Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, No. CK67764, Valerie Skeba, Juvenile Court Referee; ORIGINAL PROCEEDING. Affirmed; writ denied.
Lori A. Fields, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
James M. Owens, Assistant County Counsel, and Kim Nemoy, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
ALDRICH, J.
INTRODUCTION
Miriam C., mother of M.C., appeals from the order of the juvenile court that terminated her parental rights. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 366.26.) First, mother contends the juvenile court erred in terminating her reunification services and setting the permanent planning hearing. Because mother was not properly notified of her obligation to petition for extraordinary writ review of this order, we construe her challenge as a petition for writ of mandate. Second, mother contends the juvenile court erred in failing to apply the parental-relationship exception to adoption. (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(i).) Because the evidence supports the court’s rulings, we deny the writ petition and affirm the order terminating mother’s parental rights.
All further statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
1. Jurisdiction and disposition
When M.C. was three years old in 2007, the juvenile court sustained a petition finding true its allegations that mother and father endangered M.C. by engaging in a police chase with the child as a passenger but not in a child safety seat, and with cocaine in M.C.’s reach. (§ 300, subd. (b).) Both parents were arrested. As a case plan, the court ordered mother to participate in drug rehabilitation and testing, parent education, and individual counseling. It also awarded mother visitation to be monitored by someone approved by the Department of Children and Family Services (the Department).
Father is not a party to this appeal.
Mother, who has aliases, had been arrested four times in 2003 and 2004 for drug-related crimes and was on probation at the time of the police pursuit. The police informed the social worker that several of mother’s relatives had also been arrested for narcotic sales and transportation and were deported. Mother would be placed on an Immigration and Customs Enforcement Hold.
When the Department detained M.C., the child stated her desire to be with mother. She appeared well-groomed and healthy. The juvenile court ordered her detained from her parents. The Department eventually placed her with relatives. Her caretaker reported that M.C. would cry and become upset after hearing her mother’s voice on the telephone. The child ceased crying out for her parents in May 2007, but persisted in her belief her parents would return.
Mother contacted the caretakers about M.C. Although initially she did not want the child to visit her in jail, she changed her mind, and so M.C. visited mother twice in May 2007.
2. The six month review hearing (§ 366.21, subd. (e))
In December 2007, the Department reported that mother had been placed at Valley State Women’s Prison in Chowchilla. She had been convicted and was given a two-year sentence and a deportation order that would take effect after her scheduled release. M.C. visited mother “several” times at the detention facility. Mother spoke to the child on the telephone “several times” a week.
While in prison, mother took 14 parenting classes and 16 drug education classes. She had not completed those programs, but had completed 10 other education courses, not ordered by the juvenile court, such as classes on self-esteem and healthy relationships. Mother explained to the social worker that the prison did not offer all programs on a consistent basis and sometimes her cleaning and food-service duties prevented her from attending class. The social worker attached mother’s certificates of completion to the status review report. Mother had not begun court-ordered individual counseling. She explained that she was unable to enroll, but would as soon as she was able.
M.C. was moved to the home of another relative, paternal aunt Maritza S. The child and mother wanted to be reunited. The caretaker was willing to be a guardian, and would adopt the child “if I have to.”
After several continuances, the six-month review hearing was held on January 30, 2008. Mother’s attorney explained that she did not know whether mother could complete her case plan by the 12 month mark. Neither mother nor counsel knew when mother would be released, although mother indicated it would be in May 2009. Counsel argued that mother wanted to reunify as soon as she was released; her relationship with M.C. was “close” because they talked on the telephone several times a week, mother wrote the child letters, and M.C. visited mother in jail. Counsel also observed that mother had almost completed parenting classes and was attending her drug program. Finally, counsel surmised that mother “might have an opportunity to come back to this country before the reunification period is up.” (Italics added.)
