Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Super. Ct. No. JD223834
HULL, Judge.Aileen B. (appellant), mother of Matthew B. (the minor), appeals from a juvenile court order following a six-month review hearing continuing the minor as a dependent child of the court outside of parental custody. (Welf. & Inst. Code, §§ 366.21, subd. (e), 395; further section references are to this code unless otherwise specified.) Appellant contends there was insufficient evidence to support both the trial court’s decision not to return the minor to appellant’s care and its finding that appellant was provided with reasonable reunification services. We affirm the order.
FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS
On October 18, 2005, police responded to a report that the minor, then four years old, had been left home unsupervised. When police entered appellant’s home in San Luis Obispo County, they eventually found the minor, who was with appellant in an upstairs bedroom. They also discovered an extensive marijuana growing operation, including approximately 93 marijuana plants growing in the garage and various locations in the house, drying racks, scales and other equipment, drug paraphernalia, pay/owe sheets, other prescription narcotics and containers of marijuana in various places throughout the house. The home was “cluttered and very dirty with unsafe wiring . . . used to assist in the marijuana cultivation.” Many of the items found, including the marijuana, were visible and accessible to the minor.
Appellant told police she and her husband (the minor’s father) both had valid prescriptions for medicinal marijuana, and had both used marijuana daily for many years. Appellant also told police there was no risk to the minor because the child understood he was not to go near the marijuana or the paraphernalia and “doesn’t take an interest in it” in any event. Appellant blamed the unkempt condition of the house on the fact that the cleaning person had not shown up the previous week.
Appellant was arrested on October 18, 2005, and charged with various offenses, including child endangerment and possession of marijuana for cultivation. The minor was taken into protective custody and temporarily placed with relatives in Sacramento County. The minor’s father was arrested on October 25, 2005, and charged with child endangerment and possession of marijuana for cultivation and sale, among other things. Minor’s father denied selling marijuana, telling police he “dispense[d]” it to people with valid prescriptions. He, too, believed the minor’s health and safety were not at risk given that the minor “knows not to get into any marijuana or related items” and does not have access to the food supply containing marijuana.
For reasons not apparent from the record, the criminal charges against appellant and the minor’s father were eventually dropped.
At the December 13, 2005 jurisdictional/disposition hearing, appellant submitted to the San Luis Obispo County juvenile court’s jurisdiction over the minor pursuant to section 300, subdivision (b)(1), based on allegations including marijuana being grown in accessible regions of the home, the fact that the home was cluttered and very dirty with potentially unsafe extension cords used in the marijuana cultivation, evidence of a drug-selling operation in the home, drug paraphernalia in accessible regions of the home, and danger to the minor due to large amounts of marijuana in the home. Appellant informed the court that she and the minor’s father had moved to Alameda County and requested that the case be transferred there.
At the conclusion of the December 13, 2005 hearing, the Department of Health and Human Services (the Department) noted that the minor’s father had posted a significant amount of confidential information on the internet about the juvenile court proceedings and its participants (including the identity of the social workers and the home addresses and telephone numbers of various witnesses involved in the case) in violation of various criminal statutes. Attached to the jurisdictional/disposition report were copies of numerous pages of information the minor’s father had posted on an internet site pertaining to the confidential court proceedings. Appellant’s counsel represented to the court that the parents, unaware that their conduct was unlawful, had agreed to cease any further conduct and would make every attempt to remove all information previously posted.
On January 11, 2006, the San Luis Obispo juvenile court sustained the amended petition.
On January 13, 2006, appellant submitted a declaration notifying the court that she and the minor’s father had moved from Alameda County to Sacramento County.
On January 24, 2006, the San Luis Obispo juvenile court ordered that the case be transferred to Sacramento County. In the meantime, the Department directed appellant to complete an alcohol and drug assessment (AOD).
On January 26, 2006, appellant submitted to an AOD by Ruth Black at the Alcohol and Drug Bureau of Sacramento County. Black concluded that no treatment was necessary.
Appellant and the minor’s father met with social worker John Decker prior to the hearing on March 1, 2006. Decker recommended to appellant and her husband that they stop using marijuana immediately. They informed Decker they would not stop using marijuana in their pain treatment, along with other prescription medications. The minor’s father also informed Decker that neither his nor appellant’s use of marijuana was a problem and that they were not willing to participate in drug treatment or dependency drug court.
