Opinion
No. 56530-3-I.
July 3, 2006.
Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court for Skagit County, No. 99-4-00313-6, Susan K. Cook, J., entered June 18, 2005.
Counsel for Appellant(s), John William Hicks, Attorney at Law, 1603 S 3rd, PO Box 1165, Mount Vernon, WA 98273-1165.
Kenneth Wendell Masters, Wiggins Masters PLLC, 241 Madison Ave N, Bainbridge Island, WA 98110-1811.
Counsel for Respondent(s), C. Thomas Moser, Attorney at Law, 411 Main St, Mount Vernon, WA 98273-3837.
Affirmed by unpublished opinion per Cox, J., concurred in by Schindler, A.C.J., and Coleman, J.
The essential elements of a confidential relationship are that the parent reposes some special confidence in the child's advice and the child purports to advise with the parent's interest in mind. Such a relationship is more likely to exist between a parent and child, but parentage alone does not create such a relationship. Here, the challenged findings are supported by substantial evidence and those findings support the conclusions of law. Because Anton Weekley fails in his burden to establish either confidential relationships or undue influence, we affirm. Anton challenges the execution of two quitclaim deeds and several bank accounts held in joint-tenancy with right of survivorship. He claims his mother, Virginia Weekley, was unduly influenced by her grandson, Mike Rudig, and her daughter and son-in-law, Linda and Dennis Rudig.
McCutcheon v. Brownfield, 2 Wn. App. 348, 357, 467 P.2d 868 (1970).
Id.
For clarity we will use first names, intending no disrespect.
Virginia Weekley had two children, Anton Weekley and Linda Rudig. Virginia also had several grandchildren, including Mike Rudig. Virginia lived in Anacortes for most of her life and owned two parcels of real estate there. One parcel was a lot where her residence was located, and the other parcel was an adjoining vacant lot.
In 1982, Virginia executed a will leaving her estate to her two children, Linda and Anton, to share and share alike.
In 1991, Virginia made Linda and Mike joint tenants on several of her bank accounts.
In 1999, Virginia became ill and was hospitalized. While in the hospital, she told Mike that she wanted him to have her house and lot. On October 5, 1999, she executed two quitclaim deeds conveying her property to Mike. On October 27, 1999, she died.
Anton brought this action against the Rudigs to set aside the two deeds and the joint-tenancy accounts, alleging undue influence. Following a bench trial, the court found that there was no confidential relationship between the Rudigs and Virginia. The court also concluded that Anton failed to meet his burden to prove by clear, cogent, and convincing evidence undue influence.
Anton appeals.
CONFIDENTIAL RELATIONSHIP
Anton argues that the Rudigs and Virginia were in a confidential relationship, and the trial court erred in failing to shift the burden to them to prove they did not exercise undue influence for their actions. We disagree.
Generally, one seeking to set aside an inter vivos gift has the burden of showing the invalidity thereof. If a confidential relationship exists between the parties, the burden shifts to the defendant to prove the absence of undue influence. `A confidential relation[ship] exists between two persons when one has gained the confidence of the other and purports to act or advise with the other's interest in mind. A confidential relation[ship] is particularly likely to exist where there is a family relationship. . . .'
Pedersen v. Bibioff, 64 Wn. App. 710, 718, 828 P.2d 1113 (1992).
Id.
McCutcheon, 2 Wn. App. at 357 (quoting RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION sec. 166 d. (1937)).
While parentage frequently establishes the existence of a confidential relationship, something more is required. Where the parent is dependent on the child, `either for support and maintenance, or for care or protection in business matters . . . and the assumption of the role of adviser [is] accepted by the parent,' this may establish a confidential relationship.
Id.
Id.
On appeal, we review whether substantial evidence supports the challenged findings of fact and whether those findings support the conclusions of law. `Substantial evidence is evidence in sufficient quantum to persuade a fair-minded person of the truth of the declared premise.'
Lewis v. Estate of Lewis, 45 Wn. App. 387, 389, 725 P.2d 644 (1986).
Id.
Here, findings of fact 13 to 15, and 18 are supported by substantial evidence and support the trial court's conclusion that no confidential relationship existed between the Rudigs and Virginia:
13. [Mike Rudig] did not help [Virginia Weekley] with her finances.