The juvenile court found mother was not in compliance with the case plan. Further, the court found, based on the information contained in the report, that it was “more than highly unlikely that the mother would be able to resume custody of the minor child within the next six months because of the fact that she’s in state custody reportedly until 2009, and then she’s under a deportation order.” The court terminated services for mother but, because it was continuing the hearing to review father’s participation in reunification, it did not set the permanent plan hearing under section 366.26. The court agreed with the Department that mother could always file a section 388 petition for modification in the interim showing completion of her case plan. The court scheduled a contested hearing into whether reasonable services had been offered. Mother’s attorney waived mother’s appearance.
At the continued contested hearing into the Department’s provision of services under section 366.21, subdivision (e), held on April 23, 2008, father submitted on the recommendation to terminate reunification services as to him because of the length of his incarceration. Mother’s attorney was present but did not offer argument about the reasonableness of services. The court found by a preponderance of the evidence that return of the child to the physical custody of the parents would create a substantial risk of detriment to M.C.’s physical and emotional health and safety. The court terminated reunification services stating, “the parents have not been able to comply with the case plan, due to their incarceration.” “There is little likelihood that further reunification services would result in a different outcome, given the length of time of the parents’ incarceration [where] the.21(f) is coming up in approximately six weeks.” (Italics added.) The court ordered the clerk to mail mother notice of her writ rights “to the mother’s place of incarceration at Chowchilla.”
3. The permanent plan hearing (§ 366.26)
Despite a juvenile court order in August 2008 granting mother telephone contact with M.C. twice a month for 20 minutes, mother did not telephone M.C. before November 4, 2008. The child visited mother four times between October 26 and December 14, 2008. The visits went well. M.C. had stopped crying at night. By April 2009, M.C. was having bi-monthly visits with mother. M.C. reportedly stated that she will move to Las Vegas with mother and father once they are released from jail.
M.C. was “doing well” in her placement. She and her prospective adoptive mother, Maritza S., had “a close relationship.” M.C. was playful with Maritza S. and comfortable in her home and presence. Indeed, the social worker found that the child was attached to Maritza S. M.C. stated that if she could not reunite with her parents, she wanted to live with “Mama Maritza.”
The grandmother originally believed that if there were no adoption, then the Department would return M.C. to her parents. Eventually, the grandparents came to accept adoption as the permanent plan. Hence, Maritza S. decided she wanted to adopt the child as the two had become attached to one another. Maritza S. was committed to facilitating the child’s visits with her parents upon their release from jail.
Although mother was scheduled to be released in May 2009, she was on an immigration hold. She received her deportation order in March 2009.
Just before the permanent planning hearing (§ 366.26), mother filed a section 388 petition requesting reinstatement of reunification services. Her petition, however, did not contain new evidence showing completion of any additional court-ordered services. Rather, it referred to documentation already in the record. The court summarily denied the petition and mother did not appeal.
At the section 366.26 hearing, the juvenile court indicated that it had met with counsel to discuss whether the parent-child relationship exception to adoption applied. The court assured mother it had given a lot of thought to the question. The court found, although mother loves her child, given M.C.’s need for stability and mother’s imminent deportation, that the likelihood mother would be able to parent the child was speculative at best. The court concluded that it did not have a legal basis for not terminating mother’s parental rights, and so ordered mother’s parental rights terminated. Mother appeals.
CONTENTIONS
Mother contends that the juvenile court erred in terminating reunification services, and in refusing to apply the parental relationship exception to adoption (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(i)).
DISCUSSION
1. Mother was not given proper notice of her writ right sand so her challenge to the termination of reunification services is cognizable on appeal from the disposition after the section 366.26 hearing.
Mother contends she was not given proper notice of her right to file a petition for extraordinary writ review.
“An order setting a section 366.26 hearing ‘is not appealable; direct appellate consideration of the propriety of the setting order may be had only by petition for extraordinary writ review of the order. [Citations.]’ [Citation.]” (Jennifer T. v. Superior Court (2007) 159 Cal.App.4th 254, 259, citing § 366.26, subd. (l).) Whenever the juvenile court sets a section 366.26 hearing, it must orally advise the parties present that they must petition for an extraordinary writ if they wish to preserve any right to appellate review of the order setting the section 366.26 hearing. (§ 366.26, subd. (l)(3)(A).) For parties who are not present in court at the time the court sets the section 366.26 hearing, notice must be made by “first-class mail by the clerk of the court to the last known address of” the absent party. (§ 366.26, subd. (l)(3)(A).)