On March 1, 2006, the Sacramento County juvenile court accepted transfer of the case and ordered that the minor remain in current placement pending further court order.
On March 2, 2006, San Luis Obispo social worker, Mark Hansen, informed Decker that appellant and the minor’s father had made minimal progress in reunification services as a result of their moves to Berkeley and Sacramento. Decker referred them for an AOD with Early Intervention Specialist, Kim Dee, and directed them to attend the next available parenting class orientation.
Dee spoke with the minor’s father by telephone on March 10, 2006, to schedule the AOD. However, the minor’s father focused primarily on the legality of medicinal marijuana and denied having “any drug issues.” Based on that conversation, Dee concluded the minor’s father was unable to “accept that his marijuana affected his ability to parent [the minor] in any way,” and instructed him to speak with Decker to confirm the request for an AOD assessment.
On March 10, 2006, the Department completed an evaluation of appellant’s home in Sacramento and referred appellant to parenting class. Appellant and the minor’s father attended the initial orientation for parenting class on March 15, 2006; however, the minor’s father requested an alternative parenting class that would not conflict with his work schedule.
Decker spoke with appellant and the minor’s father twice in March 2006 and reiterated the San Luis Obispo court’s prior order that there be no dissemination of information related to the confidential juvenile court proceedings on the internet or otherwise. The minor’s father assured Decker that he was complying fully with the court’s order in that regard.
The contested disposition hearing commenced on April 20, 2006. At that time, the Department recommended that the minor be returned to the care and custody of his parents given the absence of clear and convincing evidence of substantial risk to the child in the home. Counsel for the minor disagreed, arguing there was “a substantial danger to the physical health, safety and protection and well-being of the minor in this case if he were returned home.” The court heard testimony from appellant, the minor’s father and the social worker (Decker). Based on that testimony, the Department changed its recommendation to out-of-home placement due to “the parents’ inability to recognize that the home environment at the time that [the minor] was taken into protective custody was dangerous to [the minor],” as well as the Department’s belief that the conditions that existed at the time the minor was removed from the home would likely reoccur given both parents’ reluctance to take responsibility for the pre-existing problems, their failure to recognize the impact of their daily marijuana use on the minor’s safety and well-being, and the willful violation by the minor’s father of the San Luis Obispo court’s order not to post information regarding the confidential proceedings on the internet despite his representations to Decker to the contrary.
The juvenile court adopted the Department’s revised recommendation, finding a substantial danger to the minor’s well-being if he were to be returned home and adjudging the minor a dependent child of the juvenile court. The court found evidence in the record to suggest that appellant and the minor’s father both had substance abuse problems that interfered with their ability to appropriately parent the minor, and that both parents “lacked credibility.” With respect to a case plan, the court ordered both parents to complete individual counseling addressing “the issues of recognizing a safe home environment, recognizing apparent cause by prescription and illicit drug usage on parenting abilities, psychological and/or physiological dependence upon marijuana, [and] parenting responsibilities.” Both parents were further ordered to complete an AOD and participate in drug testing or treatment as recommended by that assessment. The case plan also required both parents to participate in random drug testing and complete a physical examination by a medical professional referred by the Department. Appellant was ordered to continue being assessed for her need for antidepressant medication. The matter was set for a six-month review hearing (§ 366.21, subd. (e)), and the parents were ordered to have regular supervised visits with the minor.
The Department filed a status review report on June 14, 2006. According to the report, the minor’s parents had been provided with a number of services in Sacramento County, including referrals for an AOD, drug testing, drug treatment, counseling and parenting classes. The AOD completed on April 27, 2006, concluded both parents were “substance abusers with related problems.” They were referred to Strategies for Change for drug treatment. The report reflects that the minor’s father was referred to the night program at Strategies for Change in order to accommodate his work schedule. However, the parents informed Decker they would not be able to participate in that program because they were continuing to use marijuana. Additionally, although appellant and the minor’s father had been directed to drug test twice weekly, as of the date of the report they had only done so on one occasion, both testing positive for marijuana. Appellant and the minor’s father informed a newly-assigned social worker they would be “redoing” their AOD and, as of the date of the report, neither parent had participated in substance abuse services as directed. According to social worker Marianne Meek, both parents also failed to participate in individual therapy, telling her they were not able to participate because they were preparing to move to Oakland, California, and because they could not utilize public transportation due to their “fragile health.” We note that the report shows that appellant and the minor’s father notified the Department on May 19, 2006, that they were moving to Oakland, California. However, Meek testified that the Department continued to contact the parents at their Sacramento address until early-July 2006.
