Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Super. Ct. Nos. JD222451, JD222452 & JD222453
BLEASE , Acting P. J.
A.B. (appellant), the mother of M.B., K.B., and Mo.B. (the minors), appeals from an order of the juvenile court denying appellant’s petitions for modification. (Welf. & Inst. Code, §§ 388, 395; further undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.) Appellant’s sole contention on appeal is that the juvenile court abused its discretion in denying her petitions for modification. Disagreeing with that contention, we affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On May 24, 2005, Sacramento County Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) filed original juvenile dependency petitions pursuant to section 300 on behalf of the minors, who were nine and 10 years old at the time. Those petitions alleged in part that appellant’s substance abuse rendered her incapable of providing adequate care of the minors. Appellant has two criminal convictions for possession of a controlled substance for sale. According to appellant, she used her drug of choice, methamphetamine, first at the age of 15.
K.B. and Mo.B. are twin girls.
The juvenile court sustained the petitions as amended, adjudged the minors dependent children, and ordered them removed from parental custody. The court also ordered DHHS to offer appellant reunification services. The court granted appellant regular visitation with the minors.
In its December 2005 report, DHHS noted that appellant’s visits with the minors generally went well. However, appellant was late to and missed some visits. On July 13, 2006, the juvenile court terminated appellant’s reunification services. Thereafter, the court ordered a permanent plan of guardianship for the minors, who were placed together.
In May 2007, DHHS reported the minors opposed adoption. Appellant had maintained contact with the minors by telephone, but had not visited them for some time. As of November 2007, however, appellant was visiting the minors again, this time monthly on a supervised basis.
On January 7, 2008, appellant filed a petition for modification on behalf of each of the minors, seeking a period of additional reunification services. Alleging she had been engaged in services on her own initiative, appellant attached to each petition documents supporting her claim.
In the petitions, appellant averred that an additional period of services was in the best interests of the minors because appellant could establish she had met the expectations of the minors that she must improve her circumstances. Moreover, appellant argued, in their current placement the minors lacked permanence. Finally, according to appellant, the minors enjoyed their visits with appellant, and their eventual goal was reunification with appellant.
At the February 28, 2008, hearing on appellant’s petitions for modification, counsel for appellant argued appellant had “made a complete turn around at this point in her life, completely different, completely changed.” According to counsel, appellant had “done everything that she could to show the court that she is willing to be with [the minors] again,” the minors had not achieved permanency in their placement, and each wanted to be reunited with appellant.
In denying appellant’s modification petitions, the juvenile court stated in part that it “[had] carefully considered all the arguments and I went back and looked over the file. I -- what I’m getting from this, having looked this over and heard from everybody, there does need to be -- a decision needs to be made for these kids. I’m going to deny the 388 finding that I have no reason -- I don’t have good cause to believe it would be in their best interest because reopening services would throw major chaos into their life. And while I think it’s commendable that [appellant] has recently gotten into services which is very good, I think it’s unfair to say this is a second chance. [¶] When I went back and looked at the previous report [appellant] had an opportunity for rehabilitation even prior to the case coming into court and then had opportunity during the court -- and unfortunately family reunification services were terminated. That was in July 2006, but then [appellant] didn’t get involved. A year went by and apparently there wasn’t any visitation, so she’s only recently gotten involved in services. There was a whole big time period, so I cannot -- I’m not convinced by the argument that you did what you could after July 6, 2006. I think that was the date of the -- July 13th, because you waited more than a year and didn’t see your kids and then started getting into services, which is good, but it -- I mean we have to be honest and say you waited quite a long period of time and this would be maybe the third chance, possibly I think, if we were to reopen services. It could be six, twelve months. You may make it, you may not, and then these kids’ lives will be in total flux. [¶] At this point legally the benefit of the doubt goes to stability and keeping it stable -- keeping things stable. Maybe there’ll be a guardianship. Looks like there’ll be a guardianship, and [appellant] will have visitation. Who knows what will happen in the future. Page 3 of this report says they’re doing well in placement, settling into a routine, stable and loving home, responding to services. Under all the circumstances I think it would interject a lot of chaos and [sic] circumstances contrary to their best interest.”