Mother was present at the hearing in January 30, 2008, when the juvenile court terminated her reunification services, but the court specifically did not set the section 366.26 hearing and did not notify mother on that day of her writ rights. Mother was not present at the subsequent hearing on April 23, 2008, when the court set the section 366.26 hearing, which triggered the notice requirements. The court directed the clerk on April 23, to provide mother with the required notice in Chowchilla. The Department’s most recent status review report listed mother’s address as Valley State Prison for Women in Chowchilla, California. The Department’s notice to mother alerting her to the January six-month review hearing had been sent to Chowchilla. Notwithstanding this address of record, the court clerk sent mother’s writ notice to the Century Regional Detention Center in Lynwood. The Department defends this by arguing only that “it is possible that [mother] remained in local custody at Century Regional Detention Center in Lynwood at the time the court clerk mailed the advisement.” Regardless of what was “possible,” the statute directs the clerk to mail notices to mother’s “last known address” (§ 366.26, subd. (l)(3)(A), italics added), and the Regional Detention Center was simply not mother’s last known address. Thus, mother was not notified as required. (§ 366.26, subd. (l)(3)(A).)
The Department argues that notice to mother’s attorney was sufficient. A similar argument was rejected in In re Cathina W. (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 716. The appellate court there explained: “The ‘burden is on the parent in a juvenile dependency case to pursue his or her appellate rights[; i]t is not the attorney’s burden.’ [Citations.] In the absence of a specific direction from the mother, her attorney in the juvenile court was not obligated to take any steps to comply with section 366.26, subdivision (l), on the mother’s behalf. Because the mother had not been notified that she must seek relief by writ petition under this statute, she could not very well have directed her attorney to take steps to do so.” (In re Cathina W., supra, at pp. 723-724, fn. omitted.) Likewise here, as the juvenile court failed to provide mother with notice of her writ requirement, she may challenge the order terminating her reunification services.
However, mother may not challenge that order by appeal. (Jennifer T. v. Superior Court, supra, 159 Cal.App.4th at p. 260, disagreeing with In re Merrick V. (2004) 122 Cal.App.4th 235, 247-249.) Rather, as we explained in Jennifer T., the right to appeal is purely statutory, and so appellate courts may not confer the right to appeal as a remedy for the juvenile court’s failure to advise a party of the writ requirement. The better approach is to allow “direct review of the order setting a section 366.26 hearing by way of ordinary petition for writ of mandate, without regard to the shortened period for writ review that would otherwise be applicable. [Citations.]” (Jennifer T., supra, at p. 260.) Therefore, we construe mother’s purported appeal from the order terminating her reunification services as a petition for writ of mandate. (Ibid.; In re Harmony B. (2005)125 Cal.App.4th 831, 838 [failure to give notice of writ right allows parent to challenge orders at setting hearing in appeal from disposition following order terminating parental rights]; see also In re Rashad B. (1999) 76 Cal.App.4th 442, 450 [failure to give notice of writ right renders claims of error in setting permanency planning hearing cognizable on appeal from order terminating parental rights].)
2. The juvenile court did not err in terminating reunification services for mother.
Turning to the merits of mother’s challenge to the termination of services, she contends first that she was entitled to a “presumptive” minimum of 12 months of reunification services and the court’s termination of services at the six-month review hearing (§ 366.21, subd. (e)), some 10 and one-half months into her services was reversible error.
