¶ 10 Initially, we must set forth what is and is not properly before us for decision in this case given the factual record existent. As it was stated in the Second Syllabus by the Court in In re Mayes-Rogers Counties Conservancy District Formation, 1963 OK 206, 386 P.2d 150, 151, "[a] question of law presented and argued on appeal that is not shown to arise under the facts and record will not be considered and determined." For us to opine on an issue not within the confines of the factual situation presented would involve determining merely an abstract question without any justiciable controversy being presently before the Court.
1988); Schwartz v. Diehl, 568 P.2d 280, 283 (Okla. 1977); In Re Mayes-Rogers Counties Conservancy District Formation, 386 P.2d 150, 151 (Okla. 1963). The parties have also briefed issues related to whether the causes of action or statutes relied on by Appellants violate the Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution.
In so ruling, we recognize that the parties' main question asks us to clarify two existing cases, Apache Gas Products Corp. v. Oklahoma Tax Commission, 509 P.2d 109 (Okla. 1973), and Oklahoma Tax Commission v. Sun Oil Co., 489 P.2d 1078 (Okla. 1971), to determine whether the Commission can ever levy gross production tax upon the gross value of an enhanced product downstream from the wellhead. However, since the appeal comes before us on the sustention of a demurrer to the taxpayer's evidence, and without any evidence having been presented by the Commission nor any decision rendered by the trial court on the merits of the claim, we would be premature in addressing the questions of constitutionality. See, Mitchell v. Williamson, 304 P.2d 314 (Okla. 1956); In re: Mayes-Rogers Counties Conservancy Dist. Formation, 386 P.2d 150 (Okla. 1963). All reasonable inferences support this conclusion, and at this stage, the facts are not sufficiently developed from the Commission's point of view to enable a trier of fact to determine that no constitutional injury has occurred without assuming, for example: (1) that the contract formula for valuing residue gas truly represents the gross value of production from outside producers but not from Ladd; or, (2) that the five percent amount retained by Ladd as well as the $.02/MCF amount deducted before the sale of the residue gas represent "gross value" for purposes of 68 O.S. 1981 § 1001[ 68-1001], rather than fees attributable to the cost of gathering, transportation and processing the casinghead gas.
"2. If the child be illegitimate, by the mother."Dablemont v. State Dept. of Public Safety, Okla., 543 P.2d 563 (1975), Bradbury v. Oklahoma State Board of Chiropody, Okla., 490 P.2d 246 (1971); In re Mayes-Rogers Counties Conservancy Dist. Formation, Okla., 386 P.2d 150 (1963); Starner v. Oklahoma City, 205 Okla. 170, 236 P.2d 479 (1951). We find 58 O.S. 1971 § 769[ 58-769] to be determinative of the issue as to the surviving parent's prior right to be appointed guardian of the estates of his or her minor children.
We agree with defendants' statutory analysis and find it unnecessary to reach the constitutional issues raised by the parties. Courts, of course, will pass upon the constitutionality of a statute only when it is necessary to a determination on the merits. In re Mayes-Rogers Counties Conservancy Dist. Formation, Okla., 386 P.2d 150 (1963). We are concerned here with multiple joint defendants.
There is no showing that a pipeline designed and constructed according to the safety standards prescribed for rural areas denies appellants equal protection of law; and, appellants have failed to demonstrate their standing to challenge an alleged unconstitutional denial of equal protection. In Re Mayes-Rogers Counties Conservancy District v. Barnes, Okla., 386 P.2d 150 (1963). Appellants alleged in their complaint various ways appellee violated the rules and regulations of the Commission governing the design and construction of the pipeline.
A statute may not be attacked on constitutional grounds by one not injured thereby. In re Mayes-Rogers Counties Conservancy District v. Barnes, Okla., 386 P.2d 150 (1963). Constitutional judgments are justified only out of necessity of adjudicating rights in particular cases between litigants brought before the court.
Protestants challenge on these grounds is premature. In re Central Oklahoma Master Conservancy District, Okla., 359 P.2d 725 (1961); In re Mayes-Rogers Counties Conservancy District Formation, Welker v. Barnes, Okla., 386 P.2d 150 (1963). Protestants contend that notice by publication is not sufficient to confer jurisdiction on the court.
This court generally will not decide abstract or hypothetical questions not shown to have arisen under the facts and record. In re Mayes-Rogers Counties Conservancy District Formation, 386 P.2d 150 (Okla. 1963). Nor will we decide questions disconnected from the granting of actual relief, or make determinations where no practical relief may be granted.
1975). In the case of In re Mayes-Rogers Counties Conservancy Dist. Formation, 386 P.2d 150 (Okla. 1963), our Supreme Court refused to consider the contentions of protestants that certain statutes dealing with the organization of conservancy districts were unconstitutional, where the judgment in the proceeding under those statutes simply ordered formation of conservancy districts and imposed no liability on the protestants, no liens on their property, and assessed no taxes, no harm was sustained by protestants, and no injury was threatened. Likewise, in the instant case, because our Supreme Court has read our conservatorship statutes as a whole as not prohibiting the conservatee's participation or action in matters affecting his estate, I feel constrained to further address constitutionally impermissible action which has not been sustained, has not been threatened, and may, in fact, never materialize, as was the case in the Mayes-Rogers Counties Conservancy District Formation case.