On May 3, 2006, both parents were referred to The Effort for a medical assessment and to substantiate their self-described health issues.
On May 19, 2006, the minor’s father informed Decker they could not get a medical examination at The Effort and had instead been directed by their attorney to obtain their medical examination from New Leaf Treatment Center.
On May 25, 2006, after confirming that The Effort would indeed offer medical examinations, Decker again instructed appellant and the minor’s father to obtain an examination at The Effort.
The report confirmed that visitation with the minor was going well.
The June 14, 2006 status review report concluded that appellant and the minor’s father had ongoing substance abuse problems, had not successfully engaged in reunification services “due to resistance and due to moving,” and had made no efforts to address the issues leading to the minor’s removal.
On July 17, 2006, following the parents’ move to Oakland, the Department made referrals to services in Alameda County, including a referral to Community Recovery Center (CRC) for drug testing, AOD counseling, group counseling and physical examinations. At the parents’ request, the Department also made a referral to Earth Circles for individual counseling. Meek discussed with Mark Copithorne, the contact person at Earth Circles, the issues to be dealt with in counseling, including the Department’s concerns regarding the parents’ use of marijuana and Marinol to treat their physical ailments.
Counsel for appellant filed a motion for change of venue to Alameda County which was heard on July 26, 2006. The court denied the motion as not being in the best interest of the minor. Appellant was appointed new counsel and the hearing was continued.
At the section 366.21, subdivision (e) hearing on August 2, 2006, the court was informed that appellant and the minor’s father had retained new counsel. The trial date was vacated and the matter continued to give counsel time to prepare.
On September 7, 2006, appellant filed a change of address notifying the court that she had again moved, this time to Berkeley, California.
After several additional continuances, the contested section 366.21, subdivision (e) hearing finally commenced on September 14, 2006. Earth Circles therapists Mark Copithorne and Erika Bond testified regarding the parents’ progress in therapy. Copithorne, who at the time of the hearing had treated the minor’s father 10 times, testified that the minor’s father had taken responsibility for his actions leading to removal of the minor, that the father blamed himself “for the whole event happening,” and that the father was now able to recognize the risk to the minor as a result of the unkempt house. Copithorne also testified the minor’s father did not feel the actual cultivation of marijuana in the home was enough, in and of itself, to remove the minor from the home, and the father felt angry about being separated from his child. The minor’s father also denied being a substance abuser.
Appellant’s therapist, Erika Bond, testified that over the course of four sessions, appellant acknowledged responsibility for the dirty house, but denied having a drug dependency problem, and further denied the fact that the minor had access to marijuana at the time of his removal from the home.
Appellant testified, confirming that she had drug tested five times, and had undergone a physical examination at CRC.
The minor’s father testified he was attending counseling twice a week, had drug tested “five or six” times, had been participating in “parenting, drug rehab counseling classes” at CRC since the previous week, and had completed four AOD assessments. He stated the two drug treatment programs referred by the Department would not accept him or appellant because of their Marinol use. He admitted he may have taken too much medication in the past, but denied being a substance abuser, explaining that his current pain management regimen included daily use of Marinol and Oxycontin. The minor’s father confirmed that he understood the effects of drug abuse on his parenting of the minor, and took “100 percent responsibility” for the removal of the minor from the home.
Meek testified on rebuttal that, during a telephone conversation two weeks prior to the hearing, the minor’s father told her he felt the Department was “wrongly holding his son,” and complained to her about what he characterized as a “great deal of corruption” within the Department, within San Luis Obispo and within the courts. The minor’s father continued to shun responsibility for removal of the minor from the home, saying the child’s removal was unfair and the result of corruption. Meek also testified that the testimony given by the minor’s father at the hearing--taking responsibility for removal of the minor--was “markedly different” from every other conversation she had had with him over the course of the proceedings.