While certainly, reunification services are an essential element of the dependency system (In re Derrick S. (2007) 156 Cal.App.4th 436, 444), we disagree that mother was presumptively entitled to 12 months. With respect to the statutory framework in 2008 when the juvenile court terminated mother’s reunification services, the “dependency scheme set[] up three distinct periods and three corresponding distinct escalating standards for the provision of reunification services to parents of children under the age of three. During the first period, which runs from roughly the jurisdictional hearing (§ 355) to the six-month review hearing (§ 366.21, subd. (e)), services are afforded essentially as a matter of right (§ 361.5, subd. (a)) unless the trial court makes one of a series of statutorily specified findings relating to parental mental disability, abandonment of the child, or other specific malfeasance (§ 361.5, subd. (b)). During the second period, which runs from the six-month review hearing to the 12-month review hearing (§ 366.21, subd. (f)), a heightened showing is required to continue services. So long as reasonable services have in fact been provided, the juvenile court must find ‘a substantial probability’ that the child may be safely returned to the parent within six months in order to continue services. (§ 366.21, subd. (e).) During the final period, which runs from the 12-month review hearing to the 18-month review hearing (§ 366.22), services are available only if the juvenile court finds specifically that the parent has ‘consistently and regularly contacted and visited with the child,’ made ‘significant progress’ on the problems that led to removal, and ‘demonstrated the capacity and ability both to complete the objectives of his or her treatment plan and to provide for the child’s safety, protection, physical and emotional well-being, and special needs.’ (§ 366.21, subd. (g)(1)(A)-(C).) The effect of these shifting standards is to make services during these three periods first presumed, then possible, then disfavored. Additionally, because at each subsequent review hearing the court is statutorily obligated to reevaluate the propriety of future services under the new applicable standard for that hearing (§§ 361.5, subds. (a), (b), 366.21, subds. (e)-(g)), juvenile courts lack the authority to order services extending beyond the next review hearing.” (Tonya M. v. Superior Court, supra, 42 Cal.4th at p. 845, italics added, fn. omitted.)
The Legislature amended the statutory framework in 2008 to take effect in 2009 to establish minimum time frame for reunification services. (Sen. Judiciary Com., Analysis of Assem. Bill No. 2341 (2007-2008 Reg. Sess.) as amended Apr. 16, 2008, pp. 1, 4-7.) Mother argues that the history of Assembly Bill No. 2341 indicates that the Legislature’s intention was to clarify that the section 361.5 set forth minimum time frames. We disagree. Reviewing the legislative history, it shows that the bill sought “to establish minimum time frames,” (italics added), not clarify an existing intent. Indeed, the Senate Judiciary Committee quoted from Tonya M. v. Superior Court (2007) 42 Cal.4th 836 as “succinctly summariz[ing] the standards and timelines under which courts currently order reunification services;” i.e., the status quo. (Sen. Judiciary Com., Analysis of Assem. Bill No. 2341, supra, at p. 4, italics added.) Assembly Bill No. 2341 was designed to “impose a higher threshold for the termination of reunification services” (ibid., italics added), when the bill took effect in 2009.
Even if an argument might be made that, after the amendments which took effect in 2009, a parent of a child over the age of three is entitled to a minimum of 12 months of reunification services, that was simply not the case before 2009. (See fn. 3, supra.) Mother’s reunification services were terminated in 2008 and so the amendments do not apply to her.
Section 361.5, subdivision (a)(1), in effect in 2008, provided that services “shall not exceed” 12 months from the date the child, age three or older, entered foster care. As noted in Aryanna C., “reunification services constitute a benefit; there is no constitutional ‘ “entitlement” ’ to those services. [Citation.]” (In re Aryanna C. (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 1234, 1242; accord, In re Derrick S., supra, 156 Cal.App.4th at p. 445.) Thus, “ ‘the maximum period’ ” for a child over three years of age is 12 months. (Id. at p. 447, quoting from In re Aryanna C., supra, [involving same principle for dependent children under the age of three].) “Put even more bluntly, there [was] no absolute right to receive the maximum amount of statutorily fixed services in any and all circumstances.” (In re Derrick S., supra, at p. 445.) Therefore, in 2008, when the juvenile court decided to terminate mother’s reunification services, mother did not have the presumptive right to a full 12 months of services, only a possibility of those services. In any event, she received 10 months of services.