14. There is no evidence that Respondent Mike Rudig ever purported to act or advise with his grandmother's interest in mind. Virginia Weekley never asked Mike Rudig for advice or for help with decision-making.
15. There is no evidence that Respondent Mike Rudig was he [sic] was in a decision-making or advisory role for Virginia Weekley.
18. However, there is no evidence that either Dennis or Linda Rudig ever assumed the role of advisor to the decedent with respect to her property or financial affairs. Many people testified that Virginia Weekley was an independent, intelligent, strong-willed person who made her own decisions. Taken as a whole, the testimony does not establish a confidential relationship between the decedent and the Rudig's. The burden of proof remains with the Petitioner.
Clerk's Papers at 175.
At trial, Mike testified that he drove Virginia around to run errands, did some gardening for her, and paid some utilities around the house while he lived with her. However, he never helped Virginia with her business affairs, gave her advice, wrote checks for her, balanced her checking account, or reminded her to pay her bills. Mike further testified that Virginia paid her own bills, and, to his knowledge, his parents never helped Virginia with her financial affairs. Mike did pay some of Virginia's bills while she was in the hospital, including her medical insurance. Nevertheless, there is no evidence in the record that Mike ever acted as an advisor for Virginia. Paying a few bills does not establish that he helped Virginia with her finances in the sense of establishing a confidential relationship.
Furthermore, Linda testified that while Virginia relied on her for help in the last years of her life, Linda never advised Virginia about any of her business affairs, and did not help Virginia make decisions regarding her medical care. In August 1999, while Virginia was in the hospital, Virginia gave Dennis her power of attorney. As attorney-in-fact, Dennis paid Virginia's bills, but never advised her with regard to her business affairs. Also, there is no evidence that Linda or Dennis ever advised Virginia with respect to her property.
Anton relies on White v. White, and Pedersen v. Bibioff to argue that a confidential relationship existed between the Rudigs and Virginia. Both cases are distinguishable.
33 Wn. App. 364, 655 P.2d 1173 (1982).
In White, Daisy White signed a quitclaim deed conveying the family home to her eldest son, Leo. Daisy later brought an action to cancel the deed and quiet title in herself, alleging the transfer was a result of undue influence. The court of appeals held that Daisy and Leo were in a confidential relationship because not only were the parties mother and son, but they had a close and long standing business relationship, and Leo substantially managed the family assets, as well as Daisy's business affairs.
Id. at 369.
In Pedersen, the decedent, John Bibioff, made an inter vivos transfer of his home, by a quitclaim deed, to his son James Bibioff. This court affirmed the trial court's conclusion that a confidential relationship existed between John and James, finding several factors important. Among these facts were the father-son relationship, the fact that the parties were living together, and that John was `functionally illiterate' and he relied on James to assist him in paying bills and taking care of business matters. The court distinguished Lewis, which found no confidential relationship existed between petitioner and her son, Bill. The Pedersen court stated that the facts of Lewis are similar because Bill lived with the petitioner for many years and assisted her financially, but noted that the crucial distinction is that the petitioner in Lewis was able to read and write, whereas in Pedersen, John Bibioff could not comprehend written English. Also, at no time did the petitioner in Lewis depend on Bill to make decisions for her.
Id. at 719-20.
Id. at 719 (citing Lewis, 45 Wn. App. at 389).
Id. at 720.
Lewis, 45 Wn. App. at 390.
Here, Mike is Virginia's grandson and he lived with her periodically for years. But there is no evidence that Virginia relied on Mike with respect to her financial affairs. At oral argument, Anton argued that because Virginia authorized Mike to short plat her vacant lot a confidential relationship existed between them. Although Anton advanced this argument at oral argument, the trial court made no findings on it. Thus, we presume the trial court found against Anton on this point.
Taplett v. Khela, 60 Wn. App. 751, 759, 807 P.2d 885 (1991).
There is also no evidence that Virginia relied on her daughter, Linda for financial advice. Rather, the testimony showed that Virginia was an intelligent woman who made her own financial decisions. Even while Virginia was in the hospital, up to the time of her death, the testimony showed that she was mentally competent, very alert, and knew what she wanted. We conclude that the record supports the trial court's decision that no confidential relationship existed between Virginia and any of the Rudigs.
UNDUE INFLUENCE
Anton also argues that the trial court erred in finding no evidence of undue influence with respect to the quitclaim deeds and the joint-tenancy accounts. We disagree.
