Involuntary-admission proceedings invoke a respondent's liberty interest, and, thus, the Code must be strictly construed in the respondent's favor. In re Martens, 269 Ill.App.3d 324, 327, 206 Ill.Dec. 895, 646 N.E.2d 27 (1995).¶ 39 Again, section 3–609 states:
However, " ‘ "[E]rrors demonstrating noncompliance with the statutory provisions that appear on the face of the record may render a judgment erroneous even if not raised at trial; furthermore, such errors may be considered on appeal under a doctrine analogous to plain error." ’ " In re George O. , 314 Ill. App. 3d 1044, 1049, 248 Ill.Dec. 305, 734 N.E.2d 13 (2000) (quoting In re Rovelstad , 281 Ill. App. 3d 956, 966, 217 Ill.Dec. 631, 667 N.E.2d 720 (1996), quoting In re Martens , 269 Ill. App. 3d 324, 327, 206 Ill.Dec. 895, 646 N.E.2d 27 (1995) ). Therefore, we will consider the issue.
However, " ' "[E]rrors demonstrating noncompliance with the statutory provisions that appear on the face of the record may render a judgment erroneous even if not raised at trial; furthermore, such errors may be considered on appeal under a doctrine analogous to plain error." ' " In re George O., 314 Ill. App. 3d 1044, 1049 (2000) (quoting In re Rovelstad, 281 Ill. App. 3d 956, 966 (1996), quoting In re Martens, 269 Ill. App. 3d 324, 327 (1995)). Therefore, we will consider the issue.
"[A] long line of involuntary admission cases has held that `[e]rrors demonstrating noncompliance with the statutory provisions that appear on the face of the record may render a judgment erroneous even if not raised at trial; furthermore, such errors may be considered on appeal under a doctrine analogous to plain error.' " Id. at 966 (quoting In re Martens, 269 Ill. App. 3d 324, 327 (1995)). As thus described, this plain-error analogue is not limited to errors that are clear or obvious and that either undermine the integrity of the proceeding or threaten to tip the balance in a close case.
"`[E]rrors demonstrating noncompliance with the statutory provisions that appear on the face of the record may render a judgment erroneous even if not raised at trial; furthermore, such errors may be considered on appeal under a doctrine analogous to plain error.'" In re Rovelstad, 281 Ill. App. 3d 956, 966 (1996), quoting In re Martens, 269 Ill. App. 3d 324, 327 (1995). Therefore, we decline to apply the waiver doctrine in this case.
We further reject the State's argument that George O. has waived this error by failing to raise an objection in the circuit court. "`[E]rrors demonstrating noncompliance with the statutory provisions that appear on the face of the record may render a judgment erroneous even if not raised at trial; furthermore, such errors may be considered on appeal under a doctrine analogous to plain error.'" Rovelstad, 281 Ill. App.3d at 966, 667 N.E.2d at 726, quoting In re Martens, 269 Ill. App.3d 324, 327 (1995). We, therefore, decline to apply waiver in this case, since the State's failure to comply with section 3-610 appears on the face of the record and clearly prejudiced George O. In light of these conclusions, we need not address George O.'s other contentions.
Because involuntary commitment seriously invades a patient's liberty, the Code requirements should be strictly construed in favor of the patient. In re Martens, 269 Ill. App.3d 324, 327, 646 N.E.2d 27 (1995). However, in another context, the Illinois Supreme Court has held procedural deviations from the Code do not warrant reversal of an involuntary commitment order if the defects "could and should have been objected to immediately, could have been easily cured if timely objected to, and made no difference anyway.
However, a long line of involuntary admission cases has held that "[e]rrors demonstrating noncompliance with the statutory provisions that appear on the face of the record may render a judgment erroneous even if not raised at trial; furthermore, such errors may be considered on appeal under a doctrine analogous to plain error." See In re Martens, 269 Ill. App.3d 324, 327 (1995); see also In re Watts, 250 Ill. App.3d 723, 727-28 (1993); La Touche, 247 Ill. App.3d at 618; In re Stone, 178 Ill. App.3d 1084, 1087 (1989); In re Whittenberg, 143 Ill. App.3d 836, 837-38 (1986). Thus, because the State's failure to comply with section 3-610 appears on the face of the record, and respondent clearly suffered prejudice as a result, we decline to apply waiver in this case.
Similarly, we hold that the State's statutorily providing a respondent in an involuntary commitment proceeding with the right to counsel implicitly includes the right to the effective assistance of that counsel. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 686, 80 L. Ed. 2d at 692, 104 S. Ct. at 2063; In re Martens (1995), 269 Ill. App.3d 324, 327, 646 N.E.2d 27, 29 (statutory provisions must be construed strictly in favor of patient). In Strickland, the Court held that the sixth amendment right to counsel "envisions counsel's playing a role that is critical to the ability of the adversarial system to produce just results.