In 2008, to continue services after the first six months, as noted, “a heightened showing [was] required.... So long as reasonable services have in fact been provided, the juvenile court must find ‘a substantial probability’ that the child may be safely returned to the parent within six months in order to continue services. (§ 366.21, subd. (e).)” (Tonya M. v. Superior Court, supra, 42 Cal.4th at p. 845.)
Mother contends that the juvenile court did not make the finding that reasonable services were provided by the required clear and convincing standard pursuant to section 366.21, subdivision (g)(2), and the record does not support a finding that the Department provided reasonable services.
Initially, we disagree with mother that section 366.21, subdivision (g)(2) applied in this case. By its terms, that provision requires the court to make its finding that reasonable services have been provided by the clear and convincing evidence standard, if court-ordered services were provided for at least the time periods set forth in section 361.5 and the child is not returned to the parent’s custody at the section 366.21, subdivision (f) hearing. (§ 366.21, subd. (g).) At the April 23, 2008 hearing, the court specified that it was holding a section 366.21, subdivision (e) hearing and observed that the subdivision (f) 12-month date was approximately six weeks away. Accordingly, the requisite standard was preponderance of the evidence (§ 366.21, subd. (e)), the standard the juvenile court used.
Section 366.21, subdivision (g) reads in relevant part, “If the time period in which the court-ordered services were provided has met or exceeded the time period set forth in... Section 361.5, as appropriate, and a child is not returned to the custody of a parent or legal guardian at the permanency hearing held pursuant to subdivision (f), the court shall do one of the following: [¶]... [¶]... Order that a hearing be held within 120 days, pursuant to Section 366.26, but only if the court does not continue the case to the permanency planning review hearing and there is clear and convincing evidence that reasonable services have been provided or offered to the parents or legal guardians.” (§ 366.21, subd. (g)(2), italics added.)
Furthermore, mother forfeited her challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the juvenile court’s finding. An appellate court’s discretion to consider forfeited claims extends to dependency cases and “the discretion must be exercised with special care in such matters.” (In re S.B. (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1287, 1293.) Here, the juvenile court effectively held two hearings under section 366.21, subdivision (e). On January 30, 2008, the court terminated mother’s reunification services and, although mother’s attorney argued that mother had been complying with her case plan, neither she nor her counsel argued that the Department failed to provide adequate services. Then, on April 23, 2008, the court addressed the question of services. Although this hearing focused on father, the express purpose for the hearing was evaluation of the Department’s provision of services. Yet, mother declined to be present for that hearing. Furthermore, at the April 23rd hearing, the court found: “by a preponderance of the evidence, that return of the child to the physical custody of the parents would create a substantial risk of detriment to the minor’s physical and emotional health and safety[;]” “[r]easonable efforts have been made to prevent or eliminate the need for further removal[;]” and “[a]t this point in time, reunification services are terminated. The parents have not been able to comply with the case plan, due to their incarceration.” (Italics added.) The court’s use of the plural (parents) indicates its findings were applicable to both mother and father. Mother’s attorney was present on April 23rd, but posed no objection to the provision of services to mother. Accordingly, mother has forfeited her contention that the evidence does not support the finding that the Department failed to provide adequate services.
Notwithstanding mother’s forfeiture, we conclude that the record discloses substantial evidence to support the juvenile court’s finding that reasonable services were provided or offered. (Angela S. v. Superior Court (1995) 36 Cal.App.4th 758, 762.) “ ‘Reunification services implement “the law’s strong preference for maintaining the family relationships if at all possible.” [Citation.]’ [Citations.] Therefore, reasonable reunification services must be offered to a parent. [Citation.] The reunification plan is ‘a crucial part of a dispositional order.’ [Citations.]” (Mark N. v. Superior Court (1998) 60 Cal.App.4th 996, 1010.)