Because no confidential relationship existed between the Rudigs and Virginia, Anton bears the burden to prove undue influence by clear, cogent, and convincing evidence. The important factors for determining whether there has been undue influence include: `(1) that the [grantee] occupied a fiduciary or confidential relation[ship] to the [grantor]; (2) that the [grantee] actively participated in the preparation or procurement of the [deed]; and (3) that the [grantee] received an unusually or unnaturally large part of the estate.' Additional factors include: `(4) the age or condition of health and mental vigor of the [grantor], (5) the nature or degree of relationship between the [grantor] and the [grantee], (6) the opportunity for exerting an undue influence, and (7) the naturalness or unnaturalness of the [deed].' The weight of these factors depends upon the circumstances of each particular case.
Pedersen, 64 Wn. App. at 718; Doty v. Anderson, 17 Wn. App. 464, 467, 563 P.2d 1307 (1977).
Doty, 17 Wn. App. at 467-68.
Id. at 468.
Id.
Quitclaim Deeds
In October 1999, Virginia conveyed her house and adjoining lot to Mike, by two quitclaim deeds. The trial court found that Anton failed to meet his burden of showing by clear, cogent, and convincing evidence that the Rudigs unduly influenced Virginia. Substantial evidence supports the trial court's findings.
First, as stated above, there was no confidential relationship between the Rudigs and Virginia. Second, because Anton opened the door, Mike testified over objection that Virginia told him she wanted him to have the lot and the house and asked him to prepare the deeds for her. Mike prepared the quitclaim deeds and Virginia signed them in the presence of a notary and Linda. Several disinterested witnesses testified that Virginia told them she was leaving the house to Mike, and this did not surprise them. Further testimony at trial showed that although Virginia's physical health was deteriorating, there was no indication of mental impairment, and she was very competent and alert during October 1999. Multiple witnesses testified that Virginia was a strong-willed person, who made her own decisions, and was not susceptible to influence or manipulation. This evidence supports the trial court's decision that Virginia was not unduly influenced.
Anton assigns error to several findings, all of which are supported by substantial evidence. The evidence shows that Virginia was familiar with quitclaim deeds because she had previously deeded several parcels of real estate to both Anton and Linda. The evidence also shows that Virginia wanted to give the property to Mike, and Anton's assertion that the property was deeded to Mike to protect Virginia's assets is not supported by the record.
We hold that Virginia was not unduly influenced.
Joint-Tenancy Accounts
A bank account held in joint-tenancy with a right of survivorship is conclusive evidence that the depositors intended that the money in the bank accounts vest with the survivor or survivors absent fraud or undue influence. Because Anton fails to overcome this presumption, there is no basis to set aside the accounts.
Doty, 17 Wn. App. at 466-67 (citing RCW 30.20.015).
In the early 1990's, Virginia set up several joint-tenancy bank accounts with Linda and Mike. The trial court found that there was no evidence of Virginia's contrary intent for these accounts to pass to anyone, other than the survivors.
Lowell Ashbach, an attorney and family friend who advised Virginia about estate planning, testified that Virginia intended the joint-tenancy accounts to be divided equally among Linda and Anton. However, Ashbach advised Virginia about the effects of joint-tenancy with right of survivorship, and she never changed the accounts. Also, Susan Goad, the personal representative of Virginia's estate, testified that Virginia was an intelligent woman and knew what `right of survivorship' meant. We conclude that the trial court properly resolved this claim. There was no undue influence.
ATTORNEY FEES
Anton argues that the trial court abused its discretion in not awarding him attorney fees. He also requests attorney fees on appeal. Neither argument is persuasive.
Under RCW 11.96A.150, the court has discretionary authority to award attorney fees from estate assets. `The court may order the costs to be paid in such amount and in such manner as the court determines to be equitable.' We review a denial of attorney fees for an abuse of discretion.
In re Estate of Black, 116 Wn. App. 476, 489, 66 P.3d 670 (2003).
Black, 116 Wn. App. at 489.
Here, the trial court concluded that Anton failed to meet his burden to prove a confidential relationship and undue influence by clear and convincing evidence. The court denied him attorney fees. This was not an abuse of discretion.
Exercising our discretion, we also deny him fees on appeal.
We affirm the trial court's decision.
SCHINDLER and COLEMAN, JJ., concur.