The Illinois Supreme Court has proscribed such selective authorization of a treatment plan. In re Mary Ann P., 202 Ill. 2d 393, 405, 781 N.E.2d 237, 244 (2002), overruling In re Nancy M., 317 Ill. App. 3d 167, 178, 739 N.E.2d 607, 616 (2000). In In re Mary Ann P., the petition listed six different medications.
Our supreme court has stated the authorization of involuntary medication of mental-health patients is a matter of "`substantial public concern.'" Robert S., 213 Ill. 2d at 46, 820 N.E.2d at 434, quoting In re Mary Ann P., 202 Ill. 2d 393, 402, 781 N.E.2d 237, 243 (2002). Also, the short duration of an order authorizing involuntary treatment renders it likely that similar litigation would again be mooted by the expiration of the order.
"First, the procedures which must be followed and the proofs that must be made before a court may authorize involuntary treatment to recipients of mental health services are matters of a public nature and of substantial public concern." In re Mary Ann P., 202 Ill. 2d 393, 402 (2002). Here, there are questions involving the procedures and statutory guidelines to be followed; these are matters of considerable public concern.
As a result, this court cannot grant respondent effectual relief, and the appeal is moot. See, e.g., In re Mary Ann P., 202 Ill.2d 393, 401, 781 N.E.2d 237, 242 (2002) (finding the appeal was moot where the involuntary treatment order had expired). ¶ 27 Despite being moot, respondent invites this court to consider this appeal and the issues raised herein under the capable-of-repetition-yet-evading-review and public interest exceptions to the mootness doctrine.
Whether the trial court complied with section 2-28 of the Juvenile Court Act is a matter of statutory construction. Thus, our review is de novo.In re Mary Ann P., 202 Ill.2d 393, 404, 269 Ill.Dec. 440, 781 N.E.2d 237 (2002); In re M.G., 313 Ill.App.3d 871, 874, 247 Ill.Dec. 187, 731 N.E.2d 960 (2000). " The primary rule of statutory construction is to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the legislature."
Appellate courts generally lack jurisdiction to render advisory opinions. See In re Mary Ann P., 202 Ill.2d 393, 401, 781 N.E.2d 237, 242 (2002). However, we find that the constitutional issue raised in Mark W.'s appeal falls within the public-interest exception to the mootness doctrine.
Appellate courts generally lack jurisdiction to render advisory opinions. See In re Mary Ann P, 202 Ill. 2d 393, 401, 781 N.E.2d 237, 242 (2002). However, we find that the constitutional issue raised in Mark W.'s appeal falls within the public-interest exception to the mootness doctrine.
Appellate courts generally lack jurisdiction to render advisory opinions. In re Mary Ann P., 202 Ill.2d 393, 401, 781 N.E.2d 237, 242 (2002). We find that the issues raised in Evelyn S.'s appeal fall within the public-interest exception to the mootness doctrine, however.
¶ 17 First, as both the Illinois Supreme Court and this court have repeatedly emphasized, the procedural safeguards that must be followed before a mental health patient may be medicated against his will are matters of great public concern. See In re Mary Ann P. , 202 Ill. 2d 393, 402, 269 Ill.Dec. 440, 781 N.E.2d 237 (2002) ; Debra B. , 2016 IL App (5th) 130573, ¶ 21, 404 Ill.Dec. 116, 55 N.E.3d 212 ; In re Evelyn S. , 337 Ill. App. 3d 1096, 1102, 273 Ill.Dec. 1, 788 N.E.2d 310 (2003). We acknowledge that when a respondent raises questions concerning the sufficiency of the evidence, as H.P. does in this case, the "inherently case-specific" nature of such questions ordinarily does not "present the kinds of broad public interest issues" involved in most mental health cases.
' " (Emphasis in original.) Gail F., 365 Ill.App.3d at 447, 302 Ill.Dec. 656, 849 N.E.2d 448, quoting In re Mary Ann P., 202 Ill.2d 393, 406, 269 Ill.Dec. 440, 781 N.E.2d 237 (2002). The Code does not permit the fact finder " to parse the recommended treatment and selectively authorize only certain requested medications."