DISCUSSION
Appellant contends the juvenile court abused its discretion in denying her petitions for modification. Claiming changed circumstances already had been established, and that she had remedied her substance abuse problem, appellant asserts the best interests of the minors would have been promoted by granting appellant additional reunification services. According to appellant, the record also reflects the existence of a strong bond between appellant and the minors and only a weak one between the minors and their caregivers.
Section 388, subdivision (a), provides that the parent of a dependent child may petition the juvenile court “upon grounds of change of circumstance or new evidence... for a hearing to change, modify or set aside any order of court previously made....” Section 388 permits modification of a dependency order if a change of circumstance or new evidence is shown and if the proposed modification is in the best interests of the minor. (In re Kimberly F. (1997) 56 Cal.App.4th 519, 526 (Kimberly F.).)
When a petition for modification is brought after the end of the reunification period, the best interests of the child are the paramount consideration. (In re Stephanie M. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 295, 317.) In assessing the best interests of the child at this stage of the proceedings, the juvenile court looks to the child’s needs for permanence and stability. (Ibid.)
The party petitioning for modification has the burden of proof by a preponderance of the evidence. (In re Casey D. (1999) 70 Cal.App.4th 38, 48.) A modification petition “is addressed to the sound discretion of the juvenile court and its decision will not be disturbed on appeal in the absence of a clear abuse of discretion.” (In re Jasmon O. (1994) 8 Cal.4th 398, 415.)
In denying appellant’s petitions for modification, the juvenile court had before it evidence of appellant’s efforts to ameliorate the difficulties underlying the dependency petitions. However, doubtless out of concern for the needs of the minors, the court found it would not be in the best interests of the minors to order additional services for appellant. As the court suggested, it was uncertain whether, after an additional period of services, appellant would become able to reunify with the minors, who the court noted were doing well in their placement.
The determination by the juvenile court was well within its discretion. As the record reflects, appellant had made much progress, and her efforts are to be commended. But the record also suggests more time lay ahead for appellant in which she would need to continue to prove her fitness as a parent. In the meantime, it was likely that, as the record suggests, the minors would continue to develop, maintain stability, and attach to adult figures.
In her petitions, appellant averred it was in the best interests of the minors to provide appellant with additional reunification services, due primarily to the minors’ expectations and the close bond all shared with each other. However, at this point in the proceedings, the focus of the case had shifted to the minors’ interests, and it was unreasonable to expect the minors to wait for appellant to establish her fitness as a parent. As the record suggests, appellant requires more time in order to improve her parenting skills.
The difficulty with appellant’s petitions for modification is her failure to allege pertinent facts in support of her belief that the minors’ best interests required additional services and eventual reunification with appellant. A prima facie showing requires the proffering of facts relevant to the claim made. (In re Edward H. (1996) 43 Cal.App.4th 584, 593.) Mere beliefs, without facts to support them, do not constitute prima facie evidence of the minors’ best interests. Here, it is not enough to assert, as appellant does, that the minors eventually should be returned to her because of their expectations of reunification with appellant. At the time of the hearing on the modification petitions, the minors had been out of appellant’s custody for a substantial period of time, amounting to well over two years. Appellant’s petitions are deficient because they contain few, if any, facts relating to the minors’ current circumstances, other than to suggest the minors have not achieved “permanence” with their caregiver.
Appellant’s brief emphasizes the strength of her bond with the minors and the efforts she had made to become a better parent. But appellant says little about the minors’ circumstances and feelings, other than their feelings about living with appellant, nor about the possibility that, even after modification in the form of additional reunification services, she might not be able to achieve reunification with the minors. In short, the focus of appellant’s brief appears to be on appellant, rather than on the minors.
The record contains conflicting information about the wishes of the minors pertaining to their placement preferences. For example, two reports submitted in February 2008 on behalf of two of the minors stated Mo.B. wanted adoption, while K.B. allegedly desired a return to appellant’s custody.
