However, a probate court is permitted to take judicial notice of its own files. In re Marxhausen's Estate, 247 Mich. 192, 199; 225 N.W. 632 (1929); see also MRE 201 (permitting a court to take judicial notice of adjudicative facts). While Thomas's arguments in this appeal challenge the factual basis for the probate court's findings in the related cases, Thomas fails to explain why the probate court was not permitted to take judicial notice of its earlier findings.
Such representation does not preclude, nor is it inconsistent with, further representation by a trustee, or by others having like interest with the one so represented. Certain phases of the Dodge act were under consideration in In re Marxhausen's Estate, 247 Mich. 192; Rose v. Southern Michigan National Bank, 255 Mich. 275; and Dodge v. Detroit Trust Co., 300 Mich. 575. See, also, Metzner v. Newman, 224 Mich. 324 (33 ALR 98), and In re Milner's Estate, 324 Mich. 269.
A probate court is permitted to take judicial notice of its own files. MRE 201; In re Marxhausen's Estate, 247 Mich. 192, 199; 225 N.W. 632 (1929). "A judicially noticed fact must be one 'capable of accurate and ready determination by resort to sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned.'"
Moreover, it is well-established that a probate court may take judicial notice of its own files. See In re Marxhausen's Estate, 247 Mich. 192, 199; 225 N.W. 632 (1929); In re Jones, 286 Mich.App. 126, 129; 777 N.W.2d 728 (2009). We also reject appellant's argument that matters at issue in the other proceedings were not relevant to the revocable trust. As explained earlier, evidence of appellant's pervasive pattern of disobeying court orders, his physical and verbal altercations with Steven, and his diversion of funds without Steven's knowledge were relevant to his ability to cooperate with Steven in administering the revocable trust.
A court may take judicial notice "at any stage of the proceeding," MRE 201(e), and "whether requested or not," MRE 201(c). "[A] circuit judge may take judicial notice of the files and records of the court in which [s]he sits." Knowlton, 355 Mich. at 452; seealsoIn re Marxhausen's Estate, 247 Mich. 192, 199; 225 N.W. 632 (1929), citing Wilkinson v Conaty, 65 Mich. 614; 32 N.W. 841 (1887) ("[A] probate court takes judicial notice of its own files."). And in any event, documents in the lower court record in this case or others are within this Court's purview under principles of judicial notice, on the basis of the "one court of justice" concept in Michigan's Constitution. See Const 1963, art 6, § 1; People v Snow, 386 Mich. 586, 591; 194 N.W.2d 314 (1972).
It has long been settled that "a probate court takes judicial notice of its own files." In re Marxhausen's Estate, 247 Mich 192, 199; 225 NW 632 (1929). Additionally, the contents of Dr. Geha's report were relevant to the question of undue influence.
Although beneficiaries would ultimately be affected by a compromise, approval rests with the probate court. MCL 700.734; MSA 27.5734. In In re Marxhausen's Estate, 247 Mich. 192; 225 N.W. 632 (1929), our Supreme Court held it was within the personal representative's authority to settle a case then pending in circuit court. Marxhausen seems to imply that it is the probate court that approves any compromise or settlement, rather than the beneficiaries. However, as parties affected by the settlement, beneficiaries have standing to pose objections to any settlement or compromise.
Nor is there any New Jersey case which holds that such a hearing is necessary. In In re Marxhausen's Estate, 247 Mich. 192, 225 N.W. 632 (Sup.Ct. 1929), the court, in the context of reviewing its probate code, observed in this regard: The statute, however, does not require that testimony be taken in a proceeding for settlement.
Mrs. Warda's legal position became all the more important in light of the probate court's twin duties to assure that a good faith controversy existed regarding the efficacy of the two wills and that the settlement was just and reasonable with respect to Henry's interests. In re Marxhausen's Estate, 247 Mich. 192, 225 N.W. 632, 634 (1929). The probate court which reopened Mr. Matthews' estate in 1990 was harshly critical of the 1953 court's discharge of its duties.
In Frederick v. First Liquidating Corp., 317 Mich. 637, this Court held the settlement among the interested parties in the estate was binding upon the plaintiff and that the orders of the probate court were res judicata. See In re Marxhausen's Estate, 247 Mich. 192. In Westin v. Berrien Probate Judge, supra, Mr. Justice BUSHNELL, writing for the Court, said (pp 242, 243):