Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from orders of the Superior Court of Kern County., Nos. JJV064216A & JJV064216B Charlotte A. Wittig, Commissioner.
Kathleen Murphy Mallinger, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Kathleen Bales-Lange, County Counsel, and John A. Rozum, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
OPINION
Before Poochigian, Acting P.J., Detjen, J., and Franson, J.
F.P. (mother) appeals from orders terminating parental rights (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 366.26) to her seven-year-old daughter Mayra and three-year-old son Jose. Mother contends there was insufficient evidence to support the juvenile court’s finding that the children were likely to be adopted. On review, we disagree and affirm.
All statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code unless otherwise indicated.
PROCEDURAL AND FACTUAL HISTORY
Domestic violence in the children’s home led to their detention and the underlying dependency proceedings in 2009. As of June 2010, the children were living with their mother who was receiving family maintenance services. However, that same month police found the body of the children’s father and arrested mother and her boyfriend in connection with the father’s death. Consequently, the children were redetained and placed in foster care.
The juvenile court later found true supplemental (§ 387) and subsequent (§ 342) petitions alleging mother’s incarceration and inability to care for the children. It in turn ordered the children’s removal from mother’s custody and denied her reunification services on alternative grounds. The court further ordered adoption as the permanent plan goal and set a section 366.26 hearing to select and implement a permanent plan for the children.
Although the children were in foster care, the agency focused its efforts on placing the children with a fit relative. The children appeared to have a close bond with both maternal and paternal relatives, and there were several relatives who requested that the children be placed with them. Some of the interested relatives were ineligible for placement due to their criminal records. Nevertheless, the maternal grandmother and the paternal grandparents appeared to be promising placement prospects.
Meanwhile, both of the children were healthy and meeting developmental milestones. Mayra received weekly counseling services based on an earlier preliminary diagnosis of post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) attributable to the domestic violence she had suffered or witnessed.
Following the father’s death and mother’s incarceration, Jose apparently joined Mayra in collateral sessions. A mental health treatment team took appropriate steps to deliver the news of these events to the children in an age-appropriate fashion. When told of her father’s death, Mayra was sad and emotional. However, she appeared to be emotionally stable after learning the news and being able to grieve. Mayra was informed that her mother was in jail and had made bad choices in order to be in there. The child did not have any questions and continued to play with her toys. Jose was reportedly doing well.
The agency prepared a “366.26 WIC Report” in advance of the section 366.26 hearing. In the report, an adoptions social worker recommended termination of parental rights and placement of the children with their paternal grandparents who lived in Mexico.
According to the agency report, a Mexican social services unit, known as the DIF, had evaluated the paternal grandparents and recommended them for placement. A copy of the DIF report written in Spanish was attached to the agency report.
The adoptions social worker consulted with the children’s therapist, counseling supervisor and the children’s court-appointed special advocate (CASA), as well as interviewed the children, their current foster parents, the paternal family, and the Mexican Consul. All purportedly agreed that the children, particularly Mayra, had an emotionally meaningful, historical relationship with the paternal grandparents and family. The agency envisioned that the grandparents would be responsible for applying with local Mexican authorities and once placement occurred, the agency would ask the juvenile court to dismiss the children’s dependency proceedings.
The agency report also included an adoption assessment of each child. Both were described as well-behaved, bright little children.
Seven-year-old Mayra was in good health and appeared to be developmentally on target. She attended first grade. Her counselor supported a plan of the girl’s placement with her brother and in the care of the paternal family. Mayra consistently shared that she had positive memories of her relationship with the paternal family.
Three-year-old Jose was also in good health and appeared to be developmentally on target. He presented as a happy little boy in the care of the current foster parents.
Adoption was likely, according to the agency’s analysis. The agency also identified the paternal grandparents as prospective adoptive parents for the children.
The CASA conveyed additional information about the children in a written memorandum to the court. Mayra was doing well in the first grade and was very bright. Although Jose was too young to attend school, he did well on his social, emotional and developmental assessment. The CASA could not attest to the adoptions social worker’s statement that the children, in particular Mayra, had an emotionally meaningful and historic relationship with the paternal grandparents and family.
On the date originally set for the section 366.26 hearing, the court had its Spanish-language interpreter look at the DIF report and provide an overview of what the report stated. The court advised that if anyone wished to have a verbatim transcription of the DIF report, “you must do so on your own and submit it to the Court.” No one did so.
On appeal, mother has obtained what purports to be a verbatim translation of the DIF report and asks that we take judicial notice of it. Because the juvenile court did not have the benefit of such a translation, we will deny mother’s judicial notice request.
According to the interpreter’s overview, the DIF report contained information about the paternal grandparents’ background, home and circumstances. It also certified that neither paternal grandparent had a criminal record. The paternal grandfather reported he had visited the children two years earlier. The report further revealed the paternal grandparents had been interviewed and psychologically evaluated. According to the evaluation, the paternal grandparents were capable of giving the children a dignified and better quality of life.