Most importantly, in her petitions appellant did not allege any facts indicating that the minors’ needs for permanence and stability would be promoted either by a potentially lengthy period of reunification services or by eventual return to a parent who had been out of their lives for a substantial period of time.
Appellant speculates that the caregiver’s lack of commitment to adoption indicates she lacks a strong bond with the minors. But the juvenile court noted the minors were doing well with their caregiver. In any event, the court’s comments reflect a proper focus on the minors themselves.
In Kimberly F., supra, 56 Cal.App.4th 519, the appellate court warned against the juvenile court simply comparing the situation of the natural parent with that of a caretaker in determining a section 388 petition. It termed such an approach the “‘simple best interest test.’” (Id. at p. 529.) Instead, the appellate court found that determining a child’s best interests under section 388 required an evaluation of a number of factors, including the seriousness of the reason for the dependency action, the existing bond between parent and child and caretaker and child, and the nature of the changed circumstances. (Id. at pp. 529, 532.) The court suggested it was unlikely a parent who lost custody because of sexual abuse of a minor could prevail on a section 388 petition, whereas in a “dirty house” case, which was present in Kimberly F., the chances of success were greater. (Id. at pp. 531, fn. 9, 532.) In Kimberly F., supra, the court concluded the decision to deny the section 388 petition was based largely and improperly on the juvenile court judge’s adoption of the “‘narcissistic personality’ rationale,” which the judge had applied to the mother in that case. (Id. at p. 533; see also id. at pp. 526, 527, 532-533.)
In this case, in denying appellant’s section 388 petitions, the juvenile court did not discuss the factors analyzed in Kimberly F., supra, 56 Cal.App.4th 519. However, evidence of all of the critical factors contained in Kimberly F., including the basis of the dependency action, the relationship between appellant and the minors, and the nature of the changed circumstances, was before the court. The court’s extensive comments about the case suggest it considered carefully all pertinent circumstances. On the record before it, the court ruled impliedly that appellant failed to sustain her burden. Under the abuse of discretion standard, we see no error in that determination.
The juvenile court was required by statute (§ 388) to focus on the minors’ best interests in deciding whether to grant the petitions for modification. As we have seen, those interests consist of the minors’ needs for stability and permanence. (In re Marilyn H. (1993) 5 Cal.4th 295, 309.) Childhood cannot wait for a parent to establish readiness for parenting. (In re Baby Boy L. (1994) 24 Cal.App.4th 596, 610.) Here, the minors had shown the ability to adjust to a stable foster care placement. On the other hand, in her petitions appellant acknowledged the possibility she might require additional reunification services into the indefinite future.
We agree with appellant that the record of her efforts demonstrates a showing of changed circumstances. However, by including a request for services in her petitions and not ever mentioning a time frame for the possible return of the minors to her, even appellant tacitly acknowledged the strong probability of an indefinite, continuing need for assistance. In the past, appellant had had difficulty maintaining a consistent schedule of visitation with the minors. Moreover, reports noted two of the minors were stymied in their therapeutic progress by appellant’s lack of consistency. The record suggests the minors require the stability afforded by a nurturing and loving family, for which the minors should not have to wait. As those reports also suggested, the minors appeared to be in the most suitable placement for them.
Under the circumstances of this case, the juvenile court did not act arbitrarily, capriciously, or beyond the bounds of reason in denying appellant’s petitions for modification. The court’s determination that the needs of the minors for stability compelled denial of the petitions and served those minors’ best interests was reasonable and is supported by the record. (Cf. In re Edward H., supra, 43 Cal.App.4th at p. 594.) In sum, appellant failed to make the necessary showing, as required by section 388, that a modification would promote the best interests of the minors. (Compare In re Jeremy W. (1992) 3 Cal.App.4th 1407, 1416, with In re Heather P. (1989) 209 Cal.App.3d 886, 891.) There was no abuse of discretion or other error in the court’s decision. (Cf. In re Daijah T. (2000) 83 Cal.App.4th 666, 673-675.)
DISPOSITION
The order of the juvenile court denying the petitions for modification is affirmed.
We concur: RAYE, J., ROBIE, J.