Meek also testified she spoke with a physician’s assistant at CRC regarding the physical examinations of the parents and was informed that, because the parents’ self-described ailments could not be substantiated without an MRI, CRC was in the process of reviewing prior medical records provided by the parents and the evaluation and assessment was therefore still pending. She noted she did not refer the parents for an MRI because she felt it was “outside the scope of what the initial request was,” understanding the court’s directive to include only a physical examination by a Department approved provider.
The court concluded there still existed a substantial risk of detriment to the minor’s safety, protection or physical or emotional well-being if returned to the parents’ care and custody. Specifically, the court noted appellant’s “ongoing inability to grasp” the seriousness of the situation in which the then four-year-old minor was left to determine which foods were safe to eat and which contained marijuana. The court also noted that, although the parents were referred for a physical examination in Sacramento County, they failed to follow through at that time. Adopting the recommended findings in the June 14, 2006 status review report, the court continued the minor as a dependent child of the juvenile court, expressly finding that the parents “failed to submit to a physical exam arranged by the Department of Health & Human Services,” “failed to address issues in counseling that led to the dependency of the child,” and “failed to participate in substance abuse treatment services.” Appellant’s request that the case be transferred to Alameda County was denied.
Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal.
DISCUSSION
I
Substantial Evidence to Support Out-Of-Home Placement
Appellant contends there was no substantial evidence supporting a finding that return of the minor to her care would create a “substantial risk of detriment to the safety, protection, or physical or emotional well-being of the [minor].” (§§ 366.21, subd. (e).)
At the six-month review hearing, the juvenile court must order a child returned to parental custody, “unless [it] finds, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the return of the child to his or her parent . . . would create a substantial risk of detriment to the safety, protection, or physical or emotional well-being of the child.” (§ 366.21, subd. (e).)
The juvenile court’s order must be upheld if it is supported by substantial evidence. (Robert L. v. Superior Court (1996) 45 Cal.App.4th 619, 625.) In making this determination, we resolve all evidentiary conflicts in favor of the prevailing party, recognizing that issues of fact and credibility are questions for the trier of fact. (In re Steve W. (1990) 217 Cal.App.3d 10, 16; In re Katrina C. (1988) 201 Cal.App.3d 540, 547.) The reviewing court may not reweigh the evidence when assessing the sufficiency of the evidence. (In re Stephanie M. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 295, 318-319.)
A. Appellant’s Progress Toward Reunification Plan
Appellant first contends she started work on her reunification plan “as soon as was practicable,” she made substantial progress toward her reunification plan, and any lack of progress was due to the Department’s failure to provide her with reasonable services. We disagree.
Appellant submitted to the San Luis Obispo juvenile court’s jurisdiction on December 13, 2005. She informed the court on that date that she had moved to Alameda County. The court sustained the section 300, subdivision (b) petition on January 11, 2006. On January 13, 2006, appellant again notified the court that she had moved, this time to Sacramento County. The case was transferred to Sacramento County on January 24, 2006.
According to Mark Hansen, the social worker assigned to the case in San Luis Obispo County, appellant had made minimal progress in reunification services because of her moves to Berkeley and then to Sacramento. The record does not indicate what those services were. The record does, however, reflect referrals made in Sacramento County, including referral to an early intervention specialist for an AOD; referral to Valley Toxicology for urinalysis; referral to Strategies for Change for drug treatment; referral to a therapist; an offer of bus passes to assist in transportation; and referral to parenting classes. Appellant did little to avail herself of any of those services. Although she completed the AOD on April 27, 2006 (finding her and the minor’s father to be “substance abusers with related problems”), she did not participate in drug treatment at Strategies for Change because, as she informed Decker, she elected instead to continue her use of marijuana. As of the June 14, 2006 status report, appellant had only drug tested once despite the fact that she had been directed to drug test twice weekly, and had not participated in substance abuse services at all. Nothing presented at the six-month review hearing suggests that appellant ever participated in substance abuse treatment.
According to the testimony of Marianne Meek, appellant was referred to individual counseling in Sacramento County, but failed to avail herself of that service, telling Meek she was not able to participate because she was preparing to move to Oakland. We note that the record reflects appellant did not actually move to Oakland until sometime in June 2006.