In addition, the DIF report stated the couple wished to provide a quality life for the children, and wholeheartedly wished to devote themselves to the children so that they could become “a part of those who are their lawful family.” The couple agreed or committed to educate, discipline, protect and instill values in the children. The couple would also make the children available for individual, group and family therapy.
Because mother’s attorney requested a contested hearing, the court continued the matter. The agency subsequently filed a December 2010 therapist report for Mayra, along with its summary recommendation that adoption of the children together by the paternal grandparents was in the children’s best interest.
According to the therapist’s report, Mayra had come a long way in therapy and appeared to be coping well with the current situation. She demonstrated a significant level of resiliency by being able to process her feelings of sadness. The therapist also noted that the child demonstrated a great level of attachment and bond with one of her paternal uncles.
At the continued hearing, the court received the agency’s reports, the therapist’s report, and the CASA memorandum into evidence. The court also took judicial notice of its file.
Mayra’s therapist was the only witness called to testify. The therapist confirmed Mayra’s therapy was focused on processing both the death of the father and the incarceration of mother. Currently, she was being seen once a week. The therapist believed Mayra was coping well with the loss of both parents. In working with Mayra, the therapist observed the child’s feelings of anger and resentment towards her mother. Mayra did not exhibit sadness when her mother was mentioned in therapy.
Following closing arguments, the court found by clear and convincing evidence that the children were likely to be adopted and terminated parental rights. It also wanted to clarify that its adoptability finding was not dependent on the placement plan recommended by the agency. The court explained it found clear and convincing evidence that the children were adoptable despite any placement plan and regardless of the prospective adoptive parents the agency identified. The court did not want to leave the impression that it had approved the plan recommended by the agency. In fact, the court had concerns about whether it was legally permissible.
DISCUSSION
Mother contends there was insufficient evidence to support the court’s finding that the children were likely to be adopted. In her view, the agency relied solely on the paternal grandparents’ willingness to provide a home for the children to claim that the children were likely to be adopted. Yet, according to mother, there was no proof that the paternal grandparents were ready, willing and able to adopt the children. She also criticizes the agency’s plan to place the children with the paternal grandparents and then move to terminate the court’s jurisdiction.
In making these claims, mother overlooks the court’s statement that it made its adoptability finding without regard to the agency’s recommended plan to place the children with those relatives. Because the juvenile court neither adopted nor relied upon the agency’s placement plan for the children in finding they were likely to be adopted, we see no reason to address mother’s arguments related to the paternal grandparents and the agency’s placement plan. However, our decision not to address these claims should not be interpreted as an endorsement of the agency’s proposal.
Alternatively, mother argues there was no evidence that the children were likely to be adopted by anyone other than the paternal grandparents. She starts by characterizing the agency’s report as perfunctory, relying once again on her assumption that the children’s adoptability was inexorably tied to the paternal grandparents. However, to the extent she challenges the adequacy of the adoption assessment in the agency’s report, she forfeited such a claim by not raising her objection to the report in the juvenile court. (In re Crystal J. (1993) 12 Cal.App.4th 407, 411-412.)
Mother further argues there was no evidence that the children were generally adoptable, that is adoptable with regard to a particular family’s commitment to adopt. Mother cites the children’s ages, the fact that they should remain together, and Mayra’s emotional issues and need for mental health therapy as indicators that the children were not generally adoptable. We disagree.
Mother’s argument essentially asks us to reweigh the evidence before the juvenile court. That is not within our authority. (In re Laura F. (1983) 33 Cal.3d 826, 833.) Mother’s argument also pays lip service to the law. The adoptability issue at a permanency planning hearing focuses on the dependent child, which is whether his or her age, physical condition, and emotional state make it difficult to find a person willing to adopt. (In re Sarah M. (1994) 22 Cal.App.4th 1642, 1649.) It is not necessary that the child already be in a potential adoptive home or that there be a proposed adoptive parent waiting in the wings. (In re Jennilee T. (1992) 3 Cal.App.4th 212, 223, fn. 11.) The law also does not require evidence of approved families available or interested in adoption. (In re A.A. (2008) 167 Cal.App.4th 1292, 1313-1314.)
Here, Mayra and Jose have many positive characteristics which support the court’s adoptability finding. They are young children, who are physically healthy and appear to be developmentally on target. They are also well-behaved and bright. Although Mayra receives counseling, her symptoms have subsided, she has come a long way, and she appears to be coping well according to her therapist. There is no evidence that the children’s ages, physical condition, and emotional state would make it difficult to find a person willing to adopt. (In re Sarah M., supra, 22 Cal.App.4th at p.1649.) Instead, there is only mother’s speculation that it would be difficult to find adoptive parents for the children.
We therefore conclude there was substantial evidence to support the juvenile court’s adoptability finding.
DISPOSITION
Mother’s request for judicial notice is denied. The orders terminating parental rights are affirmed.