The Department must make a “ ‘ “ ‘good faith effort’ ” ’ to provide reasonable services responsive to the unique needs of each family [citations]... in spite of difficulties in doing so or the prospects of success. [Citations.]” (Mark N. v. Superior Court, supra, 60 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1010-1011.) We judge the Department’s efforts according to the circumstances of each case. (In re Ronell A. (1995)44 Cal.App.4th 1352, 1362.) The record should show that the Department maintained reasonable contact with the parents during the reunification period and made reasonable efforts to assist the parents in areas where compliance proved difficult. (Ibid.) Yet, “in reviewing the reasonableness of the reunification services provided by the Department, we must also recognize that in most cases more services might have been provided, and the services which are provided are often imperfect. The standard is not whether the services provided were the best that might have been provided, but whether they were reasonable under the circumstances. [Citation.]” (Elijah R. v. Superior Court (1998) 66 Cal.App.4th 965, 969.)
For incarcerated parents, reasonable services may include, among other things: “[¶] (A) Maintaining contact between the parent and child through collect telephone calls. [¶] (B) Transportation services, where appropriate. [¶] (C) Visitation services, where appropriate.” (§ 361.5, subd. (e)(1).) Additionally, if the parent is required to attend programs or services, the “social worker shall document in the child’s case plan the particular barriers to an incarcerated or institutionalized parent’s access to those court-mandated services and ability to maintain contact with his or her child.” (Ibid.)
Here, the record shows that, while not perfect, the services the Department provided were reasonable under the circumstances and comported with section 361.5, subdivision (e). The social worker organized mother’s telephonic and in-person contact with M.C. and assured they were occurring while resolving issues over telephone calls (§ 361.5, subd. (e)(1)(A) & (C)). The Department maintained contact with mother, and monitored, documented her progress in classes, obtained her attendance records, and provided them to the court (§ 361.5, subd. (e)(1)). That mother was unable to undergo counseling is not the Department’s fault. “Nor was the department in any position to rectify this problem: prisons are run by the Department of Corrections, not the department of children’s services.” (In re Ronell A., supra, 44 Cal.App.4th at p. 1363.) Finally, the social worker monitored and kept the juvenile court appraised of the status of mother’s deportation order (§ 361.5, subd. (e)(1)). In short, the record supports the juvenile court’s finding that reasonable services were provided.
The facts of this case are unlike In re Maria S. (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 1032, Mark N. v. Superior Court, supra, 60 Cal.App.4th 996, or In re Brittany S. (1993) 17 Cal.App.4th 1399, cited by mother. The appellate court in Maria S. held that the case plan was flawed from the outset and also that the record was devoid of any evidence to suggest what services the Department identified as available or offered while the mother was in prison. (In re Maria S., supra, at p. 1040.) In Mark N., the Department had apparently failed even to consider visitation (60 Cal.App.4th at p. 1009, fn. 5), and hardly maintained contact with the father (id. at p. 1013). In Brittany S., the Department failed to provide for visitation or to monitor the mother’s progress in prison. (17 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1403 & 1407.) By contrast, here the Department met all of its obligations.
In any event, the juvenile court addressed this issue three times. In addition to both six-month review hearings, in January 2009, mother filed a section 388 petition requesting reinstatement of services. The juvenile court summarily denied the petition because, among other things, it did not provide new evidence or a change of circumstances showing mother’s progress toward completion of services. Stated otherwise, even by January 2009, which fell beyond the 18-month drop dead date for reunification services, mother could not show that she had completed her case plan. Therefore, the court did not err in terminating services with the result mother’s writ petition is denied.
3. The juvenile court did not err in its analysis of the parental relationship exception to adoption (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(i)).
Mother contends that the juvenile court was so focused on mother’s potential, imminent deportation that it failed to consider the visitation and contact mother had with M.C., or the bond the two had. She further argues that even applying the appropriate standards, substantial evidence does not support the juvenile court’s refusal to apply the parental-relationship exception. We disagree.
At the permanency planning hearing, the juvenile court must order one of three dispositional alternatives: adoption, guardianship, or long-term foster care. (In re S.B. (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 289, 296-297.) The Legislature has declared a strong preference for adoption over the alternative plans if the dependent child is adoptable. (Ibid.) Thus, the statute directs, if the court finds that the child is adoptable, “the court shall terminate parental rights” unless the court “finds a compelling reason for determining that termination would be detrimental to the child due to” one of the six delineated exceptions. (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1) & (c)(1)(B), italics added.) Thus, only if a compelling reason for applying an exception may the court select a plan other than adoption.