As for the medical examination, appellant and the minor’s father were referred to The Effort on May 3, 2006. Neither parent ever went to The Effort. Instead, on May 19, 2006, the minor’s father told Decker that The Effort would not do the exam and informed him they would instead be obtaining exams at New Leaf Treatment Center as directed by their attorney. Decker, however, confirmed that The Effort would indeed offer medical examinations and reiterated his instruction to appellant and the minor’s father that they obtain an examination at that facility. The record reflects that neither appellant nor the minor’s father ever obtained an exam from The Effort, nor did they obtain one from New Leaf Treatment Center, the facility of their choosing.
Once appellant moved to Oakland, the Department referred her to CRC for drug testing, AOD counseling, group counseling and a physical examination. According to Decker, those referrals were made on July 17, 2006. The Department also accommodated appellant’s request by referring her to Earth Circles for individual counseling.
As of September 14, 2006, the date of the six-month review hearing, appellant had completed four therapy sessions with Bond (having previously completed three sessions with another therapist with whom she became uncomfortable) and drug tested just five times. Appellant did submit to a physical examination at CRC. However, her self-described physical ailments could not be substantiated without an MRI, which could not be done without a referral, and a review of her prior medical records. Appellant did not participate in parenting classes at all.
There is sufficient evidence in the record that appellant did little or nothing at the outset to avail herself of the services provided in Sacramento County. Her excuse that she was preparing to move to Oakland is unavailing, given her lack of compliance in San Luis Obispo prior to her move to Sacramento, as well as the fact that the case was transferred to Sacramento in March 2006 and she and the minor’s father did not move to Oakland until approximately June 2006, giving her sufficient time to progress toward her reunification plan.
The record also substantiates the fact that, once relocated to Oakland, appellant did little to avail herself of services in Alameda County, drug testing only a handful of times and going to counseling just seven times prior to the September 14, 2006 hearing. It is true that appellant and the minor’s father both submitted to physical examinations at CRC in Alameda County as required, but were told their health problems could not be substantiated without review of prior medical records and potentially an MRI. However, either parent could have completed a physical examination months earlier in Sacramento at either The Effort or New Leaf Treatment Center. Neither parent did.
B. Risk of Harm to Minor if Returned to Appellant’s Care
Appellant argues that, even if her progress toward reunification was minimal, the circumstances making the home unsafe had been eliminated by the time of the hearing and “there was no evidence they would recur.” Not so.
The record substantiates the fact that appellant and the minor’s father both consistently shunned responsibility for the circumstances which led to removal of the minor from their home--i.e., dangers associated with marijuana cultivation in the home and the manner in which both parents utilized marijuana and other drugs while parenting their child. Appellant’s own therapist testified that appellant acknowledged having a dirty house, but denied that the minor ever had access to marijuana and denied having a drug dependency problem. Notwithstanding his testimony at the September 14, 2006 hearing, the minor’s father was, just weeks before, persisting in his belief that the minor was wrongly removed by an unfair, corrupt system, and consistently maintaining marijuana cultivation in the home did not present a risk to the minor.
The parents’ failure to accept responsibility for the dangerous environment that resulted in removal of the minor was further demonstrated by the fact that they continued to post information about the confidential juvenile court proceedings on the internet in spite of the court’s order prohibiting such conduct, as well as Decker’s reiteration of the court’s edict and assurances from the parents that they were complying with the order.
The court’s conclusion that appellant’s failure to recognize the risks associated with unsafe conditions in the home and her continued use of marijuana and prescription drugs in the same manner presented a risk of substantial danger to the minor is substantiated by the record.
Appellant contends her denial that the minor had access to marijuana at the time he was detained does not place him at risk of harm if returned home now because, whether or not she believed the home was safe for the child then, the fact is the dangerous conditions have been eliminated and the home is safe now. Specifically, she contends she and the minor’s father removed all marijuana from the home, stopped their use of marijuana and locked up all of their prescription medication and placed it out of the minor’s reach. We note, however, that Appellant cites only to the testimony of the minor’s father at the September 14, 2006 hearing, and to testimony of Decker at the April 20, 2006 hearing (prior to the Department changing its recommendation to out-of-home placement). Appellant’s testimony at the September 14, 2006 hearing provides no evidence that appellant has done any of those things, particularly ceasing her use of marijuana and removing any trace of it from the home.
