-dependent relationships reinforce negative behavior?
[Respondent:] Yes.
[Counsel:] And can you give me some examples of that?
[Respondent:] Well, one thing is because Dan[iel] is not in the picture anymore. Daniel's not here.
[Counsel:] Now, when you say Daniel's not here. What do you mean by that?
[Respondent:] Co-dependence is one person — the other person has the alcohol problem, and I kind of — I help him with his problem.
[Counsel:] Okay. And how do you think that you've demonstrated that you understand why that's a problem?
[Respondent:] I have been going to see Debbie [Lawson], and she's been giving me reading material, and I've just — I mean I can't really demonstrate except to show that, you know, I'm not with him.
[Counsel:] When did you end your relationship with [Daniel]?
[Respondent:] Officially, I ended it in August, was the last time I saw him.
However, as discussed supra, Respondent did not end her relationship in August and continued to see Daniel at the prison and talk to him on the phone. Accordingly, neither Respondent's testimony nor her actions demonstrated that she had made progress toward correcting her co-dependence, which was one cause of the neglect of her children.
Furthermore, Respondent was asked at the hearing, "How would you ensure that your children would be safe in your care based on the past 20 months of your children being in the custody of Wake County Human Services and your progress in your case plan?" Respondent replied, "What do you mean?" Respondent was then asked, "How can you ensure that they're going to be safe?" Respondent replied, "I wouldn't make any mistakes. I mean people can make mistakes, and I'd make sure that they're in school and take them to the doctors when they need to, make sure that they're still in therapy." Furthermore, although Respondent claimed that she would be able to protect her children from future domestic violence, when asked how she planned to do this, Respondent answered, "What do you mean how would I plan? [Daniel] wouldn't be allowed to come around the house." However, Respondent admitted that, despite the domestic violence that had already occurred, Respondent had never taken out a domestic violence protective order and had never changed her phone numbers or address to keep Daniel from contacting her. Accordingly, the trial court did not "punish" Respondent for not "speak[ing] in eloquent sentences" but, rather, determined from the evidence that Respondent had not demonstrated that she had adequately addressed the conditions that led to the children's neglect.
The record evidence and the unchallenged findings show that Respondent continued to deny Mark's sexual abuse; continued to minimize the effects her relationship with Daniel have had on her children; continued to perpetuate her relationship with Daniel despite disastrous consequences for herself and her children; continued to lie to everyone about her relationship with Daniel; and failed to show that she would be able to provide a safe home for the children in the future.
Accordingly, we conclude that the challenged findings of fact are supported by clear, cogent, and convincing evidence, and that those findings, along with the unchallenged findings, adequately support the trial court's conclusion that Respondent's parental rights to Mark and Alex were subject to termination pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1111(a)(1). Respondent's assignments of error addressed to this issue are, therefore, overruled. In light of this holding, we need not address Respondent's argument regarding the remaining ground for termination found by the trial court. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1111(a) (2007).
B. Children's Best Interests
Respondent also argues that the trial court erred in concluding that it was in the best interests of the children to terminate Respondent's parental rights. We disagree.
In making the best interests determination, the trial court shall consider:
(1) The age of the juvenile.
(2) The likelihood of adoption of the juvenile.
(3) Whether the termination of parental rights will aid in the accomplishment of the permanent plan for the juvenile.
(4) The bond between the juvenile and the parent.
(5) The quality of the relationship between the juvenile and the proposed adoptive parent, guardian, custodian, or other permanent placement.
(6) Any relevant consideration.
In this case, the trial court made the following findings of fact relevant to the children's best interests:
120. That [Mark] is nine years old and [Alex] is twenty-five (25) months old. [Alex] hasn't lived with the mother since he was approximately four months old.
121. That the permanent plan for both children is adoption.
122. That termination of the parental rights of the mother will aid in achieving the children's permanent plan.
123. That the fathers of both children have relinquished their parental rights to the children and the time to revoke those relinquishments has expired.
124. That the likelihood of both children being adopted is extremely high.
125. That [Alex] is a healthy, happy child and presents no known barriers to adoption. He is in a pre-adoptive home and is highly bonded to his foster parents. [Alex] has been placed in the same foster home since he came into care.
126. That [Alex] recognizes his mother, but is not old enough to understand their biological or legal relationship. During visits, he will interact with the mother, but gravitates towards his foster parents. He continues to show some discomfort with the mother's insistence on carrying him around during visits rather than allowing him to play independently from her.
127. That [Mark] is a happy, energetic and likeable child. He has shown great resilience since coming into the custody of WCHS. He has adjusted well when he has changed placements and is able to bond with new caregivers.
128. That [Mark] is not in a pre-adoptive home, but he has shown the ability to bond with foster parents. [Mark] loves his mom and wants to be her child, but he also wants to be safe. [Mark] needs a permanent home and the mother cannot provide a safe home for him in the near future, if at all.
129. That WCHS will attempt to find an adoptive home that will allow contact with all siblings, but it may not be in [Mark's] best interest to be raised in a home with [Alex].
131. That [Mark] has a bond with his sisters and [Alex]. However, it is in [Mark's] best interest that he be adopted, despite this bond. During this case, [Mark's] sisters have rejected and blamed [Mark] for the family's involvement with WCHS and the Court has concerns that this rejection will continue.
132. That [Alex] is bonded to his siblings and his prospective adoptive parents intend to foster [Alex's] relationship with them.
133. That the minor children are in need of a permanent plan of care at the earliest possible age which can be obtained only by the severing of the relationship between the children and the mother by termination of the parental rights of the mother.
134. That it is in [Mark's] best interest that the mother's parental rights be terminated.
135. That it is in [Alex's] best interest that the mother's parental rights be terminated.
The trial court thus concluded:
[7.] That it is in the best interests of the children that the parental rights of the mother be terminated.
Respondent assigns error only to findings of fact numbers 134 and 135. Accordingly, the remaining findings are binding on appeal. Koufman, 330 N.C. at 97, 408 S.E.2d at 731. The unchallenged findings of fact establish that the trial court considered the factors required by N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1110(a). They also support the trial court's determination that it is in the best interests of the children to terminate Respondent's parental rights.
Respondent again contends that the trial court failed to consider Respondent's improvements and changed conditions. However, while the trial court considered Respondent's improvements and the evidence of changed conditions, the trial court found, and Respondent does not challenge, that "the mother cannot provide a safe home for [Mark] in the near future, if at all."
Accordingly, we find no abuse of discretion in the trial court's determination that it is in the best interests of the children to terminate Respondent's parental rights. The assignments of error upon which this argument is based are overruled.
The judgment of the trial court is
Affirmed.
Judges STROUD and ERVIN concur.
Report per Rule 30(e).