The exception to adoption mother relies on is that found in section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(B)(i), the so-called parental-relationship exception. This exception applies when the court finds that (1) “[t]he parents have maintained regular visitation and contact with the child and [(2)] the child would benefit from continuing the relationship.” (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(A)(i), italics added.) As the parent, mother bore the burden to show application of this exception. (In re Megan S. (2002) 104 Cal.App.4th 247, 251.)
On appeal, “[w]e determine whether there is substantial evidence to support the court’s ruling by reviewing the evidence most favorably to the prevailing party and indulging in all legitimate and reasonable inferences to uphold the court’s ruling. [Citation.] The reviewing court must affirm a trial court’s rejection of these exceptions if the ruling is supported by substantial evidence. [Citations.]” (In re B.D. (2008) 159 Cal.App.4th 1218, 1235.)
“[T]o terminate parental rights, the court need only make two findings: (1) that there is clear and convincing evidence that the minor will be adopted; and (2) that there has been a previous determination that reunification services shall be terminated.” (Cynthia D. v. Superior Court (1993) 5 Cal.4th 242, 249-250, italics added.) Once the court makes these two findings, “ ‘the decision to terminate parental rights will be relatively automatic.’...” (Id. at p. 250.) Mother does not challenge the juvenile court’s determination that M.C. is adoptable. Nor does she argue that the court did not terminate reunification services. Therefore, the termination of mother’s parental rights was “relatively automatic.” (Ibid.)
Mother’s argument is that the juvenile court did not explain why the parental relationship exception to adoption did not apply. Yet, the statute requires the court to state its findings on the record only when it decides to apply the exception to adoption. Section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(B) reads, “If the court finds that termination of parental rights would be detrimental to the child pursuant to [one of the six exceptions], it shall state its reasons in writing or on the record.” Here, because the court did not conclude that termination of parental rights would be detrimental to M.C., it had no further obligation to state its reasons on the record. (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B), last par.)
Mother argues that the juvenile court did not explain why the parent-child bond was not sufficient or comment on the regularity of contact. But the only finding that section 366.26 requires the juvenile court to state on the record is the finding “that termination of parental rights would be detrimental to the child” because of one of the exceptions to adoption. (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B), last par., italics added.)
We disagree with mother that (1) the juvenile court performed “an inadequate legal analysis” of the exception to adoption she advocates for, and that (2) the record supports application of that exception.
To carry her burden with respect to the parental-relationship exception, mother was obligated to “prove... she occupies a parental role in the child’s life resulting in a significant, positive emotional attachment of the child to the parent. [Citations.]” (In re B.D., supra, 159 Cal.App.4th at p. 1234.) However “[t]he juvenile court may reject the parent’s claim simply by finding that the relationship maintained during visitation does not benefit the child significantly enough to outweigh the strong preference for adoption.” (In re Jasmine D. (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 1339, 1350.)
Here, the juvenile court stated it had given the issue of the exception a lot of thought. It clearly found that the mother-child relationship did not benefit M.C. significantly enough to outweigh the strong preference for stability through adoption. (In re Jasmine D., supra, 78 Cal.App.4th at p. 1350.) Well aware of M.C.’s “fundamental independent interest in belonging to a family unit [citation] and... compelling rights... to have a placement that is stable, permanent, and that allows the caretaker to make a full emotional commitment to the child [citation]” (In re Marilyn H. (1993) 5 Cal.4th 295, 306), the court made the child’s need for stability the central consideration. It explained, while M.C. loves her mother “a great deal,” their relationship maintained over the course of the dependency was outweighed by mother’s likely deportation which rendered ability to parent the child “rather speculative” such that “to not free the child for adoption would just create instability in this child’s life.” The analysis was not erroneous.
DISPOSITION
The petition for writ of mandate challenging the order terminating reunification services is denied. The judgment terminating mother’s parental rights is affirmed.
We concur: KLEIN, P. J., KITCHING, J.