Appellant relies on several cases in which, despite the parents’ failure to take responsibility for their actions, the court granted the relief sought. (See In re Jasmine G. (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 282 (Jasmine G.) [appeal from dispositional order removing child from home pursuant to section 361, subdivision (c)]; In re Henry V. (2004) 119 Cal.App.4th 522 [appeal from dispositional order removing child from home pursuant to section 361, subdivision (c)]; In re Blanca P. (1996) 45 Cal.App.4th 1738 (Blanca P.) [petition for writ of mandate seeking review of court’s finding at 18-month review hearing of detriment if child returned home pursuant to section 366.22] and In re Kimberly F. (1997) 56 Cal.App.4th 519 [appeal from denial of mother’s section 388 modification petition and termination of parental rights].) However, because several of those cases are at a different posture in which the court is applying a different standard of review, they are inapposite here. (See Jasmine G., supra, 82 Cal.App.4th at p. 288 [appeal from dispositional order removing child from home pursuant to section 361, subdivision (c)]; Henry V., supra, 119 Cal.App.4th at p. 525 [appeal from dispositional order removing child from home pursuant to section 361, subdivision (c)]; Kimberly F., supra, 56 Cal.App.4th at pp. 525-526 [appeal from denial of mother’s section 388 petition for modification and termination of her parental rights].)
Blanca P., although more akin to the posture of this case, is similarly unavailing but deserving of some discussion. In Blanca P., several of petitioner’s children were detained as a result of excessive corporal punishment. (Blanca P., supra, 45 Cal.App.4th at p. 1742.) A subsequent petition alleging sexual molestation of one of the children by the father was sustained. (Id. at p. 1745.) Despite that the father was later exonerated by a court-ordered forensic psychologist, the juvenile court conducted a subsequent 18-month review and, without reexamining whether the molestation ever really occurred, determined that it would be detrimental to return the children to petitioner and their father based solely on the earlier questionable finding that the allegations of sexual abuse were true. (Id. at pp. 1745-1747.) The mother filed a petition for writ of mandate challenging the juvenile court’s finding for insufficient evidence. (Id. at p. 1747.) The court of appeal issued a peremptory writ of mandate commanding the juvenile court to vacate its order and conduct another 18-month review hearing on the molestation allegations. (Id. at p. 1759.) The court found the opinion of the petitioner’s social worker and a therapist that petitioner had not “internalized” what she had learned in parenting classes insufficient “to constitute substantial, credible evidence of detriment,” particularly in light of the parents’ faithful attendance and participation in “countless hours of therapy and counseling” and petitioner’s comments to social workers that she would “forswear corporal punishment altogether,” as well as the fact that petitioner’s persistent denial of any wrongdoing on the part of the children’s father was seemingly supported by the earlier findings of the forensic psychologist. (Id. at p. 1751; see id. at p. 1744.)
Here, in contrast, we have something more than just an opinion of a social worker or a therapist that appellant has not accepted responsibility for the conditions resulting in removal of the child. It is appellant’s own statements to Decker and to her therapist, as well as her testimony at the hearing, not to mention the representations made by the minor’s father to various social workers and service providers, that demonstrate appellant neither recognizes the danger presented to the minor beyond a dirty home, nor does she take responsibility for that dangerous environment. And, unlike Blanca P., where the forensic psychologist’s exoneration of the father supported petitioner’s denial of alleged sexual molestation by him, there is no doubt here that the marijuana growing operation occurred, that the minor had access to drugs and other dangers related to that endeavor, and that appellant uses marijuana and other prescription drugs on a regular basis.
Appellant also argues the Department “evaluated the parents’ home and found it safe for [the minor’s] return.” The Department did evaluate appellant’s home and found it to be “clean” and “tidy,” with no evidence of marijuana being grown. However, the minor was initially detained because of not only the marijuana growing operation and the unkempt condition of the home, but also due to the risks associated with the parents’ daily use of marijuana. Indeed, the case plan for reunification focused primarily on the parents’ ability to recognize the impact of drug use on parenting. Hence, the court’s concern for the continuing safety of the minor in light of appellant’s denial that he was ever in danger is supported by substantial evidence.
Finally, appellant contends her prescription drug use does not put the minor at risk of harm. Again, in support of that argument, appellant cites her husband’s testimony that he took full responsibility for what occurred and would not allow it to occur again. That argument is flawed because it suggests not only that the testimony of the minor’s father suffices for purposes of proving appellant’s conduct when the minor was detained, but also that the minor’s father has the ability to control what appellant does now, neither of which is true. Appellant also claims, without citation to the record, that her prescription drug use “was limited to lawful prescription drug use by the time of the review hearing.” However, appellant did not testify in that regard, nor is there any evidence in the record to suggest she has in any way curtailed her use of medication, prescription or otherwise. Indeed, there is contrary evidence in the representations by the minor’s father prior to the hearing that both he and appellant intended to continue using marijuana and other medications as they saw fit. The risk of harm to the minor resulting from appellant’s continued use of prescription medications in the same manner she did at the time the minor was removed from the home is substantially supported by the record.
C. Alternatives to Removal of the Minor from the Home
Appellant contends there were less drastic alternatives to protect the minor than out-of-home placement, such as in-home placement with continued court jurisdiction over drug use monitoring, drug testing and drug treatment. However, in light of appellant’s continuing denial of the dangers presented to the minor at the time of removal, coupled with the fact that appellant continues to use marijuana and prescription medications on a regular basis, it was reasonable for the juvenile court to assume that such an order would not insure the minor’s protection. The court’s removal order is also reasonable given appellant’s very limited and somewhat dilatory participation in reunification services such as counseling, parenting classes and substance abuse treatment, suggesting appellant requires more time to utilize those services in order for the court to feel confident she can provide a safe environment for the minor, with or without continuing court jurisdiction and supervision.
Substantial evidence supports the juvenile court’s order continuing out-of-home placement of the minor.
II
Reasonable Reunification Services
Appellant also contends there was insufficient evidence that the Department provided her with reasonable reunification services because (1) the Department failed to provide her with timely referrals after she moved to Alameda County, and (2) the Department did not refer her for a medical examination. We disagree on both counts.
At a six-month review hearing, “[i]f the child is not returned to his or her parent or legal guardian, the court shall determine whether reasonable services that were designed to aid the parent or legal guardian in overcoming the problems that led to the initial removal and the continued custody of the child have been provided or offered to the parent or legal guardian.” (§ 366.21, subd. (e).)
The court’s finding regarding reasonable reunification services is subject to review for substantial evidence. (Mark N. v. Superior Court (1998) 60 Cal.App.4th 996, 1010.) We resolve all conflicts in favor of the prevailing party, leaving the resolution of issues of fact and credibility to the trier of fact. (In re Steve W., supra, 217 Cal.App.3d at p. 16.) We do not reweigh the evidence. (Constance K. v. Superior Court (1998) 61 Cal.App.4th 689, 705.)
The social worker must make “[a] good faith effort” to provide reasonable services, responding to the unique needs of each family. (In re Kristin W. (1990) 222 Cal.App.3d 234, 254.) The agency responsible for reunification services must make reasonable efforts to provide suitable services “in spite of the difficulties of doing so or the prospects of success.” (In re Dino E. (1992) 6 Cal.App.4th 1768, 1777.)
As previously discussed in this opinion, appellant was provided with services in Sacramento County, but failed to avail herself of those services. Once the Department confirmed appellant’s relocation to Oakland, it referred her and the minor’s father to CRC for drug testing, AOD counseling, group counseling and physical exams. She was also referred, at her request, to Earth Circles for individual counseling.
Between July 17, 2006, the date of the referrals, and September 14, 2006, the date of the review hearing, appellant completed seven counseling sessions, drug tested a handful of times and tried to obtain a medical exam at CRC. The fact that the results of the physical examination at CRC were still pending as of the date of the hearing appears to be attributable to the issue surrounding the need for an MRI as opposed to any fault of appellant in timely submitting to the exam. However, we find that point to be of little consequence given that appellant was referred to The Effort over four months prior to the review hearing and refused to go despite repeated direction to do so from Decker, and similarly failed to undergo a physical examination at New Leaf Treatment Center, the facility of her own choosing.
Given the resistance on the part of appellant and the minor’s father to services offered in San Luis Obispo and Sacramento County, and the fact that appellant relocated multiple times between her initial arrest and the six-month review hearing 11 months later, the Department’s efforts to provide both parents with reunification services were reasonable. We find substantial evidence to support the juvenile court’s finding that appellant was provided with reasonable reunification services.
DISPOSITION
The order of the juvenile court is affirmed.
We concur: SIMS, Acting P.J. and BUTZ, J.